Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation II

I N the last article we inquired into the nature of some of the problems of translation and interpretation which arise from a difference in the background of the concepts of the two languages involved. In this connection we discussed the history of the Pali term *saṅkhāra* as found in the Pali Canon and examined the difficulties of translating it into English. We found that the main difficulty arose from the fact that the empirical situations classified under the concept of the term were not similarly classified by any parallel concept in the English language. It may also be the case that the empirical situations or objects have not existed in the history of the people speaking the one language or if they existed have not been noticed by them ; to the former could be attributed for instance the difficulty of translating the term " motor car " into Pali and to the latter the difficulty of translating the psychological terminology of some languages into languages where certain psychological situations seem to have not been noticed, judging from the absence of terms to denote them. It is also possible that the physical environment in which the one language came into being may contain things which were not present in the historical environment of the other language though things which bear some analogy to them may have been found, in which case the use of the names of these latter to denote the former is at the same time useful and misleading. Thus an English-speaking person meeting a panda (the animal) for the first time is likely to be struck by the novelty of the creature as well as by the similarity of its features to a racoon, a bear or a cat and may be inclined to call it by any one of these names or more likely use the expressions " a racoon-like animal ", " a sort of little bear " or " a kind of large cat " to describe the animal ; yet all these descriptions would be inadequate or misleading for the animal in question has features which are lacking in the above-mentioned animals and others which are found only in a combination of such animals. And it is probably for this latter reason that the Concise Oxford Dictionary (s.v. panda) in introducing the animal to the English reading public calls it a " red *bear-cat* ". But in the case of two fairly developed languages found among people belonging to two cultural groups there would also be differences in concepts due to differences in their psychological natures. There would be psychological experiences denoted by words of the one language for which there would be no precise parallels in the other language and what is more important, there would be differences in the concepts due to varying ways in which the respective peoples would have noticed and classified the various empirical situations apparently found in the environments of both languages.

This latter tendency may be so marked as to give rise to a different logic or different standards in the use of words in each language.

This brings us to the first problem mooted in the last article. According to the principles of Aristotelian formal logic, given an assertion p (i.e. any proposition) and its negation ∽ p (not-p), which is nowadays defined as a truth-function of the elementary proposition p (*viz.*, the proposition which is false when p is true and true when p is false), then according to the Law of Contradiction it is not the case that any proposition p is both true and false, i.e. ∽ (p. ∽ p) and according to the Law of Excluded Middle any proposition p is either true or false. In other words if we take the proposition " the sky is blue " it is false that " the sky is both blue and not blue " and it is false that " the sky is neither blue nor not blue " because " the sky is either blue or not blue " (Law of Excluded Middle). If we now consider the four propositions:

(1)   The sky is blue
(2)   The sky is not blue
(3)   The sky is blue and not blue
(4)   The sky is neither blue nor not blue

it will be found in the light of the principles mentioned above that the first two may be (individually) either true or false and empirical evidence is what is relevant to their truth or falsity. In short they are logically contingent propositions. On the other hand the last two propositions are logically impossible propositions which are necessarily false and no empirical evidence is relevant to their truth or falsity. Now we often meet with what appears ostensibly to be these last two forms of predication in Pali usually in a series of the above four types. For instance, in the Brahmajālasutta where mention is made of various theories of survival it is said, to follow the translation of Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids that the soul after death (according to one theory) " (1) has form (rūpī) " (according to another) " (2) is formless (arūpī) ", "(3) has and has not form (rūpī ca arūpī ca) "or "(4) neither has nor has not form (n'eva rūpī nârūpī) ". Also in asking questions it is natural to go through the four forms of predication of ' is, is not, is and is not and neither is nor is not ' as when it is asked " does the Tathagata exist (hoti) after death ? Does he not exist (na hoti) . . . ? Does he both exist and not exist (hoti ca na ca hoti) . . . ? Does he neither exist or not exist (n'eva hoti na na hoti) . . . ?" (DN. I, 190, 191). It will be readily granted by those acquainted with the Pali original that those propositions embodying the latter two forms of predication, as in the case of the former, admit of truth or falsity in relation to empirical evidence, while in the form of questions (e.g. is this flower both red and not red ?) they could be answered in the affirmative or negative without absurdity or contradiction. That is, they are logically contingent propositions though in the form in which they appear when they are literally translated into English is such as to suggest to the reader of the English that they are con-

tradictions or logically impossible propositions which are necessarily false. We are thus faced with a situation in which a difference in the system of logical classification adopted in each language seriously interferes with literal translation which fails to do justice either to the language from which or in which the translation is done.

Although the problem appears to be of sufficient importance as to merit the attention of the translator it is strange that no notice has been taken of it even by way of a note of warning to the reader while the scholars who have made a passing reference to the Fourfold Schema of logical classification have not explained it or made any efforts to examine what it means. If the scholars were lax the scholiasts have been no better for Buddhist commentators and logicians alike seem to have avoided discussing the implications of this classification. While we therefore raise the problem it must be emphasised that any solutions offered are only very tentative in character.

Before we can determine what is meant by the last two forms of predication in the Fourfold System of the classification of propositions mentioned above it would be helpful to probe into the possible logical and psychological origins of such systems of classification as well as the historical genesis of the system as could be gleaned by studying its elements if any in the earlier stratum of thought.

If we ignore the factors of time, location and causal changes with reference to a situation or thing it will be found that any predication made of it can be from a diversity of standpoints true, false, both true and false and neither true nor false respectively. For instance we may consider the assertion " it rained in Colombo " to be true if it was the case that it rained in Colombo yesterday, false if we take into account the fact that it did not rain day before yesterday, both true and false if we take both yesterday and day before yesterday into consideration and neither true nor false if we do not view it in respect of any specific interval of past time. Similarly if there is any ambiguity as regards location an assertion " it rained yesterday " will turn out to be true, false, etc. for it is true if we consider the fact that it rained in Colombo yesterday, false if we consider the fact that it did not rain in Kalutara yesterday, etc. Likewise if we ignore the causal changes in a thing it would be true from one point of view to say for instance that " red litmus is red in colour " and false from another if we take into account the fact that red litmus is blue in colour when treated with certain kinds of chemicals. The proposition " it rained in Colombo " (if indeed it can be called a proposition) is thus found be (a) true, (b) false, (c) true and false and (d) neither true nor false or indescribable from a variety of standpoints taken in respect of time. By combining the first three standpoints with the last there would be seven points of view according to which the proposition may be said to be (1) true (it being the case that it rained in Colombo yesterday) (2) false (it being the case that it did not rain in Colombo

day before yesterday), (3) both true and false (it being the case that it rained yesterday and did not rain day before yesterday), (4) neither true nor false or indescribable (i.e. from no specific period of past time), (5) true as well as indescribable [combining (1) and (4)], (6) false as well as indescribable [combining (2) and (4)], (7) both true and false as well as indescribable [combining (3) and (4)]. This sevenfold classification of the truth or falsity of a proposition from a variety of standpoints is what is probably intended by the Jaina theory of *syādvāda* according to which a proposition may be true (syādasti), false (syānnāsti) both true and false (syādasti syānnāsti), neither true nor false or indescribable (syādavaktavyaḥ), true as well as indescribable (syādasti câvaktavyaśca) false as well as indescribable (syānnâsti câvaktavyaśca) and both true and false as well as indescribable (syādasti syānnâsti syādavaktavyaśca). According to it it is " impossible to make any affirmation which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other ".[1] Although the doctrine preaches that the truth or falsity of an assertion is relative to the standpoint adopted so that from any one standpoint a proposition is always either true or false as the case may be and never both yet the same proposition will have changed its truth-value from another standpoint with the result that we are faced with a situation in which a proposition and its contradictory (or at least what appears to be its contradictory in the absence of any another) will both be true or both false thus negating the Law of Contradiction.

Is the above four-fold system of the classification of propositions according to truth or falsity the same as what is found in the Pali texts and whose extended seven-fold form appears in the Jaina theory of *syādvāda* ? The answer is that it is most probably not, because far from being the one adopted it seems to be a theory which is severely criticised in the Canon itself. In the Brahmajāla Sutta there is a reference to a school of religious teachers (bhonto samanabrāhmanā, DN. I, 27) and in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta to a teacher named Sañjaya (DN. I, 58) who both assert and deny from some standpoint or in other words regard as true and at the same time false, all the four forms of a factual proposition. The four forms are presumably the four as found in the Canon (whose meaning we are trying to determine) but it is interesting to see the variety of standpoints adopted in both asserting and denying according to some fancy of the thinker each of the four forms of the various propositions enumerated. Sañjaya has been called a Sceptic, compared with Pyrrho and credited with having " raised scepticism to a scientific doctrine and thus prepared the way for a critical method of investigation in philosophy "[2] but it is difficult to see how these claims can be squared with the account given in the texts. Scepticism

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1. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 181.
2. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, pp. 327,328.

does not assert and deny the truth of propositions at the same time but simply refrains from making either an assertion or a denial owing to the supposed absence of any valid grounds for doing so ; and as for the intellectual quality of the doctrine it could hardly be maintained that it was very high when it is described as being a product of sheer folly (mandattā momūhattā, DN. I, 27) probably owing to the confusions resulting from the contradictions. The fact that this may be identified with an earlier form of the *syādvāda* than that which appears in the chronologically later Jaina texts is also indicated by the fact that the phrase " iti ce me *assa* " (i.e. if it were to occur to me) (DN. I, 27) which is used to show that the assertion is relative to some standpoint of the thinker is logically equivalent to the notion of *syāt* (i.e. it may be) while the two words *assa* and *syāt* are morphologically and semantically the same (∠Skr. *asyāt).

It is not surprising if both Śaṃkara[3] and Rāmānuja[4] criticise the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine (i.e. the above Jaina theory of *Syādvāda*) as involving contradictions and the Buddhist texts too seem to have adopted a similar attitude to a similar if not the same view. For while truth or falsity was relative according to the Jaina theory owing to the diversity of standpoints (anekāntavāda) the Buddhists held at least certain propositions to be absolutely true (ekaṃsika, DN. I, 191). We have therefore to look elsewhere in determining the nature of the four forms of a proposition as found in the Pali texts without in any way identifying them with the propositional forms of the *Syādvāda* but rather contrasting them with it.

The problem that we have to deal with is to see whether statements of the form ' S is and is not P ' or ' S neither is nor is not P ' can be regarded not as contradictions but as contingent propositions without interfering with the specific temporal or local standpoint of the proposition. For this purpose we cannot regard as propositions any statements which do not refer to any specific time or location. It will be found that even in the English instances are not lacking where the statements of the above form are used in a certain class of situations. If for instance I am shown a milky whitish liquid which on analysis is found to be 20% milk and 80% water I may describe the liquid as " milk and at the same time not milk ". I would be inclined to call it milk if I concentrate on the fact that it contains 20% milk and deny that it is milk if I concentrate on the fact that it contains 80% water. It is also likely that my intention or the meaning of the proposition would be readily understood by the listener or reader who is not likely to condemn me for making a self-contradictory assertion. But at the same time it has to be admitted that if we regard such an assertion as a meaningful proposition certain difficulties arise

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3. Bhāṣya on Vedanta Sūtras, ii. 2.33.
4. Bhāṣya on Vedanta Sūtras, ii. 2.31.

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in the definition of its logical status. It would be interesting in this connection to quote the words of a modern logician who tries to grapple with this difficulty. " Now to say that a logical principle is true " says Prof. C. Lewy[5] " seems to me to entail that it is necessarily true ; and to say that a proposition is necessarily true or simply necessary entails that no empirical evidence can either establish or refute it and further that no empirical evidence can be *relevant* to its truth either favourably or unfavourably . . . For if this so it follows immediately that our principle which I shall call the principle T cannot in any circumstances whatever be disproved. Hence by saying that in certain circumstances we might not apply it but might apply some other principle instead, we cannot mean that in certain circumstances T might be shown to be false. What then can we mean ? Let us take an example of a very familiar kind. Suppose I point at Mr. Braithwaite and ask you whether he is bald. I think you will all hesitate how to reply : you will all hesitate to say that he is bald and you will all hesitate to say that he is not bald. And I think it is clear that it is neither definitely correct to say the first thing nor definitely correct to say the second. But now suppose someone argued as follows : Consider the proposition : " It is not the case that Mr. Braithwaite is bald ". Is this proposition true ? Clearly not, for to say that it *is* true is to say that Mr. Braithwaite is not bald ; if, however the proposition is *not* true then it follows in accordance with T that Mr. Braithwaite *is* bald. Hence if you dont want to say that he is not bald you must give up the principle T. Now, does this argument show that it is impossible to maintain both (1) that it is not correct to say that Mr. Braithwaite is bald and not correct to say that he is not bald and (2) that the principle T is universally applicable ? I do not think it does. For by asserting that it is not correct to say that Mr. Braithwaite is bald and not correct to say that he is not bald we are asserting that the *words* " Mr. Braithwaite is bald " and the *words* " Mr. Braithwaite is not bald " do not express any definite propositions : we are talking about these two *sentences* and are saying that neither expresses a definite proposition . . . If this is right then the example we have taken does not provide us with a situation that can be properly considered as one in which we fail to apply the principle T . . . For to say that something is a proposition and yet does not obey the principles of logic (including the principle T) is a contradiction ".

Prof. Lewy is here faced with a situation in which a person has a few hairs on his head and therefore cannot be adequately described as being " bald " or " not bald " while any attempt to describe him as being " both bald or not bald " or " neither bald or not bald " appears to violate logical principles, the principles of Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle. His solution is to save the logical principles and then argue that the assertions " Mr. Braithwaite is bald " and " Mr. Braithwaite is not bald " do not express propositions because each

5. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Suppl. Vol. XX), *Art.* By C. Lewy, *Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic*, pp. 36, 37.

cannot be definitely true or false, truth or falsity in relation to fact and obedience to logical principles being considered part of the definition of the term " proposition ". But this radical solution gives rise to certain paradoxical situations which Prof. Lewy does not seem to have taken into account. For instance we cannot say on his theory that a particular combination of words, which may be grammatically correct and semantically significant (i.e. does not violate the formation rules), expresses a proposition until we have examined the ostensible facts to which it refers and it will also be the case that the same combination of words will sometimes express a proposition and sometimes not, because the proposition " Mr. Braithwaite is bald " will be deemed to be a true one if Mr. Braithwaite was in fact completely bald though in the present situation it would not be a proposition according to Prof. Lewy.

In trying to find a solution for the above problem there seem to be four alternatives open to us. The first is to see which of the two propositions is likely to be more true than false in the situation and classify it as such without violating the logical principles. But this is not feasible if both appear to be equally true or equally false as appears to be the case in the context discussed above. If we again want to preserve the validity of the logical principles which state that every proposition must be either true or false and cant be both, we can only do this by ceasing to treat an assertion in such a situation as a genuine proposition, which is the solution that Prof. Lewy offers and to which we raised the objections mentioned in the previous paragraph. The two other alternatives left are either to regard the logical principles as being invalid or as needing amendment. The former is too drastic a course to adopt as these principles are observed to hold in the large majority of instances so that even if we adopt an amended system of logic to suit our needs (which is our last alternative) it would still contain most of the features of our present one. Prof. Lewy too suggests this idea in the concluding paragraphs of his article. He says that " there is no reason why in certain circumstances we should not change our concept of proposition. And one of the ways of doing so is to contract a logical calculus in which the principle T does not hold. Such a logic cannot be said to be inconsistent with ours : for it is not a logic of proposition in our sense of ' propositions ' ... Now we can say that in certain circumstances we might adopt some such logical system in reasoning about matters of fact ? Suppose that our sensory experiences were different from what they are at present : suppose, for instance, that they were mainly of indeterminate colours and shapes ; so that whenever we asked ourselves. ' Is this red ? ' ' Is this round ? ' We should be unable to answer either ' Yes ' or ' No '. In other words neither answer would be correct and neither incorrect just as now *it is neither correct nor incorrect* (italics mine) to say that Mr. Braithwaite is bald and neither correct nor incorrect to say that he is not bald. What should we do in such circumstances ? Clearly we could again say that the sentences:

'This is red' and 'this is not red' (where the meaning of 'this' is explained by pointing) do not express any definite propositions ; and in this way we could retain our present logic : we should regard the question whether our present logical principles are applicable to the case as nonsensical. But surely, if we constantly had to deal with such cases, we should probably find it preferable to have *some* logic which we could apply to them : we should probably want to have a set of formulated principles in accordance with which we could argue and which serve as criteria for the correctness of our inferences. And in this way we might be led to adopt a logic different from our present one ".[6]

Prof. Lewy here speaks of adopting a different system of logic for a different world in which *all* the situations were such that they could not be aptly described by assertions of the form 'S is P' and 'S is not P'. But our present world is one in which only *some* of the situations were of this sort, so that the system of logic that we need is one which could cope with these situations as well as with what we regard as the normal ones.

I think we could formulate such a system of logic if we could give the status of propositions to assertions of the form 'S is and is not P' which is used in certain empirical situations where the criteria are insufficient for bold assertions of the form 'S is P' and 'S is not P'. It should be noted that such a proposition is a contingent proposition intended to refer to a specific class of facts and may as such be either true or false and is not a self-contradictory assertion. It will be correct to say for instance that the proposition " Mr. Braithwaite is and is not bald " is true if it is the case that Mr. Braithwaite has a few hairs on his head while the other two assertions, *viz.* " Mr. Braithwaite is bald " and " Mr. Braithwaite is not bald " would both be false. We will then take three propositions of the following forms :—

   (1) S is P.

   (2) S is-and-is-not P (To be distinguished from ' It is both the case that S is P and also that S is not P ').

   (3) S is not P.

Now according to the Law of Contradiction it is not the case that if one of the above is true any one or both of the others are true and according to the Law of Exclusion (for there is no middle) either (1) or (2) or (3) must be true. We can now operate with the above three forms and the logical principles as enunciated. On this schema an instance of the propositional form 'S is-and-is-not P' will be true when the criteria are insufficient for it to be classified under (1) or (3) or in other words, in border-line cases.

As for the other propositional form 'S is neither P nor not P' it is difficult to see how precisely an instance of it could be distinguished in sense from ' S is-and-is-not P' but it is clear that some distinction was made in the Pali

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6. *Ibid*, p. 38.

Canon between the two though in English usage it occurs in situations in which (2) may be used as is evidenced by the fact that Prof. Lewy himself perhaps unconsciously speaks of the fact that " *it is neither correct nor incorrect to say*,[7] etc. " though such a form of words would be in the English, logically queer. What the difference in usage is can only be known by studying the examples in the Pali and the historical genesis of the usage itself.

In the Upaniṣads we meet with statements and sayings of a paradoxical character especially in the attempt made by the seers to describe the Absolute which was for them an Experience even though it may not have had some of the characteristics of normal experiences. In making this latter observation we are at the same time offering an explanation of such a paradoxical utterance. Supposing a man had under certain conditions an experience of a sort that he had never had before, which he subsequently tries to describe to another. Let us call this Experience X. Now supposing X bears a strong resemblance to the class of experiences Y (say y_1, y_2 . . . y_n) which normal men have under normal conditions but at the same time has intrinsic characteristics which have no parallel in or bear no analogy to any class of normal experiences. If he now tries to explain the Experience X in intelligible language to another who has had only normal experience he may say that " it is an experience of the sort Y and at the same time not of the sort Y " or " it is Y and at the same time not Y " thus indicating the similarity that Y bears to X more than to any other set of normal experiences and at the same time emphasising its marked difference from it. It is also likely or perhaps more likely that he may describe the experience negatively by saying that " it is neither Y nor not Y ". Both these statements would not pass unquestioned by the normal person who is psychologically not prone to think of an experience which has only some of characteristics of Y but not all, and is therefore also inclined to deny the causal possibility of such an experience. In any case the above types of predication seem to be the ones used in attempting to describe the highest form of intuitive experience, which some of the Upaniṣadic seers claimed to have.

We find in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad the Absolute being described as " being (sad) and non-being (asad) " (Muṇḍ. Up., 2.2.1d) but the more well-known description is in the use of the ' double negative '(?) in the formula " neti neti " (Bṛhad. Up., 2.3.6, 3.9.26, 4.5.15, etc.). What precisely this means is a matter of opinion for it is possible to offer several interpretations of this obscure statement, and if we recommend one it is only as one of the possible and even probable interpretations which deserves a most careful consideration. It may mean that the whole of Reality cannot be grasped or conceived by any effort of the intellect functioning as a separate instrument " for it is ungraspable for it cannot be grasped " (Bṛhad. Up., 4.5.15). Or it may mean that the

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7. See above.

Absolute does not have any empirical characteristics that we could think of
" for it is indestructible . . . unattached . . . unbound, does not tremble, is not
injured " (*ibid*). It is also possible that it is used to describe the Absolute as
not possessing polar characteristics being the synthesis of all contradictions
for it is in one passage said to be " not coarse, not fine, not short, not long,
not glowing, not adhesive . . ." (Bṛhad. Up., 3.8.8).

Closely related to this latter use is one which possibly explains the origin
(psychological and logical) of this use of the double " na ". The interest
of the passage lies not merely in this but also in the fact we find a Pali parallel
in which the view set forth in this Upaniṣadic passage is criticised. In one
place where the theory is being propounded that at death one is absorbed in
the Absolute which is a mass of Consciousness (vijñānaghana, Bṛhad. Up.,
4.5.13-15) the teacher says that " after death there is no perceptual or memory
consciousness " (na pretya *saṃjñā'sti*). But this denial of the fact that one
does not have normal consciousness in such a state seems to create in the
pupil the impression that one is not conscious at all for the mind would be
completely blank in such a condition and has perhaps ceased to exist. The
teacher then explains himself and says that he is " not referring to a state of
blankness " (na vā . . . *moham* bravīmi) for the soul continues to exist being
imperishable (avināśī) and indestructible (anucchittidharmā). In other words
this state in which the soul is a mass of Consciousness (vijñānaghana) is one
in which " it is not perceptually conscious " (na . . . saṃjñā'sti) " nor is it
a state of blankness " (na . . . moha). It is *neither* the one *nor* the other and
it is said in the same passage that " it is not this nor that " (neti neti = na iti
na iti, 4.5.15). If we find in this passage the possible origin of the use of the
' double na ' it appears to be confirmed by the Pali parallel. Here we are
told (MN. II, 231) that there was a school of religious teachers (bhonto samaṇa-
brāhmaṇā) who argued that " the state of being neither perceptually conscious
nor unconscious " (*na*-eva-sannā-na-asaññā) was an excellent one (paṇītam)
because on the one hand " perceptual consciousness was a defect (*saññā rogo*)
and the lack of consciousness a state of utter blankness (asaññā *sammoho*)".
The highest state of consciousness known to these thinkers was *neither* the one
nor the other. One may compare the use of *sammoha* in the Pali passage
where the reference is clearly to the unsatisfactory nature of the lack of con-
sciousness (asaññā) with the use of *moha* in the Upaniṣadic passage where
its significance is not so clear. The necessity for denying the second alter-
native is thus due to the fact that the denial of the first seems to suggest that
the second alternative is true though this is not the case.

Now, just as the phrase ' neti neti ' is used in the above-mentioned passage
to denote a state of consciousness in which it is said to be a " solid mass "
(ºghana), the phrase ' nevasaññānâsaññāº ' is used in the Pali texts to denote
consciousness "in a state of imperturbability" (āneñjappatta). And just

as it is said that " there is nothing higher than this " (Bṛhad. Up., 2.3.6) state of ' neti neti ', the state of ' nevasaññānâsaññā ', although it is considered to be one stage below the final state in Buddhism, is yet said to be the highest point of empirical and personal existence (bhavānaṃ agga-, AN., III, 202) and the highest stage of mental culture reached by pre-Buddhistic thinkers (M.N. I, 166). Could the significance of this phrase as denoting the highest stage of empirical consciousness in Buddhism be analogous to what is meant by a ' super-conscious ' and if so has this term been misunderstood in the Commentaries ? In any case it denotes a form of consciousness which is not normal consciousness and at the same time not a state of unconsciousness nor a state verging on it. We can now form the following four types of assertions in Pali with the attribute ' conscious ' (saññī):

(1) saññī—he is conscious
(2) asaññī—he is unconscious
(3) saññi ca asaññi ca—he is semiconscious
(4) nevasaññīnâsaññī—he is superconscious or conscious in a way radically different from (1), (2) or (3).

The exact uses of paradigms (3) and (4) can only be discovered by an exhaustive analysis of the several usages of this sort found in the Canon. In this article we are content to raise the problem rather than to offer any solution which has for the present to be very tentative in character. Our contention is that assertions of the type (3) and (4) are contingent propositions which should be translated as such by examining what they mean instead of merely repeating in the English the word-form of the Pali, which would be meaningless owing to the difference in the systems of logical classification adopted. And the Fourfold Schema of the classification of propositions seems to be as follows with the Laws of Contradiction and Exclusion as redefined above.—

(1) ' X is A ' is true where the *full* or *standard* criteria are present.
(2) ' X is not A ' is true where *no* criteria are present.
(3) ' X is-and-is-not A ' is true where *insufficient* criteria are present.
(4) ' X is-neither-A-nor-not A ' is true where criteria for A are present but of a different sort from (1), (2) or (3).

(To be continued).

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