

Sarvastivāda and its Theory of Sarvam Asti

THE question as to what constituted the earliest form of Buddhism has engaged the attention of scholars for the last few decades. Among those who expressed divergent views on this subject was the famous Buddhist scholar, Stcherbatsky, who held the view that the Sarvāstivāda teachings represent the earliest form of Buddhism.^{1*} This school advocated a philosophical Realism when it maintained that 'elements' (*dharma*), past, present and future, exist.² This being one of the basic tenets of this school, Stcherbatsky has endeavoured to give authority of antiquity to this teaching by quoting a sūtra from the Samyukta Āgama³ and showing that the Buddha himself advocated such a view.⁴ This sūtra in the form in which it was found in the Āgama version was not traced in the Pāli Nikāyas and therefore Stcherbatsky came to the conclusion that it was suppressed by the Theravādins because it did not agree with their particular tenets.⁵

In the present paper we propose to examine the validity of the conclusions reached by Stcherbatsky. In doing so we may have to answer two questions: (a) Does the sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky justify the Sarvāstivāda standpoint that 'everything exists' (*sarvam asti*)? (b) Did the Theravādins suppress this sūtra, and if not, how are we to account for its absence in the Pāli Nikāyas? Answers to these questions would enable us to see whether the interpretation given by Stcherbatsky regarding the nature of early Buddhism is acceptable or not.

(a) *Does the sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky justify the Sarvāstivāda standpoint that 'everything exists' (sarvam asti) ?*

* Notes indicated by letters are given in the appendix at the end of the article.

1. Stcherbatsky, T. I., *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (hereafter abbreviated as *CC*), (Third edition, Calcutta, 1961), p. 2. T. R. V. Murti seems to follow Stcherbatsky when he said "The Sarvāstivāda can claim to be as old as Theravāda", *Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London, 1960), p. 67.

2. *A-p'i-ta-mo-chü-she-lun* (hereafter abbreviated *CSL*) (= *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra*), translated by Hsüan Tsang, *Taisho Shinshu Daizōkyō* (hereafter abbreviated *TD*), vol. 29, p. 104c.

3. *CC* p. 4, n. 13. The reference, which appears to have been taken from an earlier work by McGovern, is not very specific. It seems to be the 17th sūtra of the 13th fascicle of the *Samyukta Āgama* (*TD* vol. 2, p. 91b).

4. *CC* p. 4.

5. *ibid.*, p. 4, n. 13.

The following is a full translation of the sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky.

Thus have I heard. Once the Buddha was living at Śrāvastī, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika situated in the Jeta grove. At that time there was a brahmin named Sheng-wen^a. He came to the place where the Buddha was and greeted him. Having greeted the Buddha, he sat on a side and addressed the Buddha thus: "Gautama, (people) say 'everything exists.' What is the meaning of 'everything exists'?"^b. The Buddha spoke to the brahmin Sheng-wen: "Now I will question you. Brahmin, you may reply as you like. What do you think, does the eye exist?" He replied: "Śramaṇa Gautama, it exists." (The Buddha continued) "Brahmin, (in the same way) there is material form^c, there is visual consciousness^d, there is visual contact^e. Depending on visual contact would feelings^f, pleasant, unpleasant or neutral, arise?". "Yes, Śramaṇa Gautama". "The same can be said of the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. But if this were to be questioned further (lit. elaborated) then it goes beyond the sphere of experience (*fei ching chieh*)"⁶. When the Buddha had delivered this discourse, the brahmin was very pleased and having got up from his seat he left.⁷

Stcherbatsky points out that the occasion upon which the Buddha himself is supposed to have put forward the watchword "everything exists" was a discussion with the Ājīvikas, who flatly denied the influence of past deeds upon our destinies, since they were past and non-existent.⁸ But unfortunately we have not been able to trace any references to the Ājīvikas in the sūtra referred to above. The interlocutor in the sūtra was a brahmin (*po lo men*^b) named Sheng-wen about whose views we can gather almost nothing from the introductory portion of this sūtra. Sheng-wen is, no doubt, the Chinese rendering of Jāṇussoṇī,⁹ for we find this name occurring in the other sūtras of the Chinese Āgamas which have their Pāli counterparts.¹⁰ Jāṇussoṇī was a *mahāsāla* brahmin, ranking with eminent brahmins such as Caṅkī, Tārakkha, Pokkharasāti and Todeyya. He was a follower of the Buddha, of whom he was a great admirer.¹¹

6. The phrase *fei ching chieh* occurs in the Chinese translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (TD vol. 16, p. 524a) and the Sanskrit text (ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyoto, 1956 reprint) reads *aviṣaya* (p. 49).

7. I am thankful to my colleague, Dr. W. Pachow for his suggestions regarding this translation.

8. CC p. 4.

9. Akanuma Chizen, *Indo-Bukkyo Koyumeishi Jiten*, pp. 240b-241b.

10. *ibid.*, sometimes referred to as Sheng—10.

11. Malalasekera, G. P., *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, (London, 1937-1938), vol. 1, p. 950.

Moreover, this sūtra should be examined along with two other sūtras in the Samyukta Āgama, one which precedes¹² and the other which follows¹³ it. These three sūtras seem to have been placed in a particular order, as is evident from the three questions posed in them. The questions are regarding the meaning of—

- (1) “Everything” (*i ch'iehⁱ = sarvam*), (Sūtra No. 1),
- (2) “Everything exists” (*i ch'ieh yuⁱ = sarvam asti*), (Sūtra No. 2),
- (3) “Every dharma” (*i ch'ieh fa^k = sarva dharma*), (Sūtra No. 3).

It is interesting to note that the equivalent of Sūtra No. 1 is to be found in the Pāli Nikāyas. Here it is called the *Sabba Sutta* and is included in the Samyutta Nikāya.¹⁴ Following are the English translations of these two sūtras.

Āgama Version

Thus have I heard. Once the Buddha was staying in the country of Śrāvastī, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika situated in the Jeta grove. At that time there was a brahmin named Sheng-wen who came to the place where the Buddha was and greeted the Buddha. Having greeted the Buddha he sat on a side and addressed the Buddha thus: “Gautama, (people) speak of ‘everything.’ What is the meaning of ‘everything’?” The Buddha addressed the brahmin: “Everything means the twelve āyatanas. Eye, material form, ear, sound, nose, odour, tongue, taste, body, tangibles, mind and concepts. These are called ‘everything.’ Again, there may be those who say that this is not ‘every-

thing.’ (They may say) ‘That which the Śramaṇa Gautama describes as *everything*, I will give up and proclaim another *everything*.’ Always there could be such a theory. But, if questioned (he) would not know. It increases doubt and confusion. Why? Because it is beyond the sphere of experience.” The brahmin Shen-wen listened to what the Buddha said and being pleased, went away.

Nikāya Version

Thus have I heard. Once the Buddha was staying at Sāvattī, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika in the Jeta grove. Then the Exalted One addressed the monks: “O monks!” They responded: “Yes, O Lord!” and the Exalted One

12. *Samyukta Āgama*, 13. 16 (TD. vol. 2, p. 91a-b).

13. *ibid.*, 13. 18 (TD. vol. 2, p. 91b).

14. *Samyutta Nikāya* (PTS), vol. 4, p. 15.

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spoke thus: "I will preach to you *everything* and proclaim another 'everything.' Listen to it. What, monks, is 'everything'? Eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odour, tongue and taste, body and tangible, mind and concepts. These are called 'everything.' Monks, he who would say, 'I will reject this *everything*' he may certainly have a theory (of his own). But when questioned he would not be able to answer and would be subject to vexation. Why? Because it would be beyond the sphere of experience (*avisayasmim*)."

The close similarity between these two versions cannot fail to strike us. As far as the contents are concerned, there is hardly any difference. Any variation can be noticed only with regard to the description of these contents. The fact that this sūtra is common to both traditions seems to point to its high antiquity. But it has not been possible to trace the other two sūtras in the Pāli Nikāyas.

Stcherbatsky points out that "when pressed to say what was meant by the words 'everything exists', he (the Buddha) answered 'everything exists' means that the twelve āyatanas exist".¹⁵ It seems that Stcherbatsky has confused the contents of the first two sūtras in the Samyukta Āgama, one which discusses the meaning of 'everything' (*i ch'ieh = sabbam*) and the other which discusses the meaning of 'everything exists' (*i ch'ieh yu = sabbam atthi*). It is only in Sūtra No. 1 that the twelve āyatanas are specifically mentioned, but not in Sūtra No. 2 which is actually the one quoted by Stcherbatsky. Thus instead of a statement such as "everything exists means the twelve āyatanas exist", we have the statement that "everything means the twelve āyatanas". In Sūtra No. 2, the reference to the twelve āyatanas can be had only by implication, especially because the argument follows from Sūtra No. 1. If we carefully examine Sūtra No. 2, we find that it refers not only to the twelve āyatanas, but also to the six forms of consciousness as well as contact and feelings.

Stcherbatsky argues: "Now the twelve āyatanas are merely one of the many classifications of the elements of existence of matter and mind. The Sarvāstivādin school admitted seventy-five such elements. These elements were called dharmas".¹⁶ He maintains that even in their school the word *sabba* seems to have been used rather like a technical term. It did not mean "everything" but every item of the Buddhist table of elements.¹⁷

15. *CC* p. 4.

16. *ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

17. *ibid.*, p. 4, n. 13.

But considering the antiquity of the *Sabba Sutta*, found both in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas, it would be difficult to maintain that the term *sabba* refers to the table of elements which was only presented during the period of the Abhidhamma.

Furthermore, if the Sarvāstivāda theory that 'everything exists' (*sarvam asti*) is to be interpreted as only implying that the twelve āyatanas exist, then these three sūtras in the Samyukta Āgama may be taken as justifying such a theory. But the Sarvāstivāda theory does not mean this alone. There are two more important aspects of this theory which cannot be overlooked. Firstly, the Sarvāstivādins admitted an eternal substratum (*dravya*) or ultimate nature (*svabhāva*) in dharmas as opposed to the perceptible changes that take place in the dharmas which they termed characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), etc.¹⁸ When the Sarvāstivādins said that "everything exists", they meant that the eternal substratum (*dravya*) or the ultimate nature (*svabhāva*) exists (*asti*).¹⁹ Secondly, their existence (*astitva*) is not confined to the present alone. The ultimate nature (*svabhāva*) of dharmas is said to exist during the three periods of time, past, present and future.²⁰ These, no doubt, are the two main problems on which the Sarvāstivāda differed from the other Buddhist schools, and also the doctrines which distinguish it from early Buddhism.

Let us see whether these two important aspects of the Sarvāstivāda theory are set out in the sūtras quoted. According to the first of these sūtras, 'everything' means the 'twelve āyatanas'. But it has been pointed out in the sūtra that if there was a question as to whether there is anything beyond these twelve āyatanas, then the reply would be that any such thing is beyond the sphere of experience (*fei ching chieh* = *avisaya*). This is a clear statement of the empirical attitude of early Buddhism. The last part of the answer which seems to be the most significant has been ignored by Stcherbatsky. It seems to reject the very idea that the Sarvāstivādins wanted to prove, namely, the existence of an ultimate nature (*svabhāva*) of a phenomenon as opposed to its perceptible characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). The empiricism of early Buddhism is further elaborated in the other two sūtras. In reply to the question as to what is meant by 'everything exists', the Buddha replied that the sense organs and the sensible objects exist, depending on which arise consciousness and contact. According to this analysis, what

18. *Tattvasamgraha-pañjikā*, edited by E. Krishnamaacharya, (Baroda, 1926), vol. 1 (Gaekwad Oriental Series, vol. 30), pp. 504-505.

19. *CSL* 20 (*TD* vol. 29, p. 104b-c).

20. *ibid.*

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is meant by 'everything' and 'every dharma' may be summed up by the term 'sense-datum'. It is clearly implied that one cannot go beyond sense data to describe the nature of the phenomenal world.

Moreover, it is difficult to see in these three sūtras any basis for the Sarvāstivāda theory that dharmas, past, present and future, exist. When it is said that 'everything' means the 'twelve āyatanas', there is no implication that the twelve āyatanas, past, present and future, exist, as the Sarvāstivādins would have expected to find. Here there is no reference to the past and future, and for that matter, to any conception of time. According to early Buddhism, there is no denial of present sense data and therefore their causes, namely, the sense organs and the sense objects. What is denied is that these have any substance (*svabhāva*). This is clearly expressed by the statement that any inquiry which goes beyond sense data would be beyond the sphere of experience. It seems that even with the higher forms of experience recognised in Buddhism, it is not possible to observe any permanent substratum which the Sarvāstivāda thinkers would posit in any phenomenon. According to early Buddhism, the non-substantiality of phenomena would be better seen by the development of the extrasensory faculties.²¹ Thus the 'elements' (*dharma*) which, as Stcherbatsky points out,²² were considered to be ultimate realities by the Sarvāstivādins, are reducible to sense-data and are without substance (*svabhāva*). This is the reason why in early Buddhism, the 'elements' (*dhamma*, *fa^m*) are said to be non-substantial (*anatta*, *wu woⁿ*).²³ Such an explanation would demonstrate the futility of attributing originality to the Mahāyāna as a philosophy which upholds a theory of the non-substantiality of 'elements' (*dharmanairātmya*).²⁴ Thus, although Stcherbatsky has quoted these sūtras in support of the Sarvāstivāda theory, they in fact render baseless the Sarvāstivāda theory of *sarvam asti*.

The Sarvāstivāda theory that everything, past, present and future exist, may be contradicted by another sūtra included in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas.²⁵ According to the analysis found in this sūtra, the Sarvāsti-

21. *Theragāthā*, v. 678; *Dhammapada*, v. 279,

Sabbe dhammā anattā'ti yadā paññāya passati,

Atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyā.

22. *CC* p. 62.

23. *Majjhima Nikāya*, vol. 1, p. 228; *Samyutta Nikāya*, vol. 3, p. 133, vol. 4, p. 401; *Ānguttara Nikāya*, vol. 1, p. 286, etc.; *Samyukta Āgama*, 10.7, (*TD*. vol. 2, pp. 66b-67a); *Ekottara Āgama*, 23.4, (*TD*. vol. 2, p. 668c); *Dirgha Āgama*, 1. 1, (*TD*. vol. 1, p. 9b).

24. Murti, T. R. V., *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 26; Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, (Leningrad, 1927), p. 41.

25. *Samyutta, Nikāya*, vol. 3, pp. 70-73; *Samyukta Āgama*, 10. 5, (*TD*. vol. 2, pp. 65c-66a). Cp. Jayatilke, K. N., *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (London, 1963) p. 316.

vāda theory may be taken as an instance of overstepping the limits of linguistic convention, and in fact the *Kathāvatthu* quotes this sūtra in its refutation of the Sarvāstivāda theory.²⁶ The description in the Pāli version, runs thus: “There are these three linguistic conventions or usages of words or terms, which are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are distinct in the present and will be distinct in the future, and which are not ignored by the recluses and brahmins who are wise. Which three? Whatever material form (*rūpa*) there has been, which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed is called, reckoned and termed ‘has been’ (*ahosi*); it is not reckoned as ‘exists’ (*atthi*) nor as ‘will be’ (*bhavissati*). ... (The same is repeated with regard to the other four aggregates). Whatever material form (*rūpa*) is not arisen, has not come to be, is called, reckoned or termed ‘will be’ (*bhavissati*) and is not reckoned as ‘exists’ (*atthi*) or ‘has been’ (*ahosi*). ... Whatever material form (*rupa*) has come to be, has manifested itself is called, reckoned or termed as ‘exists’ (*atthi*) and is not reckoned as ‘has been’ (*ahosi*) nor as ‘will be’ (*bhavissati*)”.²⁷ This statement, along with that found in the *Sabba Sutta*, should have served as warning for the Sarvāstivādins to avoid the mistake of maintaining that dharmas in their ultimate nature (*svabhāva*) exist during the past, present and future.

(b) *Did the Theravādins suppress this sūtras which discusses the problem of ‘everything exists’ (i.e., Sūtra No. 2) and if not, how are we to account for its absence in the Pāli Nikāyas?*

As pointed out earlier, Stecherbatsky opines that the Theravādins have suppressed this sūtra because it did not agree with their particular tenets. On the contrary, we have shown that the contents of these sūtras are quite in conformity with the teachings in the early Nikāyas and that they, in fact, represent a refutation of the Sarvāstivāda theory of *sarvam asti*.

Akanuma Chizen, in his very valuable catalogue,²⁸ has refrained from identifying this sūtra with any one of the sūtras in the Pāli Nikāyas.²⁹ This is because the Nikāyas contain no sūtra which corresponds to the Chinese version in all the details. It may be noted that there are two sūtras in the Pāli Nikāyas which discuss the problem of ‘everything exists’ (*sabbam atthi*). Both occur in the Nidāna Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikāya.³⁰ Of these, the

26. *Kathāvatthu*, vol. 1, pp. 140-141.

27. *Samyutta Nikāya*, vol. 3, pp. 71-73.

28. *The Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas*, (Nagoya, 1929).

29. *ibid.*, p. 46.

30. *Samyutta Nikāya*, vol. 2, pp. 16-17; 76-77.

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first is called the *Kaccāyanagotta Sutta* and has occupied a very important place in the history of Buddhist thought.³¹ It discusses two main theories which the Buddha considered as extreme views, namely, the eternalist view that 'everything exists' (*sabbam atthi*) and the annihilationist view that 'everything does not exist' (*sabbam natthi*).³¹ The Chinese or the Agama version of this sūtra is to be found in the twelfth fascicle of the Samyukta Āgama,³² and therefore presents no problem. The other is the *Jāṇussoṇi Sutta* which, like the *Kaccāyanagotta Sutta*, refers to the two extreme views.³³ Here too, as in the *Kaccāyanagotta Sutta*, the argument from causality has been made use of to reject the two extremes.

Although the *Jāṇussoṇi Sutta* does not correspond with the sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky in all its details, yet we find several factors which would justify a comparison of these two sūtras. Firstly, the Chinese Āgamas have not preserved a sūtra which corresponds exactly with the *Jāṇussoṇi Sutta*. Secondly, the interlocutor in the Chinese version is Sheng-wen (= Jāṇussoṇi) from whom the Pāli version derives its name. Thirdly, the Chinese version occurs in the thirteenth fascicle of the Samyukta Āgama which roughly corresponds to the Nidāna Samyutta in which the *Jāṇussoṇi Sutta* is included.

The main difference between the Pāli and the Chinese versions is that the former refers to two non-Buddhist theories, namely, that 'everything exists' (*sabbam atthi*) and that 'everything does not exist' (*sabbam n'atthi*), while the latter refers only to the theory that 'everything exists' (*i ch'ieh yu*). Now, the theory that 'everything exists' (*sabbam atthi*) mentioned in the Pāli version is, as the commentator has rightly remarked,³⁴ the theory put forward by the Eternalist (of the Vedic tradition), as opposed to the theory that 'everything does not exist' (*sabbam n'atthi*) which was advocated by the Materialist. This may be the reason why the *Kathāvatthu*, while quoting several sūtras from the Nikāyas in its refutation of the Sarvāstivāda theory of *sarvam asti*, does not refer to this sūtra or even the oft-quoted *Kaccāyanagotta Sutta*, although both of these sūtras include discussions and refutations of the problem of 'everything exists.'

31. The *Kaccāyanagotta Sutta*, which discusses the 'middle path' between the two extremes of *sabbam atthi* and *sabbam n'atthi*, is referred to in another sutta of the *Samyutta Nikāya* itself (vol. 3, pp. 134-135), and quoted by the Sarvāstivādins (*Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, commentary on *Abhidharmadīpa*, ed. by P. S. Jaini, Darbhanga, 1963, p. 270) as well as by the Mādhyamikas (*Mādhyamaka-kārikā*, 15. 7; *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*, ed. by L. De la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4, Petersbourg, 1913, p. 269).

31a. Here we are giving only a literal translation of the phrase *Sabbam n'atthi*

32. *Samyukta Āgama*, 12. 19 (TD. vol. 2, pp. 85c-86a).

33. *Samyutta Nikāya*, vol. 2, pp. 76-77.

34. *Sāratthappakāsinī* (*Samyutta-aṭṭhakathā*), vol. 2, p. 76.

If we are to see any relationship between the *Jāṇussoṇī Sutta* and the Chinese version quoted by Stcherbatsky, then we may have to explain why the latter leaves out the Materialist theory from its discussion. A careful analysis of the Theravāda canon would reveal the fact that the phrase *sabbam atthi* denoted different theories at different periods. In the earliest period, as is evident from the Nikāyas, the phrase was used to denote the eternalist theories (*sassata-ditṭhi*) accepted by the recluses and brahmins (*samana-brāhmaṇa*) beyond the pale of Buddhism. But in the Theravāda Abhidhamma, we find the phrase being used to denote a heresy advocated by the Sabbatthivādins (= Sarvāstivādins).³⁵ Its antithesis, namely, the Materialist theory of *sabbam n'atthi* was not even referred to. Thus we find the later Buddhists of the Theravāda tradition paying more attention to the former. The theory that 'everything exists' (*sabbam atthi*) put forward by the Eternalists of the Vedic tradition was rejected by the Buddha who argued that everything in this world is causally conditioned (*paṭiccasamuppanna*).³⁶ But, for the later Buddhists, a similar theory put forward by some of their own adherents, namely, the Sarvāstivādins, presented insurmountable difficulties. The argument from causality, which was earlier adduced to reject the eternalist theory of the non-Buddhist thinkers, may not have been effectively used because the Sarvāstivādins themselves accepted causality.³⁷ The best and the most effective argument against this theory was therefore the argument from empiricism and this they found in the *Sabba Sutta*. Hence, the later Buddhists seem to have taken up only the problem of 'everything exists' (*sabbam atthi*) leaving out its antithesis, the theory that 'everything does not exist' (*sabbam n'atthi*), and recast the *Jāṇussoṇī Sutta* on the model of the *Sabba Sutta*. Not being satisfied with this definition of *sarvam* (*i ch'ieh*) and *sarvam asti* (*i ch'ieh yu*) the custodians of the Āgamas seem to have compiled another sūtra defining the conception of *sarvadharma* (*i ch'ieh fa*), using the same argument found in the *Sabba Sutta* and placed them in that particular order.

If this surmise is correct, then it is possible to maintain that the *Jāṇussoṇī Sutta* of the Samyutta Nikāya was a distant precursor of the sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky from the Chinese Āgamas, and also that the phrase (*sabbam atthi*) in the Pāli Nikāyas represent an earlier and more archaic use than that found in the Chinese Āgamas and the Theravāda Abhidhamma. Instances

35. *Kathāvatthu*, vol. 1, p. 115 ff.

36. *Samyutta Nikāya*, vol. 2, pp. 17, 76.

37. Yet we find the Mādhyamikas using the argument from causality to refute the Sarvāstivāda conception of *svabhāva*, *Mādhyamaka-kārikā*, 15. 1 ff.; *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*, p. 259 ff.

Stcherbatsky was in existence at the time the *Kathāvatthu* was compiled, there was no reason why it was not quoted in the refutation of the Sarvāstivāda theory of *sarvam asti*.

Thus we may arrive at the following conclusions. Firstly, the sūtra quoted by Stcherbatsky does not support the Sarvāstivāda theory of *sarvam asti*, and if it did, then the Sarvāstivādins would have certainly quoted it in support of their standpoint. On the contrary, it serves as a refutation of their crude Realism. Secondly, this sūtra which has its precursor in the *Jāṇussoṇi Sutta*, was recast on the model of the *Sabba Sutta* at a time when the Sarvāstivāda theory became a rather popular and widespread heresy. Thirdly, the Realism of Sarvāstivāda as expressed in the theory of *sarvam asti* does not represent the earliest form of Buddhism as contained in the early sūtra literature. The emphasis on sense data coupled with the denial of any substance (*atta*=*svabhāva*) or, as a later Buddhist thinker puts it, 'thing-in-itself' (*sva bhāvo*)⁴³ makes early Buddhism a form of Realism giving a phenomenalist interpretation.

D. J. KALUPAHANA.

43. *Mādhyamika-vṛtti*, p. 260.

Appendix

(a)	生聞	婆羅門	有法	境界		
(b)	一切	一切	一切	境		
(c)	色	一	一	非	法	無
(d)	眼	識	眼	觸		
(e)	眼					
(f)	受					
(g)	非					我
						界