

R.S. PETERS' VIEW OF EDUCATION AND THE EMOTIONS—A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Emotions powerfully affect human behaviour and conduct. Emotions can be expressed in a rational or irrational manner. Emotions themselves and not just their expressions can be irrational. Since education is concerned with the formation of character it must take an interest in the education of the emotions.

It is important to be clear about the nature of emotion before an attempt is made to discuss the education of the emotions. In this paper I will explicate and critically appraise Peters' views on the nature of emotion and the education of the emotions.

Peters' View of the Nature of Emotions. Emotion, Belief and Appraisal

Peters considers emotions to be states of mind with a cognitive core. This means that different emotions are differentiated by the different beliefs that go with them. This is why Peters says that an emotion could be referred to as a feeling response to an appraisal of a situation.¹ One appraises a situation based on a belief appropriate to that particular situation. To appraise a situation is to evaluate or assess it. For Peters, a logically necessary condition for the correct application of the word 'emotion' is that some kind of appraisal should be involved. The situation that confronts one must relate to one in a particular way, and this is necessarily based on one's belief. Consequently, the appraisal of a particular situation would evoke a particular emotion appropriate to the resultant belief about the situation. The appraisal of a situation as threatening would evoke fear, to apprehend it as frustrating would produce anger, and to see it as beneficial would bring forth joy.

Dearden similarly argues that emotions have an inner feeling side to them, and one difficult to describe except by metaphor. To convey what we mean we use hydraulic metaphors like swelling, rising and falling, and burning metaphors like boiling, simmering, flaring up and dying down. Plainly, emotions are not solely a matter of such feelings, as otherwise they would be no different from bodily sensations such as heartburn or indigestion. Whereas bodily sensations have bodily causes, which we may or may not be able to discover and remove, emotions are linked to objects and states of affairs which are seen in a certain evaluative light.²

Alston correctly asserts that the terms 'appraisal', 'evaluation' or 'judgement' could be misleading, if they are taken to imply a conscious formulation of a judgement. In all probability one can be frightened by something without having time to consciously assess the situation as dangerous. According to Alston, terms like 'apprehension'

1. R.S. Peters, "The Education of the Emotions", in R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development* (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974), p. 175.
2. R.F. Dearden, *The Philosophy of Primary Education, An Introduction*, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), p.81.

or 'recognition' are preferable. The best choice, he thinks, is to employ the word 'perceive' with the understanding that the word is used in a wide sense that is not restricted to sense data alone but can involve belief and intellectual realization as well.³

Then, to apprehend a situation one must have a certain belief about the situation. For instance, I come across a poisonous snake crossing my path. Here I believe that there is a snake across the path. I also perceive the presence of the snake to be threatening. Consequently, I experience an emotion, which is fear. Again, I believe a friend has betrayed me. I assess the behaviour of my friend as frustrating. Therefore, I experience an emotion; I feel angry. This is precisely why Peters argues that each emotion encapsulates its own specific kind of appraisal.

Emotion and its Object.

Peters, like most philosophers, argues that emotions have objects. A number of names for emotions are attached to states of mind which are essentially intentional, directed, that is, in relation to an object. Emotions are *about* something; they are not *merely* states of feeling. They are directed towards the object. One feels an emotion in the way one perceives the object of one's emotion. A conceptual connection exists between a particular emotion and its object. For instance, in the previous example, the object of my fear is the snake, and my fear is directed towards the snake. My fear is not an objectless or nameless fear. The perception of the object evokes fear when I see the situation as threatening. Again, the object of my anger could be an unfaithful friend. I feel angry as I see the situation as a frustrating negation of a principle of loyalty. However, it might be the case that one may sometimes feel angry, sad or joyful, without knowing what one is angry, sad or joyful about.⁴ This suggests that one may not be able to specify the object. For example, an assessment of Ranjith's behaviour would lead an onlooker to come to the conclusion that he is angry. He may slam the door, and kick a chair while passing, or speak rudely to someone. However, this does not mean that Ranjith's emotions do not have objects. It might be the case that he is unable to specify the object or objects as the correct object is not immediately obvious, and may be difficult to bring to conscious recognition. He may even mistake the object of such feelings.

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3. W. Alston, "Emotions and Feeling", in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, Macmillan Publishing, Inc., and the Free Press, 1967), p. 481.
 4. F. Dunlop, "The Education of the Emotions". in *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1984, p. 250.

Peters argues that "different emotions must involve different appraisals."⁵ This could also mean, and explain the fact that two individuals can appraise or evaluate the same situation in two different ways, resulting in two different emotions. For instance, say x and y are both walking along a railway track. X hears a sound of an approaching train at a sharp bend. He appraises the situation as life-threatening, and trembles with fear. The normal reaction would be for x to attempt to save his life. On the other hand, y has a secret intention of committing suicide, and thus he interprets the threat in a different manner, feeling no fear, and perhaps relief.

However, it is not clear that all emotions are *mainly* distinguished by the particular beliefs that go with them. Since emotions are complex, Peters would presumably say that an appraisal of a situation could evoke more than one type of emotion. But he is not specific here, and it needs to be clarified. First, a belief about an appraisal of a situation may give rise to more than one type of emotion. Such a possibility may very well exist. Take the example of a prisoner who is tortured by his captors to elicit valuable information. The appraisal of the situation would normally produce both fear and anger. He believes that his captors would torture him, and he sees the situation as life-threatening. The pain of torture may evoke anger against his captors, and fear. Here the person does experience two emotions. It would appear that these *are* inseparably linked to his beliefs, namely, the threats evoke fear, and violation of rights evoke anger. Thus, the possibility that the appraisal of a particular situation could give rise to more than one kind of emotion cannot be ruled out. Second, different beliefs can produce the same emotion. For instance, both belief in violation of rights and criticism of one's religious beliefs can evoke anger.

Emotion as Passivity.

Peters also views emotions as a category of passivity. Most of his discussion is based on the assumption that there is no intimate connection between emotion and motivated behaviour.⁶ Peters includes views such as that of Magda Arnold, who defines 'emotion' as "a felt tendency towards or away from an object", preceded by an appraisal of a situation.⁷ But his account of emotion differs from her notion as he does not suggest an intimate connection between emotion and motivated behaviour.

Peters distinguishes emotion from motives as being essentially passive, though both are the result of evaluating or appraising a situation. He contends that emotions and motives are distinct because emotions connect appraisals with "things that come

5. R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, p. 175.

6. *Ibid.* pp. 177 - 179.

7. Peters admits that his account of emotion owes a great deal to Magda Arnold. But it differs from her account in not postulating a conceptual connection between emotion and action. See R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, p. 181.

over us" while motives connect appraisals with action.⁸ In experiencing an emotion the individual is more or less affected by the emotion. The emotion takes him, as it were, by surprise, as it "overwhelms" him. He is necessarily excited, disturbed or upset by it. However, this does not mean, argues Peters, that because emotions are passive and motives directly shape actions, they are produced by different appraisals. In fact, an emotion and a motive may be the result of the same appraisal.⁹ Nonetheless, because experiencing emotion, as such, involves the subject as passive, says Peters, the only actions produced by emotions are involuntary, "for our knees knock, we tremble, we sweat, we blush."¹⁰ To draw an example, Peters would differentiate fear as an emotion from fear as a motive. Say x comes across a ferocious dog, and the fear that x experiences overwhelms him. Possibly the fear would make him inactive, so as to be rooted to the spot or involuntarily shiver with fear, though in fact he sees the situation as threatening. Here, according to Peters, fear refers to emotion, on account of the subject's passivity in relation to it — he did not will it into being, and cannot cancel its effect at will. X could also run away from the impending danger, become frightened; then fear refers to a *motive* for action. In both instances x sees the dog as a danger and a threat to him. On such grounds, Peters maintains that the same appraisal evoked two distinct events, namely, fear as an emotion and fear as a motive.

Peters further argues that the widely held view that emotions and actions are necessarily connected is based on a confusion. To justify his claim he says that "one cannot act in an appropriate way out of wonder or grief; one is overwhelmed by them."¹¹ Dunlop claims that such a contention is simply false. Quoting an example, Dunlop says that one can very well cancel an evening's engagement when one hears of a death of a friend.¹² His point is that the action cannot be accounted for without reference to the emotion. It must be stated that Peters discounts mourning rituals as they cannot be referred to as "appropriate action". In Peters' opinion "appropriate action" must involve taking means to a desired end.¹³ It seems most likely, however, that the cancelling of an evening's engagement here should be referred to as appropriate action rather than as a mourning ritual, as a ritual is a pattern of actions and gestures already laid out by custom and followed. In this case the funeral would be the ritual, and staying home because one does not feel up to enjoyment is the appropriate action.

8. *Ibid.* p. 178

9. *Ibid.* p. 179.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. F. Dunlop, *The Education of Feeling and Emotion*, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 14.

13. R. S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, pp. 179 - 181.

On occasion one can act in an appropriate way even out of wonder and awe. For instance, when I see the Niagara Falls for the first time it may undeniably elicit a sense of wonder. I deliberately stop further activity in order to perceive the different features and be attentive to them. The wholistic visual image, the coherent whole — that is Niagara Falls — would lead me to shun all distractions in the appreciation of its immense beauty. This, I believe, is to act in an appropriate way, which even in Peters' sense is action which can be interpreted as a "means to an end".

Some writers contend that emotions are active phenomena. It is interesting to note that Solomon's definition of emotions excludes the element of passivity. He thinks emotions are "hasty judgements", and since we make them, they become activities and therefore voluntary, so that emotions are chosen.¹⁴ His emphasis on the active element in emotions excludes any kind of passivity. However, Solomon's view does not seem to explain situations where we speak of people being "paralysed by fear," "trembling and quivering with anger," or "squirming with guilt". It seems to me that emotional experience necessarily includes a passive element as well as an active component.

Though Peters seems to be correct in maintaining that emotions are essentially connected with passivity, it also seems to be the case that there is a component of activity in both the concept of and the experience of emotion. By this I mean that emotions can make people active as well as involving the subject as passive in the experiencing of them. Recent work emphasizes that experiencing an emotion is partly an active affair. It involves attention paid to selected features, interpretation of perceived features of one's situation, and making judgement of value.¹⁵

According to Peters, to experience an emotion is often to be overwhelmed by it, and this is not desirable as in certain types of appraisal it tends to "warp and cloud one's perception and judgement."¹⁶ This in fact is stipulative, and cannot be generalized to every situation of emotional experience. To take an example Priyani, say, who is not closely associated with Sriyani, has helped her in a particular difficult situation. As is to be expected, Sriyani will have a sense of gratitude to Priyani. The feeling of gratitude that Sriyani experiences may overwhelm her for a while, as Priyani is not one of her closest friends. At the same time she perceives ways in which her friend has helped her, appreciates such help, and makes a value judgement which consequently leads her to feel and probably express gratitude to Priyani.

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14. R.C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice", in *Explaining Emotions*, ed. A.M. Rorty (London; University of California Press, 1980), p. 276.
15. For more details see R.W. Hepburn, "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion", in *Education and Reason Part 3 of Education and the Development of Reason*, ed. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, R.S. Peters, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 95.
16. R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, p. 188.

In the above example, the evaluative component of the emotion of feeling gratitude can be referred to as an active component of the emotion. By evaluation I do not refer to the initial appraisal of the situation in Peters' terms. By evaluation I refer to the subsequent judgement of value that Sriyani makes in relation to the emotion of feeling grateful. This evaluative component forms a part of the emotional experience of what it is to be grateful and is not just linked to the initial appraisal of the situation.

Hepburn contends that to experience a particular emotion involves not only a perception of facts of the situation, but also an evaluation of facts. According to him the cognitive elements and the evaluative elements can be brought together in the notion of "seeing as". He would say that to feel apprehensiveness is to see such and such as possibly dangerous.¹⁷

John White argues that emotions have an active and passive side to them. He claims that the term 'emotion', unlike 'feeling', is something of a technical term devised by philosophers and psychologists, and so has a less secure place than, say, 'feeling' in ordinary language. He argues that even if we concede to Peters that the word 'emotion' is used to connote passivity, it would only be a point about the usage of the word. In his view it does not justify the more substantive claim that emotions themselves are passive phenomena.¹⁸

Peters' View of the Education of the Emotions. Cognitive and Moral Aspects

Peters' does think in terms of educating the emotions. His view of education of the emotions is closely linked to his notion of "education as initiation". Since, in his view, education involves the initiation into worthwhile activities basically involving the development of knowledge and understanding, education must consist in bringing these passive states, through their cognitive element under the control of the truth of reason.¹⁹ This is considered important as otherwise emotions could disrupt the life of reason, thus leaving one to the danger of reacting confusedly in crucial situations in life.

According to Peters, there is a two-fold task in educating the emotions, which in effect involves two inter-connected aspects of the same process. There is the development of appropriate appraisals, and the control and "canalization" of passivity²⁰.

17. R.W. Hepburn, "The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion", in *Education and Reason Part 3 of Education and the Development of Reason*, ed. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, R.S. Peters, p. 95.
18. J. White, "The Education of the Emotions", in *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, p. 238.
19. R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, pp. 182 - 183.
20. *Ibid.* p. 182.

Peters' notion of the development of appraisals and associated beliefs is that it is largely a cognitive endeavour. Since emotions are differentiated by the different beliefs that go with them they are considered as being cognitive. As such, to change an emotion is necessarily to bring about a cognitive change in the belief which encapsulates that emotion. For instance, to relieve a child of a fear of moths is to help the child discover that moths are harmless or even attractive. Therefore, education of the emotions involves an intellectual grasp of the basis of appraisal in emotions. Such an understanding of the emotions, Peters' maintains, is brought about by being initiated into the forms of knowledge.

In order to bring in a justification for the development of criteria for appropriate appraisals, Peters argues that "education of the emotions is inescapably a moral matter."²¹ This view is based on the belief that emotions and motives could be regarded as virtues as well as vices. For instance, benevolence and pity could be regarded as virtues and jealousy and envy as vices. This indicates that they are either in agreement or in conflict with fundamental moral principles, such as concern for truth, respect for persons, and consideration for people's interests. He contends that the development of appropriate appraisals would lead pupils out of error and towards the all-important concern for truth. This is precisely why Peters thinks that those who are concerned with the education of the emotions must necessarily approach this task from a moral standpoint.²²

An obvious element in Peters' view of the development of appropriate appraisals is to ensure that a major part of pupils' emotions are true to the facts of situations and not based on false or irrelevant beliefs.²³ When an appraisal of a situation involves a belief which is based on prejudice, superstition or misconception of facts, then the particular emotion is said to be based on a false belief. More often one evaluates the situation in an unreflective way.

Peters also claims that certain appraisals can be represented as being derived from unconscious beliefs. Such beliefs could in some cases be false beliefs. Quoting Freud, he says in such instances it might be the case that the individual is not aware of his beliefs.²⁴ Say, for example, a child is threatened to be severely punished by the father if caught playing truant, and this belief has been repressed. In later life the child encounters difficulty in dealing with all or most authority figures due to the repressed generalization to a false belief — a belief which is also logically irrelevant in regard to persons other than the father. The child's later fear of any authority figures as such is thus an irrational emotion.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.* p. 183.

23. *Ibid.* p. 184.

24. See *Ibid.*, p. 185. Here Peters seems to accept Freud's contention that a person could be a victim of false beliefs. In the area of irrational conduct Freud and his followers have devised a technique better known as re-education.

Peters quite reasonably asserts that one type of the education of the emotions that has to be attempted is to eliminate false and irrelevant beliefs, since they increase the likelihood of a person being emotionally unstable or maladjusted. This may well hamper one's own development, and also seriously affect one's inter-personal relationships.

Mary Warnock accepts Peters' concern about elimination of false beliefs. However, she seems to think that such tidying up of false beliefs does not always work. She is not suggesting that such a course of action is ineffective. Her premise is that changing a belief does not always or necessarily change an emotion.²⁵ This seems to me to be a fair criticism. It may be the case that an individual understands the cause and the nature of an irrational emotion, but may still feel the same way when later faced with a similar situation. To be more explicit, the individual's appraisal of the situation would be more or less similar, evoking the same type of emotion.

Furthermore, Mary Warnock says that if we are given the "horrors" or "creeps" by something, *it is hard to eliminate them by reason.*²⁶ This is importantly true. It would in fact be pointless to tell a person who is engaged in exploring a cave not to be frightened. The mere fact of a bat flapping its wings could give one the creeps, evoking fear. These examples, however, do not indicate that education of the emotions should not concern itself with the elimination of false and irrelevant beliefs, nor that reasoning does not help in understanding an emotion, nor that one cannot make an emotion more reasonable.

Peters advocates the technique of "re-education" for certain irrational conduct and appraisals which are represented as being derived from unconscious beliefs. If the person is helped to recall facts relating to false beliefs, this would be one method of the re-education of the emotions. To quote the former example, the boy who had an irrational fear of authority figures would be helped to recall what he believes about his father, and whether it was true or not, and that it was not invariably true of authority figures who reminded of his father.

Furthermore, in the development of appropriate appraisals children should be helped to recognise and react to emotions in themselves and others on a continuing basis. They must be brought to perceive emotions which actually exist. For instance, one must not too hastily assume jealousy in a person, when he may not be jealous at all. Peters would say that the concern for truth will lead them to reveal more of their true emotions to others.

Control and Canalization.

The second related way of educating the emotions is the control and the "canalization" of emotional expression. To control an emotion is to prevent the expression of one's emotions from being chaotic. To canalize an emotion is to change the form of expression of an emotion into a more acceptable manner.

25. Mary Warnock, "The Education of the Emotions", in *Education, Values and Mind*, ed. D.E. Cooper, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 80.

26. *Ibid.*

According to Peters, the development of appropriate appraisals "is made doubly difficult because of the countervailing influence of more primitive wild types of appraisal that warp and cloud perception and judgement, and abet self-deception and insecurity."²⁷ For Peters there is a conceptual connection between education and the development of reason, so education of the emotions, just as much as the study of science or history, must concern itself with the pursuit of truth. To suggest that certain appraisals are primitive is to indicate that they are either not within the reach of reason, or cannot be brought under the sway of reason. Therefore, the only possible explanation, according to Peters, is to bring such emotions under control. Say, for instance, a child who has an irrational fear of moths may be able to eliminate that fear following an explanation that moths are harmless creatures. However, it would be more difficult to dispel a more deep-seated fear, such as fear of darkness, or fear of heights. In such cases, Peters would say that education of the emotions would take the form of control.

But control of the emotions does not necessarily take the form of education. For example, emotions can be altered through conditioning and administration of drugs. However, Peters assures us that such a method is only acceptable to naturalize an existing condition which would enable a more positive educational technique to get a firmer grip.²⁸

I suspect that Peters' view of the control of emotions has two implications. The first relates to the distorted use of the term 'education'. It is inappropriate or ironic to say that we are educating someone when in fact what is being attempted is either controlling or suppressing emotions.²⁹ Secondly, a technique such as conditioning or administration of drugs suggests a "training of the emotions" rather than the "education of the emotions". Elsewhere, Peters distinguishes between educating and training the emotions as different activities. However, conditioning and the administration of drugs, which Peters considers as techniques involved in the "educating of the emotions", seem to indicate a mere "training of the emotions". This, in Peters own terms is a contradiction. To be more explicit, according to Peters, training suggests "the acquisition of appropriate appraisals and habits of response in limited conventional situations and lacks wider cognitive implications of education".³⁰ Moreover, he says that in the training of emotions what is important is that a person should not give way to emotion or should express the emotion in an appropriate way. Peters specifically states that what he is interested in is in the "education of the emotions" rather than "training of the emotions".³¹ But conditioning and the administration of drugs, in Peters' own terms, "lacks wider cognitive implications," and sees to it "that a person should not give way to emotion or should express the emotion in an appropriate way".

27. R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, p. 188.

28. *Ibid.*

29. D.R. de Nicola, "The Education of the Emotions", in *Philosophy of Education Society*, (1971) p. 214.

30. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 88.

31. *Ibid.*

Furthermore, a critic might say that the negative approach of suppressing or controlling undesirable emotions such as hatred, envy or unwarranted anger seems permissible and rational. But anger merely suppressed would seem to harm an individual and may later erupt in destructive forms. Dearden argues that instead of suppressing such emotions, or even merely developing appropriate habits for dealing with situations that give rise to them, a better approach would be the development of understanding. He contends that understanding may even dissipate such feelings.

The second approach which Peters suggests is that used by Freud and advocated by Spinoza, namely that of bringing a person to have some kind of insight into the source of his irrationalities. This would be the method of psycho-analysis.³²

Another approach, argues Peters, is that envisaged by Spinoza — that of using an emotion to control an emotion. The most effective way of loosening the hold on us of more primitive emotions, claims Peters, is to develop what Koestler calls “self-transcending emotions”. Such self-transcending emotions include notably love, a sense of justice and a concern for truth.³³

Now, Peters gives us a reason for this. According to Peters, we interpret the world in a self-referential way; as such we see the world and others through our own hopes, fears and wishes. He thinks that this cannot be remedied even with a better understanding of ourselves. Nonetheless, in his view, the development of “self-transcending emotions” could loosen the hold on us of more primitive ones, particularly in so far as they are self-referential.³⁴

At this point I would agree with Peters that we interpret the world in a self-referential way, but I would disagree with him on the point that this could not be remedied by a better understanding of ourselves. While admitting that negative emotions could at best be eliminated by self-understanding, the possibility of transcending negative emotions through love and compassion seems plausible.

Furthermore, according to Peters, since an appraisal of a situation could give rise to a motive for action as well as an emotion, one can attempt to control the subjective intensity of an emotion by the development of appropriate action patterns. Instead of writhing with sympathy and fuming with moral indignation, one can be motivated by sympathy or moral indignation to act in appropriate ways.³⁵ For instance, instead of being overwhelmed by sympathy for the cyclone victims, one is acting in an appropriate way morally and for the dissipation of such emotions when

32. R.S. Peters, *Psychology and Ethical Development*, p. 188

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.* pp. 188 – 189.

35. *Ibid.* pp. 189.

one assists in such a situation. Presumably, instead of fuming with moral indignation at a student who has bullied another student, it would be more appropriate to help him to identify the ill-effects of his conduct. Peters insists that the educator could not evoke *any* type of motive to counter more primitive ones but rather should evoke "positive sentiments such as respect, benevolence, and the sense of justice." Furthermore, regarding certain generalized appraisals children should not only be made to understand that certain things are wrong or good, but they must also be led to see the reasons for or against such courses of action.³⁶

The Expression of Emotions

In relation to the control and canalization of passivity, the manner in which emotions are expressed becomes a relevant factor. Peters would say that the expression of emotions through speech or symbolic gesture, including the forms of art, is a form of canalization. To resort to such a course of action is to prevent oneself from being dominated by extreme emotional passivity. A canalized form of emotional expression, according to Peters, could be an intermediate situation between being affected by a passive state specific to an appraisal and a drastic form of action, which may seem to be associated with such an emotion.³⁷ A person without a way of canalizing an emotion would quiver with hate and boil with anger to such intensity as to be led to damaging and even murderous actions. How could one canalize murderous hate and anger? Modern clinical psychology e.g., gets the person to imagine a punching bag to be the hated person, and to pound it until one is exhausted. Then one can regard it all in a balanced way.

Furthermore, instead of squirming with moral indignation, it is possible to express one's emotion in a piece of satirical writing or in a composition of a poem. The technique of sublimation, according to Peters, is relevant here.³⁸ To sublimate an emotion is to direct emotional expression into avenues which would be personally meaningful as well as socially acceptable.

On the whole it could be argued that Peters gives to the emotions too peripheral a place in human life. In the main what he seems to convey is that emotions tend to disrupt a life guided by reason, and, as such, they should be brought under the control of reason. It must be admitted that emotions do often interfere with the way we reason and perceive situations. They may lead to hasty action which may be regretted later. However, to regard emotion too much under its aspect of disrupting the effectiveness of reason is to portray it as being somewhat annoyingly peripheral rather than being at the heart of human life in some kind of mutually enhancing balance with reason. Such a balance would imply a life rich with feeling *and* not lived irrationally.

L. A. Kobbekaduwa

36. *Ibid.* pp. 189 - 190.

37. *Ibid.* p. 190.

38. *Ibid.*