

## *The Problem of the Bhāvas in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*

THE problem put forward in the following pages is briefly this. In the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa there occur two different sets of enumeration of the same philosophical concept. It is argued that the two divergent enumerations are the result, not of a confusion of issues, but of the concept being viewed from two different planes. They do not, therefore, present a real contradiction. In the context of the Sāṃkhya philosophy a relationship and correspondence between the two sets could be established.

Verses 46-51 of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā recognize fifty Bhāvas; other verses of the text which refer to the Bhāvas speak of them as eight in number. Verses 23, 40, and 43 explicitly mention eight while verses 41, 42 and those that follow, which describe the nature of the subtle body, imply that they are so many.

Do these two lists of Bhāvas represent a real contradiction? What explanation of them is possible? It is a solution to this problem that is attempted in this article.

Many writers on the Sāṃkhya have not even noted this difficulty. Keith,<sup>1</sup> however, states the problem in the following terms: 'The direct connection of the states (Keith translates Bhāvas by states. We shall show later why this translation is inadequate) with nature is shown by the fact that the eight enumerated are those that have already been given as the characteristics of the Sattva and Tamas aspects of intellect. They are performance of duty and the reverse . . . '.

'The Kārikā, however, gives, beside this eightfold division which is frequently referred to, another division of fifty states, divided into four heads . . . '.

'It seems hopeless to reconcile these two lists of states: they are too much alike to be regarded as radically different, and the obvious solution of the problem is to assume that they represent a view which was held in the school, and which developed the matter in a different way. It is, however, so strange that Īśvarakṛṣṇa should have introduced the matter without any hint of the relation of the two sets of states—except the wholly misleading one that they are the same thing—that the conjecture is justified that the verses (46-51) which deal with them are a later interpolation, added at or

1. Keith, *The Sāṃkhya System*, pp. 95-97.

before the time when the last three verses were added and the statement made that the tract numbered seventy verses'.

As the discussion centres round the term *bhāva*, some preliminary explanation of the term may be necessary. Keith employs 'psychic states' to designate the Bhāvas. 'In its passage through the world, from body to body, in the course of time each soul, or spirit with its psychic body, is subject to determination, which cannot be deduced from its own nature as spirit nor from the psychic body, but must be derived directly from nature. This determination is afforded by the Bhāvas, psychic states, which are inseparably bound up with the psychic apparatus: the two go together so long as the spirit is not finally freed from the psychic apparatus. Each individual life starts with a definite equipment of states, and it adds others in its life: apparently those with which it starts exhaust themselves in the course of its life, and when it passes away and in due course a new life begins the new life carries with it the states accumulated in the last existence'.<sup>2</sup>

What the Bhāvas are is explained in general terms in verse 40 of the *Kārikā*. They are described as characterizing the subtle body or rather the subtle body is said 'to be coloured' or affected by the Bhāvas. 'The subtle body', says the *Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, 'is affected by the Bhāvas in the same manner as a garment is perfumed by contact with a fragrant *campha* flower'. The relation between the subtle body and the Bhāvas is perhaps even more picturesquely expressed by the comparison of a picture that does not stand without a ground or that of a shadow without a stake. In like manner, the subtle body does not subsist without the Bhāvas. In each of the last two comparisons, the (supporting) ground and the stake which correspond to the Bhāvas are found to be of a concrete, material and tangible character. From which it may be concluded, that the Bhāvas too have something of the nature of the concrete, material and tangible in them. This stress on their physical rather than the psychical aspect marks it out from the usage of the term in other systems of Indian thought. A second point to be observed is that the subtle body is constantly in the course of evolving, developing and transforming itself. It is an ever-active process. Thus also the Bhāvas, which are inseparable associates of the subtle body, are to be conceived of as being in the course of incessant evolution and transformation, having within them the potentiality to evolve and transform themselves. They are to be understood not as a static condition but as a dynamic process. It is not usual to seek for something concrete in the usage of the term *bhāva*. The general connotation of the term does not imply anything of that nature. It has been generally employed to denote the psychological nature of a thing sharply distinguishing it from its more material aspect. This makes it all the more

2. Keith, op. cit., p. 95.

## THE PROBLEM OF THE BHĀVAS IN THE SĀṂKHYA-KĀRIKĀ

necessary to stress its concrete nature. This together with its dynamic quality helps one to form a more complete idea of the meaning of the term.

Two objections may be raised against Keith's rendering of the term. The first is that, as the foregoing illustrations show, the Bhāvas possess something of a physical, material character and are not merely psychical. The second is that the term does not convey sufficiently clearly their functional, dynamic character. For both these reasons we would prefer to translate the term by 'dispositions', adopted by Colebrooke and followed by Wilson, which does not militate against the first notion and conveys with considerable accuracy the second.

Let us first consider the cases where reference is made to eight Bhāvas. Verse 23 describes *buddhi* as having four forms (*rūpa*) partaking of the *guṇa* of *sattva* and four forms partaking of the *guṇa* of *tamas*. They are *dharma*, virtue, performance of duty, *jñāna*, knowledge, *virāga*, dispassion and *aiśvarya*, power. The following four are their opposites: *adharmā*, vice, neglect of duty, *ajñāna*, ignorance, imperfect knowledge, *avairāgya*, passion, *anaiśvarya*, weakness. These eight are referred to as the limbs (*aṅga*) of the intellect (*buddhi*) in Gauḍapāda's commentary: 'This intellect has eight members according to the two-fold division of *sattva* and *tamas*'; and 'In this manner intellect having eight members is produced from the undifferentiated principle having the three constituent elements'.<sup>3</sup> These eight correspond to the eight Bhāvas.

This entails a discussion of Intellect, *buddhi*, and the part it plays in relation to Nature, *prakṛti*, and Self, *puruṣa*. Nature, as it works in the Sāṃkhya system, has a two-fold aspect: the physical or cosmological aspect and the psychical or intellectual development. Thus it would be necessary to see the place of Intellect in relation to those two aspects of Nature, that is, first on a cosmological plane and secondly on an intellectual plane, the latter involving some reference to Sāṃkhya epistemology.

### Cosmological aspect of Intellect

On the cosmological plane, the Sāṃkhya theory that evolution means a real transformation of the material cause into the effect logically leads to the concept of Nature as the ultimate cause of the world of objects. Nature, the ultimate cause of the world, is an unintelligent, unconscious principle, eternal and all-pervading, fine and always ready to produce the world of objects. It includes everything but the Self (or rather the Selves). It is the eternal and undifferentiated matrix of the world of non-Self which is variously known in the Sāṃkhya as *prakṛti*, *pradhāna*, *avyakta* and so forth. Nature consists of the three constituent elements of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is the unity of the

3. *sā ca buddhir-aṣṭāṅgikā sātṭvika-tāmasa-rūpabhedāt and evaṃ sātṭvikair-tāmasaiḥ svarūpairo-ṣṭāṅgā buddhis-triguṇādāvayaktād upadyate.* S.K. comm. v. 23.

elements held in equilibrium. *Guṇa*, in the Sāṃkhya, is not a mere attribute or quality but a component element.

The second fundamental notion of the Sāṃkhya is the Self or the Selves, *puruṣa*. Important as the role of Nature, *prakṛti*, in the Sāṃkhya philosophy may be, it has been rightly remarked that without an understanding of the nature of Self, it is impossible to understand the Sāṃkhya.<sup>4</sup> In two important respects the Self in the Sāṃkhya differs from the Self in other philosophical systems. It is devoid of any characteristic ; it is pure consciousness. The Self or the Selves, which in the Vedānta are treated as mere illusory manifestations of the great Self, the Brahman, are here considered real. The Self is a conscious spirit which is always the subject of Knowledge and never its object. It is not a subject with the attribute of consciousness but pure consciousness itself. Consciousness is its very essence.

It is also like a light which illuminates all that is around it. It is the 'light which illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes'.

The evolution of the world has as its starting point the contact (*saṃyoga*) between the Self and Nature. The Self alone cannot evolve because it is inactive ; Nature alone cannot because it is non-intelligent. The two principles working in co-operation evolve ; 'just as a blind man and a lame man can co-operate in order to get out of a forest, so non-intelligent Nature and inactive Self co-operate to serve their respective interests'.

With the contact between the Self and Nature, there is a disturbance in the equilibrium of the constituent elements (*guṇa*). A gradual differentiation and re-integration of the three component elements occur, and as a result of their combination in different proportions, the various objects of the world originate.

The first product of the evolution of Nature is *mahat* or *buddhi*, Intellect. The former is its cosmic aspect and the latter its psychical one. Intellect arises out of the preponderance of the constituent of *sattva* in Nature.

The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge accepts three sources of valid knowledge. They are perception, *dr̥ṣṭi*, inference, *anumāna* and authority, *āpta-vacana*. Valid knowledge is explained as the unerring cognition of some object

4. 'The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Unlike the Jaina soul possessing *ananta-jñāna*, *ananta-darśana*, and *ananta-vīrya*, the Sāṃkhya soul is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic ; but its nature is absolute pure consciousness (*cit*). The Sāṃkhya view differs from the Vedānta, firstly in that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (*ānanda*). (Citsukha's *Tattva-pradīpikā*, IV). Bliss with Sāṃkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to *prakṛti* and does not constitute the nature of soul ; according to the Vedānta the individual souls (*jīva*) are but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness, the Brahman, but according to Sāṃkhya they are all real and many'. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I, pp. 238, 239.

through the modification of Intellect which reflects the consciousness of the Self in it.

Perception is the direct cognition of an object through its contact with some sense-organ. When, for instance, an object such as the table comes in contact with the eyes, the table produces certain impressions or modifications in the sense-organ, which are analysed and synthesized by Mind, *manas*. Through the activity of the senses and Mind, Intellect becomes modified or transformed into the shape of the table.

### Psychological aspect of Intellect

This leads us naturally to the role of Intellect on the psychological plane. Intellect, together with the other two internal organs, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*, all of which are unconscious, material principles advert to every object (see vs. 35, 36 and 37). They are metaphorically conceived as warders while the rest are gates, that is the five organs of perception *buddhīndriyāṇi*, and the five organs of action *karmendriyāṇi*. The warders who are in charge of the gates, not merely open and close them, but take note of all that enters. Intellect and the other internal organs thus act through the external organs.

These last mentioned external organs, differing from one another and variously affected by the physical constituents, *guṇa*, present to the Intellect the Self's purpose, lighting it like a lamp. By the interaction of the internal and external organs, the Intellect again becomes the central point of interest. These organs, in fact, are said to have sprung up from the constituents. If they are not actually identified with them, they are at least modifications or varieties of the physical constituents. Being influenced by the constituents, the external organs begin to exert an influence upon Intellect. Thus Intellect becomes the instrument or organ which is the medium or connecting link between the other sense-organs and the Self. In other words, all ideas resulting from the interplay of the internal and external organs must pass through *buddhi*, Intellect, before they can be known to *puruṣa*, the Self, for whose interest and advantage alone, they have been assembled.

Intellect which is thus affected by the other organs, which have themselves been affected by the three constituents, performs a function of capital importance. It discriminates or draws a subtle distinction (*liṅga*) between the chief principle, *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* and the Self, *puruṣa*. Without the comprehension of this distinction the Self is incapable of enjoying itself.

The subtle distinction is conceived of as an entity, *liṅga*, the characteristics and behaviour of which are explained by a well-known comparison. (v. 42). It presents itself like a dancer (*naṭavad*), in order to fulfil the wish of the Self. 'For the sake of the Self's wish, that subtle person, through the

relation of means and consequence, with the aid of Nature's influence, presents itself like a dancer'.<sup>5</sup>

According to the above explanation, Intellect, through the interaction and influence of the physical constituents and chiefly owing to the preponderance of the constituent of *sattva*, reflects the consciousness of the Self in itself. With the reflection of the Self's consciousness in it, Intellect becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception.

But there is another explanation where Intellect is not considered the agent of perception. Intellect though modified, remains incapable of perception. Thus Vijñāna-bhikṣu may certainly be right when he says that Intellect which is modified into the form of the object reflects it again in the Self. Thus after a reciprocal reflection the object is finally presented to the Self. Such a view is perfectly consistent with the cardinal notion of pure Sāṃkhya where Nature is conceived of as an unconscious, unintelligent and unperceiving principle while the Self is gifted with the power of consciousness. There is no reason to maintain that any development of Nature, any outcome of it such as Intellect, should be considered otherwise.

With these preliminary remarks on the part played by Intellect, we could proceed to ascertain more closely the nature of the Bhāvas—'dispositions'. Intellect is one of the eight primary, productive elements, *prakṛti*. The first of them all, *mūlaprakṛti* or 'Root-prakṛti', is not produced; it is the producer of the other seven, which partake of the nature of producing and produced.<sup>6</sup>

Thus Intellect is produced by the 'Root-prakṛti' and it in turn produces *ahamkāra* or Egotism. It is the producing aspect of Intellect that is interesting here and it is in this connection that the eight dispositions which are called limbs (*aṅga*) of Intellect are mentioned.

In verse 40, where reference is made to the subtle body which is composed of Intellect and the other subtle principles<sup>7</sup> and 'coloured with the dispositions',<sup>8</sup> and migrates, it is the eight dispositions that are described.

Verse 43 of the *Kārikā* proposes a classification of the Bhāvas into three groups, namely: (i) *sāmsiddhika*, (ii) *prākṛtika* and (iii) *vaiṅkṛtika*, which partake of the nature of cause or instrument *karanāśrayiṇaḥ* and effect *kāryāśrayiṇaḥ*. These three divisions constitute the producing and the produced aspects, the cause and the effect, of evolution. Indeed, it is such a two-fold division that is recognized by Vācaspati who very clearly reduces the two divisions of Gauḍapāda into two, in the following manner: (i) *svābhāvika* and (ii) *vaiṅkṛtika* or *naimittika*. He identifies *sāmsiddhika* and *prākṛtika*

5. S.K. v. 42.

6. *mūla-prakṛti avikṛtir-mahadādyāḥ prakṛti-vikṛtayah saptah*, S.K. v. 3.

7. *mahadādi-sūkṣma-paryantam* . . . S.K. v. 40.

8. *bhāvair-adhivāsitam* . . . S.K. v. 40.

with the first group.<sup>9</sup> It will be seen that the former of these divisions correspond to the instrumental causes and the latter to the produced effects of evolution. The first is the means which produces the second, the consequences. The eight dispositions are spoken of regarding the first category as the commentary to verse 43 explains: 'Consequently, there are eight dispositions, namely: virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion and weakness. Where do they abide? They are considered appurtenant to the instrument'.<sup>10</sup>

In quite clear and unmistakable terms the commentary speaks of other dispositions besides the eight-fold classification. These are the physical dispositions, or more correctly the resultant products of the instrumental ones. They are regarded as corporeal. 'Effect corresponds to body. The uterine germ and the rest belong to it; those which are born of the mother, the germ and the rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the muscle and the rest, which are (generated) for the development of the infant in the union of the blood and the seminal fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth and old-age are produced, the instrumental causes of which are food and beverage; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect (or of the body) having as the instrumental cause, the fruition of the sensuous pleasures of eating and the like'.<sup>11</sup>

It is by a disparity of the influence and interplay of the three elements of the producing, evolving creation, *pratyaya-sarga*, that a division of fifty dispositions is obtained. The development takes place in the following manner. There is the producing, evolving creation that is characterized by eight Bhāvas. Upon this is brought to bear the influence of the three constituents, *guṇa*; these three do not exert a uniform influence on the producing, evolving creation. The effect of this varying and unequal influence of the constituents acting upon the developing creation is to bring about a further sub-division of it. The eight-fold creation becomes, in effect, fifty; it results in fifty modifications of the former eight. Those fifty dispositions thus brought about are not of the nature of producing but are produced, not the instrument but the result, not the cause but the effect, (*kāryāśrayiṇaḥ*). The producing, evolving creation is four-fold (I) *viṣayaya*, obstruction (= *ajñāna*, (Vācaspati) and = *saṃśaya*

9. *vaiṅkṛtikā naimittikā prakṛtikāḥ sāmsiddhikā bhāvāḥ svābhāvika itī* . . . S.K. comm. v. 43.

10. . . . *evam aṣṭau dharmo jñānam vairāgyamaśvāryam-adharmo jñānam-avairāgyam-anaiśvāryam ityaṣṭau bhāvāḥ kva variante dṛṣṭāḥ karanāśrayiṇo buddhiḥ karanam tadāśrayiṇaḥ* . . . S.K. comm. v. 43.

11. *kāryam dehāstadāśrayaḥ kalalādyā ye mātṛjā ityuktāḥ śukraśonitasamyoge viwrāhi-hetukāḥ kalalādyā budbuda-māmsa-peśi-prabhṛtayah/ tathā kaumāra-yauvana-sthavīra-tvādayo bhāvā anna-pāna-rasa-nimittā nispadyanta atihāḥ kāryāśrayiṇa ucyaṅta annādi-viśaya-bhoga-nimittā jāyante/ nimittā-naimittika-prasāngeneti yaduktamatrocyaṅte//*

(Gauḍapāda)), (2) *aśakti*, disability ; (3) *tuṣṭi*, acquiescence and (4) *siddhi*, perfection. Obstruction is five-fold, disability is twenty-eight-fold, acquiescence is nine-fold and perfection is eight-fold, the whole totalling fifty. ' By the unequal influence of the constituents of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* acting on this four-fold producing creation there are fifty modifications of it ; and these kinds in which severally *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* prevail and the other two are subordinate, are next particularized '.<sup>12</sup>

Now the correspondence of the eight dispositions to the fifty is demonstrated in the following manner. Seven of the first group of eight, associated with Intellect, correspond to the five obstructions, the twenty-eight disabilities and the nine satisfactions or acquiescences. The eighth, Knowledge, corresponds to the eight perfections. These last-mentioned are directly concerned with the helping of the Self to obtain final release. Although Nature makes efforts, in diverse ways, to effect the release of the Self, there is only one means by which she can succeed, and that is by knowledge. The other seven dispositions keep the Self bound, only knowledge sets it free. Thus a reconciliation of the two sets of dispositions has been attempted by one of the commentators : ' There, in obstruction, disability and satisfaction are comprised the seven intellectual faculties, virtue and so forth : all except knowledge which is comprehended in perfection '.<sup>13</sup>

Verses 46-51 of the *Kārikā* may or may not be an interpolation. There is no valid reason, however, to presume that they are. The treatment of the two sets of dispositions both in the text and in the commentary suggests that, in spite of the two divergent sets being recognized which operate on two different planes, the *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* developments, that is in their producing and produced aspects, yet, in essence, they are not different. They are different insofar as they represent two different aspects of the same phenomenon. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's tacit introduction of the subject without any apparent hostility towards one or the other view renders it likely that the two views represented two independent schools of thought, which were not, however, mutually exclusive. The first school might have tended to emphasize the developing aspect of creation and thus studied the eight dispositions. The second school, on the other hand, might have been more concerned with examining the nature of the developed aspect of creation and so naturally treated the dispositions as fifty in number.

12. *evam-asya caturvidasya pratyayasargasya guṇa-vaiṣamya-vimarde tasya bhedāstu pañcāsat yo'yam sattva-rajas-tamo-guṇa-vaiṣamyo-vimardah tena tasya pratyasya pañcāsat bhedā bhavanti*// S.K. comm. v. 46.

13. *tatra viparyayā-śakti-tuṣṭiṣu yathāyogaṃ sapṭānāṃ dharmādīnāṃ jñānavarjjamantarbhāvah siddhau ca jñānasyeti. Sāṃkhya-tattva-kauṃudī. S.K. p. 197.*

Two points deserve to be stressed in conclusion. The first is the producing and produced aspects of evolution, the *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* developments. The Sāṃkhya philosophy is known as a *sat-kārya-vāda*, that is a philosophy which teaches that the effect is potentially contained in the cause. A cloth is not really different from the threads, nor a statue from the stone, nor a table from the wood, and so on. But threads can never become a cloth nor stone a statue nor wood a table, without an intervening process, a transformation. It is this transformation, this course of incessant evolution and development which must be borne in mind. It is only when conceived as a process or movement that the full implication of the expression *sat-kārya-vāda* can be comprehended. It is rather to be conceived as a course of development, a movement, wherein certain forces and principles are at play, and not as certain entities bringing about a new movement. The Sāṃkhya teaching is only intelligible when Nature has started its course of evolution and transformation. The dispositions too, are to be viewed in the context of this evolution and transformation of Nature. The second consideration is that, in both stages of evolution, the dispositions possess a physical character. In neither of them are they purely psychical. They are, in some sense matter-stuff. The producing, evolving stage is termed *pratyaya-sarga*, sometimes rendered as ' intellectual creation ', where the dispositions have a body-mind character, that is sharing both physical and psychical attributes. The evolved, produced state is termed *bhūta-sarga*, rendered as ' physical creation '. That stage may be of an entirely physical character though here one is confronted with the difficulty that it is also termed *tanmātra-sarga* where the interpretation of *tanmātra*, in itself, presents a problem. Yet, in either case, the expression psychical states would be inadequate. The dispositions have to be understood as possessing the character of both body and mind, that is, both physical and psychical. Only such a synthetic view enables one to get a more accurate understanding of the Bhāvas and to resolve an apparent contradiction.

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APPENDIX I

TABLE SHOWING TWO GROUPS OF BHĀVAS MENTIONED IN THE SĀM-  
KHYA-KĀRIKĀ—

Bhāvas	S.K. verses	Comm.
8 Bhāvas (explicit)	23, 40, 43	43.
8 Bhāvas (implicit)	41, 42	
50 Bhāvas (explicit)	46, 47, 48 49, 50, 51	46.
50 Bhāvas (implicit)		43.

APPENDIX II

TABLE SHOWING CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN 8 AND 50 BHĀVAS—

8 Bhāvas	50 Bhāvas	9 tuṣṭi
	5 viparyaya	
	28 aśakti	
	= 11 indriya-vadha	
	17 buddhi-vadha	
1. dharma	1. bādhirya	1. prakṛti
2. vairāgya	2. andhatā	2. upādāna
3. aiśvarya	3. praśupti	3. kāla
4. adharma	4. upahvika	4. bhāgya
5. ajñāna	5. āghrānapāka	5. śabda- viśayoparama
6. avairāgya	6. mūkatā	6. sparsā-
7. anaiśvarya	7. kuṇitva	7. rūpa-
	8. khānjya	8. rasa-
	9. gudāvarta	9. gandha-
	10. klaivya	
	11. unmāda, etc., etc.	
8. jñāna	8 siddhi	
	1. anādhyātmika	
	2. anādhibhautika	
	3. anādhidaivika	
	4. ūha	
	5. śabda	
	6. adhyayana	
	7. suhṛt-prāpti	
	8. dāna	

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Reviews

*History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas.* By A. L. Basham, pp. xxxii + 304.  
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Even a cursory glance over the volume under review will convince any one that the history of Indian religion is a most fruitful field to the student of cultural history or anthropology, or comparative religion, for continued investigation. Any such course in research, if conducted with the usual scientific spirit of objectivity and freedom from prejudice, is bound to result in valuable conclusions. And how much could be achieved by an impartial and scientific investigation of this nature even in such an out-of-the-way field as the history of that queer sect of Indian *religieux*, the Ājīvikas (or Ājīvakas), hardly familiar to students of Comparative Religion outside the group of Indologists, is well demonstrated by this admirable study by Dr. Basham. He reconstructs the history of this little known sect 'with much skill and scholarly thoroughness', to use the words employed by Dr. Barnett in his interesting foreword to the work. The author has distinctly succeeded in bringing to light from underneath the debris of a discarded and forgotten creed and exposed to scientific view ideas and doctrines of inestimable value for the accurate reconstruction of the complete History of Indian Religion, yet to be written. No reader of this book will fail to agree with Dr. Barnett that the story that is here narrated is indeed a highly interesting and instructive chapter in the vast record of Indian thought. Its great importance both to Indologists and to students of religion and culture needs no further emphasis.

A very important point that emerges from Dr. Basham's study is that the records of the Ājīvika and other 'heretical' doctrines contained in the Pali Canon are not so fictitious as imagined by certain critics. As so well pointed out by Dr. Basham they suffer no doubt by the inevitable *odium theologicum* natural with such religious documents. But a comparative study based on all the sources, as done by the author, namely the Pali, Sanskrit, Prakrit and Dravidian literature as well as epigraphical records, reveals a degree of consistency that definitely does credit to the sources, particularly the Pali ones. Thus Dr. Basham regards the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya as his *locus classicus* and the amount of support that that record gains by a comparison with other sources, particularly the Dravidian, must impress students of cultural history with regard to the general value of the Pali Canon as a reliable historical document, at least in the sphere of religious ideas.

The author has taken great pains to make his thesis as comprehensive as possible and does not fail to notice even the most insignificant contributions to the subject by previous scholars. But the main criticism is based on the pioneer works of Hoernle and Barua in this little known subject. No reader will fail to be impressed by the definite advance the present author has made on the existing knowledge regarding the *history* of the Ājīvikas. In fact, it is in this particular aspect that Dr. Basham's contribution stands out clearly against all past studies.

The cautious manner in which he extracts a kernel of 'historical truth' from the mass of vague and often legendary data, particularly in Chapter III, is certainly striking. Although this is the main objective of the author, he has not neglected the *doctrines* of the sect. The last 75 pages deal with the literature and the philosophy of Ājīvikism, and students of Indian philosophy will find much that is valuable in Dr. Basham's brief but lucid presentation.

APPENDIX I

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KHYA-KĀRIKĀ—

Bhāvas	S.K. verses	Comm.
8 Bhāvas (explicit)	23, 40, 43	43.
8 Bhāvas (implicit)	41, 42	
50 Bhāvas (explicit)	46, 47, 48 49, 50, 51	46.
50 Bhāvas (implicit)		43.

APPENDIX II

TABLE SHOWING CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN 8 AND 50 BHĀVAS—

8 Bhāvas	5 viparyaya	28 aśakti = 11 indriya-vadha 17 buddhi-vadha	9 tuṣṭi
1. dharma	1. tama	1. bādhirya	1. prakṛti
2. vairāgya	2. moha	2. andhatā	2. upādāna
3. aiśvarya	3. mahā-moha	3. praśupti	3. kāla
4. adharma	4. tāmisra	4. upahvika	4. bhāgya
5. ajñāna	5. andha-tāmisra	5. āghrāṇapāka	5. śabda- viśayoparama
6. avairāgya		6. mūkatā	6. sparśa-
7. anaiśvarya		7. kuṇitva	7. rūpa-
		8. khānjya	8. rasa-
		9. gudāvarta	9. gandha-
		10. klaivya	
		11. unumāda, etc., etc.	
8. jñāna		8 siddhi	
		1. anādhyātmika	
		2. anādhibhautika	
		3. anādhidaivika	
		4. ūha	
		5. śabda	
		6. adhyayana	
		7. suhṛt-prāpti	
		8. dāna	

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ANANDA S. KULASURIYA

Reviews

*History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas*. By A. L. Basham, pp. xxxii + 304.  
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Even a cursory glance over the volume under review will convince any one that the history of Indian religion is a most fruitful field to the student of cultural history or anthropology, or comparative religion, for continued investigation. Any such course in research, if conducted with the usual scientific spirit of objectivity and freedom from prejudice, is bound to result in valuable conclusions. And how much could be achieved by an impartial and scientific investigation of this nature even in such an out-of-the-way field as the history of that queer sect of Indian *religieux*, the Ājīvikas (or Ājīvakas), hardly familiar to students of Comparative Religion outside the group of Indologists, is well demonstrated by this admirable study by Dr. Basham. He reconstructs the history of this little known sect 'with much skill and scholarly thoroughness', to use the words employed by Dr. Barnett in his interesting foreword to the work. The author has distinctly succeeded in bringing to light from underneath the debris of a discarded and forgotten creed and exposed to scientific view ideas and doctrines of inestimable value for the accurate reconstruction of the complete History of Indian Religion, yet to be written. No reader of this book will fail to agree with Dr. Barnett that the story that is here narrated is indeed a highly interesting and instructive chapter in the vast record of Indian thought. Its great importance both to Indologists and to students of religion and culture needs no further emphasis.

A very important point that emerges from Dr. Basham's study is that the records of the Ājīvika and other 'heretical' doctrines contained in the Pali Canon are not so fictitious as imagined by certain critics. As so well pointed out by Dr. Basham they suffer no doubt by the inevitable *odium theologicum* natural with such religious documents. But a comparative study based on all the sources, as done by the author, namely the Pali, Sanskrit, Prakrit and Dravidian literature as well as epigraphical records, reveals a degree of consistency that definitely does credit to the sources, particularly the Pali ones. Thus Dr. Basham regards the Sāmaññaphala Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya as his *locus classicus* and the amount of support that that record gains by a comparison with other sources, particularly the Dravidian, must impress students of cultural history with regard to the general value of the Pali Canon as a reliable historical document, at least in the sphere of religious ideas.

The author has taken great pains to make his thesis as comprehensive as possible and does not fail to notice even the most insignificant contributions to the subject by previous scholars. But the main criticism is based on the pioneer works of Hoernle and Barua in this little known subject. No reader will fail to be impressed by the definite advance the present author has made on the existing knowledge regarding the *history* of the Ājīvikas. In fact, it is in this particular aspect that Dr. Basham's contribution stands out clearly against all past studies.

The cautious manner in which he extracts a kernel of 'historical truth' from the mass of vague and often legendary data, particularly in Chapter III, is certainly striking. Although this is the main objective of the author, he has not neglected the *doctrines* of the sect. The last 75 pages deal with the literature and the philosophy of Ājīvikism, and students of Indian philosophy will find much that is valuable in Dr. Basham's brief but lucid presentation.

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The doctrine of *Niyati*, Fate or Destiny, is certainly the central concept of Ājīvikism and Dr. Basham quite appropriately devotes the whole of Chapter XII to a discussion of this important theory. He starts with the Sāmaññaphala Sutta reference to 'Niyati-saṅgati-bhāva' and deals as exhaustively as the data permit with the later history of this concept, even up to the Dravidian documents of the late mediaeval period. Of the possible sources of this doctrine of Fatalism, however, the author's discussion is all too brief. The references to the Suśruta Saṁhitā and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad on pp. 228-9 are obviously not meant as an explanation of 'origins'. For Dr. Basham one possible source of Ājīvika Fatalism may be found in the Aryan epic tradition with its doomed hero (e.g. Karṇa in the Mahābhārata) and the other in the lot of the peasant in the Ganges Valley with his crops ruined by storm or drought and his livestock dying of pestilence. 'Probably both elements, as well as the personal genius of Makkhali Gosāla and of others, contributed to the finished Ājīvika doctrine'. It is a pity that the author did not continue the investigation further along these two lines, particularly in the latter. Not only the Mahābhārata but the Rāmāyaṇa in its conception of 'Kāla', etc. offers much data on Fatalist doctrines. References to the actual word *Niyati* in ancient Sanskrit texts may be few (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa, etc.), but concepts of fatalistic nature are not so rare. Special reference could be made to the Atharva Veda notion of 'diṣṭa' (XII. 3. 55, 60; X. 3. 16) which undoubtedly refers to some crude form of Fatalism. Both in the heroic tradition and in the lot of the peasant it is the idea of the hopelessness of man's situation in the face of the inevitable, particularly Death, that leads to the notion 'Human effort is ineffectual'. The Atharva Veda employs 'diṣṭa' to mean what is 'decreed' or 'inevitable', particularly, as referring to the life span of mortals, and, as Griffith has translated, it means Destiny, a notion present also in the Kāla Hymns of the Atharva Veda (particularly XIX, 53 and 54). The root *diś* means to *regulate* or *decree*, and it is significant, as Dr. Basham himself shows (p. 281), that the Pāñcarātra system included both *dik* and *kāla* under *Niyati*. It is not without significance here to point out that 'Yama' and 'Kāla' are synonymously used in contexts referring to the inevitable end of all existence and that it is the same root *yam* (control, regulate) which gives both 'Niyati' and 'Yama'. It is generally agreed that the Atharva Veda is to a great extent a record of the popular beliefs current in the eastern parts of India. As Bloomfield and others argued, some of the Atharvavedic concepts may be even anterior to those of the Ṛgveda. If so, it is highly probable, in view of what I have said above, that the notion of Destiny and therefore also the theory of Determinism, had their origins among the peasants of the East without the influence of Ṛgvedic Aryanism. Thus the historical origins of Ājīvikism and perhaps of most religions that arose in the East of India may fall outside the pale of Ṛgveda Aryanism, although there was a 'syncretic' stage later on. This certainly is a line of thought worth pursuing and must be left to future research.

These suggestions, however, need not be taken as detracting in any way from the great value of Dr. Basham's comprehensive study of Ājīvikism. It is a work of great merit reflecting sound scholarship and sober judgement. Few works have appeared during recent years in the field of Indology to merit comparison with this treatise, especially in point of critical research. It is indeed a noteworthy contribution to the subject.

The volume is adorned by several apt illustrations, two maps, a complete bibliography and a most helpful index. And the printing along with the general get-up leaves nothing to be desired.