

IV

THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY

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The public service in Sri Lanka has been the focal point of a considerable body of literature in the recent past. Much of this literature, however, has been devoted to an examination of the colonial roots of the service and to an analysis of its structural arrangements.¹ Less has been said of the role of the bureaucracy in the socio-political process of the country—indeed, there has yet to be a full length study of the bureaucracy placed within the context of the developmental goals sought by governments in power.² The present essay is in no way intended to fill this void; it has been conceived far less ambitiously, to survey briefly the principal factors which need to be considered if the role of the bureaucracy in the socio-political process of Sri Lanka is to be properly evaluated.³

The key question which has been debated for long in the island is whether the bureaucracy could be effectively used to realise the aspirations of a politically awakened people. If this question is asked from a representative politician, the answer would be unhesitatingly in the negative. Indeed, the view that the bureaucracy is innately unsympathetic to the aspirations of the people and utterly incapable of innovation is widely held and the term bureaucracy used in this context has acquired

1. Of the many writings concerned with these aspects, particular reference could be made to the following: R. N. Kearney, 'Ceylon: The Contemporary Bureaucracy', in R. Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*; (Duke University Press, Durham, N. C. 1960), pp. 485-549; A. J. Wilson, 'Public Administration in Ceylon', in S. S. Hsueh (ed.) *Public Administration in South and South East Asia*, (International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels 1962), pp. 199-240; W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, *Civil Service Administration in Ceylon*, (Government Press, Colombo 1974). For a discussion of the more recent changes introduced in the public service see, V. Samaraweera, 'The Administration and the Judicial System', in K. M. de Silva (ed.), *Sri Lanka, A Survey* (London, C. Hurst, for Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg), forthcoming.
2. A recent report on Sri Lanka by a mission organised by the International Labour Office placed great emphasis on the role of the bureaucracy in the achievement of developmental goals. See, *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon, Report*, (International Labour Office, Geneva 1971), ch. 10. The role of the bureaucracy in the socio-political process has been examined rather perfunctorily in C. R. Hensmar (ed.), *The Public Service and the People*, (Colombo: Community Institute Pamphlets no 3, 1963), and R. N. Kearney, in his recent *The Politics of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London 1973), discusses in some detail the place of the bureaucracy in the political process of the island.
3. The present essay draws heavily on the material collected by the writer on the basis of interviews with administrative officials but for obvious reasons the sources will remain anonymous.

a derogatory meaning.⁴ In the years immediately after independence the blame for this was placed on the nature of the structure and the complexion of the bureaucracy which the nation inherited: an institution built up during colonial times to perform 'colonial functions' of maintaining order and collecting revenue was necessarily insensitive to the changing needs of the administration, especially relating to economic development and social welfare. Whatever the validity of this view, the important factor to note is that it generated a movement towards reform and provided the rationale for re-structuring of the bureaucracy: as a government appointed commission of inquiry put it, there was 'the need to reorganise the Public Service, to rid it of its so-called colonial attitudes and to make it a dynamic organization for giving effect to the will of the people through the elected representatives'.⁵ Several measures of bureaucratic reform were undertaken and among them were crucial steps like the abolition of the Civil Service and the establishment of the Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) Administrative Service and the ending of the Headmen System and the assimilation of the village administration to the central administrative structure, but the criticisms of the bureaucracy were not abated and the debate whether the bureaucracy serves the people or not continued. Why?

The structural changes brought about in the public service in 1963 with the creation of a broad-based unified administrative service were almost universally applauded. Care was taken, so it was announced at that time, that the obnoxious and unsatisfactory features of the old Civil Service were not duplicated in the new service but evidence accumulated since then casts doubts about it. To be sure, the *elite* cadre is now recruited from a much broader social background, a background which is certainly more representative of the wider society in the island; a rump of the old Civil Service might remain but the higher bureaucracy cannot be characterised, as it was once, as the 'last bastion' of the English educated *elite*.⁶ The *swabasha*-educated now dominate the service but to a great many observers there is still a lamentable lack of commitment to the cause of the public within the bureaucracy and in fact the inevitable question has been posed as to whether the bureaucracy as an institution possesses inherent qualities which moulds the recruits in a particular fashion so that they become alienated from the public they are required to serve. There is no doubt that 'Red-tapism' and centralised control continues to inhibit the bureaucracy, preventing it from innovating and dealing in a flexible manner with the public. Much more important is the contention that the new bureaucracy is still governed by the norms of the abolished Civil Service, norms which are insensitive and inimical to the needs of contemporary times. Thus, to take but two examples, the continued reliance placed on the administrative generalist in the service and the prominent position still held by examinations in the recruitment of officials have been often

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4. See, the speeches at successive parliamentary debates on the annual Appropriation Bills as reported in the *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)* volumes. The budget debates have become almost ritualistic occasions for political attacks on the bureaucracy.
 5. Report of the Salaries and Cadres Commission, 1958-61, *Sessional Paper III* of 1961, p. 10.
 6. Cf. H. Abhayavardhana, *et al.*, *The Role of the Western Educated Elite*, (Community Institute Pamphlets, Colombo) : no. 2, 1962.

decried. Equally importantly, the new administrative service seems to be afflicted with the effects of what could be described as a split-personality. The new service was so structured that there would be mobility within the whole public service—direct recruitment, from among young university graduates, was retained but provision was made for the absorption of personnel from the lower rungs—and it was hoped that this would pave the way for an integration of the lower and higher strata of the public service, while eliminating a primary cause of discontent among those who did not belong to the Civil Service. But, a situation soon arose where a division between the direct recruits and others emerged within the service and the direct recruits are now accused of assuming the *elitist* posture which once characterised the Civil Service personnel.⁷

The basic problem seems to lie in the fact that there is still confusion in the minds of the public as well as among the bureaucrats as to what precise role the bureaucracy should play in the administration. Is the bureaucrat a 'servant' of the people or of the government, assuming of course that the interests of the people and the government (defined here as a group wielding state power) do not invariably coincide? This is more than a merely rhetorical question. That multiple images of the bureaucrat exists cannot be doubted. As one 'Public Servant' wrote, a bureaucrat is at different times looked upon by the public as:

- (a) a perverse God who must be propitiated
- (b) a recalcitrant ass that must be driven
- (c) a privileged snob, impossible to get the better of
- (d) a lazy hound, impossible to bring to book, and
- (e) (occasionally) a hardworked, underpaid and harassed official doing his best under difficult circumstances'.⁸

It is arguable that the bureaucrat in Sri Lanka was always a highly visible figure; he never functioned in 'cold anonymity'. This was certainly true of the colonial civil servants. The role they were required to play, especially at the centres away from the capital not only by the very nature of the structure of the administration but perhaps even by the people whom they were ruling, was that of a 'benevolent despot'.⁹ With the national politicians increasingly assuming control of the administration, attempts were made to curb the powers which the civil servants wielded and transform them to the status of more regular administrators but there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the old image lingered on among the people, not only during the late colonial

7. The division between the direct recruits and others is most evident in the respective membership of the two principle trade unions formed by the members of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service. The Sri Lanka Administrative Service Association is dominated by the direct recruits and is acknowledged to represent the interests of the direct recruits and the Sri Lanka Administrative Service Union draws heavily on the others for its membership and has been agitating causes which favour this group.

8. Annon., 'The Public Servant : A Self-Portrait and a Self-Criticism', in Hensman (ed.), *The Public Service and the People*, pp. 38-48. This is indeed a most revealing essay.

9. See the revealing memoir, Leonard Woolf, *Growing: An Autobiography of the Years 1904-1914*. (Hogarth Press, London) : 1961.

times but also after independence.¹⁰ It is no surprise that in time to come this image conflicted with and ran counter to the developments which took place within and without the bureaucracy. For one, with the government entering new areas of activity, the work of the bureaucrats expanded apace and encompassed hitherto untouched subjects. This and structural changes brought about at the district level, in particular the complexity which arose with the setting up of numerous agencies of highly centralised departments which radiated from the capital, tended to place a greater distance between the bureaucrat and the public and a sharply impersonal relationship between them developed. This was perhaps more so in areas where specialised technical officials took over from the purely managerial officer and in fact entry of the technical officials introduced a new dimension into the relations between the bureaucrats and the public, for problems and tension cropped up between the administrator and the technical man.¹¹ Of equal importance in the changing nature of the relationship is the growth of trade unionism in the public service: the bureaucrat is no longer a silent and pliant 'servant' of the public and the government; he has his own distinct interests, relating either to his career or his political convictions, and these interests he has endeavoured to advance in a determined fashion.¹²

The bureaucrats have been often accused of lack of a sense of occasion. The public service, as a number of studies have shown, has always held a very high occupational value in the island¹³ but over the last decade and half or so, with the expansion of the activities of the state and the noticeable contraction of the private sector, even greater demands have been made for opportunities in the administration as almost the only realistic avenue of employment open to the rapidly growing national labour pool. The recruitment of either ill-equipped or over-qualified personnel has taken place, hardly the type of persons, it could be argued, who would develop a sense of vocation; and, as an official committee reported in 1966 (and this still holds true), 'there is no special incentive to one in the Public Service to make a special effort under the present conditions (and) it is hardly surprising that the public service is neither enterprising nor dynamic in this context'.¹⁴ Moreover, until recently, by

10. Here the case of much revered H. R. Freeman who for long represented Anuradhapura in the State Council after his retirement as the Government Agent there could be cited. For the post independent period see, V. A. J. Senaratne, 'Some Aspects of Provincial Administration in Ceylon', in Hensman (ed.), *The Public Service and the People*, pp. 91-6. See also the two novels by Leel Gunasekera, *Pethsama* (the Petition), (Saman Prakasakayo, Maharagama: 1961), and *Ahsana* (the Signature), (Saman Prakasakayo, Maharagama: 1963), which deal with the problems of the peasants and the attitudes of the peasants towards the bureaucracy. Gunasekera was a member of the Civil Service at the time he wrote these novels.
11. See, Bradman Weerakoon, 'Role of the Administrators in the Context of a Changing Agrarian Situation: A District Point of View', *Ceylon Studies Seminar*, 1973 series, no. 7, mimeographed paper, pp. 2-4 and *Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations*, pp. 158-9.
12. See, R. H. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon*, (University of California Press Los Angeles), 1971.
13. See for example, B. Ryan, 'Status, Achievement and Education in Ceylon', *Journal of Asian Studies*, XX (1961), 463-66, and 'Attitudes of Undergraduates', in *Matching Employment and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon, Technical Papers*, (International Labour Office, Geneva): pp. 147-51.
14. Report of the Committee on Administrative Reforms, *Sessional Paper IX* of 1966, p. 17, quoted in Kearney, *The Politics of Ceylon*, p. 77.

and large the administrative officials were not provided opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of new management tools. This has been remedied to a considerable extent with the establishment in 1966 of the Academy of Administrative Studies by the government.¹⁵ But, it is doubtful whether a mere knowledge of new (and perhaps too sophisticated) tools in administration would turn out a new type of bureaucrat, one who is deeply committed. For one, transferability still persists, despite efforts on the part of some heads of departments to retain experienced officials to prevent disruption of operations; increasingly it has been realised, though no action has been taken as yet, that regular transfer of officials between departments has helped to produce that classic figure, 'Jack of all trades and master of none'. Moreover, there is still a lack of awareness and understanding among the generality of the bureaucrats of the purpose and activities of particular governments in power. This is indeed a formidable problem and deserves separate examination.

The public service has been described as the most modern (or westernized) sector of the island¹⁶ but its performance, by all accounts, has in no way matched or equalled that of the less modern sectors. It has failed to function as an innovating agent in administration: no personality comparable to, say, C. V. Brayne, the official who made a crucial breakthrough in the land policy in the 1930s¹⁷, has emerged. Equally, as it has been often pointed out, the old civil service tradition of scholarship has died; the occasional novelist there might be but no substantial contribution to the study of the islands' history and society has come from the public service in the recent past. The bureaucracy has been subjected to heavy criticism over the last two decades—it is interesting to note the emergence of a whole new genre of Sinhala fiction writing with the 'alienated' 'bureaucrat' as the central theme—¹⁸ and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that it is in a beleaguered state. The strongest attacks are from politicians (it is noteworthy that in Sri Lanka fewer politicians have come from a bureaucratic background); the repeated warnings that ill-considered criticism serves only to embitter the public service have not been heeded. The criticisms are there and perhaps are to a certain extent justifiable but it cannot be said that the bureaucracy has totally failed. The Salaries and Cadres Commission of 1958-61, which made perhaps the most exhaustive study of the public service yet, commented that it cannot be 'said to have failed the people it serves'¹⁹ and the role the bureaucracy played during traumatic events like the communal riots of 1958 and the 1971 insurrection amply demonstrated (in the latter case to some who were strongly sceptical) its value.²⁰

15. For the work of this institution see, *The Academy of Administrative Studies* (Colombo: Administrative Training Division, General Treasury, n.d.)

16. Kearney, 'Ceylon: The Contemporary Bureaucracy', in Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems*, p. 503.

17. On Brayne see, V. K. Samaraweera, 'Land Policy and Peasant Colonization, 1914-1948', in K. M. de Silva (ed.), University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. III (Colombo, 1973) pp. 450-1.

18. See, for example, Gunadasa Amarasekera's novel, *Gandhabba Apadanaya* (Sarasavi Printers, Gampaha, 1964) and Henry Jayasena's play, *Janelaya* (window), (n.p., Dehiwela, 1964).

19. *Sessional Paper III* of 1961, p. 11.

20. Kearney, *The Politics of Ceylon*, p. 76. See also below, note 31.

It is quite evident that the bureaucracy neither relished nor cared for the innovating role some observers felt it should play and it does not now act as a catalyst of change. A senior bureaucrat wrote recently that 'in the modern situation... the catalytic function is being performed more and more by political authorities and that the administrators work consists largely in the functions of linking the old with the new, of smoothing over the transition and in a general sense keeping the system in some kind of equilibrium'.²¹ This is an image to which perhaps a large number of other bureaucrats would subscribe and certainly the politicians would unreservedly accept it. In fact, what has occurred is not only the retreat of the bureaucrat to the background in favour of the politician but also a domination of the bureaucracy by the politicians, trend always seen in independent Sri Lanka. The public service, so the makers of the island's first constitution intended, should be insulated from political interference. The device they adopted, the setting up of an autonomous Public Service Commission charged with the recruitment and control of the public servants, never really succeeded in checking overt interference in the public service—as early as 1950 the Commission complained of the 'burden' of 'extraneous influences'—²² and in fact it was soon reduced to a mere 'rubber stamp' of the wishes of the politicians in power. The Public Service Commission was abolished by the 1972 constitution—its passing away was hardly bemoaned—and a much more realistic position now exists with the cabinet of ministers being vested with the authority for recruitment and disciplinary control of the public servants.

The argument that the bureaucracy should be subjected to political control is based primarily on the strongly held view that the bureaucracy inherently generates implacable opposition to those who wield state power. While this view is stated as a general principle from a neo-Maxian standpoint—there cannot be 'neutral' public servants, so it is argued—it has also assumed a particular perspective. It has been widely held that in the immediate post independence period, in the years when the United National Party formed the government, bureaucrats and their political masters were 'connected not only in manner and ideals but also in kinship' and that when another government came into power in 1956 with a different political complexion, it had to face the hostility of the bureaucracy.²³ This view cannot be entirely dismissed but it is worth noting that the relations between the UNP government and the bureaucracy were far from smooth all the time.²⁴ On the other hand, it could be established that in the case of every government which has been formed in the island,

21. Weerakoon, 'The Role of the Administration in the Context of a Changing Agrarian Situation', *Ceylon Studies Seminar*, 1973 series, no 7, pp. 1-2.

22. Annual Report of the Public Service Commission 1950, *Sessional Paper XVI* of 1951, p. 11. It is worth recalling here that the pre-independent administration under the Donoughmore Constitution encouraged direct interference in the work of the administrators by the legislators. See, Wisva Warnapala, *Civil Service Administration*, pp. 75ff.

23. S. D. Saparamadu, introduction to Leonard Woolf, 'Diaries in Ceylon, 1908-1911', *Ceylon Historical Journal*, IX (1959/60), p. xxii; Hensman (ed.), *The Public Service and the people*, p. 65.

24. Interview with M. Rajendra by C. R. de Silva, 6 May 1974. I am grateful to Dr. C. R. de Silva for allowing me the use of this material.

there has been a significant group of officials belonging to the higher bureaucracy who had close kinship and other social ties with the politicians in control.²⁵ Therefore, it is perhaps more realistic to look at this reasoning as a rationale for political control rather than as an actual state of affairs which prevailed.

All major political parties in the island now accept that the bureaucracy should be subjected to direct political control, though they differ on the degree desirable. The more extreme position, taken by the United Front Government formed in 1970, is that the higher bureaucracy, at least those officials who are in influential and sensitive positions, should display a positive commitment to the policy-goals desired by it. To some extent the problem of functioning through unsympathetic officials was overcome by this government by bringing in outside personnel or promoting junior officials with decidedly clear commitments to the key positions. The politicisation of the public service has proceeded unabated during the last decade or so and the extent to which it has taken place could be perhaps measured by the examination of two recent developments. Firstly, there is the institutionalised acceptance of letters of (government) parliamentary members—described by some as ‘the political certificate’—in matters relating to appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public servants. It is relevant to note here that under the 1972 constitution, exercise of the authority of the cabinet in relation to the public service is specifically excluded from the purview of courts of law.²⁶ Where the fortunes of the bureaucrats now rests was perhaps best summed up by a public servant: ‘Power lies where there is the right to (determine) promotion and preference. In our system of administration, it is not the Permanent Secretary who determines promotions and other preferences. . . . (These decisions) tend to lie in the political sector and naturally power lies there’.²⁷ Secondly, there is the appointment since late 1973 of ‘Political Authorities’ in each of the twenty-two administrative districts in the island to give immediate political control and direction to the administrative work carried on within them. These Political Authorities are chosen and appointed by the Prime Minister from among the (government) parliamentary members who (generally) have constituencies in the particular administrative district.

The politicisation of the public service has obviously generated tension and discontent. With considerable justification it could be argued that the island has yet to see a government in power with a cohesive ideology or well constructed and clear set of policy-goals. Many of the governments in the recent past have been coalitions of political parties with differing ideologies and within this context the lot of the bureaucrat has been difficult indeed. If the role of the Political Authorities is taken into consideration, it could be shown that similar problems have arisen. There are often clashes between the Political Authority and the other parliamentary members of the district,²⁸ and in such cases the plight of the bureaucrat, who can ill-afford to antagonise any member of parliament, is unenviable. It is also worth

25. See, Janice Jiggins, *Family and Caste in the Politics of the Sinhalese, 1947-1971* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1973, University of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya).

26. Section 106 (6) of *The Constitution of Sri Lanka (Ceylon)*, Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka, 1972.

27. Quoted in Kearney, *The Politics of Ceylon*, p. 80.

28. See, *Sun*, 4 March 1974, for one reported instance of a clash.

examining what changes have taken place in the decision-making process with these developments. Quite obviously the political picture which prevails in the country would be a primary determinant at every level of decision-making. The position of the Secretaries of the Ministries (prior to 1972, Permanent Secretaries) would depend on their relationship with their ministers; those who relish exploiting opportunities could become powerful figures in the decision-making process—indeed examples have been cited where, despite the politicisation which has taken place, the Secretaries virtually run the ministries because of the relinquishment of their powers by some ministers. Situation could still arise, as it occurred earlier, where Secretaries could pursue their own personal or particularistic interests regardless of the stance taken by the government in general.²⁹ At the next important level of decision-making, at the district level of the Government Agents, much the same could be said. Examples are there of Government Agents completely surrendering their initiative in administration to the Political Authorities as well as of those who have retained much of the powers they were originally entrusted with. Unlike at the centre, the Government Agents have been subjected to additional forms of pressure. The local government institutions and other regional interests, uneasily articulated to the central administrative structure, could be quoted as examples. Reportedly even technical officials, who, it was asserted in the past, escaped political pressures, have been subjected to political interference in their work in recent years. With diverse and conflicting pressures upon them, it is no surprise that officials entrusted with powers of decision-making either fight shy of the responsibility or work towards the achievement of consensus, which means weak or unworkable compromises, rather than taking firm and clear-cut decisions.

With the politicisation of the public service increasingly taking place some political observers have begun to speak ominously of the creation of a veritable 'MP's Raj' in the island.³⁰ The politicisation has placed the bureaucrat in a vulnerable position in more than one sense. The occupational value which employment in the public sector carried stemmed from, apart from other factors, the relative security which it provided but this factor no longer seems to be relevant. Over the last decade, and increasingly so in the recent years, with every change of government those in the higher echelons of the administration have been replaced with personnel upon whom the new wielders of state power could place confidence and trust. Indeed, mere appointment to a high office by one government, though based only on merit, has been at times considered an adequate reason to refrain from reposing trust upon officials. The present Minister of Public Administration has publicly acknowledged mistakes made in this fashion³¹ but it is doubtful whether a reversal of this trend would take place. In fact, the evidence seem to indicate that this trend would be

29. Permanent Secretaries, as administrative heads of ministries, have often been accused of favouritism towards either their fellow caste or family members. Thus, allegation were made in parliament in 1962 that the then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs favoured members of his *karāva* caste within his ministry. See, R. N. Kearney and R. L. Harris, 'Bureaucracy and Environment in Ceylon', *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, II (1963-64), 260.

30. See, *The Tribune*, 27 Oct. 1973, editorial.

31. See, the Minister's tribute to the performance during the 1971 insurgency of two Government Agents who had been transferred on 'punishment' after the U. F. Government was formed, in House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 94 (1971/2), cols. 582-3.

strengthened and that Sri Lanka would entirely adopt the American 'spoils' system by moving away from the British tradition of a completely professionalised public service, at least in the case of the higher appointments.

The public service has been politicised, a relatively new development, but it has also had to function at the same time within a framework in which what could be described as pressures from the old order persisted. Of these of particular significance are ethnic, caste and kinship pressures. The ethnic pressure has been perhaps the most explosive and disruptive of the influences to which the public service has been subjected. It was popularly held by the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority community that the public service was dominated at independence by Tamils and Christians and the late 1950s saw a distinct bias against these groups in the matter of recruitment and promotion of public servants. The resistance to the switch-over to Sinhala language in the administration by the Tamils generated further hostility. There is little doubt that the Sinhalese-Buddhists dominate the public service now but prejudice does not seem to have been entirely erased. The minority social groups, especially the Tamils³², have in the recent years made repeated allegations of bias against them in the public service and it cannot be said that these allegations, though simply dismissed by Sinhalese politicians, are without foundation. Moreover, given the fact that the Tamils traditionally depend largely upon government employment for their livelihood, this has had considerable implications on the relations between the two social groups on the political plane.

That there are kinship and caste pressures operating in the public service is widely acknowledged.³³ Kinship and caste affiliations are looked upon as the means of mobilising channels of advancement where the chosen medium is the public service. There is sufficient evidence to indicate, for example, that where an individual belonging to a less privileged caste reaches a position of power and influence in the bureaucracy, he is required to play the role of the patron, creating and enhancing opportunities for mobility. Caste has also acted in a negative way, by the prejudices and bias it arouses. Thus, a parliamentary member, speaking of the discrimination a particular caste faced, declared that 'the feeling among the people of that caste (is) that they will not get any public office, that they are not being treated equally in a matter like appointments of even police constables'.³⁴ Family ties have always been important in the matter of recruitment and promotion of public servants, though it would be difficult to document each such instance. It has been even argued that family loyalties tend to eclipse political pressures, for individuals with opposing political sympathies find opportunities in the public service because family 'obligation' plays a peculiarly pervasive role in the society in Sri Lanka.

It has been often announced by national leaders, with considerable pride, that universalistic criteria govern the composition of the public service, but clearly this is an assertion which deserves little credence. It was inevitable that the bureaucracy would mirror the values dominant in the socio-political process in the island.

32. See, *A Memorandum on Discrimination Submitted to The International Commission of Jurists by the Tamil United Front of Ceylon*, Jaffna: St. Joseph's Catholic Press, 1973.

33. See, the recent study by Janice Jiggins, *Family and Caste in the Politics of the Sinhalese, 1947-1971*.

34. Quoted in Kearney, 'Ceylon: The Contemporary Bureaucracy', in Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems*, p. 505.