Knowledge and Belief*

PLATO, in the fifth book of the Republic, makes a distinction between what he calls ἃγων, ἀνδριάν and ἑπτὰμην (or γραμματίσ). They are all powers or potentialities, like sight and hearing, but have different objects. The object of ἃγων is 'non-being'. By ἃγων (or γραμματίσ) Plato means the state we are in when we have nothing before the mind and when our mind is a blank, as we say. We are in a condition of ἃγων when so far from knowing, or believing, we are not even entertaining, a proposition. ἑπτὰμην or γραμματίσ has 'being' for its object and by 'being' he means ἡμῖν or Forms which exist without changing. The objects of ἡμῖν are those things that lie between 'being' and 'non-being', i.e. things that exist but change—sounds, colours, shapes, bodies, actions and such aesthetic and moral judgements as are generally passed by the generality of men. It is not my intention to give an exposition of Plato's theory of knowledge. I am not concerned with the state of mind he calls ἑπτὰμην but only with ἡμῖν (or γραμματίσ) and ἃγων. I shall take seriously the distinction he makes between ἑπτὰμην and ἃγων and consider whether a similar distinction can be made between what we call 'knowledge' and what we call 'belief'. I shall then ask a second question: 'What are the objects of knowledge and what are the objects of belief?'. In answering this question it may be necessary for me to show that the word 'know' is used in more than one sense in English and to refer briefly to the different kinds of knowledge.

I shall use the word 'belief' in a fairly general sense. I shall not attempt to make a distinction between opinion, conviction, what is strictly called belief and other similar states, as Cook Wilson has done. When I speak of belief in opposition to knowledge I shall use the word 'belief' in such a way as to include in belief those cognate states to which Cook Wilson refers.

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1. Plato: Republic 477A, 478C.
2. ibid. 477A.
3. Mr. R. Sri Pathmanathan considers it wrong to say that Plato meant that we have nothing before the mind when we are in a condition of ἃγων. He thinks that the objects of ἃγων can be described by the Greek word ἱμίτης.
4. Plato: op. cit., 477B, 478A.
5. ibid. 478A, E.
6. ibid. 476A, B; 486A.
7. ibid. 476D, 484D, 493A.
Plato implies that there are three differences between ἐπιστήμη and ἰδέα. First, ἐπιστήμη is infallible; ἰδέα is not infallible.9 Secondly, ἰδέα is darker than γνώσεις (or ἐπιστήμη); it is brighter than ἰδέα.10 Thirdly, the objects of ἰδέα are different from the objects of ἐπιστήμη; it is impossible for the same thing to be an object of ἰδέα as well as an object of ἐπιστήμη.11 I shall take separately each of the three differences which, according to Plato, exist between ἰδέα and ἐπιστήμη and ask myself whether these same differences exist between what we call 'knowledge' and what we call 'belief'.

Plato says that ἐπιστήμη is infallible while ἰδέα is not infallible. This distinction is applicable also to knowledge and belief. We can believe true as well as false propositions. But we cannot know propositions that are false. I can believe either the proposition 'Brutus killed Caesar' or the proposition 'Caesar killed Brutus'. But I cannot know the proposition 'Caesar killed Brutus' if Caesar did not kill Brutus. It is logically possible for a person to assert 'Perera believes that Caesar killed Brutus but Caesar did not kill Brutus'. But one cannot, without self-contradiction, say 'Perera knows that Brutus killed Caesar but Brutus did not kill Caesar'. It is not tautologous to say 'Perera believes that Brutus killed Caesar and it is true that Brutus killed Caesar'. But to say 'Perera knows that Brutus killed Caesar and it is true that Brutus killed Caesar' is to assert a tautology.

Any proposition, whether true or false, can be believed but only true propositions are knowable. Knowledge is infallible and belief fallible in the sense that while one can believe even a false proposition one cannot know any proposition that is false.

Plato says that ἐπιστήμη is 'brighter' than ἰδέα and that ἰδέα is 'darker' than ἐπιστήμη. Is there any sense in which knowledge is brighter than belief? Can we say that knowledge is brighter than belief in the sense that what is known is more clearly and distinctly apprehended than what is believed? The proposition 'The interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles' may be as clearly and distinctly apprehended by A as well as by B in the sense that it is equally intelligible to both. Yet A may know the proposition and B only believe it. Therefore if knowledge is brighter than belief it cannot be in the sense that what is known is more intelligible, or more clearly and distinctly apprehended, than what is believed.

For Plato the 'brightness' of ἐπιστήμη in relation to ἰδέα and the darkness of ἰδέα in relation to ἐπιστήμη was dependent partly at least on the nature of the objects of ἐπιστήμη and the objects of ἰδέα.12 He thought that the objects of ἰδέα were different from the objects of ἐπιστήμη. But we should not be justified in asserting that the believable is always different in nature from the knowable. To us it seems that sometimes at least what is believed is identical with what is known. We can say either 'We know that Ceylon is an island' or 'We believe that Ceylon is an island'; here the very same proposition 'Ceylon is an island' seems to be an object of belief as well as an object of knowledge. If we are going to say that knowledge is brighter than belief and belief darker than knowledge it cannot be for the reason that the objects of knowledge are different from the objects of belief. For sometimes at least what is believed seems to be identical with what is known.

We have now found that we cannot say that knowledge is brighter than belief or belief darker than knowledge either because the objects of knowledge are necessarily more intelligible, or more clearly and distinctly apprehended, than the objects of belief, or because what is believed is different in nature from what is known. Is there then any sense in which we can say that knowledge is brighter than belief and belief darker than knowledge? It seems to me that there is. Belief is darker than knowledge, and knowledge brighter than belief, in the sense that an element of doubt is always present in belief while knowledge is characterised by an absence of doubt. I can say without self-contradiction 'I believe that Winston Churchill is the present Prime Minister of England but perhaps he is not'; or 'I think it is going to rain but it may not rain'; or 'I may be wrong but I think that Macgama is in the Western Province'. But I contradict myself if I say 'I know that Colombo is the capital of Ceylon but perhaps it is not'; or 'Perera knows that Dutugemunu killed Elara but he may not have killed Elara', or 'I know that Hitler is dead but there is a chance that he is alive'; or 'I know there is a tavern in Usuwetakeyawa but I am doubtful whether there is'; or 'I know that I am sober but it is just possible that I am not'. When a person knows a proposition he does not feel even the slightest doubt about its truth. One may believe a proposition and yet be prepared to grant that one's belief may be mistaken and that the proposition that one believes may be false. But one can be said to know a proposition only if one feels certain that it is true and refuses to grant that it may be false. Belief is attended with doubt, misgiving and a lack of conviction that the proposition believed is true, while one of the conditions of knowledge is that the knower should feel certain that the proposition he knows is true. In this sense, and in this sense only, are we justified in saying that knowledge is brighter than belief and belief darker than knowledge. When in English we speak of a 'shadow of doubt', implying that doubt is shadowy, we use a metaphor similar to that employed by Plato when he described ἰδέα as darker than ἐπιστήμη.
I have shown that a feeling of doubt is present in belief and that when one knows one is certain that the proposition that one knows is true. But A. E. Taylor, in a paper entitled ‘Knowing and Believing’, expresses the view that we can believe a proposition with complete confidence in its truth, and that therefore we are not justified in saying that the difference between knowledge and belief is that belief is more or less doubtful while knowledge is characterised by an absence of doubt. He writes: ‘The impossibility of identifying knowledge with confident belief of what is true in particular, is well illustrated by the example Plato has selected in the Theaetetus, the effect of advocacy on a jury. Skilful advocacy will frequently lead a jury to pronounce with complete confidence on a question of fact where the evidence is patently incomplete. Indeed, we may imagine a case...in which such evidence as there is all points in one direction, and yet the jury are induced to return an unhesitating verdict in the opposite sense by clever and eloquent but wholly irrelevant appeals to sentiment and prejudice. And in a case of this kind it may well happen that such a feeling is in accord with fact; the available evidence may have pointed unmistakably in one direction and yet have been misleading.’

He gives two examples to show how a jury may be made to feel certain that a proposition is true when the available evidence is not adequate to establish its truth or when there is no evidence at all to show that the proposition is true. He then adds: ‘if the appeal to sentiment and prejudice were sufficiently adroit and eloquent, every member of the jury might leave the box without a shadow of hesitation in his mind, and yet it would be monstrous to call this unqualified conviction knowledge.’

Appeals to sentiment, our prejudices, hopes, wishes and fears may make us feel certain that a proposition is true even when the evidence is not conclusive, and the proposition may in fact be true. But such a condition should not be confused with knowledge. When we know we not only feel certain that the proposition known is true but also examine the evidence and decide that the proposition is true, and the evidence is adequate to establish its truth. When we feel certain that a proposition is true without considering the evidence for its truth it would be misleading even to say, as A. E. Taylor does, that we believe that the proposition is true. For then so far from knowing we do not even believe that it is true. I shall call such a condition ‘unreasoning faith’.

‘Unreasoning faith’ differs from belief in being emotional rather than intellectual. One who is in a condition of ‘unreasoning faith’ entertains a proposition and, without weighing the evidence available to him, takes up an emotional attitude towards it. As long

15. Ibid. p. 376.
When a belief is false that which is falsely believed can never become an object of knowledge. False propositions are believable but not knowable. Sometimes therefore it is impossible for what is believed to be known. But are the objects of belief always different from the objects of knowledge? Is it impossible for what is truly believed to be known? Here we should really ask ourselves two questions:—(a) Can an individual know that which he himself truly believes?, (b) Can one individual know what another individual truly believes?

It looks as if an individual cannot know that which he truly believes. Let us assume that Brutus did actually kill Caesar. If Perera believes that Brutus killed Caesar then his belief is true. But can Perera believe that Brutus killed Caesar and at the same time also know that Brutus killed Caesar? We have decided that a condition of knowledge is the certainty that what is known is true and that such certainty is absent from belief. The certainty that characterises knowledge is produced by the adequacy of the evidence. If Perera having examined the evidence and decided that Brutus killed Caesar feels certain that Brutus killed Caesar so that no further evidence is necessary to produce in him the certainty that Brutus killed Caesar, if Brutus did actually kill Caesar, and if the evidence is adequate to establish the proposition that Brutus killed Caesar, then Perera knows that Brutus killed Caesar. But the evidence cannot be adequate and also at the same time inadequate. He cannot feel certain that Brutus killed Caesar and also at the same time lack this certainty. Therefore if Perera knows that Brutus killed Caesar he cannot at the same time believe that Brutus killed Caesar, and if he believes that Brutus killed Caesar it is impossible for him at the same time to know that Brutus killed Caesar. Of course an individual having known a proposition may cease to know and later only believe it; or he may get to know subsequently what he previously only believed. Thus I may now know the proposition that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides in the sense that I am able to prove it. But after some years I may forget the proof. I shall then have ceased to know and only believe it. When Perera was a schoolboy and had not yet read the authorities he believed, but did not know, that Brutus killed Caesar. But having studied the evidence as an undergraduate he ceased to believe and came actually to know it. Although an individual may believe at one time what he knew at another and come to know at one time what he only believed at another yet he cannot know that which he himself believes at the same time as he believes it.

We have now seen that an individual cannot know that which he himself truly believes. Is it also impossible for one individual to know that which another individual truly believes? In a court of law when one witness, A, says 'I know that the accused stabbed the deceased' and another witness, B, says 'I believe that the accused stabbed the deceased', the statement made by B would, in the absence of evidence to show that he is lying, be held to corroborate the statement made by A, however weak that corroborator may be. The fact that B's statement is held to corroborate A's makes it probable that, when A knows and B believes that the accused stabbed the deceased, the object of B's belief is identical with the object of A's knowledge. It would seem therefore that it is possible for one individual to know that which another individual truly believes.

Plato held that the objects of ἑπετίθεμαι are different from the objects of ἐπιστήμη. He would probably not have denied that those things that are objects of ἐπιστήμη for the guardians can be objects of ἑπετίθεμαι for auxiliaries and workers. He would perhaps have said that it was possible for auxiliaries and workers to believe that Forms exist while only the guardians had knowledge of their existence. In one place he implies that the auxiliaries have ἐπιθυμεῖν ἑπετίθεμαι or 'correct belief' about what ought and ought not to be feared. Plato then would probably not have denied that what the guardians knew could be believed by auxiliaries and workers. But on his theory those things which are properly the objects of ἑπετίθεμαι can never be objects of ἐπιστήμη. According to him things we perceive through the senses, for example, can never be objects of ἐπιστήμη. We can at the most have true beliefs about them.

Two modern philosophers, A. E. Taylor and H. H. Price, agree with Plato in thinking that the objects of belief are different from the objects of knowledge. We must now examine their views.

A. E. Taylor, in the article to which I have already referred, says that there are some things which from the nature of the case are capable of being known even though they may be only believed and not known; and that there are other things which, again from the nature of the case, can be believed but not known.

He thinks that if we do not make the distinction between knowledge and belief depend on the difference in their object we shall have to make the distinction psychological and say that when we know a proposition we feel certain that it is true and that such certainty is absent from belief. But if we do so we shall, according to him, not be able to distinguish true belief from knowledge; for we may feel certain that a proposition is true even when we only believe and do not know it. He then points to the effect of skilful
advocacy on a jury and shows how a person can be made to feel certain that a proposition is true when the evidence is incomplete or in the absence of evidence. I have already shown that the condition in which we feel certain that a proposition is true even when the evidence is inconclusive should not be called 'belief'. Such a condition is also not knowledge. The feeling of certainty that a proposition is true is not the only characteristic that distinguishes knowledge from true belief. When we know a proposition not only is the proposition true and not only do we feel certain of its truth; we also examine the evidence and decide that the proposition is true and the evidence is adequate to establish the truth of the proposition. Therefore in order to distinguish true belief from knowledge it is not necessary to assert, as A. E. Taylor does, that the objects of knowledge are different from the objects of belief.

For A. E. Taylor there are somebelievables which are not knowable. Judging and inferring are not knowing; judgement and inference belong to the domain of belief. Knowledge is a kind of vision, and has the directness characteristic of our apprehension of sensible fact and of ultimate indemonstrable principles. He writes: 'And it is this kind of direct and immediate apprehension of truth which we should regard as the type of true knowing. All that we commonly call our scientific knowledge is an endeavour, never fully successful, to recapture for our mental vision of facts this immediacy and obviousness from which we begin by passing away, the moment judgement supervenes on sense-perception'. Vision is the ideal type of knowledge and vision in its completeness is impossible for us. Historical insight into the individual is genuine knowledge. We can, if we will, succeed in knowing, not merely opining or thinking, what the historical Plato, or Cromwell or Shelley was...'

A. E. Taylor says that knowing is a kind of vision and asserts that we can have knowledge of individuals who have lived in the past and whom we cannot remember. It seems to me that we can have only inferential knowledge of them.

What we call scientific knowledge is, according to A. E. Taylor, not really knowledge; here again he is in agreement with Plato. He writes: 'such science as is possible to beings as temporal as men... is never quite identical with knowledge'. Yet, in the way in which we use the word 'knowledge', we can say that we know that an eclipse of the sun will take place at some distant date or that the earth is not flat or that butter melts when heated. A. E. Taylor is thinking of the type of true knowing and 'the ideal of knowledge'. He admits that it cannot be attained by men. Instead of trying to find out by a logical analysis how the words 'knowledge' and 'belief' are actually used he has been telling us how he thinks they ought to be used. He seems to think that the word 'knowledge' ought to be used by us in more or less the way in which Plato used the word ἔφεσις and Aristotle the words ἐπιστήμη and νοησις; and that our use of the words 'opinion' and 'belief' should be more or less similar to Plato's use of the word ἐφεσία and Aristotle's use of the words ἐπιστήμη and νοησις. He has been making value-judgements rather than statements of fact.

H. H. Price too, like Plato and A. E. Taylor, seems to hold that the objects of belief are different from the objects of knowledge. I have only notes I made at his lectures. I hope I am not misrepresenting him. In knowing we are, according to him, in direct contact with reality or the facts themselves; in believing the fact itself is not present to the mind; even in true belief the fact which makes the belief true is not present to the mind. On this view the objects of knowledge are facts; facts are never the objects of belief. But unfortunately for this theory we can speak not only of knowing facts but also of believing them. We can say 'He refused to believe the facts' or 'A knows, but B only believes, the fact that Lawrence wrote Lady Chatterley's Lover'. So presumably facts can be believed and not merely known. There does not seem to be sufficient reason for urging that facts are different from true propositions. The words 'fact' and 'true proposition' are used in pretty much the same way. We can say 'It is a fact that Colombo is hot' or 'It is true (or a true proposition) that Colombo is hot'. As A. D. Woozley points out in his book Theory of Knowledge, 'fact' and 'true proposition' ('true', 'truth') are normally identical in descriptive meaning, i.e. what would be...
asserted in the one case is the same as what would be asserted in the other. Therefore when A knows, and B truly believes, that Colombo is hot, we cannot make the object of A's knowledge different from the object of B's belief by asserting that what A knows is a fact and what B believes is something other than a fact, e.g., a true proposition. Facts do not seem to be different from true propositions and can apparently be believed as well as known. We cannot hold with H. H. Price that the objects of belief, even when belief is true, are different from the objects of knowledge on the ground that what we know are facts and what we believe when we believe truly are true propositions.

There seems to be no good reason for saying that there are some believables which can never be known. The history of knowledge shows that propositions which have only been believed by the people of one age have become known to people of subsequent ages. We know more than the ancient Greeks or those who lived in the nineteenth century. Certain propositions which were believed by them are known to us. It is probable that propositions which we today only believe will be known in the next century. One should not therefore assert that there are certain propositions which from the nature of the case can only be believed and can never be known by any mind.

Having examined the distinction which Plato makes between ἐπιστήμη and ἐξέγερσις we have found that it does not exactly correspond to the distinction we make between knowledge and belief. Objects of ἐξέγερσις can never become objects of ἐπιστήμη. But true propositions can be believed as well as known. We must now ask the question: 'What are the objects of belief and what are the objects of knowledge?'

What is believed is always a proposition, whether true or false. We do not believe things; we do not, for example, say 'Perera believes Adam's Peak'. Persons also are not objects of belief. It is true that we sometimes speak of believing a person. A judge in a court of law might say that he believes witness A. But what he really means is that he believes the statements made by witness A. We may also speak of believing in a person. But what we then mean is that we believe certain propositions about him. When we say we believe in a person we mean that we believe that he will keep his word and that he is capable of doing something. Only propositions can be the objects of belief.

Before we attempt to answer the question: 'What are the objects of knowledge?' we must distinguish three kinds of knowing. The first is knowing that x is y, i.e., knowledge of propositions. The second is knowing x where x is a person or thing; this kind of knowing I shall call acquaintance. The third is knowing how to do something. I shall deal individually with these three kinds of knowing.

When we know that something is, or is not, the case what we know is a proposition. We have already seen that only true propositions can be known. The question we must now ask is: 'What kind of true proposition can we know?'

The objects of ἐπιστήμη, according to Plato, are ἔδη or Forms. He seems sometimes to have thought of them as universals and at other times as universal propositions. Can we know only universal or general propositions? In the way in which we use the word 'know' we can say that we know not only that 'All crows are black' but also that 'This book is red' or that 'Smith is a twerp', or that 'Some cats are white'. Our use of the word knowledge is different from Plato's use of the word ἐπιστήμη. For we say that we know general as well as singular and particular propositions.

Plato's ἔδη or Forms exist without changing. He thought of them as propositions and as changeless. Can we say that only propositions which are changeless in the sense of being necessarily true can be known and that contingent truths can only be believed and not known?

I shall first try to explain the distinction I am making between necessary and contingent (or empirical) truths. The proposition '2 + 3 = 5' is necessarily true in the sense that it cannot be denied without self-contradiction. We use the symbols 2, 3, and 5 in such a way that we transgress the rules of formal logic if we deny that 2 + 3 = 5. Similarly the proposition 'If all men are mortal then some men are mortal' is necessarily true in the sense that it is logically impossible to assert that all men are mortal and at the same time to deny that some men are mortal. One has only to know the meanings of the words 'all' and 'some' and to understand the sentence 'If all men are mortal then some men are mortal' in order to realise that the sentence expresses a truth. One can know that the proposition expressed by the sentence is true without examining actual men, or even being acquainted with actual men. Necessary truths are true at all times and in all places. Contingent truths, unlike necessary truths, can be denied without self-contradiction. The proposition expressed by the sentence 'All leopards are carnivorous' is, if true, a contingent truth. If we deny the proposition and say that all leopards are not carnivorous the assertion we make may be false but is not self-contradictory. We may understand the sentence 'All leopards are carnivorous' but we cannot know whether the proposition expressed by it is true without observing particular leopards. The proposition is not one that we can say must be true at all times and in all places. The proposition may be true today. But if tomorrow even one single leopard, because it is unable to find animals on which it can feed, turns vegetarian and ceases to be carnivorous then the proposition expressed by the sentence 'All leopards are carnivorous' will be falsified.
We use the word 'know' in such a way that we can speak of knowing not only necessary but also contingent truths. I can, for example, say 'I know that some dogs bite' or 'I know that I am writing this sentence'. The certainty that accompanies our knowledge of necessary truths I would call logical certainty. I am logically certain that if A is greater than B and B is greater than C then A is greater than C, because the sentence 'If A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A is greater than C' expresses a necessary truth I cannot with logical certainty know a contingent truth. But it does not necessarily follow that our knowledge of contingent truths is not marked by a feeling of certainty. Having been bitten by dogs myself and having seen other people bitten by dogs I feel certain that some dogs bite, and no further evidence can increase my confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence 'Some dogs bite'. Therefore there is no valid reason for saying that only necessary truths can be known and that contingent truths can only be believed but not known. All truths, whether necessary or contingent, are knowable.

We have dealt with knowing that. We must now consider that kind of knowing which, for want of a better name, I have called acquaintance.

To be acquainted with something is to apprehend it directly. By apprehending something directly I mean being aware of it without knowing, believing, or even entertaining a proposition about it. I can apprehend something directly either through the 'inner sense', i.e. by introspection, or any of the outer senses. I can, for example, be acquainted with a thought, feeling, colour, shape, sound or smell. Acquaintance is very often accompanied by belief, and acquaintance with a thing may often give us knowledge of one or more propositions about it. But being acquainted with a thing is different from entertaining propositions about it. For not only can we be directly aware of something without entertaining propositions about it; we can also entertain propositions about something with which we are not acquainted. I can think about the Pyramids even though, at this moment, I am not touching, seeing, smelling or tasting them, and even though I have never seen, touched, smelt or tasted them, i.e. it is possible for me to entertain propositions about the Pyramids without being acquainted with them.

I am using the word 'acquaintance' differently from the way in which it is used in everyday speech. We usually say we are acquainted with a person we have once met even when we are not seeing, hearing or touching him. Thus I have met The Provost of The Queen's College Oxford and can claim acquaintance with him even though at this moment I am in Colombo and he in Oxford, and even though I am not hearing his voice over the telephone or radio. We usually use the word 'acquaintance' in such a way as not to exclude reference to the entertaining of propositions about that with which we say we are acquainted. But I am departing from ordinary usage. By acquaintance I mean the direct, i.e. non-propositional, awareness of what I am seeing, touching, smelling, hearing, tasting, feeling, remembering or introspecting at any given moment.

Certain philosophers have asserted that all knowledge is knowledge of truths, that there is no such thing as acquaintance, and that acquaintance is psychologically impossible. 'Should add 'Acquaintance' be forgot And never brought to min' because some philosophers have doubted its existence? Is acquaintance a myth? The question has been discussed in two symposia entitled 'Is there Knowledge by Acquaintance?' in the Supplementary Volumes of the Aristotelian Society. Some of those who contributed to these two symposia have urged that there is no such thing as acquaintance. As in this paper I am concerned with knowledge in general and not with acquaintance only, I shall not examine their arguments in detail. I hope that I shall be indirectly meeting their arguments when I give my reasons for thinking that there is such a thing as acquaintance. Many of their arguments have been directed not so much against acquaintance as against Bertrand Russell's statement of the case for acquaintance. I shall criticise Bertrand Russell myself but I shall urge at the same time that, in addition to knowing that and knowing how, there is also another kind of knowing which I, like Bertrand Russell, call acquaintance.

We cannot, in my opinion, find out whether there is such a thing as acquaintance by asking ourselves what happens when we see or hear something. For, the moment we ask the question: 'Am I entertaining a proposition about what I am now seeing?', I begin to entertain propositions about it. That it is possible to apprehend something without entertaining propositions about it is shown by what often happens when a person asks a question about something that one has seen in the past. Let us suppose that a friend asks me what Miss Jones wore to The Queen's College Ball. I had vaguely seen Miss Jones at The Queen's College Ball but as I was not particularly interested in her I had not given a thought to the clothes she was wearing. When my friend asks me what she wore to The Queen's College Ball I try to recall the sense-impression I then had of Miss Jones. My friend helps me by asking me questions. 'Was her dress long or short?' I say: 'Long'. 'Was it silk or cotton?' I answer: 'Cotton'. 'What was the colour of her dress?' I reply: 'White'. Then, having succeeded in recalling the sense-impression I had of Miss Jones, I assert the proposition: 'Miss Jones was wearing a long, white, silk, sleeveless and strapless dress'. We know from our own experience that we have often seen or heard something without naming, describing, or entertaining propositions about what we have seen or heard.

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There is, then, such a thing as acquaintance. There is also knowledge by acquaintance in the sense that acquaintance may give us knowledge of propositions about that with which we are acquainted. I may see something and say: I see a red circle. If what I am seeing is both red and circular, then the proposition I see a red circle is true. If the proposition is true and I am certain of its truth, then I have knowledge of it and this knowledge is based on my acquaintance with the red circle.

Having shown that there is knowledge by acquaintance we must now ask: Is acquaintance itself a kind of knowing? When we are acquainted with something we may not entertain, and therefore may not know, propositions about it; but it does not necessarily follow that we have no knowledge of it. We often observe something, e.g. a colour, without knowing what it is in the sense of being able to make statements about it. But we seem to have some knowledge of it even though we do not know any propositions about it. For later we may see a colour and then say: This is the colour I saw on the previous occasion and was not able to describe. The fact that we are able to recognise a colour that we have seen in the past but not named or described seems to imply that we have a non-propositional knowledge of that with which we are acquainted. Acquaintance therefore can be considered a kind of knowing.

I have defined acquaintance and given reasons for thinking that there is such a thing as acquaintance. I have shown that acquaintance is a kind of knowing. I must now ask the question: What are the objects of acquaintance? In The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell says that we cannot be acquainted with physical objects or other people's minds; we can only know truths about them. We have acquaintance with sense-data, such as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We are acquainted with things we remember, what we have seen or heard or had otherwise present to our senses and with things we are aware of in introspection—thoughts, feelings, desires, etc. One is acquainted with the I or with one's self. One is also acquainted with abstract ideas, universals or concepts.

Bertrand Russell says that we cannot be acquainted with physical objects; I think we can. I also think that he is wrong in saying that we can be acquainted with universals. I shall deal with these two points in some detail.

Bertrand Russell is not acquainted with the physical object which is his table. I am acquainted, he writes, with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table—its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc. It follows then that a proposition which is true of the table is not true of the sense-data. The proposition he is wrong in saying that we can be acquainted with universals. I shall deal with these two points in some detail.

I am in agreement with most of what Bertrand Russell says about the objects of acquaintance. I disagree with him on two points. He thinks that we cannot be acquainted with physical objects; I think we can. I also think that he is wrong in saying that we can be acquainted with universals. I shall deal with these two points in some detail.

Bertrand Russell is not acquainted with the physical object which is his table. I am acquainted, he writes, with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table—its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc. It follows then that a proposition which is true of the table is not true of the sense-data. The proposition he is wrong in saying that we can be acquainted with universals. I shall deal with these two points in some detail.

If this theory is true we are not entitled to say anything more about physical objects than that they are the cause of sense-data. The fact that we have sense-data—brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc.—which we associate with the table will not justify us in asserting that the table itself is brown, oblong and smooth. For a cause need not be like its effect. Bertrand Russell himself gives an example which helps to establish the point I am trying to make. Referring to dreams he says that a door banging . . . may cause us to dream of a naval engagement. But although, in this case, there is a physical cause for the sense-data, there is not a physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an actual naval battle would correspond. On the view that sense-data are different from physical objects, that physical objects cause sense-data, and that we are acquainted only with sense-data and not with physical objects, we shall not be able to say anything more about physical objects.
In opposition to Bertrand Russell I hold that we can be acquainted with physical objects and that it is precisely because we are acquainted with them that we are able to describe them. When we see something we do not see first a shape and then a colour. We see a coloured shape (or shapely colour). In one and the same act of perception I see a particular shape of a particular colour. The particular coloured shape (or shapely colour) that I see may be unnamed and unrecognised. Later on I may entertain propositions about it. I may describe it as a black rectangle (or rectangular blackness) and call it a blackboard. Because the process of naming and recognising comes afterwards it does not necessarily follow that what I first saw was not the physical object that is the blackboard but something else. The sense of sight gives us acquaintance with coloured shapes (or shapely colours), i.e. with physical objects. Bertrand Russell was wrong in holding that we cannot be acquainted with physical objects.

It may be urged that we can be acquainted at the most with only parts or aspects of physical objects and that we should not therefore say that we are acquainted with physical objects. When I look at something, e.g. the black rectangle which is in fact the blackboard, I may be aware only of one side of it. It may be said that I should therefore not claim acquaintance with the physical object which is called the blackboard. But we usually say that we are seeing something even though in fact we are seeing only a part of it. I may assert that I am seeing the Town Hall when I am seeing only the front of the Town Hall and not the top or the back or the inside of it. In the same way I think that I am justified in saying that I am acquainted with a physical object even though I am actually acquainted with only a part or aspect of it.

I have given reasons for thinking that we can be acquainted with physical objects. I shall now try to show that we cannot have acquaintance with universals.

Bertrand Russell says that we can be acquainted with both particulars and universals,54 general ideas such as 'whiteness', 'diversity', 'brotherhood', and so on.55 Among universals he thinks that we have acquaintance not only with 'sensible qualities'56 like 'white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data57 but also with relations.58 We can be acquainted with space and time-relations, the relation of 'resemblance or similarity'59 and 'greater than'.60 Explaining what he means by acquaintance he says that 'we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths'.61 In the sense in which the word acquaintance is used by him it is doubtful whether we can be acquainted with universals. I shall try to show that we cannot be acquainted with universals which are 'sensible qualities' and it will follow a fortiori that we cannot be acquainted with universals which are relations.

Before we attempt to understand what Bertrand Russell means by acquaintance with universals it would be helpful for us to see what he does not mean when he claims that we are acquainted with them.

That he does not mean that we are acquainted in sensation with universals is clear from his definition of 'particular' and 'universal'. He writes: 'We speak of whatever is given in sensation, or is of the same nature as things given in sensation, as a particular; by opposition to this, a universal will be anything which may be shared by many particulars, and has those characteristics which ... distinguish justice and whiteness from just acts and white things.'62 He is right, I think, in holding that universals are not 'given in sensation'. We are acquainted in sensation with particular qualities and particular relations. I may see a particular colour-patch which is in fact red. I cannot be aware of the colour-patch as an instance of whiteness without entertaining propositions about it. I cannot assert that the particular colour-patch is red without recognising that its colour is similar to the colour of other objects which are described as red. I cannot in sense-perception be acquainted with universals in the sense that I cannot, without entertaining propositions about the qualities and relations that I see, become aware that universals are exemplified in them.

By acquaintance with universals he does not mean acquaintance with an image of a particular thing. I may have an image of a particular white object but in having this image I am not being acquainted with the universal 'whiteness'. The particular object of which I am having the image is of a particular shape. But 'whiteness' is a characteristic that is present in a number of objects of different shapes. An image I may have of a triangle is different from the universal 'triangle'. The triangle of which I have an image is equilateral, isosceles or scalene; but triangularity is common to all triangles. We may also know a universal without being able to have an image of one of its instances. We cannot have an image of a particular chiliagon but we know

52. Bertrand Russell : The Problems of Philosophy, p. 76.
53. Ibid. p. 81.
54. Ibid. p. 159.
55. Ibid. p. 158.
56. Ibid. pp. 159-161.
58. Ibid. p. 161.
59. Ibid. p. 73.
60. Ibid. p. 145.
the universal 'chiliagon'. If in a Radio Quiz the question were asked: 'What is a chiliagon?' a school-girl, if she had a knowledge of Greek, would reply: 'A chiliagon is a figure with a thousand sides'. Knowing a universal is therefore different from having an image of an object characterised by the universal.

Bertrand Russell's theory of universals, as stated in The Problems of Philosophy is, I think, different from Plato's. But Plato too, like Bertrand Russell, seems to have thought that we can be acquainted with universals. Plato meant by the word 'είδη' or Form partly at least what we mean by the word 'universal'. Forms, according to him, are apprehended by intuitive, and not by discursive, thinking. We are therefore justified in saying that he thought that we can have acquaintance with Forms in Bertrand Russell's sense of being directly aware of them 'without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths'. Among universals Plato seems to have paid attention to qualities and to have ignored relations. For, though he says that there are Forms corresponding to universals which are named by nouns and adjectives, he does not in the Republic at least assert that there are Forms corresponding to universals expressed by prepositions and verbs. He says that there is a Form 'good' and a Form 'beauty'. But he does not say, for example, that there is a Form 'being to the left of', a Form 'resemblance' or 'similarity', or a Form 'being greater than'. According to Plato's theory universals exist independently of minds and independently of sensible objects. He would say that particular good things are good because they all partake of the Form 'good'. On this view not only would particular goods resemble each other; they would also resemble the Form 'good'. If, in order to explain the resemblance between particular goods we say that there is a Form 'good' in which they all participate, it will be necessary for us to account for the resemblance between particular goods and the Form 'good' by asserting that, in addition to particular goods and the Form 'good', there is also something else in which particular goods and the Form 'good' all participate. Thus, if we accept Plato's view of universals, we shall be faced with an infinite regress. In The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell asserts that universals exist independently of minds, but he does not appear to think that they exist independently of particulars. When he says that we can be acquainted with universals he does not seem to mean, as Plato did, that we can be acquainted with objects which would exist even if there were no minds to apprehend them and even if there were no particulars in which they are exemplified.

By acquaintance with universals we have seen that Bertrand Russell does not mean either acquaintance with an image of a particular thing or with objects which exist independently of minds and independently of particulars. Having seen what he does not mean by acquaintance with universals we must consider what he does mean when he says that we can be acquainted with them. He writes: 'It is obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with whiteness. A similar process will make us acquainted with any other universal of the same sort.' He says that we become acquainted with 'whiteness' by seeing many white patches and abstracting the whiteness which they all have in common. To abstract the whiteness which white patches have in common we shall have to compare them with one another; and we cannot do this without entertaining propositions about them. Once we have abstracted the whiteness which the white patches we see have in common he seems to think that we become acquainted with 'whiteness', i.e. that we become directly aware of it 'without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths'. It is doubtful whether, in this sense of the word acquaintance, he can be acquainted with 'whiteness' if he does not mean by the universal 'whiteness' either a particular white patch, or an image of a particular white patch, or an object which exists, like Plato's Forms, independently of minds and independently of particulars.

The schoolgirl who says that a chiliagon is a figure with a thousand sides has knowledge of the universal 'chiliagon' even if she has never seen, or had an
I mean by saying I can't swim is that I have not learned to perform certain bodily movements and for that reason am not able to perform them. Of course in one sense of the word 'cannot' it is not contradictory to say that we know how to do something but cannot do it. I may ask a girl at a party whether she knows how to dance the Tango. If she replies: 'I know but I can't' she is not necessarily contradicting herself. What she would mean is that she has learnt to perform certain movements which we call dancing the Tango but that there are certain circumstances which prevent her from doing so. It may be that she is ill, or tired, or has worn the wrong shoes, or that her mother is present and disapproves of her dancing. Similarly in French I can say without self-contradiction 'Je ne sais nager mais je ne peux pas nager' which would be a translation of the English 'I can swim but can't'. When I say 'Je sais nager' I mean that I can swim in the sense of knowing how to swim. When I say 'Je ne peux pas nager' I mean that I can't swim in the sense that there is something that prevents me from swimming. The circumstance that prevents me from swimming may be that the water is too cold, or that there is a crocodile in the water, or that I am having pneumonia. When I say I know how to do something but cannot do it I contradict myself only if I mean that what prevents me from doing it is the fact that I have not learned to do it. It is doubtful whether we can speak of 'knowing how' as having objects. 'Knowing how' consists in the ability to perform certain actions. It is different from acquaintance and knowing that because it is usually concerned with activities that are physical rather than mental. It is more often than not the ability to perform certain bodily movements as opposed to perceiving, remembering or thinking, though sometimes we speak of knowing how to think. In order to distinguish knowing how from acquaintance and knowing that we may adopt the practice of H. H. Price and say that acquaintance and knowing that are cognitive whereas knowing how is practical.

I have examined the distinction that Plato makes between ἐπιστήμη and ἐπίστημα and found that it does not exactly correspond to the distinction we make between knowledge and belief. I have asked the question: 'What are the objects of knowledge and what are the objects of belief?' In answering this question I have shown that the word 'know' is used in three ways and that there are three different kinds of knowing. I shall now state, as briefly as possible, the propositions I have been trying to establish in this paper.

(a) Plato says that ἐπίστημα is not infallible and that ἐπιστήμη is infallible. Belief is fallible and knowledge infallible in the sense that though even false propositions may be believed only propositions that are true can be known.

(b) Plato says that ἐπιστήμη is 'brighter' than ἐπίστημα and that ἐπίστημα is 'darker' than ἐπιστήμη. Knowledge is 'brighter' than belief and belief 'darker' than knowledge in the sense that an element of doubt is always present in belief while knowledge is characterised by an absence of doubt.
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(e) Plato holds that the objects of \( \varepsilon \) are different from the objects of \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \). False propositions are believable but not knowable. True propositions can be known as well as believed. A. E. Taylor and H. H. Price are wrong in thinking that the objects of belief are always different from the objects of knowledge.

(d) Knowledge is not a sub-class of true belief. The difference between knowledge and true belief is not one of degree.

(e) The objects of belief are propositions, whether true or false.

(f) There are three different kinds of knowing — knowing that or knowledge of propositions, acquaintance and knowing how.

(g) The objects of the kind of knowing which I have called knowing that are true propositions. We can know general as well as particular and singular propositions, contingent as well as necessary truths.

(h) Acquaintance is direct, i.e. non-propositional, awareness of something. We can be acquainted with colours, shapes, sounds, smells and things we remember and introspect. We can be acquainted with physical objects but not with universals. Bertrand Russell was wrong in thinking that we cannot be acquainted with physical objects and that we can be acquainted with universals.

(i) The expression know how is used in two ways. When I say I know how to go to a certain place I mean that I know the way there even though I may never have been there. Or when I say I know how to do something I may mean that by doing something I have acquired a certain skill and am able to do it. We cannot speak of knowing how as having objects. It consists in the ability to perform certain bodily movements.

G. H. WIKRAMANAYAKE

Reviews

The Experience of Poetry in School, edited by Victoria V. Brown. Oxford University Press, Mount Road, Madras 2. Rs. 8/-.

This is a collection of 'SIX ESSAYS ON VARIOUS WAYS OF PRESENTING POETRY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS', written 'out of the experience of various practitioners whose common aim is 'to give children a pleasurable experience of poetry'. Teachers of English in the Middle School will find this book helpful and stimulating.

If the initial feeling registered is one of disappointment, it is because of the expectations set up by the word 'Experience' in the title; the Introduction and the first Essay, which set out to define this 'experience' get the book off to a stalling start, from which it only recovers when subsequent essays are taken for what they are: not attempts to probe the nature of the 'poetic experience' in children, but accounts of the methods by which various teachers have tried to make the 'poetry class' pleasurable and interesting to children in the Secondary Modern School, who are 'between eleven and fifteen years, most of them of average ability, a few above average, and many below' (p. 136). In this context 'poetry' can hardly be considered in relation to some high-sounding 'poetic experience'; it is only verse suitable for children.

It was (I think) a mistake not to define clearly and hold to this limited objective, instead of talking about 'creating the conditions' in which may take place a 'poetic experience' which is described so inadequately and inaccurately (p. xi). There is a general confusion regarding what poetry for children is and what it can do for them. The word 'poetry' is used, without discussion or qualification, to include anything written in verse, and the specific 'experience of poetry' that a child may have is never even approached.

The first essay, TALKING ABOUT POETRY, is (in my opinion) the least satisfactory. The writer, it is clear, distrusts the discussion of poetry. She finds that it is a problem to decide what aspects of a particular poem can be talked about without destroying its unity or distorting its meaning. The treatment of imagery is naive. The writer is an uncritical admirer of Dr. Edith Sitwell's 'critical writings'. She quotes approvingly some of Dr. Sitwell's elucidations of her own imagery: for instance, that when she wrote 'the wooden flowers that 'gin to cluck', she was thinking of 'the tattie-looking flowers that dip and bend beneath the rain with a movement like that of hens when they cluck'. The writer certainly does not avoid the great danger she is aware of in all such work, 'that it can foster the belief that imagery is merely decoration, and develop the attitude that awards good marks to the poet for mere ingenuity'. Some good points are made, one can agree that 'the conscious exercise of the art of discrimination . . . is difficult to use with profit in the Secondary Modern School, chiefly because it demands of the children a degree of self-confidence in their critical powers which few can achieve'; and that, 'In work on poetry the training of taste takes place imperceptibly, largely at first by infection from the teacher, and by familiarity with plenty of good poems; evaluation goes on all the time as poems are discussed and examined; . . . But the Essay does little to help the teacher who would like to train taste.

II. SPEAKING POETRY and III. ACTING POETRY are accounts of the methods and experiences of teachers who have tried to substitute something lively and pleasurable for the usual learning by heart, paraphrasing, doing comprehension exercises on poems, etc. There is no doubt that ballads and songs written for music could be made to come