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# The Psychological Discoveries of Buddhism

THE scientific study of Buddhism began in Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. Previously, the existence of Buddhism as well as some of its external peculiarities were known, for example, in France, since the exchange of embassies between the kings of France and Siam at the end of the seventeenth century. But the first historical attempt to introduce Buddhism in the West was done by Deguignes two centuries ago according to Chinese historical documents. Deguignes tried to get some idea of the Buddhist faith from non-Chinese sources as well. Nevertheless, it was only in the second quarter of the last century that Buddhist philosophy came to be more deeply studied in the West. At that time some of the chief Pali Suttas were revealed to Europe by Burnouf and Gogerly and a great part of the Sanskrit Nepalese literature purchased by Hodgson was analysed by Burnouf. On another side, the canonical collection of Buddhist writings in Tibetan (the Kanjur) was also analysed by Goma. Thanks to many other attempts, chiefly those of Hardy soon after and later of Childers and Rhys Davids, the Buddhist doctrines began to be more and more widely and deeply known.

Unfortunately, they were not at first properly understood in some of their specific aspects. This was however not due to any lack of attention or competence among scholars sincerely devoted to the study of the Dhamma. It was chiefly due to the stage then reached in Europe in philo-An essential part of the Dhamma was a careful and deep analysis sophy. of human psychology, with a representation of the natural mechanism of the mind, binding everybody to a painful series of births. But then, in Europe the psychological analysis of the mind was not yet developed on the same level. European psychology of the first part of the nineteenth century was purely intellectualistic. According to its main conception the mind was essentially the organ of manifestation of the soul, a unitary, autonomous and personal being existing in itself with all its particulars fully existing as necessary and characteristic elements of its specific nature. Such a conception was very far from the Buddhist one or more generally speaking of the Indian one. Now, on the contrary, psychologists are much better

prepared to understand and estimate the Buddhistic and Indian psychologies; and perhaps, it should be interesting to examine the matter, to search more precisely the reasons for the misunderstanding in Europe of the Indian conceptions on the nature and structure of the mind, and to ascertain some points of agreement between the ancient Buddhist and the modern systems of psychology. In fact, the matter is not lacking in importance because the conception, established at the first European contact with Buddhist thought, of the heterogeneity of this thought by reference to European mentality seems to be still unduly prevalent among the historians of philosophy. We have now, I think, to correct, not to repeat past judgements ; we have to leave out the heritage of views fashioned on the thought of past centuries and peep afresh with the eyes of today.

The first representations of Indian thought and of Indian religion were usually conceived by comparison with the European ones. The most important question was not, "How do the Indian people explain the structure of the world and the nature of man ?" but, "How much do the Indian conceptions of the world and of man differ from those of Europe,?" or even, "How far are the Indians from us ?" And, when differences were noticed, they were ascribed to a specific singularity of Indian philosophical research. It was not frequently surmised that they would correspond to something new in the knowledge of reality.

Yoga as psychic discipline was almost entirely ignored. In practice, it was confused with *tapas* or asceticism, more intelligible in Europe, and was known for its quality of religious austerity fit for spiritual preparation to renounce the mundane life and join the divine. But whatever in Yoga appeared to be distinct from ordinary austerity was considered to be a deviation from the right path and an indulgence in excesses or even as an ostentatious display of marvellous material powers, turning sanctity into acrobatics. Its value as a psychotechnical method remained unknown simply because such a method was as yet unknown. As nobody could see what it could correspond to in European ideas and practices, it seemed to correspond to nothing.

The example of Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, a most laborious historian of philosophy in the last century, would illustrate our contention about the difficulties of appreciating in Europe the nature and significance of the Indian realisations, when equivalents were lacking in this part of the world. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was a Hellenist and was the author of a translation of Aristotle's works. He was also deeply interested in the Sanskrit philosophical texts and gave both a translation and comments of a part of the  $Ny\bar{a}yas\bar{u}tras$  and of the whole of the  $S\bar{a}wkhyak\bar{u}rikas$ . His analysis of the

views of the Indian classical authors on logic was valuable, as Indian logical research was of the same kind as Aristotle's. In fact Saint-Hilaire had traced, with or without justification, many differences between the views of Aristotle and the Nyāya, but they touched only on points of detail. These differences were not sufficient to prevent an European philosopher from recognising a similarity between the Indian and Greek criticism of the judgement. In the same way Saint-Hilaire was able to appreciate with the European scale of comparison the dualism of the Sāmkhya. Like logic, Indian physics and metaphysics had of course European counterparts. But in dealing with both Yoga and Buddhism, Saint-Hilaire was deprived of elements of comparison and of classification in recognised categories. Owing to that he failed to surmise their place in the general spiritual inquiry of mankind. For him they were somewhat of the nature of strange aber-Considering Yoga he wrote once that "it was unfit to try to rations. bring in such a matter a light which could not belong to it." As regarding Buddhism, after a valuable review of its history, expansion, various aspects and present state, he came unfortunately, in examining its doctrines, to the conclusion that the primary value of the study of Buddhism was the fact that it revealed how great was the loss for people not partaking of European Such an opinion came in fact from a very old tradition. Already ideas. the Greek philosophers, companions of Alexander, had given some account of their Indian colleagues. Already their judgements were founded chiefly in comparison with their own ideas. Already, they noticed only what was referable to these, either by similitude or direct opposition, almost never what was not reducible to their familiar mentality. In my opinion that is the main reason for their almost complete silence on Yoga and Buddhism. They had well paid attention to the doctrine of the five great elements (pañcamahābhūta), because it corresponded with an addition to the Greek one of the four. They had paid attention also to the importance of the knowledge of the self and the divine as possessing the same essence, because Socrates taught the knowledge of one's self and at the time of Aristotle, Aristoxenes of Tarenta told the story of an Indian philosopher discussing that subject with Socrates in Athens. They were astonished by the austerities of the so-called gymnosophistai, "naked sophists," whose extraordinary achievements, the masterly control of the pain and proud disgust of the body were fit for the admiration of the Greek philosophers of some schools like the Cynics, Stoics and Sceptics, some of whom perhaps were encouraged in their own views by the Indian examples. But no reference was made to Yoga as a technique for controlling both the body and the mind.

On the other hand, the Sarmanes or Samanas of the Greeks were the samanas alluded together with the brahmanas in the Pali canonical books, not-or very rarely-the Buddhist monks. Similarly, after a new and long period of contact between India and the classical world of Europe, in the third century A.D. in a short Greek account of the doctrine of the Brahmins, S. Hippolytus (or another author of the same time) gave a clear and exact summary of the main ideas of the Upanishads on soul and God, especially as given in the Maitryupanishad, but he did not mention either Yoga or Buddhism, their practices or ideas. And, if Plotinus, who was able in Rome to know the work ascribed to Hippolytus or its sources themselves, did borrow from them or from another source, something from Indian thought -as some scholars have surmised—it was not from Yoga or from Buddhism. The specific characteristics of Yoga seen never to have been recognised in Greco-Roman antiquity and it only at a late date that the Buddha was incidentally mentioned by Clemens of Alexandria. Nevertheless, we know that Asoka in the third century B.C. sent his ambassadors to Greek kings, especially in Egypt and Cyrenaica.

During the Middle Ages and the period of the Islamic conquest of the ancient cultures of India, it was of course impossible for European scholars to learn Indian thought. With the coming of commercial expeditions during the period of the great trade exchanges between Europe and Asia, rare scholars came into contact with India but with the exception of a few Christian missionaries ready to do justice to non-Christian thinkers, they were ill prepared by their classical scholarship to pay attention to Indian thought. They have broadcast the notion of the obscurity of this thought.

So, at every period of European contact with India, Yoga and Buddhism appeared to have been the most difficult elements of Indian culture for the understanding of European philosophers. Surely, that is because they possess a common peculiarity—their analysis and utilisation of the mind and the body for the sake of salvation. More precisely, they had early discovered the role of the subconscious mind, not thought of in European psychology at the time of the first introductions of Buddhism and Yoga to Europe.

The classical texts of Yoga are more recent then the canonical texts of Buddhism. Nevertheless as they are more specialised let us first examine their data.

According to the classical *Yogasūtra*, Yoga is obtained by stopping the activities of the mind (*cittavrttinirodha*). These activities are like the faculties of some ordinary systems of European philosophy. They are the activities

of correct rational judgements of different kinds (*pramā ņa*), error (*viparyaya*), fantasy (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidrā*) and remembrance (*smrti*). It is a purely psychological analysis, very simple and limited to the consideration of phenomena relating to conciousness, somewhat of the nature of an inquiry into the external manifestations of the mind. It is completed by an analysis of the products of error, that is the *kleśas* or afflictions consisting of ignorance, the notion of personality, love, hate and obsessions (*avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dvesa*, and *abhiniveša*). It is completed above all by a deep notion of a subconscious or unconscious activity or presence, remaining always, both during the play of the faculties and during their complete cessation, being the permanent fundamental substratum of each individual psychism.

This fundamental unconscious activity is alluded to by the *Yogasūtra* in the description of *samādhi*, the chief achievement of Yoga. *Samādhi* is not "ecstasy" as surmised by many scholars trying to find in European religious mysticism an equivalent for that actually pure psychological notion. It is by no means a raptus of the soul outside the body. On the contrary, it is a masterful domination of the entire psychological and physiological human forces, a control of all the episodical manifestations affecting the self. It is the relation, the *sādhana*, of full antonomy, the *kaivalya* of the self.

It is reached by means of a special training, an *ablyāsa*, which is both physical as well as psychological. For scholars who thought that *Yaga* was a mystical process of union with God, the mixture of physical and psychic efforts was a turn in the wrong direction. But, for us, recognising its psychotechnical character, it is not surprising. We know now very well the link between physiological and psychical activities, psychosomatic phenomena and reciprocal influences of the mental and the corporeal, each on the other. According to modern psychophysiology, the double exercising of the mind and the body by means of Yoga is fully legitimate and harmoniously conceived.

To reach samā dhi is to eliminate adventitious psychosomatic phenomena and put the mind into its basic position or state. The original meaning of samā dhi—from the root dhā—"to place"—is "fully placing." Samā dhi has two degrees. In the first, a residue of consciousness remains after elimination of most of the effects of mental activities; this is samprajūā ta-samā dhi. In that stage the residual activity is giving effects or, more exactly, preparing future fruits; it is "with seed," sabīja. In that case, as in ordinary psychic activity, all conscious psychic phenomena are carving impressions

in the subconscious. These impressions are preserved like photographic plates. They are what some psychologists call "engrams." They constitute a kind of psychic body, an individual stock of past experiences enregistered and not only fixed but still active, because they are coming from doings and possessing a nature of activity. They are the "psychic constructions," the *saṃskāra* or "psychic impregnations," the *vāsanā*. They are the clements of the unconscious mind, the permanent basis of each individual.

Such an unconscious stock is not reducible to a memory as conceived by psychologists of the last century. These psychologists generally thought that memory was an engraving of conscious phenomena in the mind ; the mind being conceived of as an organ of the personal soul. But for the Yogic psychologists, a personal soul as an unitary being does not exist. There is only a group of psychic constructions, of *samskūra*, aggregated each to the other and each after the other on arising. So is constituted a phenomenal, not a substantial, being ; an individual catena of psychic events, not an uncompounded soul. For ancient ordinary psychology such a conception was rather strange, but for modern psychology, recognising the composite character of the unconscious, always enriched and determined for the future by occasional acquisitions, it is quite easy to understand.

Since in the samādhi with a residue of consciousness, the consciousness bears seeds for the future, there is a fixed object of meditation, dhyāna, and at the moment of that samādhi, the psychic manifestation of the meditating subject is a full setting on the object, a full adaptation (samāpatti) of the subject to the object. Accordingly, such an adaptative meditation puts into the unconscious stock very strong seeds for the future. Well chosen, the object of meditation automatically leads the man in the right way. Dhyāna and conscious samādhi are the means for determining the future of the psychic individual by giving shape and potentialities to the psychic stock compounding it.

In the second and highest degree of samadhi, there are no more conscious phenomena. The Samadhi is asamprajnata or "unconscious." There are no more acquisitions of new samskaras. That is complete suppression of mental activity. Accordingly, the intellectualistic psychology of the last century deemed that in such an exercise the value of the spirit was misunderstood, as the higher stage of spiritual culture seemd to be the annihilation of the spirit itself. Fortunately, the phenomenal mental activity is not the whole. It is only the momentary manifestation of the latent unconscious stock, which is strictly itself in its autonomous individuality, when no more troubled by momentary additional reactions to external

representations. Furthermore, in the isolating unconscious samādhi there is no effacement of the entire psychic activity. According to Yogasūtra III, 9, there is, after the stopping of mental activities, an evolution of the state of stopping, an evolution (parināma) which follows the last thought at the moment of stopping. According to the same text the evolution consists in the control of the samskāras accumulated during the previous states of consciousness and in the manifestation of the samskāras of the state of stopping. So, there is an automatic activity of the psychic unconscious constructions after the stopping of all sensorial, affective and intellectual activities, and that conception was quite familiar to the very ancient Indian speculations. The *Upanishads* well illustrate the idea that the state of deep sleep without any dream is a psychical state, even higher than those of awakening and of sleep with dreams, because it is closer to the supreme state called the fourth, the *turiya*, in which there is no more than pure self-existence.

We are now in a position to examine the Buddhist counterpart of Yogic psychology.

It would surely be one-sided and perhaps somewhat irreverential to see in Buddhism only a psychotechnical method. But perhaps it would be granted that Buddhism is using such a method as a means of discipline and for the practical realisation of its aims, the method being now intelligible to European people in the light of modern psychology. Perhaps it is not without interest for the general history of science and human culture to observe how some discoveries in the realm of psychology were made and utilised long ago by Buddhism and which even at the present time may furnish very rich material for fresh psychological research.

In fact, it is not quite easy to find who in India was the first to discover the existence and importance of the subconscious, the role of psychical and bodily interactions, the means to become master of one's mind and activities, and also the means to change or even eradicate the inheritance of acts carved into one's individual psychic stock. But, in the present state of our knowledge of the history of Indian thought, it seems as if Buddhism has led the way in the work of discovery.

Surely the Bhagavan, after his renouncement of the world and before his Bodhi (Enlightenment), did follow teachers of Yogic techniques. All traditions preserve the memory of his studies under Alāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, who were teaching respectively, specific exercises of Yogic meditation, namely the *samā patti*, that is the "adaptation" to the *ākincaññā yatana* "realm of nothingness," and the adaptation to *nevasaññānā saññayā tana* "realm where is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness."

The conditions required for the realisation of such *samā patti* were *saddhā* "faith," *viriya* "energy," *sati* "presence of mind," *samā dhi* "setting of mind" and *pañīnā* "intelligence," exactly the same as required also in classical Yoga. Therefore at the time of the Bhagavan, Yoga was already in existence and was practically utilised. But it was not sufficient and we have no texts belonging to it and giving before Buddhist canonical texts evidence of the psychological discoveries previously alluded to.

Many scholars, it is true, are claiming for Yoga a very ancient origin. They think it was an old prehistoric method with roots in a primitive shamanism. The alleged evidences are of two kinds. The first is archaeological. In the Mohenjo-Daro seals of the proto-historic civilisation of the Indus valley, we have representations of a man seated in so-called Yogic posture, reputed to gaze on the tip of his nose, crowned with buffaloes' horns and accompanied by some wildbeasts. They identify this figure with Siva as Yogin and Pasupati ; but they forget that the pastas of which Siva is the *pati*, the lord, are not wild beasts but human souls compared to animals in the care of the shepherd. Again, the so-called Yogic posture is not a characteristic asana of Yoga but a very common manner of sitting, the gazing on the nose is by no means clear, in the picture and if the classical Siva has a bull as his companion, the buffaloes' horns on the head of the scated figure reminds us of the bull only by a very loose association of ideas.

The second piece of evidence presented by the theory of a prehistoric antiquity for Yoga is ethnological. Its basis is a similarity in some extraordinary realisations or claims to superhuman powers on the part of the so-called "shamans" and some yogins or ascetics more or less related to Yoga. The search of such men for superhuman powers is generally held by ethnologists to be a survival of immemorial practices belonging to primitive peoples long before the birth of the rational and scientific efforts of humanity.

But then, we know shamans only in under-civilised countries or human groups of modern times long after many contacts between these human groups and more civilised peoples. We dont touch on real primitive humanity and in the case of "shamans" it is doubtful whether they have not inherited the practices of Indian *samanas* and even Yogins without knowing their corresponding thoughts and doctrines. In the realm of Indian cultural influence the doings of the so-called shamans may well be debased imitations of Indian achievements instead of being remains of the origins of these. If the practices and ideas of the Asian shamans are frequently very similar to the practices and ideas of foreign tribes, like the North American tribes who never submitted to Indian influence, it is most

probably because rudimentary stages of creeds and desires are naturally similar throughout mankind. Furthermore and above all the ideas of the so-called "shamans" are by no means characteristic of Yoga.

In brief, although a sitting posture with crossed legs in a proto-historic image or the claim to ascend the sky on the part of undercivilised people may recall Yogic practices or Yogic superhuman powers, they are by no means evidence for a prehistoric existence and a precivilised origin for Yoga. Without its specific characteristics of psychotechnical theory and method Yoga does not exist.

In my opinion, we can trace the origins of the most specific conceptions and doings of the Yogins in the physiological and psychological speculations of ancient learned India, especially in the Vedic theories of the physical and psychological role of breath, the  $pr\bar{a}na$ . Under these conditions, we have no need nor even any right to reject the testimony of the texts in favour of the darkness of indiscernible primitive origins.

But origin is one thing and development another. Along with the Brahmanical origin and classical achievements of Yoga take place the great creative effort of Buddhism and it seems clear that this effort has played a great part in the development of Yogic psychology as described in the classical *Yogasūtras*. The common features of the psychology of Buddhism and the psychology of the *Yogasūtras* are first mentioned in the Buddhist texts.

Let us consider these common features. The Buddhist doctrine of the five *khandhas* is a general analysis of the contents of the world from the point of view of the psychological being. The first, rūpas, corresponds to appearances. The second and third, vedanās and saññas to sensations and perceptions of the appearances. And, before the fifth, viññana or "thoughts" we have the fourth, the sankhāras, that is the constituent elements of the entire psychism, representing the prepared functional mechanisms of the The lists of these sankhāras are to some extent different in the various mind. ancient Buddhist traditions, but they usually contain, as in the Pali texts, the unconscious preestablished mechanisms of the functions of phassa " contact," vedanā " sensation," saññā " perception," cetanā " volition," ekaggatā "attention," manasikāra "memorisation," vitakka "reasoning," vicara "mental deliberation," adhimokkha "decisive conclusion," viriya "energy," chanda "aim," thina "laziness," middha "mental heaviness," sati " presence of mind " and paññindriya " power of understanding." These sankhāras and some others are cittasampayuttā cetasikā dhammā, i.e. "psychical events relating to thought." Their chief character is to be constructed,

sankhata. Already, like in the more recent classical texts of Yoga, they construct for each man his psychic individuality, but they are not an autonomous soul of unitary being. They are subject to dissolution and decay and to new incarnations as well after the death of the body according to their prevalent tendencies. But they seem to be different from the sams- $k\bar{a}ras$  of classical Yoga, as they are not only a stock of previously engraved psychic acts of mental faculties but also the mental faculties themselves; not only are they contents of the mind but they are constituent parts of it as well.

Nevertheless, their fundamental similarity with the samskāra of Yoga is obvious. These sankhārā of the Theravada school and other ancient schools of Buddhism surely forestall those of Yoga and correspond to the discovery of the importance of the unconscious element of the psychism and the composite nature of the whole psychic being, manifesting both conscious mental phenomena as well as unconscious continuing potentiality.

Furthermore, some Buddhist schools, distinct from the ancient schools like Theravāda, have been teaching theories intermediate between those of Theravada and classical Yoga. The Sarvāstivādins and Vaibhāşikas hold the same theory as the Theravādins, but distinguish on the one hand the *saṃskāras* which are *cittasamprayuktā* "relating to thought" and on the the other *saṃskāras* which are *cittaviprayuktā* "not relating to thought," psychical of course but essentially automatic and unconscious. The most important of these are the *prāpti* and the *aprāpti*, the "latent possession" and the "absence of possession" of the psychical remains of doings, and also of the two *nirodhas* leading to salvation. These two *nirodhas* or "stoppings" are *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and *apratisamkhyānirodha*. The first is reached by recapitulation or counting, that is by analysis, of truths and produces Nirvana. The second, "stopping without analysis," is actualised by *pratyayavaikalya*, that is "suppression of causality" of the remains of deeds in the psychism and therefore of the fruits of these deeds.

According to these views, Buddhism is a psychological technique for the neutralisation of unconscious activities, which are constructed by past psychic acts producing their consequences in a serial continuity (santana) of psychic phenomena which constitute each individual.

The Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāsika tradition also gives importance to other special *samskāras*, one working in the subconscious psychism against conscious thought, the *asamjñika*, another being the habit of full adaptation to unconsciousness (asamjñisamapātti).

Other Buddhist schools have come into existence at subsequent periods of transformation of Buddhist thought but they too are prior to the redaction of the *Yogasūtra*. These schools belong to the so-called Mahāyāna. One of them seems to be alluded to in the *Yogasūtra* itself, although there is some doubt about the interpretation of the passage concerned. It is the school of Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins, who make use of Yoga and teach that the world exists only as a psychic representation. For them, the external world is a purely psychic phenomenon and through the psychic training of Yoga we are able to control it. They were easily in contact with the non-Buddhistic schools of Yoga, which they emulated, and there was mutual borrowing on both sides. That is seemingly a very legitimate reason for a reference to them in the *Yogasūtras*.

Their system of psychology deserves notice. It is far more elaborate than any other in the world at the same period (i.e. the first four or five centuries of the Christian era). It was expounded by Asanga and Vasubandhu, probably during the last part of the fourth century and spread as far as China, chiefly owing to the efforts of the famous pilgrim Hiuan-tsang in the seventh century.

According to its views, the world exists only as a psychic representation but the representation is by far to be exclusively a product of sensorial functions. It rests upon the subconscious stock of psychic constructions (samskāra) or impregnations (vā sanā). This stock is organised into a whole which is the main part of the entire psychism; it is the *ālayavijjūāna*,<sup>1</sup>the "basic psychism." Its importance and its general role are nearly the same as that of the Unconscious of modern psychologists. The view of the world is given through the *ālayavijītāna* to the conscious mind and not founded on any objective reality existing outside. And, if this view is coherent it is because all the individual *ālayavijnāna* of men are of the same type and produce the same or concordant conceptions. The *ālayavijīāna* has some aspects of the Collective Unconscious of Jung. The content of the basic psychism is continuously enriched by the aggregation of the remains of all conscious psychical experiences, that is by vāsanās. For that reason the basic psychism is also called *ādānavijītāna* or "psychism of appropriation." These remains of psychical acts are seeds for the production of future fruits of the acts and are continually being put back again into consciousness as elements of new psychic acts and representations. The mind, as the organ of elaboration of representations, rests upon the basic psychism, being both its channel of acquisition of new vāsanās as well as its means for the conscious use of the unconscious psychic stock. It is not pure, but afflicted by *kleśas* responsible for the false feeling of personality.

In brief, the  $\bar{a}layavijn\bar{a}na$  is the fundamental substratum of the psychism of everyone, who owing to the activity of the mind is merged into the world of appearances and into samsārapravrti, the "process of transmigration." For the sake of salvation, it is necessary to eliminate the klesas by stopping, through Yoga, the activities of the mind and to operate by Yogic training and exact awareness of the truth, a conversion, a kind of revolution in the  $\bar{a}layavijn\bar{a}na$ , such a conversion being technically called  $\bar{a}srayapar\bar{a}vrtti$  "substratum's conversion." So the heavy unconscious contents of the basic psychism, which are in some respects similar to the "complex" of modern psycho-analysists, should be dissolved or neutralised, leaving alone the essential absolute reality which is pure existence in itself, the *tathatā* or "being as it is."

So the great role of the unconscious psychism, far superior to the conscious one and the possibility of controlling it by special training were well known, with variants, in the Buddhist schools, since the most original and the corresponding conceptions in classical Yoga were without any doubt prepared in close contact with the results of the Buddhist ideas and methods.

Technical means of realisation of the control of the unconscious psychism were also frequently the same in Buddhism and Yoga.

The preliminary general conditions to be realised before the beginning of exercises are already very similar, even frequently identical as, for example, when they consist in a training of the four brahmavihara : "benevolence" mettā, or maitri, " compassion " karu nā, " joy " muditā and " unperturbability" upekkhā or upeksā. The first exercises themselves are chosen in order to prepare in the unconscious mind-stuff, good dispositions and familiarity with the principles of knowledge and conduct. They construct in this mind-stuff psychical conditioned reflexes. The main exercises of this sort are in the Theravada school the kasi nas and more generally in all schools and in Yogic schools as well, the "psychic creations" or bhavana. The word bhavana is frequently translated simply by "meditation" or "visualisation," but the first translation is too vague and the second too restrictive. In fact, the best translation in keeping with the etymology of the word seems to be "psychic creation" because it is actually an act of creation not only of a single representation but also of a persistent latent picture in the unconscious. Meditation in general, *jhāna* or *dhyāna* is common to Buddhistic and Yogic methods. In Buddhist texts it is more precisely described with four stages.

In the first, it puts aside passionate desires and preserves feelings of joy  $(p\bar{i}ti, pr\bar{i}ti)$  and felicity (sukha) along with intellectual activities. In the

second, these intellectual activities are restricted; full serenity in himself and onepointedness of thought are developed, joy and felicity remaining. In the third, there is suppression of the affectivity of joy, and the development of unperturbability and the preservation of the general disposition to felicity. In the fourth, felicity is also suppressed. Then all intellectual and affective psychic phenomena are eliminated and the purity of unperturbability and presence of mind is obtained (*upekkhāsatipārisuddhi*). At this stage we are near to what is called in the *Yogasūtra*, *samūdhi* or simply *yoga*, and described as the stopping of psychical activities.

The samādhis, according to the Buddhist traditions are more various than *jhāna* or *dhyāna*. They put into a definite determined state the psychism of everyone practising them. Considering their intellectual contents they are of three kinds : with both reasoning and reflexion (*savitakka*, *savicāra*), without reasoning but with reflexion or without either reasoning or reflexion. They lead gradually to the elimination of occasional phenomena in the psychism and to the creation of many kinds of definite determined psychic states.

It is not necessary, it would seem, to go further into the comparisons. Buddhism and Yoga were necessarily associated or proceeding on parallel lines when working to give man mastery of himself. This is the reason why they were able to make valuable discoveries in the realm of psychology, for a great part first attested in Buddhist scriptures.

Indian civilisation was by nature ready to make early psychological discoveries. In many religions of the world human weakness and suffering are the results of man's sin and God's curse or punishment. In these religions the problem of salvation is ethical and mystical. The means of salvation are good deeds, love of God and prayer for mercy. Man has to realise his personal responsibility, the position of his own Ego before the world and the divine will. He has no need for any analysis of his psychological nature. According to Indian views, on the contrary, the origin of suffering is found in ignorance of man regarding his true nature. Man needs critically examine his ideas, false and true. He must discover his errors and their mode of production in order to be able to eradicate or neutralise them. The way to salvation is through the analysis of the psychical condition of man and conduct involving a control of these conditions. That is why Indian thinkers-and the Buddhists were of the first rank among them-were soon aware of the importance of the unconscious element of the psychism. They had to pay attention to the latent tendencies and automatic forces which determine the whole psychic life of each person.

They had also to realise the interdependance of psychic and somatic phenomena and to take care of both with regular methodical training.

In the meantime, European thinkers had to focus their attention on consciousness as they searched for the responsibility and the means of salvation in the conscious achievements of the thinking spirit. Therefore, mutual understanding was difficult at the beginning of their contact, between Indian and European thinkers. They were not working on the same lines. But now they can more easily see the logical results of their different points of view. And we can, as our special object of study for today, be fully convinced of the legitimacy of the ancient inquiries of Buddhism and Yoga in the field of psychology, psycho-somatic phenomena and psychotechnics.

Important modern psychophysiological research on the achievements of Yoga were recently begun and we have, in concluding, to hope for their extension as soon as possible. On the one hand, modern psychological discoveries have justified similar ancient discoveries at first misunderstood. On the other hand, the rich material of psychophysiological facts and methods collected by Buddhist and Yogic technicians should now be utilised as data for psychological research for the enrichment of psychology.

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