

The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism (1)

THE THEORY OF RELATIONS PRE-SUPPOSED IN THE NIKĀYAS

THE theory of Relations formulated in the Abhidhamma is not altogether unknown in the Nikāyas. Mrs. Rhys Davids¹ has made an attempt to show that the original and most constructive contribution of the Ābhidhammikas to Buddhist thought lies in the formulation of the theory of Relations. But a careful examination of the Nikāya texts would not warrant such an assumption. As is evident from the texts the Nekkāyikas were not unaware of this aspect of the theory of causality, for we find implicit references to most of the relations discussed in the Paṭṭhāna. As mentioned in the prolegomena² the theory of Relations is the outcome of the attempt made by the Ābhidhammikas to place the doctrine of causality on a more philosophical and firm foundation. This was no doubt induced by the criticism the other schools of thought levelled against Buddhism. Prompted by ethical and practical considerations the Nekkāyikas spared no pains in the analysis of these relations. But as occasion demanded they described the manner in which some things are related to the others.

The study of the early Nikāya texts involves some difficulty due to the ambiguous and synonymous use of terms. No systematic selection of terms is made by the compilers of the Nikāya texts with the result that some of the doctrines explained there need further elucidation and clearer exposition. The elasticity of the use of terms has necessitated the re-examination of many of the important doctrines. Sometimes the same term is used to explain different, at times divergent, concepts. At other times different terms are employed to denote the same concept. Lack of clarity in the use of terms in the Nikāya method of exposition has been a great drawback as compared with the Abhidhamma.

The same problem arises with regard to the use of the term *paccaya*. In the Nikāyas it is used synonymously with *hetu* and several other terms

1. ERE. Vol. X. p. 649.

2. University of Ceylon Review, Vol. XIX, No. 2, pp. 167ff.

like *kāraṇa*, *sambhava*, *pabhava*, *nidāna* etc. All these terms are used in the Nikāyas to denote the concept of cause in general. Without any discrimination the early Buddhist teachers made use of terms current in usage to denote this concept of cause.

1. Hetu-paccaya

The first of the twenty-four forms of relations enumerated in the Abhidhamma is the relation by way of root-condition (*hetu paccaya*). Hetu is a term that is used profusely in the Nikāya texts to denote cause or condition. It is there used in a very general sense comprehending as it were any form of cause. It had not assumed the more specific or limited sense of the invariable or root condition as in the Abhidhamma. But along with this more general application of the term *hetu* we come across some instances where it is used to denote the root-cause. In the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta³, greed (*lobha*), hatred or aversion (*dosa*) and confusion (*moha*) are treated as roots of evil conduct (*akusala mūla*) and their opposites as the roots of good conduct (*kusala mūla*). From this it should become evident that these three attitudes, to wit, greed, aversion, and confusion are related to evil action by way of root-condition (*mūlatṭhena*).

2. Ārammana-paccaya

References to the relations by way of object are found in plenty in the Nikāya texts. Moreover they are explicitly stated unlike most of other forms or relations which are only implicitly referred to. Concepts of various kinds are said to be related to consciousness (*viññāṇa*) by way of object.⁴ It is also mentioned that in the absence of this objective support (*ārammaṇa*) consciousness would not develop and thus there would not be rebirth and the consequent suffering.⁵ Again the six spheres of sense (*salāyatana*) comprehending the external world are related to the perceiving individual by way of object. The percept serves as an object for the perceiver.⁶

3. Adhipati-paccaya

References to certain attitudes dominating the minds of individuals are not rare in the Nikāya texts. The particular nature of the actions of an

3. M. I. 47.

4. S. II. 65—Yaṅca kho bhikkhave ceteti, yaṅca pakappeti yaṅca anuseti ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa tṭhiyā, ārammaṇe sati paṭiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti.

5. *ibid.*—Tasmim paṭiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūlhe āyatim punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti.

6. M. I. 111-112.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

individual is always due to the nature of the attitude dominating his mind. Some attitudes like craving (*taṇhā*), desire (*chanda*) are said to dominate the minds of individuals and thus confine them to suffering (*dukkha*).⁷ In such cases these attitudes such as *taṇhā* are said to relate themselves to *dukkha* by way of dominance.

False view (*micchā ditṭhi*) also serves as a dominance-condition to suffering and this is clearly illustrated in the Kukkuravatiya Sutta⁸ where it is said that certain individuals observe certain practices like the posture of a cow (*govata*) because their minds are dominated by the false view that by doing so they would be able to attain happiness.⁹ According to the Buddha, instead of their attaining happiness they are led on, by their false views, to various forms of suffering.

4. *Aññamañña-paccaya*

The doctrine of rebirth being one of the corner stones of early Buddhist philosophy, the Buddhists were compelled to explain the process by which a being is reborn. They were not able to silence the sceptic queries by saying that it is a phenomenon which could be perceived only by the development of extra-sensory faculties. Therefore in the Nikāyas we see an attempt being made to describe the way in which rebirth takes place. It is said in the Mahānidāna Sutta¹⁰ that consciousness (*viññāṇa*) depends on name and form (*nāma rūpa*) i.e., the psycho-physical personality for its existence and vice versa.¹¹ In the absence of one, the other cannot exist or grow into maturity. It is clear from this description that the relation existing between *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa* is one of reciprocity (*aññamañña*). The one cannot exist without the other. If one falls or is destroyed the other too falls or is destroyed.

5. *Anantara-paccaya*

According to the Buddhist conception of saṃsāra there exists nothing in this world, that is permanent or substantial. Everything is impermanent (*anicca*), and is changing every moment. This led them to conceive of things (*dhamma*) as arising and passing away.¹² There is nothing that is

7. M. I. 48-49; III. 19.

8. M. I. 388 f.

9. *ibid.*

10. D. II. 55 ff.

11. *ibid.* 56.

12. *Thag.* vv. 23,379; *It.* 120.

static, not even the body made of the four elements. On the other hand, nothing is completely destroyed or annihilated. Along with the passing away there is arising. This is more so in the case of the mind. Thoughts arise, pass away and arise once again. The rapidity with which the mind changes is explained by a very striking simile. It is compared to a monkey who, roaming in a forest, leaves one branch of a tree and gets hold of another.¹³ This simile explains one very significant characteristic in the Buddhist theory of change. According to it there is no break or interval between arising and passing away or passing away and arising of a thing (*dhamma*). One thing gives rise to another immediately. Hence the idea of contiguity (*anantara*) which was later formulated by the Ābhidhammikas as a condition (*paccaya*).

6. Nissaya-paccaya

The Nekkāyikas were aware of the fact that a relation of dependence too is obtained between consciousness (*viññāṇa*) and name and form (*nāmarūpa*). The question is raised by the Buddha as to whether consciousness (*viññāṇa*) would develop or grow if it does not find a foot hold on some psycho-physical personality.¹⁴ If the psycho-physical personality (*nāmarūpa*) is not there, consciousness would be rendered baseless, without a support (*patiṭṭhā*) on which to stand. Once again volition (*cetanā*) is said to be the basis on which consciousness rests.¹⁵ Hence the psycho-physical personality in one instance and volition in the other, serve as a dependence-condition (*nissaya paccaya*) to consciousness.

7. Vipāka-paccaya

Instances are not wanting where decay (*jarā*), death (*maraṇa*), grief, lamentation are given as the result of repeated birth.¹⁶ They are the direct results of birth (*jāti*). The nature of the world is such that everything in this world is impermanent. Hence decay and destruction follow birth. Therefore the relation that decay and death etc. bears to birth is one of effect (*vipāka*).

8. Āhāra-paccaya

This is another form of relation that is explicitly given in the Nikāya texts. Four things are said to serve as food for the beings that are born

13. S. II. 95; Sn. 791—Kapī va sākhaṃ pamuñcaṃ gahāya.

14. D. II. 63.

15. S. II. 65.

16. *ibid.*

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

(*bhūta*) and those to be born (*sambhavesi*). They are—(1) material food (*kabalīnikāra āhāra*) gross or subtle (*olārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā*), (2) contact (*phassa*), (3) volition (*manosañcetanā*) and (4) consciousness (*viññāṇa*).¹⁷

The first one is the most evident form of food. The physical body of a being is sustained by material food.¹⁸ Then contact relates itself to a being by way of food because to a great extent the individual character is fed and nourished by the impressions that he gets from the world external to him.¹⁹ Again volition (*manosañcetanā*) is also considered to serve as food to an individual because, according to the Buddhist conception of *saṃsāra*, volition plays a major role in the prolongation of *saṃsāric* existence of a being. It is the food that sustains the psychical body in its continued existence in *saṃsāra*.²⁰ While all these things serve as food for the being who is already born, the last one, i.e., consciousness (*viññāṇa*) serves as food for the being who awaits rebirth. The psycho-physical personality (*nāma-rūpa*) would not develop if it is not fed and nourished with consciousness.²¹ Consciousness is said to be a food and also a condition for future birth.²²

These are some of the more important forms of relations that are presupposed in the *Nikāya* texts. With the development of scholastic activity the *Ābhidhammikas*, far removed from the flesh and blood actuality of the ever-fluid reality, began to take a more keen interest in this second aspect of the theory of causality. Their time and energy were absorbed by the investigations that they carried out into the various ways in which phenomena are inter-related. Their's was a philosophical rather than a religious pursuit. Although the religious aspect, i.e. the living of the religious life, was not cared for, yet in fairness to the *Ābhidhammikas* it must be said that they laid bare, made explicit the philosophical problems implicit in the *Nikāyas*. They can be said to have placed the theory of causality on a more firm and philosophical foundation.

Buddhaghosa makes an attempt to give authority and sanctity to these findings of the *Ābhidhammikas* by pushing it back to the time of the Buddha himself. After analysing the theory of conditionality (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) Buddhaghosa raises a problem which in actuality depicts the stage in which

17. M. I. 48; S. II. 11, 13, 98 ff.

18. S. II. 11.

19. SA. II. 23.

20. *ibid.* 25

21. *ibid.*

22. *ibid.* 25-26.

the Ābhidhammikas were led on to formulate the theory of relations (*paṭṭhāna naya*). He says, "At this stage the objector might say, 'we accept that ignorance (*avijjā*) is the cause of dispositions (*saṅkhāra*)'. But one ought to ask of which of them and in what way (*kathaṃ*) it is the cause?'²³ thus clearing the stage for the introduction of the theory of relations. Then he goes on to say that in order to counteract this objection the Buddha has enumerated the twenty-four forms of relations.

9. Sarvastivādin theory of Relations

It is also significant to note that the Sarvastivādins, who branched off from the main Theravāda tradition after the Third Council and whose Abhidharma Piṭaka is quite different from the Abhidhamma Piṭaka of the Theravādins, recognise only four relations (*pratyaya*) and no more.²⁴ The four relations are (1) root-condition (*hetu*), (2) object-condition (*ālambana*), (3) dominance-condition (*adhipati*) and (4) contiguity-condition (*anantara*). It appears as if the Theravādins went further to analyse every form of relation existing between phenomena, while the Sarvastivādins were quite satisfied with the analysis of the most important forms of relations which according to them were only four in number.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM PACCAYA IN THE ABHIDHAMMA

Since the greater part of the Dhamma was taught in a free style, the rich and varied contents of the Suttas occasionally lent themselves to a wide variety of interpretations. As the words of Buddha gradually grew into a religion and philosophy professed by an increasing number of people the necessity arose for a precise and categorical presentation of the Teachings. This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that other contemporary religions and schools of philosophy were turning out their own literature in which they attempted to present the doctrine precisely and systematically. The richness of the philosophical content of the Buddha's discourses allowed for the possibility of divergence of opinion and this actually happened as indicated by the early history of the emergence of the schools of Buddhism. The store house of words and terms found in the Nikāyas could be interpreted in various ways. Ambiguity of words presented a serious problem.

23. Vism. p. 532.

24. Mādhyamika Kārikā. I. 2; Abhidharmakoṣa. II. 61.
 Catvārah pratyayā hetuḥ
 'Cālambanamanantaram
 Tathaiivādhipateyañ ca
 Pratyayo nāsti pañcamah.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

Classification and definition are the necessities of logic, the prime necessities of precise logical thinking. Hence it fell to the lot of the Ābhidhammikas who made an attempt to build up a system of philosophy, to classify, define and select terms. Precision in the selection of terms is thus a notable feature in the Abhidhamma texts. The development of a technical terminology, including a system of definition and classification lies to the credit of the Ābhidhammikas.

As was pointed out earlier the Buddhists, especially the Ābhidhammikas were agreed that nothing can be produced by the action of a single cause, that every dhamma is the product of at least two causes. Out of the two terms *hetu* and *paccaya*²⁵ which were used to denote the concept of cause and which were very widely used in the Nikāyas, the Ābhidhammikas selected the term *paccaya* to denote the various causes, restricting the use of the term *hetu* to denote the root-cause only. After this only the term *paccaya* came to mean any form of cause or condition.

Then the necessity arose for the definition and clear exposition of the concept of *paccaya*. Buddhaghosa explains it thus—*paṭicca etasmā eti 'ti paccayo*,²⁶ i.e. that form which the (fruit or effect) derived (from a cause) comes. The term *ṭhiti* (occasion) is used synonymously with the term *paccaya*²⁷ and is defined as that by dependence on which the effect (fruit) stands.²⁸ Whatever state that stands or arises through not letting go another state, the latter is called the cause of the former. There are, for instance, many circumstances necessary for the production of a chair, to wit, wood, a carpenter and the instruments with which he works. If these conditions which are very necessary for the production of a chair are mere passive things they could hardly be called causes or conditions. Their passive existence would not lead to the production of a chair. They could be called causes or conditions only if they are helpful in the production of the chair. Any such thing, among a group of conditions, which does not render service to, has no influence over, the effect cannot be thus included under the category of cause or condition.

25. These two terms were used in the Nikāyas synonymously, e.g., *ko hetu ko paccayo* M. I. 442, 444; II. 45, 74; A. I. 55 ff; 66, 200; IV. 151 ff.

26. Vism. p. 532; Tikap. I. 11-12. Sumangala goes a step further than Buddhaghosa in defining the term *paccaya*—*paṭicca phalaṃ eti etasmā'ti paccayo*—thus including the term *phalaṃ* (effect or fruit), in the definition. Abvn. p. 133.

27. As is evident from the use of the compound term *paccayaṭṭhiti*. Abvn. p. 133.

28. *Tiṭṭhati phalaṃ ettha tadāyattavuttitāya*. *ibid*.

It was because of this that Buddhaghosa and his successors extended their definitions of the term *paccaya* by saying that it has the characteristic of rendering service.²⁹ According to them only that state which renders service to the standing or arising of a state only is said to be its cause or condition.³⁰ Where one dhamma by its arising or persistence is a helper to another dhamma, that first named is the (causally) relating dhamma to the last named. Thus a *paccaya* is not only a relating thing but also an "assisting agency" (*upakāraka*). This ability or power that a certain condition possesses by which it renders help to the effect is thus called *satti* (Skt. *sakti*).³¹ *Paccayasatti* is the power or potentiality a dhamma exerts in the arising of another dhamma. This is of the greatest importance to an understanding of the Buddhist philosophy of change and it has remained a key note in that tradition to the present day. The formulation of the concept of *paccaya satti* was so essential for bringing about synthesis of the various dhammas that were analysed into discrete units in the Vibhaṅga. Ledi Sadaw³² expands it as follows—

"Just as an heir normally inherits the property of his deceased parent, so does a succeeding unit of consciousness inherit all the energy, the functions, the impressions of the expired unit."

The same is believed with regard to material units. A mango seed which produces a tree also possesses the potentiality to produce a mango which is of the same kind. Hence it is a law that reigns supreme not only in the psychical sphere but also in the spheres of physical world. This legacy is spoken of as a force, vim, influence of the *paccaya*, or causally relating term (*paccaya-satti*).

A careful examination of this theory would show that it is according to this power or force of the condition (*paccaya*) that the conditions could be distinguished from one another. It is the *paccayasatti* that describes the function of the condition, the type or nature of service it renders to the effect. Thus a root-condition (*hetu-paccaya*) renders service to the effect as a root (*mūlatthēna*).

29. Vism. p. 532; Tikap. I. 11-12—Upakārako lakkhaṇo paccayo. Abvn. p. 137—Upakāratthēna paccayo.

30. Yo hi dhammo yassa dhammassa thitiyā vā uppattiyā vā upakārako hoti so tassa paccayo—Vism. p. 533; Tikap. I. 11-12.

31. This term was coined by Ariyavaṃsa, a notable Burmese teacher of the 15th century—See Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology* 1924. p. 196.

32. JPTS. 1915-1916. p. 37.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

Taking a tree as an illustration we see that the roots of a tree, having firmly established themselves in the ground and drawing up sap, both from the soil and water, carry that sap right up to the crown of the tree so that the tree develops and grows for a long time until it blossoms forth and bears fruit.³³ In the same way greed (*lobha*) having firmly established itself in desirable things and drawing up the essence of pleasure and enjoyment from them conveys that essence to the concomitant mental elements till they burst into immoral acts and words. Therefore greed (*lobha*) is related to immoral (*akusala*) acts and words by way of root-condition.

Thus it is clear that greed fulfils the function of a root in the production of immoral acts. The service that it renders to the effect is similar to the service rendered by a root to the tree.

Instead of the use of the term *phala* to denote the effect the Ābhidhammikas in keeping with their conception of the plurality of causes coined the new term *paccayuppanna*³⁴ to denote the resultant or that which comes into existence due to the interplay or concatenation of conditions.

THEORY OF RELATIONS IN THE ABHIDHAMMA

The Paṭṭhāna enumerates twenty-four forms or modes of relations. Here we meet with a very exhaustive and detailed treatment of the various ways in which things are related.

10. Root-condition (*Hetu-paccaya*)

Out of the twenty-four forms of relations, the root-condition or the relation by way of root is the most important. It is one of the few conditions (*paccaya*) that could properly be called a "cause" in the sense, the term is used by the philosophers of the Western world.³⁵ The rest are mere conditions in the sense of assisting agencies.

Greed (*lobha*), hate (*dosa*) and confusion (*moha*) and their opposites, viz., disinterestedness (*alobha*), amity (*adosa*) and intelligence (*amoha*) are described in the Abhidhamma as the root conditions.³⁶

33. Abvn. p. 137—Uddham ojam abhiharantena mūlena viya pādapo tappaccayaṃ phalam gacchati pavattati vuddhiṃ virūhiṃ āpajjati.

34. Tikap. I. 23.

35. Bertrand Russell—Our knowledge of the External World.
See. Chapter on the Notion of Cause.

36. Tikap. I. 27.

According to the Nikāyas the first three are the condition of evil (*akusala*) while the last three are the conditions of good (*kusala*). But the Ābhidhammikas who were trying to place the philosophy of life (*bhava*) on a more firm footing discussed this condition not only in relation to what is good and bad (*kusala* and *akusala*) in this life but also with regard to the causality of a human being. Hence for them *lobha*, *dosa*, and *moha* are related to the mental and material qualities produced by the mind during life-time as well as to the mental and material qualities produced by *kamma* at the initial stage of the conception of a human being.

According to the Nikāya theory of the conception of a being, the material body as well as the mental qualities that one inherits is influenced by the mental qualities (*viññāna*) of the previous life. The individual (*nāmarūpa*) assumes a certain individuality with its bodily and mental characteristics because of the influence of this psychic element (*viññāna*) belonging to the previous life. If that consciousness were to be dominated or influenced by one or the other of the conditions (*paccaya*) given above then the resultant (*paccayuppanna*) material and mental qualities are fed and nourished by these conditions just as the root of the tree stimulates the whole stem and other parts. Therefore in the absence of these root-conditions there would be no more rebirth just as a tree would not grow if it is not nourished by the roots. Thus *lobha*, *dosa* and *moha* constitute the most important causes or conditions for the propelling of an individual in the cycle of existence. This is not all.

They serve as root conditions for the material and mental qualities that are produced during life-time too. Suppose a man is in love with a woman. Now so long as he does not dispel the lustful thoughts, all his acts, words, and thoughts regarding this woman will be rooted in lust. In this connection it should be noted that acts and words come under the category of material qualities for we find *kāyaviññatti* and *vacīviññatti* included within the category of derived matter (*upādā rūpa*) in the Abhidhamma analysis of matter.³⁷ In short, his whole behaviour is conditioned by greed or lust, the material qualities as well as the mental qualities being rooted in lustful greed for that woman. Because greed or lust serves as the root and also because it serves or assists in the arising of these states of mind and body, it becomes a *hetupaccaya*. The rest may be explained and understood in the same manner.

37. Vism. p. 448.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

Transporting the essence, thus, the three elements *lobha*, *dosa* and *moha* operate upon the component parts, so that they become happy and joyful at the desirable object etc.

With regard to the other three elements, *alobha*, *adosa* and *amoha*, suppose a man sees danger in sensual pleasures and gives up that lustful thought for the woman. In doing so disinterestedness as regards her arises in him. Therefore instead of the impure acts, words, and thoughts that arose formerly, now arise pure acts, words and thoughts having their root in disinterestedness (*alobha*).

Thus *lobha* and *moha*, which in the Nikāyas are given as *taṇhā* and *avijjā*, are the entire roots of all three rounds of misery. Hate (*dosa*) being the incidental consequence of greed is only a root of evil.

The two elements of intelligence and disinterestedness which are respectively termed wisdom and the element of renunciation are the entire roots for the dissolution of the round of misery (*dukkhakkhaya*).

11. Object-condition (*Ārammaṇa-paccaya*)

A phenomenon (*dhamma*) which assists or renders help to some other phenomenon by way of an object or presentation on to which the latter could cling or hold fast (*ālambiyati*) is said to be related in this manner.³⁸ Just as a weak person (*dubbalo puriso*) makes an attempt to stand up leaning on a stick or holding fast to a rope, even so mind (*citta*) and its co-efficient (*cetasika*) arise only with an objective support.³⁹

In the empirical world Buddhism holds that everything is relative and interdependent. Mental phenomena (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*) are interdependent; the one cannot stand without the other. Thus for the manifestation of mental phenomena some kind of objective support is a *sine qua non*. This objective basis is worthy of being examined for it is said that there is nothing in this world that would not become the object of consciousness.⁴⁰

The object of consciousness is said to be either an object of sense or object of thought. The former is subdivided into five classes, viz., visible form (*cakkhuvīññeyya rūpa*), audible sound (*sotaviññeyya sadda*), odorous smell

38. Tikap. I. p. 1 f.

39. *ibid.* I. p. 12 f; Vism. p. 533; Abvn. p. 138.

40. Vism. p. 533; Abvn. p. 138.

(*ghānaviññeyya gandha*), sapid taste (*jivhāviññeyya rasa*) and tangible matter (*kāyaviññeyya phoṭṭhabba*). These serve as the basis or support (*paccaya-upakāraka dhamma*) for the arising of consciousness (*viññāna*) of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch respectively. Hence these five classes of sensibles are related to the five classes of consciousness by way of object (*ārammaṇa*).⁴¹

The object of thought consists of six classes.

They are—

- (1) all classes of consciousness (*citta*),
- (2) all states of mental co-efficients (*cetasika*),
- (3) & (4) all kinds of material qualities (*rūpa*), whether they are sensitive (*pasāda*) or subtle (*sukhuma*).
- (5) all terms expressive of concepts, and
- (6) *nibbāna*.

These can be termed ideas of reflection and are collectively called *dhammārammaṇa*.⁴²

All these sensibles or objects of sense, past, present or future and all objects of thought, past, present, future or outside time, comprising the conventional (*sammuti*), the relative (*paṭṭicasamuppanna*) and the transcendental (*lokuttara*) are object-conditions and are causally related severally, to the seventy-six classes of consciousness known as mind cognitions which are the *paccayuppannā dhammā*.

In the same way the actions (*kamma*) the sign of action (*kammanimitta*) and the sign of destiny (*gatinimitta*) presented to a man at the moment of death serve as the object conditions and are causally related to the consciousness known as the life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*).⁴³ It is clear from this description that the dying consciousness (*cuticitta*) of an individual cannot generate rebirth consciousness (*paṭisandhicitta*) without the support of these objects which are presented to him at the moment of death. Only to the dying consciousness of a person who has attained final emancipation (*parinibbāna*) are these objects not presented, for in the episode of Godhika it is said that he passed away with consciousness finding no basis (*appatitṭhitena viññāṇena*).⁴⁴

41. Tikap. I. 1-2.

42. Abhs. p. 13.

43. BPR. p. 10.

44. S. I. 120 ff.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

It may be pointed out that this relation involves a subject, thus indicating a standpoint that is opposed to orthodox Buddhist philosophy, viz., the positing of a substance or agent. But it should be noted that the object (*ārammaṇa*) involves no correlate of metaphysical import; and this is applied also to the subject. The ever-changing object or objective process is regarded as the relating thing (*paccaya*) and the ever-changing mental aggregates are the related thing (*paccayuppanna*),⁴⁵ the only constant factor being the concept of the specific relation.⁴⁶

12. Dominance-condition (*Adhipati-paccaya*)

Buddhism by making the ethical character of an action dependent upon the motive and not upon the external performance transformed the doctrine of karma. The aim was no longer to attend to the external actions but to the motives that inspire them. The Buddha made the greatest advance in Indian ethics by insisting on motive as the standard of moral judgement. The value of our actions are determined by the motives which inspire them. Causality of moral behaviour was also a problem that the Buddhist had to explain clearly. Therefore in the statement of causality they had to take into account of the motives which dominate the mind. Hence the necessity for the formulation of the dominance-condition (*adhipati paccaya*).

Taking into consideration the part played by objects (*ārammaṇa*) both material and mental (i.e. ideas of reflection), in dominating the consciousness of an individual, the Buddhists distinguished them from such mental attitudes or dispositions like intentions, will, etc., which arise spontaneously in the consciousness of an individual. Therefore, according to them, dominance is of two varieties, to wit,

- (a) objective dominance (*ārammaṇa adhipati*),
- (b) co-existence dominance (*sahajāta adhipati*).⁴⁷

The first accounts for the impressions created by external objects on the mind. The external world presents us with various agreeable and disagreeable objects. One's behaviour is therefore to a great extent determined by these objective presentations. The simile of the man in love with a woman, quoted above, would illustrate this relation too. The external object (*ārammaṇa*), in this case, the woman, generates in the man a great lust

45. CP. p. 2.

46. JPTS. 1915-1916, p. 25.

47. Tikap. I. 13.

or attachment. All his behaviour is thus dominated by this external object which he longs to possess. He would go to the extent of murdering any other person who tries to win over that woman. If we are to explain the causality of his rash conduct, the woman whom he loved is related to that act by way of objective-dominance. Hence the woman becomes the *paccaya dhamma* and the behaviour of the man, his acts, words and thoughts are the *paccayuppannā dhammā*. It is said that objects of sense exhibit the causal relation of objective dominance only when they are highly regarded, otherwise they do not. But those who reach the various stages of the *jhānas* are never lacking in high esteem for the sublime states they have obtained.

Apart from this, there are certain attitudes which dominate our consciousness and which are said to arise along with consciousness (*sahuppādana*). Intention or desire to do, will, energy or effort, reason and investigation are said to fall into this category. But in the ultimate analysis it appears that even such mental concomitants are generated by objects, material as well as mental. But because of the dominating influence of these attitudes which overshadow⁴⁸ the objects that gave rise to them and which persist along with consciousness the distinction is made between objective dominance and co-existent dominance.

The potency of the objects to control these states of mind and its mental co-efficients by which the objects are highly regarded is called *adhipaccattha*.

13. Relations of Contiguity and Immediate Contiguity (Anantara-and Samanantara-paccaya)

Orthodox systems of thought in India posited an unchanging soul not only to explain the process of perception⁴⁹ but also to explain the phenomenon of rebirth.⁵⁰ Such a conception was abhorred by the Buddhists for whom the philosophy of change was one of vital importance. The doctrine of insubstantiality (*anatta*) which is the corollary of the philosophy of change, has remained the key note especially in the tradition of the Theravādins up to the present day. This no doubt created enormous problems for the Buddhists. The difficult task of reconciling the doctrine of change with the doctrine of continuity had to be faced. The Buddhists were equal to the task. The philosophic importance of the relation of

48. *Yadā hi chandaṃ dhuraṃ chandaṃ jeṭṭhakaṃ katvā, cittaṃ pavattati tadā chando 'va adhipati, no itare*—*Tikap. I. 13.*

49. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. III. 7.*

50. *ibid. VI. 2.*

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

contiguity and also of immediate contiguity is evident from the fact that they enabled the Buddhists to dispense with the conception of an unchanging entity, a soul, not only in explaining the perceptual process but also in explaining the problem of personal continuity, i.e. the phenomenon of rebirth, quite consistently.

The Buddhists who psychologised without a 'psyche' thus had to explain how thoughts arose one after the other without an interval, yet not giving up their characteristics. To account for this they formulated these two relations according to which the relating subject (*paccaya*) that is the preceding consciousness and its mental concomitants which have just ceased in the immediately preceding moment is related to the related object (*paccayuppanna*) which is the succeeding consciousness and its mental concomitants which have just arisen, by way of contiguity and also immediate contiguity.⁵¹ The relations that obtain between these two, the one that ceases and the other that arises without a pause or gap, are said to be the relations of contiguity (*anantara*) and immediate contiguity (*samanantara*).⁵²

Sumangala, in his celebrated work, *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*, says that the preceding consciousness is able to cause such states of consciousness as are similar to its own, to succeed in the immediately following instant.⁵³ Ledi Sadaw, while expounding the philosophy of relations,⁵⁴ says that in the phrase, "similar to its own" the word similar is meant to express similarity in respect of having the faculty of being conscious of an object.

The ability on the part of the preceding thought-moment to cause such thought-moments as are similar to its own, is the *paccaya satti*, for there is not a mere sequence or succession in time without any causal connection between the two correlated things. On the other hand it is a temporal and also a spatial relation where causality is also obtained. Thus the preceding consciousness towards the succeeding consciousness, the predecessor towards the successor, is like a parent towards its off-spring, with the difference that the predecessor in the mental sequence ceases to be as such, the moment the successor appears. Moreover, the succeeding unit of consciousness inherits

51. Tikap. I. 3—*Yesam yesam dhammanam anantarā ye ye dhammā uppajjanti, te te dhammā tesam tesam dhammanam anantara-(samanantara)-paccayena paccayo.*

52. *ibid.*

53. p. 138—*attano attano anantaram anurūpacittuppādajananasamattho purimapurimaniruddho dhammo anantarapaccayo samanantarapaccayo 'ti ca vuccati.* Tikap. I, 13.

54. BPR. p. 24.

all the energy, functions and impressions of the expiring unit, in the same way as an heir inherits the property of his deceased parent.

It is important to note that this relation of contiguity as well as the relation of immediate contiguity prevail not only in this life, beginning with birth and ending with the dissolution of the material body, but right throughout the whole space of recurring existences of an individual, right throughout the cycle of evolution, with unbroken continuity. Hence we see the relation of contiguity existing between death consciousness (*cuticitta*) and rebirth consciousness (*paṭisandhi citta*). Thus rebirth consciousness is related to the following life-continuum (*bhavāga*) by way of contiguity; and this life-continuum is again related in a similar way to the subsequent life-continuum and so on with the rest.⁵⁵ Ledi Sayadaw opines that until after the attainment of the Path of Arahantship and the final dissolution of the five aggregates (*khandha-parinibbāna*) this continuum is not broken, or more strictly speaking, does not cease for ever.⁵⁶

Sumangala refutes the theory held by some people that the relation of contiguity (*anantara paccaya*) refers to the spatial relation and that the relation of immediate contiguity (*samanantara paccaya*) refers to the temporal relation.⁵⁷ According to him there is no difference between the two with regard to the things they refer to. Whatever difference there is between them is merely verbal.⁵⁸

14. Co-existent Condition (*Sahajāta-paccaya*)

That which arises helping or assisting the arising of another dhamma is said to be a co-existent condition.⁵⁹ The example of a lamp is quoted to illustrate this relation.⁶⁰ When a lamp is lighted, the light comes along with the lighting of the lamp. When a lamp is burning, it burns together with its heat and light. In this case the lamp relates itself to the light and heat by way of co-existence. Carefully analysing some phenomena which

55. JPTS. 1884. p. 37.

56. BPR. p. 24.

57. Yaṃ pana keci vadanti atthānantaratāya anantarapaccayo, kālānantaratāya samanantarapaccayo 'ti.—Abvn. p. 138.

58. Byañjanamatten'eva hi nesaṃ vireso; atthato pana ubhayampi samanantara—niruddhass'eva adhivacanāṃ; na hi nesaṃ atthato bhedo upalabbhati—ibid.

59. Tikap. I. 14—Uppajjamāno saha uppajjamānabhāvena upakārako dhammo sahajāta-paccayo. Abvn. p. 138—attano anuppattiyā sahuppannānaṃ sahuppādabhāvena paccayo.

60. Abvn. p. 138.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

arise together with their effects, or, in other words, phenomena which also cause their effects to arise simultaneously, the Buddhists formulated this relation.

The *paccayasatti* in this case is the ability on the part of the *paccaya* (the lamp, in the simile quoted) to give rise to the *paccayuppanna* (i.e. the light and heat) simultaneously with the arising of the *paccaya*.

The four immaterial aggregates (*arūpino khandhā*) are said to be related to one another in this manner. So are the four great elements (*mahā bhūtā*). But here it must be noted that there is to be obtained not only a relation of co-existence but also a relation of reciprocity (*aññamañña paccaya*).⁶¹ Not only do the elements of cohesion (*āpo*), heat (*tejo*) and motion (*vāyo*) arise along with the arising of the elements of extension (*paṭhavi*) but they also cannot exist in the absence of the others. So are related, mutually as well as by way of co-existence, psychological data (*nāma*) and material data (*rūpa*) at the birth of a being. The one does not arise nor exist without the other.

But in the case of material qualities⁶² which are born of mind during life-time, they arise along with consciousness but not vice versa. So are the four great elements related to the derived material qualities (*upādārūpa*).

15. Mutuality-condition or the Relation by way of Reciprocity (Añña-mañña-paccaya)

Mutuality-condition or the relation by way of reciprocity is in some respects similar to the relation by way of co-existence (*sahajāta paccaya*). The important feature to be noted in this relation is that both terms of the relation are mutually relating and related. They function as the relating subject (*paccaya*) and also as the related object (*paccayuppanna*). Hence it is called mutuality condition or *aññamañña paccaya*.⁶³

The example of the three sticks is usually quoted to illustrate this relation.⁶⁴ When three sticks are set upright leaning against one another at their upper ends, each of them depends on, and is depended on by, the other

61. Tikap. I. 14.

62. As mentioned earlier, the material qualities referred to here, are nothing but words and deeds of an individual (cp. *vacīviññatti*, *kāyaviññatti* included under the category of matter).

63. Tikap. I. 36.

64. Abvn. p. 138—Aññamaññaṃ upatthambhayamānaṃ tidaṇḍaṃ viya attano upa-kāraḍadhammānaṃ upatthambhakabhāvena paccayo.

two. Hence each serves as a *paccaya* as well as the *paccayuppanna*. If one of them falls, the rest will fall at the same time. The relation of reciprocity or mutuality should be understood in a similar way.

The Tikapaṭṭhāna⁶⁵ says that the relation of reciprocity is three-fold. Firstly, the four non-material aggregates (*cattāro arūpino khandhā*) are mutually related. The mental properties, according to the Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī, cannot arise in the absence of consciousness.⁶⁶ They arise in consciousness and depend on consciousness for their existence.⁶⁷ On the other hand consciousness is not able to arise without the correlated mental properties. The knowledge of the existence of consciousness can be had only when the mental properties are manifest. It is because they are concomitant factors of consciousness.

Secondly, the four great elements (*cattāro mahābhūtā*) are interdependent and mutually related. The element of extension (*paṭhavi*), of cohesion (*āpo*), of heat (*tejo*) and of motion (*vāyo*) are all related, each contributing its share to form the material body.⁶⁸

Lastly, at the birth of a being (*okkautikkhaṇe*), the psychological data (*nāma*) and the corporeal data (*rūpa*) which go to constitute it, are mutually related.⁶⁹

But a relation of reciprocity is not obtained between consciousness and material qualities born of mind and also between the four great elements and derived material qualities where we find only a relation of co-existence.⁷⁰

16. Dependence-condition (Nissaya-paccaya)

That which serves as a standing ground or basis for the existence of some other thing is said to be the dependence-condition.⁷¹ This relation too may appear to be similar to the two previous relations. But there is a difference. The simile of the tree as well as of the painting⁷² would illustrate this difference very clearly.

65. I. 3.

66. P. 40—Na hi taṃ cittaṇa viṇā ārammaṇagahanasamatthaṃ. Asati citte sabbena sabbam anupajjanato.

67. *ibid.*—Cetasi bhavaṃ tadāyattavuttikaṃ.

68. Tikap. I. 3, 14.

69. *ibid.*

70. Abvn. p. 138—Tathā hi saha-jāta-paccaya-bhāvi yeva koci aññamañña-paccayo na hoti. Cittajarūpānaṃ saha-jāta-paccaya bhāvino nāmassa upādārūpānaṃ saha-jāta-paccaya-bhāvīnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ ca aññamañña-paccaya bhāvassa anuddhaṭṭā.

71. Tikap. I. 15.

72. *ibid.*; Abvn. p. 139.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

The earth is the basis or standing ground depending on which the tree could grow. Therefore the earth becomes the dependence-condition (*nissaya paccaya*) and the tree, the effect (*paccayuppanna*). But as in the case of the relation of co-existence, the earth does not arise with the tree nor is the earth dependent on the tree for its existence as in the case of the relation of reciprocity. Similarly the painting for which the cloth (*paṭa*) on which it is done becomes the basis (*nissaya*). In psychology, the five bases (*āyatana*), viz., eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, serve as the dependence conditions for the six elements of cognition (*viññāṇa dhātu*). Whatever objective basis depending on which arise consciousness and mind-cognitions, all these objective bases serve as the dependence condition for the consciousness and the mind cognitions.⁷³ But Ledi Sadaw wrongly considers the heart as the dependence-condition of mind cognitions.⁷⁴

17. Sufficing-condition (*Upanissaya-paccaya*)

The emergence of the concept of sufficing condition or the *upanissaya paccaya* bears testimony to the fact that in spite of the keen interest taken by the Ābhidhammikas in scholastic work yet they were not unmindful of the purpose for which the *dhamma* was preached by the Buddha. A purely scholastic work, completely divorced from the ethical and religious life, would contain an analysis of the reality of man and his surroundings viewed from an objective standpoint. Although the bulk of the *Abhidhamma piṭaka* appears to have this stamp of scholasticism, yet we see the Ābhidhammikas making an attempt to account for religious consciousness in their analysis of phenomena. The *upanissaya paccaya* stands as an oasis in the desert of dry scholasticism to give consolation and peace of mind to the man with a religious bent of mind.

Buddhaghosa defines the sufficing condition as "excessive dependence. It is a synonym for strong reason. Hence that state which renders service by being a strong reason is to be known as the sufficing condition."⁷⁵

Sufficing condition, according to the *Tikapaṭṭhāna*,⁷⁶ is three-fold—

- (1) Object sufficing condition (*ārammaṇūpanissaya*),
- (2) Immediate sufficing condition (*anantarūpanissaya*),
- (3) Natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*).

73. Tikap. I. 15.

74. Infra. p. 34.

75. Vism. p. 536.

76. I. 15.

UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

Out of these, object-sufficing condition is similar to the dominant influence of the object (*ārammaṇādhipati*)⁷⁷ without making any difference. For example, a man having practised charity, observed the precepts and the holy day, reflects thereon with due regard. He reflects on his past good behaviour with due regard.⁷⁸

That object with due regard to which mind and mental properties arise is, as a rule, the strong object among objects. Therefore, Buddhaghosa says, "Dominant influence has the meaning of being fit for due regard, sufficing condition of the object, that of a strong reason."⁷⁹

Immediate sufficing condition is the same as the immediate or contiguous condition (*anantara paccaya*)⁸⁰ treated above.

But out of all these, the most important is the natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*) which accounts for the whole of the religious, moral and social life, past, present and future.

All classes of consciousness, past, present and future, internal as well as external, together with their concomitants, all material qualities,⁸¹ Nibbāna and concepts, are said to be natural sufficing conditions, severally related to—as the case may be—to all the present classes of consciousness and their concomitants.

It is significant to note that this relation accounts for religious consciousness of the present depending on the past as well as the future. The continuity of the influence of past traditions and institutions for the good of the people is here explained causally. The tradition of the Lord Buddha who had passed away and has attained Nibbāna, the Dhamma that he has preached and the succession of disciples beginning with his immediate disciples who had all achieved the goal of the religious life, no doubt influences the present generation of people for the cultivation of good. Taking into consideration this influence of the past on the behaviour of the present generation, the Ābhidhammikas in their attempt to explain the causality of this religious consciousness formulated the relation of sufficing condition.

77. Tikap. I. 15.

78. *ibid.*

79. *Vism.* p. 536.

80. Tikap. I. 16.

81. Once again these refer to behaviour, bodily and verbal.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

In the same way, our forefathers, in their respective capacities as parents, teachers, erudite monks and brahmins, eminent philosophers and powerful and august kings, are also causally related to the succeeding generations by way of natural sufficing condition, either for the cultivation of good or of evil, or for the experience of pleasure or of pain. It becomes clearly evident from this that the sufficing condition explains causally the evolution of the social as well as religious life. This is not all.

The acquirement of happy existences and wealth, and the attainment of the Pāth (*magga*), Fruition (*phala*) and Nibbāna which are to be enjoyed in the future, are also natural sufficing conditions, related to the present generation of men for the cultivation of meritorious deeds such as charity, beneficence, virtue, etc.,. Again with the hope of reaping crops in future, men till the soil, sow seeds in the rainy season; or do various kinds of work which require labour and intelligence, with the hope of getting money upon their completion of the work. Now the crops to be reaped and the money to be got are future natural sufficing conditions related to the present exertions.

Just as past history exerts a great influence on the evolution of the present society by way of a sufficing condition, even so future expectations or ideals to be achieved definitely serve as a cultural force for the present generation.

It is also possible that evil conduct (*akusala kamma*) serves as a sufficing condition for the cultivation of morally good deeds (*kusala kamma*). Not very rarely do we come across people who, being under the influence of one of the three roots of evil, to wit, greed, hate and confusion, commit immoral deeds such as murder, theft, slandering etc. But once they awake from the slumber they begin to repent on what they have done. This consciousness of guilt has a powerful cultural force due to which people try to avoid such transgressions in future and lead a morally good life. Cases of this type are not wanting. The example of Aṅgulimāla, recorded in the Pāli texts, is a shining example of this cultural force.

On the other hand morally good conduct relates itself to morally bad conduct by way of sufficing condition. A man, may be through understanding or otherwise, performs morally good and wholesome actions such as generosity, kindness etc. But because he is conscious of his own good

deeds he may disparage and revile others who do not cultivate the same path of virtue. Thus for his immoral deeds his moral actions served as a natural sufficing condition.

Although the philosophy of Relations (*paccaya*) is a theoretic one, yet the Buddhists had kept in mind the inseparable connection existing between theory and practice. The relation by way of sufficing condition giving causal status to religious consciousness clearly points to this.

18. Pre-existent condition (Purejāta-paccaya)

The prior existence of some phenomenon to give rise to some other phenomenon is recognised by this relation. Helping or supporting the arising of a thing by way of prior existence is the function of this *paccaya*.⁸² Just as the sound of the violin arises only when it is played with a bow, and the sounding necessitates the pre-existence of both the violin strings and the violin bow, so also those thoughts which arise at the five sense-doors, spring into being owing to the presentation of the five respective objects of sense at the five doors which are no other than the five bases. Therefore, according to the Tikapaṭṭhāna,⁸³ the bases (*āyatana*) of sense are related to the sense cognitions and the concomitant mental qualities by way of prior existence. So also are the external objects presented to the mind and the mind-cognitions related to the latter by way of prior existence.

19. Post-existent condition (Pacchājāta-paccaya)

That which serves as a support for the continued sustenance of a phenomenon which has come into existence earlier is said to be a post-existent condition.⁸⁴ For example, growth and development of a tree necessitates continued sustenance such as manure and water. Otherwise the tree would not grow. In the same way this body, which is due to the working of past kamma, requires continued sustenances. If the four kinds of food, viz., material food, contact, volitions and consciousness, were not to feed this body it would not develop or continue to exist. Therefore these foods serve as post-existent conditions for the growth and development of the body which has already come into existence.⁸⁵

82. Tikap. I. 17—Paṭhamataram uppajjitvā vattamānabhāvena upakārako dhammo.

83. I. 4-5.

84. Tikap. I. 17—Purejātānaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ upatthambhakaṭṭhena upakārako arūpadhammo.

85. *ibid.*

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

20. Habitual-recurrence condition (*Āsevana-paccaya*)

The term *āsevana* is here used in the sense of habituating by constant repetition. Anything that causes its resultants (*paccayuppanna dhamma*) to accept its inspiration, for them to gain greater and greater proficiency, energy and force, is called a habitual condition.⁸⁶

When a person engages himself in some craft continuously, repeatedly and incessantly, he becomes proficient in it. Sometime after he engages himself in that craft he gathers more and more experience as well as knowledge of that craft. For example a carpenter makes a chair, let us say, for the first time. But when he goes on to make a chair after that, all the experiences that he has gathered earlier would come to his help. Therefore the first chair serves as a habitual recurrence condition to the second chair which is more efficiently done. The *Ābhidhammikas* saw that the degree of perfection of the second chair is due nothing but to the first chair. Therefore they said that the first chair has the potentiality to produce a better chair later. This is the *paccaya satti*.

In the same way moral behaviour of the past is related to the moral behaviour of the present and future. So are immoral behaviour, inoperative consciousness, apperceptions etc., related to their respective forms of behaviour and consciousness.⁸⁷ If a man were to develop loving-kindness (*mettā*) once, later he would be able to develop the same with a greater degree of perfection. Even so with regard to the others.

One very important feature to be noted in this relation is that it exists among things of the same order only, among likes. The relation is not obtained between two different things.⁸⁸ If we consider the simile discussed above, the construction of a table would not, in any way, be helped by the earlier construction of a well or any such thing. The well is a completely different thing. The experience gathered while constructing a well would not be helpful in making a table.

This relation accounts for the gradual down-fall and the gradual perfection of an individual with regard to his behaviour. Moral and immoral actions which have been repeatedly performed or cultivated in former existences causally relate by way of habitual recurrence, to moral and immoral

86. *ibid.*

87. *ibid.* I. 5.

88. *ibid.* I. 44; *Abvn.* p. 139.

actions of the present existence for their greater improvement or worsening respectively. With the cessation of a thought inspired with lust, hate or any other attitude, its force does not cease. Its force pervades the succeeding thought. Therefore, every succeeding thought-moment on coming into existence, becomes more vigorous on account of the former's habituation.

The importance of this relation becomes evident on account of the quite consistent manner in which it explains the phenomenon of memory. The psychology of memory is causally explained by this. More than that, the explanation of the manner in which a man may gradually attain perfection or come to ruin, which is so essential for the inculcation of religious ideas, is very consistent and true.

Mrs. Rhys Davids commenting on the *Khandha Saṃyutta* says⁸⁹ thus, "In time this original quarrel with the Ātmanist position diverged. In Buddhism it became an irrational denial of the man as man; he was reduced to his instruments, body and mind. The scrutinizer of these became what he scrutinized. The baby was emptied out with the bath. With the rejection of the divinity in the self, the self himself, the man, the person, the spirit using mind and body was also rejected."

How unfounded this statement is if we take into consideration the relation by way of habitual recurrence, let along the others. Without recognizing the existence of a permanent self, the spirit or divinity in man, which being potential becomes actual, the Buddhists were able to explain how man, consisting of five fleeting aggregates, could attain to such divine stature as Buddhahood. The relation by way of habitual recurrence alone explains this process very consistently and accurately. As such a relation of habitual recurrence is found among all transient, insubstantial phenomena, manly zeal and effort, exerted for a long period of time, have developed to such a high degree, that many great and difficult labours have reached complete accomplishment and that even Buddhahood has been attained. Such is the importance of the relation by way of habitual recurrence.

21. Relation of Kamma (Kamma-paccaya)

The need for the formulation of this relation was felt by the Ābhidhammikas because they had to explain causally another very important doctrine, i.e., the doctrine of moral responsibility. Moral as well as immoral life

89. *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*. III. viii.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

were given causal status in the Nikāyas. Application of the general theory of causality to explain the causality of moral behaviour was done earlier.⁹⁰ The Ābhidharmikas by formulating the relation of kamma gave accommodation to this doctrine in their theory of causality.

Here kamma refers nothing but to the peculiar function of the volitions (*saikhāra* or *cetanā*).⁹¹ When any action of thought, word or body takes place, volition determines, fashions, patronizes, or causes its concomitants to perform their respective functions. Because of this, volition dominates every action. Unlike the other contemporary schools of thought, Buddhism emphasised the importance of volition rather than the outward manifestation of volitions which are expressed in behaviour, bodily, verbal and mental. It went to the extent of explaining kamma as volition.⁹²

Relation of kamma is two-fold, to wit, asynchronous (*nānakkhaṇika*) and co-existent (*sahajāta*).⁹³

The psycho-physical personality which arises in this existence is said to be due to the volitions of the past existence. Therefore these volitions which have the potentiality to give rise to a psycho-physical personality in the next existence are said to be related to that psycho-physical personality by way of kamma. It is the activity (*kamma*) of the volitions that gives rise to the new being. Therefore the nature of the new being is also determined by the nature of the volitions. Those volitions which have the potentiality to give rise to a new being in the next moment is therefore called the asynchronous kamma-relation.⁹⁴

On the other hand there are certain thoughts, wholesome (*kusala*) or unwholesome (*akusala*) which arise along with the volitions themselves. These volitions which arise together with the thoughts are said to be related to the thoughts by way of co-existent kamma relation (*sahajāta kamma paccaya*),⁹⁵ for, the activity of the volitions continues to exist along with the thought itself. Even so with regard to verbal and bodily behaviour.

Out of these two different classes of kamma relations, the first, i.e., the asynchronous kamma relation, explains how sometimes a virtuous man,

90. A. I. 28.

91. Tikap. I. 45—Kamman'ti cetanākammaṃ ceva. See Abvn. p. 139.

92. A. III. 415—Cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi.

93. Tikap. I. 18.

94. *ibid.* 45-46.

95. *ibid.* I. 46.

even an arahant who has attained perfect happiness (*parama sukha*), has to undergo suffering. It also explains the legend, handed down to posterity in the tradition, which says that even Moggallāna, who possessed such psychic powers (*iddhi*), could not escape his assailants.⁹⁶ In the asynchronous kamma relation, the kamma signifies quite a peculiar energy. It does not cease though the volition ceases, but latently follows the sequences of mind. As soon as it obtains a favourable opportunity, and when the other necessary conditions are available,⁹⁷ it takes effect.

22. Relation of Effect (*Vipāka-paccaya*)

It may appear as if there is hardly any difference between this and the kamma-relation or even the relation by way of habitual recurrence (*āsevana*). For *vipāka* is used in the sense of *vipaccana* or change of state from infancy or youth to maturity. That which has attained maturity after being in an infant stage is called the *vipāka paccaya*. This is the same as the asynchronous kamma relation.

The difference lies in the fact that in the case of the kamma relation as also the relation by way of habitual recurrence, the manly zeal or effort is a *sine qua non* for their function. But in the case of the relation of effect (*vipāka*) this effort on the part of man is not necessary. The effect comes without any effort, automatically,⁹⁸ so that this relation accounts for those thoughts which are said to be automatic (*asaṅkhārika*).⁹⁹

23. Relation by way of Food (*Āhāra-paccaya*)

The relation by way of food is the same as that discussed in the Nikāyas.¹⁰⁰ But the Ābhīdhammikas who formulated the theory of relations, unlike the early Buddhist teachers, specified the function of food. Even though food has the power to produce something, yet the function of this relation is not so much that, but the supporting of that which has already come into existence.¹⁰¹ The main function therefore is not production

96. JA. V. 125 ff; DhA. III 65 ff.

97. Tikap. I. 46—Avasesapaccayasamāyoge sati phalaṃ uppādeti.

98. Tikap. I. 18—Nirussāhasantabhāvena nirussāhasantabhāvāya upakārako vipāka-dhammo.

Abvn. p. 139—Payogena asādhetaḅbatāya kammaṣṣa katattā nippajjamānamattato nirussāhasantabhāvā hontī.

99. Abhs. p. 1.

100. M. I. 48; S. II. 11, 13, 98 ff.

101. Abvn. p. 139—Sati hi pi janakabhāve upatthambhakattaṃ eva āhārassa padhāna-kiccaṃ.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

but sustenance. Although food has the power to give rise to something yet it has a greater power in giving continued sustenance.¹⁰² That is to say a relating thing (*paccaya*) nourishes its related thing (*paccayuppanna*) so as to enable it to endure long, to develop, to flourish, and to thrive by means of support. Thus it becomes clear that though the causal relation of food possesses a producing power, the power of supporting is predominant here.

Material food, both gross and subtle, serve as a condition (*paccaya*) to the material body because it strongly holds up the group of internal material qualities by nourishing them so that they may exist firmly, endure long and reach their full life-term.

Contact is an *āhāra* because it strongly holds up its co-existent things and enables them to stand firmly and endure long, by nourishing them with the essence extracted from desirable and undesirable objects. Volitional activity of mind is an *āhāra* in that it furnishes courage and stimulus for the execution of deeds, words and thoughts. So is consciousness which is an *āhāra* inasmuch as it predominates in all thinking about an object as also in giving continued support to the psycho-physical personality (*nāma-rūpa*).

24. Control-condition (*Indriya-paccaya*)

The twenty controlling faculties¹⁰³ (*indriya*) excluding femininity (*itthindriya*) and masculinity (*purisindriya*) are said to be related to mental and material qualities by way of dominance (*adhipatīyatthena*).¹⁰⁴ These controlling faculties or powers which exert their influence on the effects (*paccayuppanna dhamma*), causing the effects to adopt their characteristics (i.e., those of the *paccayas*) are called controlling conditions (*indriya-paccaya*).¹⁰⁵ Ledi Sadaw's comment on the term *indriya* is very explicative. According to him, "Indriyas are so called because of sovereignty (or control). What is sovereignty? It is the ability to make all that is connected with it follow itself always in its own career. Thus *indriyas* are the exercisers, the performers of lordship called sovereignty over this and that function."¹⁰⁶

Herein the twenty controlling faculties explain two processes of life, one the normal life and the other, the religious life.

102. *ibid.*—Janayanto 'pi āhāro avicchedavasena upatthambhento va janeti.

103. See list at PED. (PTS) p. 122.

104. Tikap. I. 18.

105. Abvn. p. 139.

106. Quoted by Mrs. Rhys Davids. See CP. pp. 228-9.

Mind (*manas*) together with the sense faculties, serenity of mind (*somanassa*) and also its opposite (*domanassa*) and vital force (*jīvita*) account for the functioning of the normal life process.

The various forms of consciousness such as visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile are controlled by their respective faculties, to wit, eye, ear, nose, tongue and body. These organs exercise a controlling power over their respective forms of consciousness. Eye controls sight, ear hearing and so on, because each sense depends upon its respective organ. If the organ be weak, the sense is weak. According to Mrs. Rhys Davids,¹⁰⁷ we are not here speaking of the sense of sight, but of the eye itself, as exercising a certain control over that sense of sight etc.

The importance of mind (*manas*) as a controlling faculty is recognised in Buddhism from its very inception, as is evident from the opening verse of the Dhammapada.¹⁰⁸ It is *manas* that makes it possible for the senses to operate according to their nature and which, in addition, assists and helps the operation of the sense. Mind or psychic life exercises control over its co-existent mental properties, in addition, assists and helps the operation of the senses. Mind or psychic life exercises control over its co-existent mental properties in infusing life, i.e., in the matter of their prolongation by continuity. Mind exerts its influence on all forms of consciousness because it is their meeting-place, their refuge (*paṭisaraṇa*)¹⁰⁹ 'the unity of center'.¹¹⁰

Serenity of mind (*somanassa*) is a certain mood which gives a specific evaluation to the whole of consciousness without interfering with the intrinsic nature of the psychic process. It is found in a healthy form of consciousness (*kusala citta*) and because of its association with joy and enthusiasm and the feeling of happiness and ease (*somanassa*) it is an embellishment to man's mental life.¹¹¹

The third, i.e., the vital force (*jīvita*) is the kinetic energy of a process and not an entity or a substance (*dravya*) existing *per se*. Life is that by which the factors associated with it live. It is a control because of its nature of guarding. It is the controlling force in the continuity of a process that

107. CP. p. 229.

108. Mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā mano setthā manomayā etc.,

109. M. I. 295; S. V. 218.

110. Broad, C. D.—The Mind and its place in Nature (1937) p. 212, 585.

111. Dhs. p. 11.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

is already going on. "Vital force has the characteristic of guarding those processes which are not separated from it, the function of keeping them going on, the actuality of maintaining them, and the basis on which it operates is the very process which has to be kept going on."¹¹²

With the help of this controlling condition (*indriya-paccaya*) the Buddhists were thus once again able to explain the process of life without resorting to any permanent entity such as a soul or a self.

The rest of the controlling faculties explain the religious life. The Buddhists recognised the necessity of energy in the religious life starting from an initial moral state rising to the top-most rung in the ladder of spiritual development by a process of gradual training (*anupubbasicchā*). The concept of energy only gives a descriptive account of the fact that at certain times and under certain circumstances certain processes are stronger and more decisive than others. Those functions, processes or factors which may gain in strength and ability to work their proper course, thereby exerting control over other function events are called controlling-conditions (*indriya paccaya*). Faith (*saddhā*), energy (*virīya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*), knowledge (*paññā*) etc. are all controlling conditions.

For example, faith or certitude (*saddhā*) becomes a controlling condition (*indriya paccaya*) in the sense of exerting its sovereignty over its opponents inasmuch as it overcomes that which is not trustworthy and which does not deserve our respect. It is the forerunner of him who makes gifts, leads a decent and respectable life, observes the *Uposatha* and begins the way to spiritual culture. Even so with regard to other controlling faculties which serve as controlling conditions.

The exclusion of the two sexes,¹¹³ namely the male (*purisindriya*) and the female (*itthindriya*), which come under the controlling faculties, is explained by Ledi Sadaw thus, "Because they have none of a *paccaya*. A *paccaya* has three kinds of functioning, to wit, producing, supporting, and maintaining. Now the two sexes do not execute any one of the said three functions. Therefore they are not taken as a *paccaya-dhamma* in this relation of control."¹¹⁴ But yet it must be said that though they are not controlling conditions (*indriya paccaya*) yet they are controlling faculties (*indriya*) because they have something of the controlling power. At the

112. *ibid.*

113. *Tikap.* I. 18.

114. *BPR.* pp. 69-70.

period of conception, one or the other of the sexes produced in the being controls all its personality, i.e., the five aggregates produced by kamma, and this personality tends towards masculinity or femininity as the case may be.

25. Contemplation-condition (Jhāna-paccaya)

Those things by means of which the mind is able to view closely, look at attentively, are the relating conditions (*paccaya*) in this relation. The seven constituents of contemplation (*jhānaṅga*), to wit, initial application (*vitakka*), sustained application (*vicāra*), pleasurable interest (*pīti*), joy (*somanassa*), hedonic indifference (*upekkhā*) and one-pointedness (*ekaggatā*),¹¹⁵ serve as the conditions (*paccaya*) by means of which the mind could be gradually trained to do something.

Just as an archer—who from a distance is able to send, or thrust an arrow into the bull's eye of a small target—holding the arrow firmly in his hand, making it steady, directing it towards the mark, keeping the target in view and attentively looking (or rather aiming at it) sends the arrow through the bull's eye or thrusts it into it; even so a man intending to murder an enemy has got to ponder over this act, its consequence etc., over and over again. A pleasurable interest and a joy arises in him at the thought of getting rid of this enemy and these in turn prompts him to continue his effort and at last gathering up courage he, with his mind concentrated on the act of murder, would stab him or bring harm on him by some means. This is so with regard to every conscious act of killing. The analysis of the psychology of a man who attempts murder would reveal this. Such a person, who intends to take away the life of another, cannot be a feeble-minded person, for, he requires plenty of courage and continued reflection (though misdirected) to commit such a thing. If his mind wavers he would never be able to do it.

These constituent factors are a *sine qua non* even in the case of moral acts. No moral deed such as charity could be executed by a feeble mind lacking these necessary constituents. Only after viewing attentively, considering fully the value of generosity one is able to give alms to the poor, etc.

This is more so with regard to the practising of the religious life. Great courage is necessary to give up the pleasures of the family life in order to

115. Tikap. I. 51.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

embrace the life of an ascetic. A man never does so all of a sudden. Even though he appears to take a sudden decision yet the analysis of his psychology would reveal how he pondered over the disadvantages and the misery attended upon the worldly life. Without such pondering and consideration one cannot take to this new life of a religious mendicant. Once again even after adopting a life devoted to religious pursuit, one has got to be assisted by these contemplation-conditions if one is desirous of attaining spiritual perfection. Thus a yogi or one who practises contemplation with a view to control his mind and attain supernormal powers by which he could attain release has got to direct his mind towards the object, making it steadfast and keeping the kasina-object in view, thrust the mind into it by means of these constituents of *jhāna*.

Therefore all classes of consciousness (with the exception of the five senses),¹¹⁶ their concomitants and material qualities in co-existence with the seven constituents are the things related (*paccayuppanna*). Here consciousness refers to mental behaviour, while material qualities refer to bodily and vocal behaviour. Closely viewing an object a person carries out his actions of body, of word and of mind without failure. Failure therefore, refers nothing but to the absence of these conditions or in other words to the inability on the part of these contemplation-conditions to give rise to the effects (*paccayuppanna*).

26. Path-condition (*Magga-paccaya*)

The constituents which serve as stages on the path to any goal are considered by the *Ābhidhammikas* as conditions (*paccaya*), for each stage has the power of clearing the ground and assisting the reach of the succeeding stage. The path may be leading to the realm of misfortune or to the realm of happiness. The stages of the path serve as conditions (*paccaya*) for the attainment of the respective goal, i.e., suffering or happiness. All classes of consciousness and mental qualities in co-existence with the *hetu*-conditioned mind are effects (*paccayuppanna dhamma*).

The eight constituents of the Noble Path beginning with right view (*sammā ditṭhi*)¹¹⁷ are the conditions for the attainment of the highest spiritual state, the state of supreme happiness. On the other hand wrong view, wrong aspiration, wrong endeavour and wrong concentration¹¹⁸ are said to be conditions (*paccaya*) resulting in the attainment of misfortune.

116. *ibid.*

117. *ibid.* I. 52.

118. *ibid.*

27. Association-condition (Sampayutta-paccaya)

This explains the unitary nature of consciousness. Consciousness is not an aggregate but a continuous whole or continuum, a succession of mental facts or congeries of states. In attending to a state we break up the the continuum. Consciousness is not necessarily in one state at a time; rather it is in many, one being prominent. Mind is not a thing that can be broken up into separate parts or divisions, as Professor Bain's¹¹⁹ procedure suggests; nor compounded, as Mr. Spencer's¹²⁰ phrase 'composition of mind' seems to imply. But it does admit of being held apart, in idea, for consideration, and this or that phrase being distinguished, i.e., a tooth-ache, languor, determination etc., The Dhammasaṅgani, analysed mental phenomena in this manner because the Ābhidhammikas felt the necessity of doing so in order to understand more fully the nature of the mind, the absence or any permanent entity behind consciousness. But knowing fully the nature of consciousness which could not in actuality be analysed into discrete moments they formulated the association conditions and thus tried to explain the unitary nature.

According to this relation, all classes of consciousness and mental properties mutually relate themselves to one another by way of association. Association, according to the commentary to the Paṭṭhāna, takes place in four ways, viz. having one base (*ekavattḥuka*), one object (*ekārammaṇa*), simultaneous arising (*ekuppāda*) and synchronous cessation (*ekanirodha*).¹²¹

The four immaterial aggregates are said to be related to one another in this manner. If we take one complete unit of consciousness such as the sight of a red flower, we see that all the four non-material aggregates are to be found merging into one in this complete perception.

This instance of complete perception includes within itself feeling (*vedanā*), assimilation (*saññā*), volition (*saṅkhārā*). With the perception arises feeling of awareness as also a pleasurable or painful or neutral feeling. At the same time there is discrimination depending on past experience because one recognises that it is a flower and also a red flower. This is more a passive function. On the other hand there is the more active function of the mind which desires to have the flower for one's own self. These aspects of consciousness cannot be separated for they arise together, depending on one object and also cease together.

119. Robertson, G. C.—Elements of Psychology (ed. by C. A. F. Rhys Davids), 1896, p. 19

120. *ibid.*

121. Tikap. I. 19.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

The essential homogeneousness of consciousness would seem to be here upheld, as a corrective against attaching too much weight to analytic distinctions. Viññāṇa includes and involves the other three mental aggregates, for according to Buddhist psychology there is only a logical distinction for purposes of analysis between two or more main phases of consciousness. To see further separateness would be according to Buddhaghosa "as if one drew water at the delta where the five rivers enter the sea saying 'this is Ganges water, this is Jumna water'".¹²²

28. Dissociation-condition (*Vippayutta-paccaya*)

While the relation by way of association illustrated the homogeneous nature of consciousness which for practical purposes was analysed by the Buddhists into four non-material aggregates, the relation by way of dissociation explains the duality of mind (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*). The relation of dissociation also refutes the claims of the Idealist who is prone to consider material elements as the projection of the mind. While explaining the close connection, the interdependence of mind and matter this relation helps to keep them apart.

By being a support for the manifestation of consciousness, and at the same time being dissociated from consciousness, material elements become a dissociation condition (*vippayutta paccaya*); so is consciousness to the material elements.¹²³

29. Presence-condition (*Atthi-paccaya*)

The state which renders service by being a support to a state through presence is called the presence-condition (*atthi-paccaya*).¹²⁴ It has the characteristic of the present time because it causally relates itself to its effect, according to Ledi Sadaw,¹²⁵ by being present in the three phases of time called moments (*khāṇa*).

This may appear to be a redundancy. But yet the usefulness of it becomes clearly evident when we consider the nature of causality that the Ābhidhammikas were expounding. As reiterated earlier, they unanimously upheld the view that causality consists of a concatenation of several causes. The presence of several causes or condition which assist in various ways in the arising of a phenomenon was thus recognised. The presence-condition

122. MA. II. 345. (Commentary to the Mahā Vedalla Sutta).

123. Tikap. I. 20.

124. Tikap. I. 20; Vism. p. 540.

125. Op. cit. p. 81.

(*atthi-paccaya*) refers to those various causes which are present at the time or giving rise to a phenomenon. Though the functions of these causes of conditions may vary, for example by being reciprocal, dependence, food, etc. yet there is an underlying unity or uniformity in these several conditions, in that all of them are present at the moment of giving rise to the effect.

30. Absence-condition (*Natthi-paccaya*)

The mental states which have ceased quite immediately and which render service by giving an opportunity¹²⁶ for the proceeding of non-material states which arise immediately after themselves are called the absence-conditions (*natthi paccaya*).¹²⁷

The Ābhidhammikas who were able to see the homogeneous nature of consciousness, were also able to see the non-arising of two mental states of the same calibre at the same time. For example there cannot be two different forms of contact (*phassa*) taking place at the same moment. One has to give way to the other. Therefore that mental state which ceases by giving an opportunity for the other to come into existence, they called the absence-condition.

31. Abeyance-condition (*Vigata-paccaya*) and the Continuance-condition (*Avigata-paccaya*)

The first, i.e., the abeyance-condition, is defined in the manner of the absence-condition (*natthi-paccaya*),¹²⁸ and the second, in the manner of the presence-condition (*atthi-paccaya*).¹²⁹ Why the same process should be described in another way may appear to be a problem to the critical student who does not take any delight in repetitions. Only if we keep in mind the nature of the attempt made by the Ābhidhammikas we are able to appreciate the methodology that they adopted.

In the first place it should be noted that they were trying to explain in terms of language something that could not be described by such symbols. Therefore they made an attempt to look at it from every possible angle and describe it in every possible way so that the description would be as exhaustive as possible.

126. *okāsassa dānena.*—Tikap. I. 21.

127. *ibid.* I. 21.

128. *Abvn.* p. 140.

129. *ibid.*

PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

The presence-condition (*atthi-paccaya*) and absence-condition (*natthi-paccaya*) describing the causal process could not do full justice to the life-process which is compared to a flowing river (*sota*). Adopting the attitude of the Existentialist by taking into consideration facts as they were presented at the moment they described some things as presence-conditions and others as absence-conditions. Although the existentialist position is well preserved by this, yet they did not describe fully the reality that they had to explain.

Reality as mentioned earlier was conceived in the form of a flux (*santati*) comparable only to a flowing stream. The significance of the two terms abeyance (*vigata*) and continuance (*avigata*) becomes more explicit when we keep in mind this nature of the reality that is being described. Absence (*natthi*) may point to the momentary destruction, while abeyance (*vigata*) points to gradual disappearance. In the same way continuance-condition (*avigata-paccaya*) explains continuity better than the presence-condition (*atthi-paccaya*) for the latter is prone to convey the idea of permanency.

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UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

Thag	: Theragātha.
Thig	: Therigātha.
Tikap	: Tikapaṭṭhāna, including the commentary of Buddhaghosa.
UCR	: University of Ceylon Review.
Ud	: Udāna.
Vin	: Vinaya Piṭaka
Vism	: Visuddhimagga