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UNIVERSITY OF CEYLOIl REVIEW

The University of Ceylon was established on the 1st July, 1942, by the fusion of the
Ceylon Medical College (founded 1870) and the Ceylon University College (founded
1921). It has at present Faculties of Oriental Studies, Arts, Science and Medicine.
Its seat is temporarily in Colombo, but it will be moved to Peradeniya, near Kandy, as
soon as its new buildings are ready for occupation. The University has taken over from
the Government of Ceylon the publication of the Ceylon Journal of Science, which will
be developed as its chief means of contact with Scientists elsewhere as soon as paper
supplies enable issues to be published more frequently and regularly. The University of
Ceylon Review has been founded in order to make similar contact with scholars in
literary subjects, to provide a medium of publication for the research in those subjects
conducted in the University, and to provide a learned review for Ceylon. The Review
will normally be published twice a year, in April and in November. The price of a single
copy is Rs. 2.50.
The Pāli Chronicles of Ceylon

An Examination of the Opinions expressed about them since 1879

The three Pāli works, the Dīpavamsa, the chronicle of the island, the Introduction to the Samantapāsādikā, the commentary to the Vinaya Piṭaka, and the Mahāvamsa, the great chronicle, which enshrine the ancient historical tradition of Ceylon, are still available to the student of Ceylon history. All these three are closely related to one another, and it is not possible to study one independently of the other two. In addition to these there is the Vamsatihapakāsini, the tīkā or commentary to the Mahāvamsa, which sheds considerable light on its main source, the Sihaḷaṭṭhakathā Mahāvaṃsa.¹

Few Pāli works have attracted so much attention as the Dv, the Sp and the Mv. This was mainly due to the fact that they contain some traditions of the early history of Buddhism. Hermann Oldenberg edited the Dv, and published it with an English translation in 1879,² and in his Pāli edition of the Vinaya Piṭaka he included the historical introduction to the Sp.³ In 1905 Wilhelm Geiger made a critical examination of the Dv and the Mv and of other works which dealt with the early history of Ceylon.⁴ In 1907 still another German scholar, Otto Franke, criticized some of the conclusions arrived at by Geiger in this work,⁵ and Geiger replied to him in the same year.⁶ In 1908 Geiger brought out his edition of the Pāli text of the Mv,⁷ and his English translation of the same made with the assistance of Mabel H. Bode was

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¹ These five works will be referred to hereafter by the abbreviations Dv, Sp, Mv, Vap and SākMv. Sp will refer to the Introduction alone and not to the whole Samantapāsādikā.


⁴ Dīpavamsa un Mahāvaṃsa und die geschichtliche Überlieferung in Ceylon. Leipzig, 1905. The references in this work are to the English translation by Ethel M. Coomaraswamy. Colombo, 1908.


published in 1912. In the Introduction to the latter work Geiger once more summed up his views on the Mv, but a few of them were modified in his English translation of the Cūlayān̄sa, published in 1930.

Since then two other contributions have added to our knowledge of the subject. In 1933 E. W. Adikaram submitted a thesis to the University of London on "State of Buddhism in Ceylon as revealed by the Pāḷi Commentaries of the Fifth Century." This was followed by the publication in 1935 of the Vamsathapakhāsinī, edited by G. P. Malalasekera.

The object of this article is to examine the views expressed by these writers with regard to these four works, the Dv, the Sp, the Mv and the Vap in the light of evidence now available. One of the chief points that will be considered is whether the view maintained or accepted by most of them that the Dv was based on the SakMv of the Mahāvihāra is tenable.

Much of what is stated in the works referred to centred round the question of the sources of the Dv, the Sp and the Mv. Oldenberg in his Introduction to his edition of the Dv pointed out that according to the Vap there was an Aṭṭhakathā (a commentary on Buddhist canonical writings) " handed down and probably also composed in the Mahāvihāra," written in Sinhalese, the introductory stanzas of which allude to a historical account of Buddha's visits to Ceylon, of the Councils, of Mahinda, etc., intended to be given in that very Aṭṭhakathā. This Aṭṭhakathā was the same as the Porāṇaṭṭhakathā and was also called the Śikhaṭṭhakathā Mahāvamsa.

Oldenberg did not consider the last two works identical but that the latter was only a part of the former. "It is not difficult" he continued, "to account for this expression where the two at first sight contradictory elements of a (theological) commentary (Aṭṭhakathā) and of an extensive historical narrative, (Mahāvamsa) are combined together. If we look at Buddhaghosa's Aṭṭhakathā on the Vinaya, we find that the author has there prefixed to his explanations of the sacred texts a detailed historical account of the origin of the Tipiṭaka, its redaction in the three Councils, and its propagation to Ceylon by Mahinda and his companions. Buddhaghosa's commentary is based, as is well known, on that very Sinhalese Aṭṭhakathā of the Mahāvihāra, which we are discussing, and we may assume with almost certainty, that to this Aṭṭhakathā a similar introduction was prefixed which may have been of greater extent than that of Buddhaghosa."

After drawing this inference about the relationship of the SakMv to the Porāṇaṭṭhakathā from the analogy of the Samantapāśadikā, and incidentally suggesting that the Sp too was based on the Śikhaṭṭhakathā of the Mahāvihāra, Oldenberg concluded that the SakMv was in prose intermixed with a considerable number of stanzas in Pāḷi, and was the source on which the Dv and the Mv were based. He drew the inference with regard to the Dv not from any actual statement to that effect as in the case of the Mv, but because the proem of the Dv as well as five passages in Pāḷi verse, ascribed to the Porāṇa in the Sp and the Vap, were common to the Dv, and both the Dv and the Mv finished their record at the same point. He expressed the view that the author of the Dv borrowed from the Aṭṭhakathā sometimes the mode of expression and even whole lines, word for word. He added further that the Dv and the Mv are "indeed in the main nothing but two versions of the same substance, both being based on the historical introduction to the Great Commentary of the Mahāvihāra. Each work represented, of course, their common subject in its own way, the Dipavaṃsa followed step by step and almost word for word the traces of the original, the Mahāvamsa proceeding with much greater independence and perfect literary mastership."

Finally Oldenberg suggested that the Mahāvamsa of the ancient referred to in the proem of the Mv may mean the Dv itself, as it contains the defects attributed to the old work.

Geiger in The Dipavaṃsa and Mahāvamsa agreed with Oldenberg with regard to the relationship between the Sp and the Mv on the one hand and their connection with the SakMv on the other. "Our M," he wrote, "as far as the contents are concerned, was a fairly correct translation of the AKM. It supplements the Sinhalese of the latter by Pāḷi verse and avoids certain deficiencies in the original, viz., its frequent repetitions and the uneven
character of its account, which is sometimes too short, sometimes too diffuse.

He stated further: "The contents of the Smp. run very closely parallel with the M. We see so much verbal agreement between them that there can be no question of mere coincidence. This may be explained by the fact that the two works, the Smp. as well as the M., are both derived from the same source, the Aṭṭhakatākha, and both reflect their source with fair exactness."23

Geiger also agreed with Oldenberg that the Dv like the Mv was based on the SākMv. "As there is no doubt that the M. is younger than the D.," he wrote, "two suppositions only are possible: either the M. has borrowed its material and arrangement from the D., or else both the M. and the D. have borrowed from the same sources, either directly or indirectly. The latter supposition is, as we shall see, the correct one."24

But Geiger did not accept the suggestion of Oldenberg that the proem of the Mv referred to the Dv. "One might be inclined to think," he wrote, "that the proem of the M. refers directly to the D., in which, it is true, the fault complained of, that of irregular representation appears. The words ' free from faults' would look like a slight mockery of the self-conscious saying, ' without faults,' which is found in the proem of the D. 3. In reality our M. means, as we shall see, by the ' Mahāvamsa of the ancients,' the original work, upon which the Mv in 1907, in the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XXI, pp. 203 and 307.

Rhys Davids, reviewing Dīpavaṃsa and Mahāvamsa, referred to "its great and permanent value as the most complete work which we have on the many important subjects it treats with scholarship so thorough (often indeed unique) and with judgment so sober and sound."29 But Otto Franke did not consider Geiger's work in the same light. After a detailed examination of the Dv text he came to the conviction that the Dv was an original work and was not based on any other work as pointed out by Oldenberg and Geiger.30

Franke pointed out that the main topics of the Dv were composed out of verses and pieces of verse of the canonical literature and was in language and ideas influenced above all by the Buddhist, the Caruvaṭṭika, and somewhat large for an "historical introduction." No doubt it can be shown that the Ak. was extraordinarily comprehensive, and therefore that even the introduction may have been a long one. But another consideration seems to me of more importance. An introduction of the kind that Oldenberg imagines would hardly embrace the whole range of Sinhalese kings as far as Mahāsena. A transition from this prince to the Tipitaka does not seem to be very probable. It is much more likely that such an introduction would have finished with the coming of Buddhism into Ceylon, and with Mahinda, who brought the Tipitaka to the Island. According to my idea the " Mahāvamsa of the ancients" was an independent chronicle, which the monks of the Mahāvihāra carried on to Mahāsena, and certainly would have continued still further had they not been disturbed in their peaceable work in some violent manner.

"The analogy of the chronicles of our medieval monasteries lies extraordinarily near; but it may be correct that the base of that chronicle was such an introduction to the Tipitaka. The proem of the D. speaks at all events in favour of that. This proem was, as can be seen from the MT. QS. a, simply the proem of the old M. The subjects were mentioned in it which were to be represented. These are without exception those which belong to the period before Mahinda. There is no account of later times, not even of the great deeds of Dutṭhagāmini. The proem thus belongs to an epoch in which the extent of the work was smaller than at the time when Mahānāma developed the material into a poem, or when the D. was written. The old framework had burst, and out of the "historical introduction" of the Ak., the " Mahāvamsa of the ancients," the extensive monastery chronicle of the Mahāvihāra developed."25

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the Jātaka. Thus it was a clumsy bungling work, a mere botched compilation of Pāli quotations from these and other works of the Canon. From that he concluded that the Dv was not based on any source and must be considered as standing on its own tottering feet. He further compared the Dv with the Sp and the Mv and rushed to the conclusion that the authors of the Sp and the Mv merely rewrote the Dv.

Geiger accepted some of the minor conclusions of Franke. That the Dv was a clumsy bungling work had already been declared both by Oldenberg and himself. He admitted that Franke had shed further light on the manner of composition of the author of the Dv, and that the evidence produced showed that the author of the Dv was strongly influenced by the ideas of the Buddhavamsa, the Caruṇḍāyika and the Jātaka, the metrical diction of which was familiar to his feelings. Earlier he had expressed the view that the author of the Dv had confined himself especially to the material that was already in Pāli in the Ak, viz. the verses interspersed throughout. He now concluded that the SAKMv had probably far less Pāli verses than he originally imagined.

But the main contention of Franke that the Dv, the Sp, and the Mv were not based on another source Geiger refused to accept. The indebtedness of the Dv for its forms of expression to the Pāli Canon was not sufficient proof to conclude that the Dv was independent of the SAKMv. Such verses and pieces of verses which Franke quoted covered only a small part of the Dv. The authors of the Sp and the Mv could not have merely rewritten the Dv, as both the Sp and the Mv contained considerable fresh material, both new matter on old topics as well as entirely new episodes. The Sp made it clear that it was based on a Sinhalese work. The Vap was definite that the Mv was based on a Sinhalese work. The Vap made it clear that it was based on a Sinhalese work. The Vap was definite that the Mv was based on a Sinhalese work. The Vap was definite that the Mv was based on a Sinhalese work. The Vap was definite that the Mv was based on a Sinhalese work.

It is clear that in this summary Geiger's views differ to some extent from the conclusions he gave in The Dipavamsa and Mahāvamsa. Though he does not deny the indebtedness of the author of the Sp and the Mv to the SAKMv, he regards here the Mv "as a conscious and intentional rearrangement of the Dv, as a sort of commentary to this latter"; and thinks that "the quotation of the Mahāvamsa of the ancients in the proemium of our Mah. refers precisely to the Dip." Further he expresses the view that the Sp is based on the Dv.

These are up to a point the views expressed by Franke. But Geiger seems to have come to these conclusions from an article written by Fleet in which he translated the passage in the Cūrāvasaṃsa xxxviii, 59, datāv sahasam dīpēlam Dipavamsam samādīsit as "he (King Dhātuseṇa) bestowed a thousand (pieces of gold) and gave orders to write a dipika on the Dipavamsa," and inferred that the dīpīkā meant the Mahāvamsa. Geiger, however, found later that he had made a mistake in accepting this conclusion. "I was myself (Mhvs. trsl. p. xii) inclined to follow him," he wrote. "But I have since had scruples. Verses 58-59 belong in construction most closely together. Consequently dīpīkā Dipavamsam must refer to an action which took place within the framework of a festival. That, however, can only have been
a reading of the Dipavamsa, perhaps with historical and legendary explanations, but not the composition of so voluminous a work as the Mahavamsa. Thus we have to go back once more to his original view expressed in The Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa that the Sp and the Mv were based not on the Dv but on the SAKMv.

Adikaram adds considerably to our knowledge of the Sinhalese commentaries of which the SAKMv formed a part. Though his subject is "State of Buddhism in Ceylon as revealed by the Pali Commentaries of the Fifth Century A.D.", he supplies his readers with much information on the sources of these Pali works, the Sinhalese commentaries, their nature and contents. His work clarifies certain obscure points and enables one to draw a few conclusions different from those that have been expressed so far with regard to the early historical tradition of Ceylon.

Dealing with the nature of the Sinhalese commentaries, Adikaram points out that Buddhaghosa mentions that a part of his work of translation consisted of the removal of errors and of repetitions. He draws attention also to the fact that these commentaries though written in Sinhalese contained Pali verses. Thus the defect of repetition and the practice of the inclusion of Pali verses were not features peculiar to the SAKMv.

Adikaram agrees with Oldenberg and Geiger that the term Porana referred to the Poranaththakathā. He examines in detail the numerous references to the Porana in the Commentaries and comes to the conclusion that it is a definite commentary. This means he accepts the view of Oldenberg and Geiger that the SAKMv was at first really a part of the Poranaththakathā till probably, as Geiger suggests, it broke its bounds and developed into an independent work.

According to Adikaram the Siha Mahahakathā contained expositions on the entire Tipiṭaka. There were in addition separate commentaries on the different sections such as the Vināya. From this one may conclude

that the Sp is a translation not of the SAKMv as Geiger imagined but of the introduction to the Sinhalese Vinayathakathā.

Other available evidence supports this view. The Vap mentions a few instances where the Vinayathakathā either differed from, or gave information not contained in, the SAKMv. The account of Asoka's benefactions is said to have been drawn not from the SAKMv but from the Vak. It is also given in the Sp. The Vak is said to have used the word rohitamiga for the word gokarna in the Mv. So does the Sp. The Vak says that in Suvannabhumi after the preaching of the Brahmajīta a Sūtra at 1,500 daughters of noble families received the pabhrajya while the SAKMv gave the number as 1,500. The Sp also gives the number as 1,500.

Besides, as Adikaram points out, the Sp appears at least in one part to be a literal translation of its original Sinhalese text. It gives a list of teachers who handed down the Vinaya from the time of Mahinda "up to the present day" (yena avijjata). None of these teachers belongs to the period after the first century A.D. It is the Sinhalese commentaries that were put into writing during the first century A.D., and not the Sp which Buddhaghosa wrote in the fifth century A.D. And if we are to draw any inference from the list of teachers who handed down the Vinaya, the original work on which the Sp was based appears to be no other than the Vinayathakathā.

Malalasekera helped the study of the Mv further by the publication of a critical edition with an introduction and notes of the Pāli text of the Vamsatthaṭṭhakasini, which not only gives some idea of its main source, the SAKMv, but also refers to many other works which give us an insight into the growth of the early historical tradition of Ceylon.
problems discussed by Oldenberg, Geiger and Adikaram. He rejects their view that he expressed many years ago that they are merely sayings of the ancients quoted by different writers. There is undoubtedly some ground for his view. The quotations from the Porāṇā clearly deal with a large variety of subjects. He could have added that in the Saddharmasanga they occur in the Cālavamsa dealing with events of the fifth century A.D. are called sayings of the ancients. But this and the arguments he puts forward do not express anything more than a contrary view. They do not prove that the commentary called the Porāṇatthakathā did not include the older sayings of the ancients.59

Malalasekera disagrees with Geiger to some extent also in regard to the relationship between the SakMv and the My. "Mahānāma," wrote Geiger who appears to have based his view on the evidence of the Vap, "could not yet rise quite above his material. He confined himself to his source to the best of his power. It is clear that certain sections in the My. are merely versifications of the corresponding passage in the original work. Often Mahānāma adopted the Pāli verses of the original unchanged into his work, especially if they bore an authoritative character. That is the case, for example, where the D. and M. agree word for word. Mahānāma is no genius, and his work is not a literary performance of the first rank; nevertheless the My. signifies in comparison with the D., a great aesthetic advance."60 But says Malalasekera, "The Tikā would also have us believe that the translation (into Pāli) followed the original in its subject matter, if not word for word, at least very closely, and that only the style was changed. This, however, is not the case, as will appear in the sequel, and the My. should be considered rather as an adaptation, a work of an eclectic character, the author having obtained his material from diverse sources, sifted them with great care and attention to accuracy of detail, according to his own lights."61

60. D. and M., p. 69. See also p. 63.
61. Vap, p. lvii.

59. Pāli Literature of Ceylon, p. 92. This work will be referred to hereafter by the abbreviation P.L.C.
57. Pāli Literature of Ceylon, p. 92. This work will be referred to hereafter by the abbreviation P.L.C.

GEIGER has shown, that he did not deviate much from his original. But a close examination of his work makes it clear that he did not sift his material with such great care and attention to accuracy of detail59 and, as Geiger has shown, that he did not deny much from his original.

One of the causes that led Malalasekera to come to his view appears to have been the assumption that the double versions given in the Dv were both derived from the SakMv.51 That he took this for granted is not surprising as both Oldenberg and Geiger did not think such an assumption unjustifiable, but they were guarded in their statements. "A great part of the Dipavamsa," said Oldenberg, "has the appearance not of an independent continuous work, but of a composition of such single stanzas extracted from a work or works like that Aṭṭhakathā."62 "We may assume," wrote Geiger, "that the original work may have already contained different recensions, which were indebted for their origin to oral tradition, and that they had been placed directly side by side in order to give the whole content of the tradition: but there remains the other possibility that the compiler of the Dv as well as the Ak M. of the Mahāvihāra from which Mahānāma's work was produced, also made use of a second source."63

Thus according to Geiger it is possible that a considerable amount of the adaptation, which Malalasekera attributes to the author of the My., was the work of the authors of the SakMv themselves. This seems to have been the case, as the Vap does not seem to refer to such double versions in the SakMv. The repetitions there seem to have been of a different type. "We are able from the MT. to form an idea," wrote Geiger, "of the way in which such repetitions came occasionally to be made. Messages were given most probably in the same words at the sending of the order as at the delivery of the message. Thus, e.g. in M. 31, 15 Sonuttara was sent by the monastery to fetch from the Nāga king the relics of the Buddha that had been guarded by him. It is said that this corresponded with a prophecy of the Buddha, who at his death ordered that a doña should be deposited in Lanka in the Mahāthupa with his

63. A close examination of the My shows that its author has put together accounts which do not always agree in matters of detail.
64. Vap, p. lv.
65. The Dipavamsa, p. 6. The italics are not in the original.
66. D. and M., p. 68. Rhyys Davids wrote of the Dv in J.R.A.S., 1905, p. 591: "It is the outcome of a fairly large number of previous works."
Relics. When Soquuttara came to the Naga king, it says in M. 31, 48 merely
vattidhikaram, that he executed the order. But in the T. (413, 22) the words
were again repeated: devinda, mama affhusu sarvaradhuwodesu ekam donam
Lembisita Mahabbuliye nishanaya bhavissati.

"The following is another example. As Duttha agamani felt his end
drawing near, he ordered that his bed should be carried out, so that he could
once more see the masterpieces of his life, the Lohap-produ and the Mahathupa.
Many monks came there in order to get news of the condition of the
sick man. Among them the king missed the Thera Puttabhaya. The MT.
were again repeated:
vatv/idhitiram,
relics. When Sonuttara came to the Naga king, it says in M. 31, 48 merely

Many
Lankaprodu M a!tiithupe
its description (according to }L 30, 97). and recurs i~:'If. 34, 49 in the history
of the reign of this-king."?

All this tends to show that there is
definite evidence for assuming that
these double versions of the Dv were derived from the SAkMV, and it seems
to be even more closely in its subject matter and that only the
style was changed.

What then can we conclude about the origins of the Dv, the Sp, the Mv,
and the SAkMV? That the Mv was based on a Sinhalese chronicle is beyond
doubt in spite of the assertion of Franke. The author of the Vap says that
that the Sinhalese chronicle, the SAkMV, also called the Pordhatthakathita, belonged
to the Mahavihara, and was a prose work in the Sinhalese dialect. He
makes it clear that the Mahavamsa of the ancients referred to in the Pali
Mv is this work and that it contained the faults of over-condensation, prolixity
and repetition.77

Similarly the Sp too was based on a Sinhalese work. Its author says that
its chief source was the Mahabbutkathita. He wrote this Pali work as the

68. Vap, p. 586.
69. Vap, p. 548.
70. D. and M., p. 67.
72. Ibid, p. 46.
73. Sp, p. 2.

74. D. and M., pp. 49 and 70.
75. Ibid, pp. 79-73.
76. The Dhipanama, p. 6.
77. D. and M., p. 5.
they form the backbone of the whole story; the reciter would thus with their help retain in his memory the whole course of the action. The verses were bound together by independent prose, in the ancient Sinhalese tongue. Thrus the disagreement between Franke on the one hand and Oldenberg and Geiger on the other on this point seems to be more apparent than real.

But were all these Pāli verses in the Dv, as Oldenberg and Geiger imagined, extracted from the SākMv? Geiger himself, as noticed earlier, admitted the possibility that the SākMv had fewer Pāli verses than he originally imagined. But cannot one go further and ask whether the Dv was based on the SākMv at all? Is it not possible that it, or at least most of it, was based on oral tradition and not on the SākMv?

There is no doubt, as Oldenberg and Geiger have shown, that there is a great similarity between the Dv on the one hand and the Sp and the Mv on the other. The Mv in its material is similar to the Dv and generally follows the order of the Dv, though its accounts are much longer and fuller. The Sp, the earlier work, is even closer to the Dv in language and at times in the arrangement of matter. Further some of the verses found interspersed in the Sp and the Vap as well as some verses in the Mv are identical with, or almost the same as, some in the Dv, the differences of those in the Sp being due to improvements in language and metre. Besides the Dv covers the same period of time, and like the Mv ends with Mahāsena in whose reign the destruction of some of its buildings probably led to the conclusion of the first part of the Mv.

But does it necessarily follow from all this that the Dv too was based on the SākMv? The Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvamsa of the Uttaravihāra, as Geiger has shown from the evidence drawn from the Dv, does not seem to have been very different from the SākMv except in matters of detail. Hence could not the Dv have been a chronicle of some other vihāra like the Thūpārāma, which was closely associated with the Mahāvihāra and probably suffered equally from the persecution of Mahasena? In fact the Dv seems to attach greater importance to the Thūpārāma than the Mahāvihāra.

The similarity of many verses in the Dv and the Mv is natural as both the Dv and the SākMv seem to have followed a common oral tradition at least to the coming of Mahinda. But to judge from the Uttaravihāra.

83. Ibid. pp. 50, 51, 63.
84. Geiger believed the verses common to the Dv and the Mv were borrowed by each from the SākMv.
85. Sp. p. 75.
86. Mv iv, 37, 38, xi, 28, 29, xi, 31b, xi, 34, xiv, 8.
Dv iv, 49, v, 22, xi, 33, xii, 1, xii, 4a, xii, 5, xii, 51.
87. D. and M., p. 16.
88. Dv xii, 21b, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33, 51, 56a, 66.
Mv xxxvi, 4a, xxxv, 115, 123, xxxvi, 1, 6, 16 and 19, 57, 105, xxxvii, 1.
89. Sp. p. 62. This list appears also in the Purāṇa (p. 2), but not in the Dv though it seems to have formed a part of it once. See Dv, p. 304.
90. Sp. pp. 70, 71.
92. Sp. pp. 75-76.

THE PĀLI CHRONICLES OF CEYLON

Aṭṭhakathā there is no reason why there should not be similarity in verses in later accounts too. The only verses that need be considered are those which are identical or very similar. The author of the Sp, or more probably the author of the Vinayatthakathā, knew the Dv as he quotes from it. Hence it is not strange if he borrowed any verses from the Dv, even if it is assumed for the moment that he did not obtain the verses from oral tradition common to the many viharas. All the verses common to the Dv and the Mv in the earlier chapters are also common to the Sp. Since the author of the Mv knew the Vinayatthakathā and made use of it even to correct the SākMv, he could have borrowed them from the Vāk or the Sp, if it is again assumed that the SākMv did not obtain the common verses from oral tradition. Two such verses, not common to the Sp, in a later chapter deal with the writing down of the Pāli Canon and the Commentaries. These, as Geiger points out, along with two other verses give the impression that they were officially stamped by tradition, and therefore the words were fixed in the same way for the author of the Dv as for the author of the Mv. The other verses common to the Dv and the Mv occur in one chapter of the Dv in a second version which appears to have been borrowed along with other second versions in the Dv from another source. These second versions appear to be closer to the Mv than the rest, and may have been borrowed from the Mahāvihāra itself or from some other vihāra of the Theravādins.

In fact the Sp (or the Vāk) seems to look upon the Dv as a work distinct from the Porūḷakathā. The Sp has three quotations from the Porūḷa. The first of these gives a list of the theras of Ceylon who handed down the Vinaya. The second and the third deal with the coming of Mahinda and these are also found in the Dv. There are some more quotations in the Sp, but they are said to be from the Dv. They deal with the relations between Asoka and Devānampiya Tissa, a subject not included in the contents

78. D. and M., p. 65.
79. The Abhayagiri Vihāra.
81. Cf. Dv xv, 34; xvii, 1 (also Sp, p. 99) with Mv xv, 51. Mahālasokera quotes an extract from Nevill who suggests that the Dv was a work of the nuns and not of the Mahāvihāra. P.L.C., p. 135. See also Epigraphia Ceylanica iv, p. 278.
82. D. and M., p. 64.
recorded in the first three lines of the Dv, which are common to the Porāṇa. If the Dv merely gave extracts from or reproduced in Pāli what was already in the Porāṇāṭṭhakathā, it is strange that the Sp should give the Porāṇa as the source for two passages contained also in the Dv and attribute the other quotations to the Dv.

The Kathāvatthupakarana also quotes once from the Dv, but what it extracts is the passage about the heretical schools which finds no mention in the Sp or the Mv and thus probably formed no part of the SAkMv or the other works of the Mahāvihāra.93

There is still another reason for thinking that the Dv originally was not based on the Sinhalese works on which the Sp and the Mv depended. It clearly belongs to an earlier stratum of tradition. Almost all the accounts in it are much shorter, and it does not refer at all to some of the episodes related in the Sp and the Mv. It mentions fewer places as visited by the Buddha. It makes no reference to Tissa, the brother of Asoka, and says that Asoka killed all his brothers. It knows of a western route from India to Ceylon, but not an eastern route like the Sp and the Mv. It refers to buildings not mentioned in the Mv, and sometimes credits a building to a king other than the one mentioned in the Mv.

The Dv has also traditions about the death of the Buddha and of the Third Buddhist Council which appear to show that it assumed dates for the death of the Buddha and Asoka’s consecration different from those of the Sp and the Mv according to which Buddha died on the full-moon day of Vesakhaa and Asoka was consecrated 218 years after the Parinibbāna. The statement in the Dv that Mahinda arrived 236 years after the death of the Buddha24 does not agree with another that the first consecration of Devānampiya Tissa took place also in the 237th year.95 These two statements can be reconciled only if it is assumed that the Buddha died not on the full-moon day of Vesakhaa, but on some other date like the 8th day of the second half of Kattika (September-October), which the Sārvasatīvadins considered to be the date of the Parinibbāna.96 The Dv traditions that the Third Buddhist Council took place 118 years after the death of the Buddha97 seem to assume that Asoka was consecrated only a hundred years later. This again is a view held in the Sārvasatīvadin works, the Dīvānāvatāra and the Avadīna Sātaka.98 Do these dates too belong to an earlier stratum of tradition?

93. J.P.T.S., 1909, p. 3; Dv v, 30-33; Kathāvattthu Atthakathā, p. 123.
94. Dv xxvi, 71; xii, 44; xvii, 88.
95. Ibid. xxvii, 78.
97. Dv i, 24, 25; V, 55-59.
98. E. J. Thomas: Theravāda and Sārvasatīvāda Dates of the Nirvāna. B.C.
Law Volume, pp. 15-20.

The Dv was probably not even a work of the Mahāvihāra. The author of the Vap takes great pains to note differences between the Mv and other works such as the Atthakathā. He points out, for instance, that the Uttaravihāra Atthakathā leaves out King Cetiya from the genealogy of the Buddha.99 The Atthakathā says that Pañḍukāhbaya sojourned on the Dalaṭpabbata five years and on the Ariṭṭhapabbata six years whereas the Mv gives four and seven years.100 He even refers to verbal differences. He says for the phrase dinam gato the Atthakathā has kālam akāsī devalokam gato.101 The Vina-yaṭṭhakathā uses visājīsī in place of adāśī.102 But the author of the Vap never refers to the differences between the Dv and the Mv. He mentions a Dīpamaṃsa Atthakathā,103 but, like the author of the Mv,104 never refers to the Dv itself. If the Dv was based on even an older tradition of the Mahāvihāra it is likely that the author of the Vap would have made some reference to it.

Thus the Dv seems to be an independent work with little or no direct connection with the SAkMv. But it does not follow, as Franke assumed, that it stands on its own tottering feet. Similarly all the accounts in the SAkMv need not necessarily be inventions of its authors. As Franke himself pointed out the language of the Dv clearly show the influence of the Jātaka, Cariyāpiṭaka and the Buddhavaṃsa. A close examination of the Dv, the Sp and the Mv show that some of the episodes and stories in them such as those of Vijaya, Pañḍukāhbaya and Nigrodha are based on Jātakas while certain other accounts show that they have been amplified or embellished with details from these tales.

The ancient historical tradition of Ceylon reveals also the influence of many other Pāli works. The chief of them are the Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga of the Vinaya Piṭaka, the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya and the Pāli Commentaries.

Another work that contains some of the traditions common to the chronicles of Ceylon is the Abhāvadāna. A considerable portion of the material in the Dv, the Sp and the Mv appears to have been borrowed from it or from other sources utilized by the authors of this work. The Abhāvadāna is also a work which has grown with time. The original accounts in it have been amplified

100. Mv x, 45; Vap, pp. 287 and 290.
101. Mv viii, 3; Vap, p. 268.
102. Mv v, 83; Vap, p. 207.
103. This is clearly not the Dv as the references are not to its contents.
104. Geiger believed that the author of the Mv was familiar with the Dv. “That the Dv was known to the author of the Mv is quite certain, and it is not at all unlikely that he, here and there, borrowed from it, considering the Indian’s way of working in such cases.” D. and M., p. 16. There is no conclusive evidence for such an assumption.
and new episodes have been added to it. The Sp and the Mv show that some of the legends included in the later forms of this work were known in Ceylon.

What conclusions may we draw from all this about the growth of the ancient historical tradition of Ceylon?

The Dv undoubtedly contains the oldest form of the tradition. But it is not the work of one author or of a single century. As Oldenberg and Geiger point out it is clearly a compilation. Different parts have been composed by different persons at different times. This is evident from the variety in style. Some passages, if the interpolations are omitted, are free from irregularities in metre and mistakes in grammar. Some parts have one part in one metre and another in another metre. Some, like the accounts of Vijaya give only a summary of the story. Others, like the visits of the Buddha and the bringing of the Bo-tree, are narrated in greater detail. Some passages give only the speeches without any mention of the speakers, while others, which give the speakers, seem to represent a more developed form of such speeches. The double accounts seem to be derived from two different sources. The first accounts probably belonged to the vihāra that produced the Dv, while the second accounts belonged to another. The memory verses show how some of the stories were remembered before the ballads themselves were composed. Some parts, such as the account of the life of the Buddha, seem to have been based on Pāli prose passages of the Canon. It is often quite clear that couplets have been introduced to connect independent ballads or parts of ballads.

Most of the sentences expressed in a single line, many lines occuring in sentences which are expressed in three lines, many lines either metrically or grammatically wrong, and many lines which obviously consist of commentarial matter may have been added to the original verses at the time of compilation or even later. The Dv appears to have existed before the Vinayatthakathā was written in the first century A.D. But at that time the narrative is not likely to have extended much beyond the introduction of Buddhism to the island. Such a work could have been either made up from oral tradition or extracted, as Oldenberg and Geiger imagined, from one or more written sources. Obviously the rest must have been added to this nucleus either from time to time or about the fourth century in which the last king referred to in it lived. Even if the additions were made still later the material itself is not likely to have belonged to a period later than the fourth century.

The different parts of the Dv may be further apportioned to different centuries. Some sections, like the visits of the Buddha may belong to the first century B.C. The predictions about the buildings of the Mahāvihāra by Mahinda may belong to the second half of the first century A.D. or even later as the account is fuller than that in the Sp which was based on the Vinayatthakathā probably written not earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. Perhaps the most that can be concluded at present is that the contents of the Dv range from the first century B.C. to the fourth century A.D.

The work that seems to come next to the Dv is the SākMv. As Geiger points out, 'This Mahāvamsa of the ancients' is certainly not a work completed at one time; it took the form in which Mahānāma found it, quite gradually in the course of generations. New episodes were always being added on, so that in time it assumed more and more the character of a chronicle.'

If the view of Oldenberg, Geiger and Adikaram is accepted that the term Porāṇa referred to a definite Atthakathā, it is clear that the SākMv existed when the Vinayatthakathā was written. This, in its original form, may have dealt only with the topics mentioned in the proem of the Dv: the visits of the Buddha, the bringing of the relics and of the Bo-tree of Buddhism and the Pāli Canon and the Atthakathā and the coming of Vijaya. But as far as it can be judged from the evidence in the Vap, which shows that the SākMv did not differ much from the Mv, its author does not seem to have merely reproduced in Sinhalese the oral tradition in the form found in the Dv, though he often keeps to the original language and quotes Pāli verses, but appears to have revised and added to it in accordance with the new information that was available to him.

This first part was probably written down about the time of Vatagāmapi Abhaya in whose reign, according to the Dv and the Mv the Sinhalese Commentaries were written down. According to the Nikāya Sāṅgānā the writing was done at Alvihāre near Mātalā after the famine that followed the rebellion of the Brahmin Tissa. The rest of the Chronicle must have been written from time to time by different persons in the Mahāvihāra. The work of adding seems to have continued even after the Mv was composed.

106. See also D. and M., pp. 5-26, 66.
107. For the views of Oldenberg and Geiger, see D. and M., p. 43.
108. The fact that the language of some parts of the Dv has been influenced by the Buddhavamsa and the Cariya Pitaka unfortunately is of no assistance to get at the earliest possible date of the earliest ballads as no serious attempt has yet been made to fix the dates of these works.
109. D. and M., p. 66; See also Vap, p. lix.
110. D. and M., p. 69. This can also be assumed from the fact that the Sp quotes from the Dv in dealing with a topic outside these contents. Buddhaghoṣa need not have done this. The author of the Vāk was no doubt responsible for it.
111. Dv xx, 20-21; Mv xxxiii, 102b-104a.
112. Colombo, 1908, p. 70.
The Vinayanr̥kahadhā comes next in order. Its author knew the Porana as well as the Dv. He borrowed material either oral or written from other sources too. According to Adikaram this work appears to have been written in the latter half of the first century A.D. as the phrase yava aijatana already referred to applies to about this period of time.

The Samantapāśādikā, the Pāli Commentary, the introduction of which gives an account of the early history of Ceylon, seems to have been based on the Vinayanr̥kahadhā. It contains additional information not given in the Mv. According to Adikaram Buddhaghosa wrote it at the request of Buddhāsiri having learnt the Sinhalese Commentaries from Buddhāmita while residing in the building erected to the east of the Mahāvihāra by the Minister Mahānīgama. Buddhaghosa probably derived the additional information from the other commentaries he consulted. In addition to the Mahābhāskarā he mentions two others by name, the Mahāpaccarī and the Kuruṇī. According to the Sāratthādīpani and the Vinavīnuvānii, the others he consulted were the Anāhaka Atthakathā and the Sankhepa Atthakathā, but according to the Visarabhuddhi they were the Anāhaka Atthakathā and the Cullapaccarī.

It is possible to fix more definitely the date of the Samantapāśādikā. According to Adikaram the writing of the Commentary was begun in the kathakā, nineteenth year and completed in the twentieth year of King Sirinivasa.

The Mv is undoubtedly a later work than the Sp, but there is no evidence in it to fix its date. In the Vap, though at times the names of other theras are given, the author of the Mv is always referred to as acariya, a term used for the writers of the Commentaries; but, in a colophon at the end of it, Buddhāsiri having learnt the Sinhalese Commentaries from Buddhāmita while residing in the building erected to the east of the Mahāvihāra by the Minister Mahānīgama, Buddhaghosa probably derived the additional information from the other commentaries he consulted. In addition to the Mahābhāskarā he mentions two others by name, the Mahāpaccarī and the Kuruṇī. According to the Sāratthādīpani and the Vinavīnuvānii, the others he consulted were the Anāhaka Atthakathā and the Sankhepa Atthakathā, but according to the Visarabhuddhi they were the Anāhaka Atthakathā and the Cullapaccarī.

It is possible to fix more definitely the date of the Samantapāśādikā. According to Adikaram the writing of the Commentary was begun in the kathakā, nineteenth year and completed in the twentieth year of King Sirinivasa. The king referred to here appears to be Mahānīma, who reigned from 409 to 431. Hence the date of the Samantapāśādikā may be said to be 430.

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Who was this Mahānīma and when did he live? The only therā known to have lived in the Dīghasanda Parivēna is the uncle of King Dīhtusena, but there is nothing to show that his name was Mahānīma. A Mahānīma is mentioned in the Cūlavamsa, but according to the readings given by Geiger he lived in the Dīghā or Dīghasana Vihāra. Therefore these two theras need not be the same person unless it can be proved that the Dīghasana Vihāra and the Dīghasanda Parivēna are two different names for the same place. Hence the evidence is insufficient to show that either of these was the author of the Mv.

Two questions arise from the foregoing. Was the statement in the colophon of the Vap based on a reliable tradition or was it a guess from the passages in the Cūlavamsa referred to in the previous paragraphs? If the latter is the case, the tradition is of no value. If the former is right, who was this Mahānīma? Is it valid to accept him, according to the Ceylon tradition, as the uncle of Dīhtusena as well as the Mahānīma of the Dīghasana Vihāra? This tradition seems to have no antiquity and only casts doubts on the authority of the statement in the colophon of the Vap itself.

Adikaram points out that a therā by the name of Mahānīma, while living in a vihāra built by the Minister Uttaramanti, wrote the Saddhāmaṇāpakaśini, the Pāli Commentary on the Puṭisambhidānaṃga, in the third year after the death of Moggalāṇa I (i.e. about A.D. 516). So far no one has connected this Mahānīma, who too lived in the sixth century A.D., with the authorship of the Mv.

Geiger first placed the Mv in the last quarter of the fifth century on the ground that its author was the Mahānīma who lived in the reign of Moggalāṇa.

125. XV, 212-213.
126. Cūlavamsa xxxviii. 16.
127. Ibid. xxxix. 42.
128. For a discussion on this question, see D. and M., pp. 41 and p. 140. In these it is assumed that Mahānīma lived in the Dīghasanda Parivēna and not in Dīghā or Dīghasana Vihāra. Geiger thinks that on grounds of age these two cannot be the same but Malalasekera thinks otherwise. See also Cūlavamsa, Eng. Trs. I, p. 48, n. 1. Geiger gives no reason for assuming that the Dīghasanda Parivēna and the Dīghasana Vihāra are the same.
130. Adikaram, p. 9.
131. Malalasekera in his P.L.C., p. 144, appears to identify this Mahānīma with the author of the Vap. It is not clear why he thinks that the two Mahānīmas mentioned in an inscription at Buddha Gayā are the authors of the Mv and Vap respectively.
in the Dighāsana Vihāra, which at that time was believed to be the Dighasanda Parivēna. Later he placed it in the sixth century depending on Fleet's translation of the passage in the Cūḷavamsa referred to earlier. Since he rejected later the view that this passage referred to the Mv, other evidence has to be sought to fix the date of the Mv.

The only piece of evidence available suggests that the Mv was composed some time after the visit of Fa Hsien to Ceylon at the beginning of the fifth century. There is no reference either in the Dv or the Sp to imply that the bowl of the Buddha was in Ceylon. According to Fa Hsien he learnt from an Indian in Ceylon that it was at first at Vaiśāli and then in Gandhāra. According to the Mv it was in Ceylon. Thus it is perhaps best to place the Mv in the sixth century, the date suggested by Geiger though on other grounds.

There is also no definite evidence to fix the date of the Vap. Geiger placed it between 1,000 and 1250. The author of the Vap lived after the reign of Dāṭhopa Tissa II (650-658), as he refers in his work to Dāṭhopa Tissa, the nephew. The Vap was not later than the thirteenth century as its author does not seem to have known the later additions to the Mv while the author of the Pāli ThākāvanaSA, which belongs to the thirteenth century, made use of the Vap. Geiger also took into account the possibility that the Vap was later than the MahābodhiVamsa. This made him place the Vap after 1000.

Malalasekera did not accept the view that the author of the Vap knew the MahābodhiVamsa. This would place the Vap any time between 658 and 1250. But Malalasekera placed it at first in the seventh or eighth century on the belief that the Sinhalese sources on which the Vap was based disappeared not long after the Mv was written. He appears to have been influenced also by the Ceylon tradition which attributed the Vap too to Mahānāma, the author of the Mv. He did not agree that the same person was responsible for both these works, but he seems to have thought that the mistake was due to the fact that the Vap followed the Mv closely. But both these are assumptions which have yet to be established.

In the Vap Malalasekera places it in the eighth or ninth century, since the author of the Mv is said to have lived in the sixth century and two centuries

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were sufficient for the development of the variant readings referred to in the Vap. He gives also additional arguments for placing it earlier than Geiger. He now thinks the fact that the author of the Mv was not the same as the author of the Vap does not preclude the possibility that the author of the Vap was also called Mahānāma. He then hints that the author of the Vap may be the second Mahānāma of the Buddha Gaya inscription, who is said to have been born in Ceylon.

Geiger pointed out that the name Sāmagala mentioned in the Mv had changed into Moragalla when the Vap was written. Earlier Malalasekera wrote: "It is clear that many years had elapsed between the original work and its tikō, sufficiently long to allow the name of a village to have undergone change." Now he says: "But this means nothing in point of time. We do not know the circumstances in which the change occurred; such a change may take place sometimes in one day, as happened, I believe, in the Great European War."

Malalasekera also points out that the MahābodhiVamsa attributed to the tenth century is in style more involved and more plentiful in ornamental epithets than the Vap, and therefore the Vap is likely to be older than the MahābodhiVamsa.

Malalasekera's attempt seems to be not so much to discover the date of the Vap as to maintain as far as possible the view taken earlier that it belonged to the seventh or eighth century. The fact that the author of the Mv was a person different from the author of the Vap certainly does not preclude the possibility that the author of the Vap was a Mahānāma. But what grounds are there to accept a tradition, first recorded by Turnour, that he was called Mahānāma? Can one connect the Mahānāmas of the Buddha Gaya inscription merely on the ground of the similarity of names and the fact that the second of them was born in Ceylon with the authorship of the Vap and the Mv? Could a name of a village have changed even in those times in a day? Can any other such instance be quoted? Does it necessarily follow that the Vap is older than the MahābodhiVamsa because the latter, a poem, is in style more involved and more plentiful in ornamental epithets?

Geiger, has shown that the first part of the Cūḷavamsa was most probably composed not in the thirteenth century, as Malalasekera had suggested, but at the end of the twelfth century or at the beginning of the

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132. D. and M., p. 42. The date is based on the reckoning that Buddha died in 544 B.C. and not 483 B.C.
136. D. and M., p. 32.
140. Mv xxxiii, 53; Vap, p. 616; D. and M. p. 33.
142. Vap, p. cv.
143. Ibid., p. cvii.
thirteenth. Therefore, we may conclude that the Vap was probably written not earlier than the eighth century and not later than the twelfth century. Perhaps we may go further and say that in all probability it was written about the time of Parākramabahu the Great (1153-1186) when the other tbās or sub-commentaries were written on the earlier commentaries of Buddhaghosa. If we do that we shall have to go back closer to the view of Geiger rather than that of Malalasekera.

Thus we see that Geiger’s Dīpavānusā and Mahāvānusā still continues to be the most complete and most reliable work on the subject of the ancient chronicles of Ceylon. The conclusions arrived at by Franke and Malalasekera which go against its views are hardly tenable. The modifications of his views made by Geiger himself in his Introduction to his English Translation of the Mv have to be rejected as they were based on an incorrect inference of Fleer.

But in the light of evidence now available a few of the conclusions of this work have to be revised. Adikaram has supplied evidence to conclude that the Sp was based on the Vinayaṭṭhakathā and not on the SAkMv. He has also supplied more definite dates for the Vinayaṭṭhakathā and the Sp, and thereby also for the SAkMv. Geiger’s own research has shown that it is not possible to fix the date of the Sp from evidence from the Cālavānusā even if the author of the Mv, as the colophon of the Vap says, was one Mahānāma who lived in the Dīghañṣa Pariyena of the Mahāvihāra. Further the available evidence shows that the Dv was neither based on the SAkMv nor belonged to the Mahāvihāra as was inferred by Oldenberg and Geiger and generally accepted by other scholars on the basis of their arguments.

G. C. MENDIS.

The Institution of Property.

The essence of the conception of property is that it is an institution like marriage or the legislature or the church. In this connection it is necessary to guard against the popular mistake of confusing the meaning of the two different concepts “institution” and “association.” Institutions are not associations just as brushes are not paintings. They are the “instruments or devices by which modes of associations are formed and maintained and by which their special functions are fulfilled.” The association known as the “family,” for instance, is formed and is being maintained by the social institution known by the name of “marriage.”

The second popular mistake which must be avoided in a paper like this is that of treating the words “property” and “goods” as synonyms. This is entirely erroneous. Any conglomeration of things or goods (in a state of nature) is not property; the matter of that, goods (chattels and land) are not property at all. Those goods the use and enjoyment of which are sanctioned by the State are the objects of proprietary rights. This right of use, enjoyment and possession over things is property. It is not the things themselves but a particular legal relation of a man (or a body of men) to a thing (or things) that is property.

All goods however cannot be objects of proprietary rights and certainly goods in a state of nature are not. Even free-goods located within the State cannot be owned by a private individual, though they certainly can be treated as objects over which the state or a corporation can exert and exercise proprietary rights. They are the objects of public property. No doubt the political society gets the proprietary rights over such things without effort or labour but so does one with regard to the proprietary rights which he receives through inheritance. They can be the objects of a nation’s proprietary rights because their use and transmission can be sanctioned by the State.

But though “property” is one of the social institutions it is an institution of special import and implication, because unlike any other institution which brings into being and maintains any one definite association within the social fabric the institution of property permeates through and interlinks all the associations in the society. In its scope and incidence it transgresses the boundaries of all the institutions except the institution of Law of which it is an important branch.

145. Indian Historical Quarterly Vol. VI No. 2 p. 207.
146. P.L.C., pp. 190-193. Malalasekera’s view that the Sinhalese sources on which the Vap was based disappeared not long after the Mv was written is not tenable. There is definite evidence to show that they existed in the tenth century and there is no reason to think that they did not exist in the thirteenth century. See J. de Lanerolle: Simhala Sāhitya Lépt p. 23.

J. S. Mackenzie: Outlines of Social Philosophy, p. 63. The same view has been taken by Professor MacIver in his “Community.” Bk. II, Chap. IV.
Professor Ely of Wisconsin has classified fundamental social institutions of the first rank under five heads:—*viz.*, property, inheritance, contract, vested rights and personal conditions. On a careful scrutiny it will be found that this classification is based on mere convenience. In their essence they are species of the same genus—property. Inheritance is a special "process of transmission of property from generation to generation." The right to make contracts has been held to be a class of proprietary right by the Supreme Court of America. Vested rights are a special variety of caste-property. Personal conditions like slavery and wifehood were originally and fundamentally and still are proprietary rights of the most objectionable type. It is a strange anomaly of our social history that though slavery has been thoroughly culminated and practically abolished at least from civilised societies marriage is not only tolerated but sanctified and worshipped. A beautiful wife of a rich husband bought off through social influence or with the help of superior purchasing power at one's command is an exercise of a type of monopolistic proprietary right which is difficult to justify by any decent standard of social ethics. Be that as it may, it suffices here to say that the institution of property is extremely wide in its scope and affects the life of the individual in almost each one of his activities.

Property is essentially a juridical concept. Proprietary right, like all other rights, is a product of Law. Like marriage (which we propose to treat as a special type of proprietary right) the right of ownership is unimaginable outside the State. In this connection I want to draw attention to the fact that even a purely religious marriage like the Hindu marriage is marriage only within the ambit of law as promulgated by the State. Its incidence, for example, the duty of the wife to observe chastity, the legitimation of the children of the union, the wife's right to maintenance—has meaning only within the compass of Law and Law presupposes the existence of the State. Every member within a state enjoys things over every atom of which he can exclude the rest of the world his right of use is by law, not by occupation, his adverse possession is ratified by the State and when that is done then that act of ratification will give rise to his exclusive right over those things and those rights will be his property. Consequently a person may own proprietary right over a thing without a single day's possession and conversely he may not acquire any legal claim in it after years of possession. It is however, an entirely different matter that long term of possession of things by a person is usually recognised by the State as a good certificate for conferring proprietary rights over those things on the possessor. The origin of proprietary right therefore, is not occupation but Law or the recognition of the political society.

The institution of property further, is not merely a social institution like the church, but like the State, it is a social institution of peculiar incidence; its origin in a given society being coeval with State and Law. It is, I maintain, a political institution, that is, to say, it comes into being in a given society only when that society has been able to evolve a sovereign political authority from which positive law can emanate. In a society which has not yet developed into a State there can be no proprietary right. Men may have possession but no ownership, just as they may have love and friendship but no marriage or customs and conventions but no law.

What then is the chief characteristic of the right of ownership which confers upon men proprietary rights over things owned? It is the right of exclusive possession sanctioned and protected by the State. When I say this book is "mine" it is simultaneously declared that it is not thine, not his, not hers, not anybody else's. This declaration receives legal sanction by the ratification of the State, at which point of time my proprietary right over the book is established against the whole world.

This exclusive right theory of ownership however, is not true in an absolute sense. Not only there are cases of ownership where the owner is obliged to concede an inferior type of right of use and enjoyment over things owned by him to non-owners but even in those objects of ownership from the enjoyment of which he can exclude the rest of the world his right of use is by no means unlimited in extent. That is, though he can exclude others from their use, he cannot use them in any way he likes (though it is admitted that the scope of his use is very large). It is not the narrowness of the sphere of restriction but the restriction itself that is important in this case and the restriction is really not so insignificant as it appears at first sight to be.

Within the limitations imposed upon by Law the right of exclusive control over things (which ownership confers upon the owner) can be exercised by a private individual as well as a public body. If this control is vested in a
political unit (as a city or a state) then it is public property, but if it is vested in a private individual or a group of such individuals then it is private property.

Apart from public property, which is expressly meant for the use and enjoyment of the public in general, even private property has a social aspect. This social complexion of private property is inherent in the very concept "property" and manifests itself clearly in the limitations imposed upon its use by the social will or the State. Just like any other right authorised by the State, the right of ownership is relative to the social needs and limited by the social necessities.

The social aspect of private property has been recognised by eminent jurists and constitutional authorities. In the words of the renowned German jurist, Professor von Jhering, "an absolute right of Property would result in the dissolution of the State." The Code of Frederick the Great lays down:

"Niemand darf sein Eigentum zur Krankung oder Beschädigung anderer missbrauchen."4

That is, none is permitted to (mis-) use his property to the discomfort or injury of others.

The Napoleonic Code says:

"La propriété est le droit de jouir et de disposer de choses de la manière la plus absolue, porvu qu'on n'en fasse un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les reglements."5

Lord Mackenzie Says:

"Property is a right to the absolute use, enjoyment and disposal of a thing, without any restraint, except what is imposed on the owner by law or action."6

Professor Huxley remarks:

"At present the state protects men in the possession and enjoyment of their property and defines what the property is. The justification for its so doing is that its action promotes the good of the people. If it can be clearly proved that the abolition of property would tend still more to promote the good of the people, the state will have the same justification for abolishing property that it now has for maintaining it."7

We conclude therefore that the main ethical justification of private property is its potential power of promoting public good. Indeed some learned autho-

4. Das Allgemeine Landrecht. Teil I., para. 27.
5. Art 544. Property is the right of using things and of controlling them in the most absolute manner, provided that one does not make a use of them prohibited by the laws or ordinances.
6. Roman Law, p. 171.

THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY

rities are of opinion that in every law there is a silent clause to the effect that it is effective only so long as it does not destroy public weal or offend public conscience. Lasalle in his "System of Acquired Rights" observes:

"Die Idee des Eigentums kann nichts mit sich bringen was mit der Idee der Gesellschaft in Widerspruch steht."8

This obligation on the part of the owner not to offend the public conscience lends a social character to property, even to those types which we commonly term private property.

Admitting therefore that private property has a social aspect and that it is an important aspect we cannot however, interpret it, as Prof. Ely9 has endeavoured to do, as a social trust. All that we are prepared to say is that owing to a tendency towards wholesale socialisation of private property, private profit-makers have conceded of late, to so conduct their business affairs as to offer some benefit to the society at large but the guiding force and motive behind it is not social service but personal gain. The effort to interpret private property as a social trust appears to me to be an eleventh hour attempt to save the capitalist order of society and to check the onrush of socialism. The social aspect of private property as yet, appears to have received merely a negative recognition, that is, its exercise is to be so regulated as not to offend the public conscience and still it is not obligatory on the part of the owner of proprietary rights to so use them as to promote positive public weal.

The start towards the promotion of public utility by private property owners has however been made and there are unmistakable signs which give emphatic indication of the swing towards public utilisation. Laws relating to easement and servitude, disinfection and quarantine, laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals and children and marriage of minor girls, laws relating to the sterilization of the physically unfit and the consumption of opium and cocaine—all point to the same direction and tell the same story. The social aspect of private proprietar
cright is demonstrated nowhere so

emphatically and clearly as in the law relating to the prevention of suicides. Whether or not the state is justified in depriving a person from his moral right of refusing to live his own life when he so desires is entirely a different question with which we are not concerned here.

The ethical correctness of this tendency towards socialization of private property has come to be recognised among advanced peoples and progressive states. The Supreme Court of Carolina in a leading case held that “the right of the public to private property, to the extent that the use of it is needful and advantageous to the public must, we think, be universally acknowledged. Writers upon the laws of nature and of nations treat it as a right inherent in society.” This in other words means the recognition of the right of expropriation or the right of the State of compulsory seizing of private property in order to make it public property.

Thus far will be admitted by enlightened public opinion in all advanced countries at least in theory. A controversial point arises however, when we turn to the question whether this seizing of private property for public utilisation should be carried out with or without compensation. The arguments advanced in favour of paying compensation are (a) that an unfortunate mistake (of permitting a too wide range of proprietary rights to private individuals) has already been committed by the society at large (at a previous stage of our social evolution) and therefore the price for setting it right should be borne by the entire society and (b) that there will be political convulsion if no compensation is paid for expropriation.

The arguments however do not seem to be able to stand the test of criticism. Firstly if the society is asked to pay for a blunder said to have been committed by it centuries ago it may very well be said that the society has endured and paid enough for its original mistake by allowing the private owners the monopoly enjoyment of rights which should have been owned by the public.

Secondly the right of private ownership in land and other important factors of production was never willingly conceded by the society as a whole but by the governing group (which was for the time being in power) in the name of the society which being obliged to obey the political superior had no option but to acquiesce in this as in any other decision of the governing clique (assuming of course the absence of democratic form of government in those early days).

As to the fear of social convulsions it may be retorted, (i) that such a fear affords no ethical justification for paying compensation for expropriation though


it may have to be conceded in some cases on the grounds of administrative convenience and (ii) that social convulsions however undesirable a social phenomenon is certainly not worse than a state of affairs in which the accumulated groan of the propertyless is not even allowed to make itself audible and they are deprived of the courage to protest against injustice because that will bring them into conflict with the privileged class who holds the production units in their grip. Therefore on principles at least I would advocate expropriation without compensation on the largest possible scale. In the practical working out of the plan of expropriation however some compensation may be paid in special cases as a means of arresting social convulsions.

Though we accept the ideal of continuous expropriation at all time, the socio-economic history of mankind however shows that expropriation takes place in a given society more actively during a transition from one economic period to another. For instance when Europe passed from feudalism to industrialism great many rights, such as those connected with slavery and serfdom, were done away with. In India we are sure to witness instances of expropriation in great number as that country is now passing through a period of economic transition. Here in Ceylon the land-colonisation scheme sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture indicates the same tendency towards expropriation of private property for public benefit during a period of transition.

Property therefore we find is in a continuous state of flux and the tendency of the flux, in progressive societies, is to swing from private to public ownership. This is so because it is being progressively felt by the conscientious section of society that the contractual basis of acquiring property can have no ethical foundation in a capitalistic society where the poor (because of his poverty and dependence on the rich for his bare necessities without which he cannot live, far less act freely) is not free to enter into contracts which may truly be termed voluntary. The result has been a growing tendency towards the socialization of larger and larger spheres of private ownership.

Now that the process of socialisation has set in (at least in progressive societies) it must be decided once for all as to who is to take the initiative in this matter—the philanthropic rich or the State? I submit that the State ought to take the initiative in this matter and that for two important reasons: (a) in urgent cases we cannot depend upon the voluntary philanthropy of the generous rich even though it is possible to mention exceptional cases of voluntary socialisation of property like the Anand-Bhawan of Allahabad or the Tiergarten of Berlin where private proprietary rights were voluntarily transferred to the Nation by the Nehrus and the Hohenzollerns respectively on political and philanthropic grounds, and (b) secondly we should not depend upon the charity of others for a thing which ought to be ours by right.

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The result that emerges out of our discussion so far is that the proprietary right of the individual should be controlled and limited as far as possible by the social will as expressed through the State and this launches us directly into a system of State Socialism. Consistently with our moral obligation to the vast majority of poor citizens in the State we have no option but to accept the above position, because we have only three alternative ideals of Proprietary Philosophy from which to choose:

(i) the ideal of private property under capitalism (punctuated by occasional doses of philanthropy on the part of the propertied class) with which we have no sympathy for its obvious lack of an ethical justification,

(ii) the ideal of anarchism (that is statelessness and propertylessness) which does not appear capable of ever being realised unless human nature changes from its very root,

(iii) the ideal of State Socialism which appears to be the only practicable and plausible course to adopt at the present stage of our social evolution.

We want to emphasise here the fact that when we talk of socialisation of property we do not for a moment suggest that thereby we aim at or are capable of abolishing the institution of property so long as we are limiting our activities within the framework of a State. It is absurd to recognise the State and chuck off that institution. The abolition, the destruction of proprietary rights and claims, as distinguished from their transfer to some other ownership, "can only mean that the thing or the service claimed, if it is at all desirable, is flung out to be scrambled for." That in other words means plain anarchy. That also means that within the State we can never abolish property altogether. Even in a hundred per cent communist State there will be property—may be that every thing will be owned by the State and that there will be no Private Property.

It will be readily seen that though it is possible to imagine a state of perfect communism where private property is abolished in its entirety and individuals are reduced to mere users of public property in theory, some limits and restrictions have got to be put on the extent of socialisation of property when we come down to the realm of practical politics. Proprietary rights to the barest necessities of life and in the things which satisfy our emotional and aesthetic cravings have got to be admitted by any State but that which is out to be inhuman or intolerable. Nor does it appear just to deny proprietary rights over savings out of one's legitimate personal income acquired through thrift and self-denial so long as the extent of his right of ownership does not cover such a wide field as to enable the owner to deprive others of their inherent right to evolve their own free personalities or to influence the life of the nation in a manner detrimental to the moral and physical well-being of its members.

All that we can do in this direction from the practical point of view therefore is to maximise socialisation, suppress our private greed and progressively diminish the sphere of private ownership and bring it down to its absolute minimum level. In the words of Mr. Wells, "the extension of one's personality to things outside oneself is indeed as natural and instinctive a thing as eating. But because the liver is necessary and inevitable, there is no reason why it should be enlarged to uncomfortable proportions, because eating is an un conquerable instinct there is no excuse for repulsion." But however we may reduce the sphere of private ownership the existence of the irreducible residue has got to be admitted.

The state-socialist does not like Proudhan, consider all private property as robbery. He preserves all that class of private property which is an "enlargement of personality" such as proprietary rights over one's person, clothes, personal tools, books and objects of aesthetic and emotional satisfaction. What he seeks to destroy is that class of proprietary rights which gives the individual power over the food and need of his fellow creatures, a power which can frustrate the realisation of the best selves of other individuals who do not have that power. He endeavours therefore to destroy the claim of the landlord, the usurer, the forestaller, the gambling speculator, monopolizer, etc. He socializes the means of large-scale production. He denies private ownership of great enterprises. Interested persons may be allowed to invest their surplus in those enterprises as shareholders but the control is to be vested in the State. The State is to be the sole banker, the sole landlord and the sole insurance office. This however is not the same thing as to abolish proprietary rights in big enterprise. By socialisation simply the centre of ownership is shifted from the individual to the State. Private property is replaced by public property; property is not abolished. Within the ambit of the State, it cannot be abolished.


The Early Buddhist Councils and the Various Buddhist Sects

It is impossible to explain the origin of the various sects of the Buddhist Sangha without first giving an account of the early councils of the community. Accounts of the first three councils as related in the Pali sources are well known to the Southern Buddhists; but the accounts that appear in the records of the Northern Buddhists are not so accessible to us. Therefore, here I intend to give both the accounts side by side that the reader may easily find out what differences there are. The Northern account I take from "The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet," compiled in the 14th century by a Tibetan Pandit named Bu-ston, which was translated into English by Dr. E. Obermiller in 1931. Dr. T. Stcherbatsky, the famous Russian scholar who writes an introduction to this work, says: "No one is better qualified for such a task than Budon, for he was one of the redactors of the Kanjur and Tanjur collections in their final form." For the Southern Record I generally follow the Mahāvamsa. Here I use the abbreviations S.R. for the Southern Record and N.R. for the Northern.

The First Council.

S. R.

Seven hundred thousand bhikkhus were assembled at the funeral of the Buddha; the Elder Mahākāśyapa was the saṅghathāthāra of that congregation. When he had performed all rites due to the dead body of the Master and the bodily relics, the great Elder, thinking of the evil words of the aged Subhadda, selected 500 eminent bhikkhus to make a compilation of the holy Dhamma. But there was one less than 500 because of the theran Ānanda, and it was not possible without him.

N. R.

After the monuments harbouring the relics of the Buddha had thus been erected, the gods began to show their contempt towards the Doctrine, saying: "The word of the Teacher is dispersing like smoke. The monks who possessed authority and power have likewise passed away. Therefore the 3 Codes of Scripture will never come to be expounded." In order to put an end to this manifestation of contempt, Mahākāśyapa resolved to call a council of the clergy and bade Pūrṇa to compile the monies and seven in homage of the relics—they passed the following resolution: "Spending the rainy season in Rājagaha we will make a compilation of the Dhamma; no other monks must be permitted to dwell there."

In the bright half of the month of Asāḷha the elders went to Rājagaha and during the first of the rainy months they busied themselves with repairing all the vihāras there. When this was finished they said to the king: "Now we will hold the council." To the question "What should be done?" they answered: "A place should be prepared for the meetings." He with all speed had a splendid hall built by the side of the Vełhāra Rock by the entrance of the Sattapannā grotto.

When the king informed the elders that his work was finished they addressed Ānanda: "To-morrow the assembly comes together; it behoves thee not to take part in it since thou art still preparing for the highest stage. Thus spurred the theragāthā put forth due effort and reached the state of an arahant without being confined to anyone of the four postures. (He became an arahant at the moment when he was on the point of lying down).

When these elders had spent half a month—seven days in funeral ceremonies and seven in homage of the relics—they passed the following resolution: "Spending the rainy season in Rājagaha we will make a compilation of the Dhamma; no other monks must be permitted to dwell there."

Then they sent away the monks who were still under discipline and appointed Ānanda as their verger. Ānanda with the congregation passed through many a country district while travelling towards Magadha. But Mahākāśyapa went straight to Rājagaha and was seen by Ajātaśatru. Kāśyapa told the king that they desired to discuss about the Doctrine in that godly place. The king saying "I shall provide all that is necessary," ordered the preparation of the seats, couches, and other requisites in the hollow of a Nyagrodha tree. The summer fast was then proclaimed.

N.R. has understood sattapannāgūha as a hollow of a certain tree. Sattapannā is defined as a name of a tree. Sattapannā is the Pali-English Dictionary of the P.T.S. only states that it is a name of a tree. In Sinhalese we call it ශාතපන්න. If it was a Nyagrodha (⸻banyan) tree as N.R. names it, a big banyan tree might hold such an assembly under its widespread branches. Such a vast banyan tree exists even now within the premises of the Head Quarters of the Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras.

1. Published by the "Institut für Buddhismus-Kunde" and printed in Heidelberg.
2. "Budon" is to be pronounced as "Budon."
3. "The translation of the Scriptures known as the Kanjur in 100 or 108 volumes was completed between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. There is also a collection of commentaries and secular works known as Tanjur." History of Buddhist Thought, p. 449.
On the second day of the second month of the rainy season the bhikkhus met together in that splendid hall. Leaving a fitting place vacant for Ananda the Elders seated themselves on the seats, according to their rank. Ananda at once appeared on the seat appropriated for him, rising out of the ground or passing through the air.  

Together the theras chose the Elder Upāli to speak on the Vinaya, for the rest of the Dhamma they chose Ananda. Mahākassapa took upon himself the task of asking questions touching the Vinaya and the Elder Upāli was ready to explain them. Sitting in the Elder's chair, the former asked the latter the questions and Upāli, seated in the preacher's chair, expounded the matter. As this best master of the Vinaya expounded each clause in turn all the bhikkhus repeated the same after him.  

Then the Elder Mahākassapa taking the task upon himself questioned Ananda concerning the Dhamma. And all the theras repeated the same in turn after the sage of the Videha country.

First of all there was a discussion about the rehearsal of the Sūtras. Kāśyapa asked Ananda whether he had energy enough and bade him to compile the Sūtras on the basis of the resolution of the Congregation. Thereafter the 500 Arhats spread their religious garments on the seat supported by lions on which Ananda seated himself. Thereupon Ananda recollected all the teachings he was to compile and began: "This is what I have once heard: The Lord was abiding in Benares, in Rshipatana, in the Grove of Antilopes. Then the Lord addressed the 5 monks as follows: O brethren, this is the doctrine that has not been heard before . . . and so on.

Thereafter the Arhats asked Ananda: "Is this the Word of the Buddha that is acknowledged by thee?" "It is the Word acknowledged by all of us," replied Ananda. This and the following Ananda repeated, and 499 Arhats established that which he had said as the canonical text.

Thereupon Upāli was asked whether he had sufficient energy and was then ordered to rehearse the Vinaya. After Upāli had been seated on the preacher's seat Kāśyapa asked: "Where did the Lord lay the first foundation of Discipline?" "At Benares." "For whose sake?" "For the five monks. He has ordered them to wear the lower garment in a circular form."

In such a way the Vinaya was rehearsed and after that Upāli descended from his seat. Then Mahākāśyapa, in order to rehearse the Abhidharma, followed the procedure of vote and resolution. He said: "Of the Abhidharma I shall speak myself."

As the 500 Arhats thus rehearsed the 3 Codes of Scripture, the 500 monks received the name of the "Great Compilers."
The Second Council.

S. R

At the end of the tenth year of Kāśyapa's reign a century had gone by since the parinibbāna of the Buddha. At that time in Vesālī many bhikkhus of the Vajji-clan accepted the following ten points as lawful: (1) The custom of putting salt in a horn vessel, in order to season unsalted food, when received; (2) The custom of taking the mid-day meal, even after the prescribed time, as long as the shadow had not passed the meridian by more than two-fingers' breadth; (3) The custom of going into a village after the meal, and there eating again, if invited; (4) Holding the uposatha feast separately by bhikkhus dwelling in the same district; (5) The carrying out of official acts by bhikkhus dwelling in the same district; (6) Exclamations of astonishment like “ aho;” (7) Exclamations of rejoicing; (8) Using the sacred salt; (9) The monks having gone a yojana or a half of such, assemble and eat, with the pretext that they are travelling; (10) Abstaining from the use of precedents as authority.

N. R

One hundred and ten years after the Teacher had passed away, the monks abiding in Vesālī were indulging in prohibited actions of which there were ten kinds:—(1) Exclamations of astonishment like “ aho;” (2) Exclamations of rejoicing; (3) Using the sacred salt; (4) The monks having gone a yojana or a half of such, assemble and eat, with the pretext that they are travelling; (5) The food which has not been left from a previous meal they eat, taking it with two fingers; (6) The monks take wine in the manner of a leech that sucks blood and, having drunk, excuse it with illness; (7) The monks mix a droma measure of milk with as much sour milk and eat it at undue time, considering this to be admissible; (8) It is considered admissible to live by agriculture (by digging the ground); (9) The monks begin to use a carpet without patching it with a piece from the old one; (10) Gold and silver (coins) might be drunk.

9. These two lists of the ten points differ very much in their contents. Mr. Nanināka Datta, in his “Early History of the Spread of Buddhism,” (p. 226), has defined these according to the S. R. in a different way, which I reproduce here for more clear understanding of the points:

(1) Singisakappa—or the practice of carrying salt in a horn for use when needed, which contravened according to one view the rule against the storing of articles of food (Pācittiya 38).
(2) Dvāngukappam—or the practice of taking food after midday, lit. when the shadow of the dial is two digits wide (Pāc. 37).
(3) Gāmanarakappam—or the practice of going to a neighbouring village and taking a second meal there the same day, committing thereby the offence of over-eating (Pāc. 35).
(4) Avakappam—or the observance of uposathas in different places within the same parish. (MV. ii, 8, 3).
(5) Anumatiyakappam—or doing an act and obtaining sanction for it afterwards. (MV. ix, 3, 5).
(6) Aṇipakappam—or the use of precedents as authority.
(7) Amahikappam—or the drinking of milk-whey after meal. (Pāc. 35).
(8) Jālojīyam—or drinking of fermenting palm-juice which is not yet toddy. (Pāc. 51).
(9) Adaṭṭham nisṭhānām—or the use of a borderless sheet to sit on. (Pāc. 89).
(10) Šaripasojīyam—or the acceptance of gold and silver. (Nissaggiya 18).

The Early Buddhist Councils

When this came to the ears of the Elder Yasa, the son of Kāṇḍa, who was wandering about in the Vajji country, he betook himself to the Mahāvāna vilāra with the resolve to settle the matter. In the uposatha-hall those monks had placed a vessel made of metal and filled with water, and had said to the lay-folk: “Bestow on the brotherhood kārapha and let them be given the permission of pardon from lay-folk. He asked for one to bear him company and went with him into the city and proclaimed to the citizens that his own saying was according to the Dhamma.

When the bhikkhus heard what Yasa's companion had to tell, they came to excommunicate him and surrounded the thera's cell. He left it, rising up and passing through the

At that time an Arhat named Sarvakāmin was residing at Vesālī. And from the city called Dhaniya there came an Arhat called Yaśas, with 500 adherents, who had made a turn through the country. Having arrived at Vesālī, they found that the monks had a large income, and they themselves obtained a great share. Having asked the reason for this, they came to know that 10 prohibited points were admitted. Accordingly, they went to Sarvakāmin and asked him whether these ten points are admissible. The Elder gave a negative answer and said to Yaśas: "Go thou and find such as would be of accord with thee, and I will be thy friend according to the Doctrine." Yaśas accordingly departed and spoke as he had before to Śālī from the city of Śaṅkā, to Dhaniya from Saṅkāsa, to Kubjita of Pāṭaliputra, to Ajita of Śrūgna, to
air, and halting at Kosambi, he forthwith sent messengers to the bhikkhus of Pava and Avanti; he himself went to the Ahoganga-mountain and related all to the Elder Sambhûta Śaṇavasī. Sixty great theras from Pava and eighty from Avanti came together on the Ahoganga. The bhikkhus who met together here from this and that region were in all ninety thousand. When they had all conferred together, knowing that the deeply learned theri Revata of Soreyya was the chief among them at that time, went thence to seek him out. They met him at Sahajati; there the Elder Yasa questioned him. Thus the deeply learned thera Revata of Sahaja. Thereafter the brotherhood came together under the Elder Revata, to bring the dispute to a peaceful end. But the Elder would not end the dispute save in the presence of those with whom it had begun; therefore all the bhikkhus went thence to Vesali.

Thereafter the monks of Vaisālī asked the pupils of Yasa: Whither has your teacher gone? He is seeking for those who will aid him in executing the act of your excommunication. The monks of Vaisālī became afraid and tried to bribe the pupils of Yasa, by presenting to them robes, etc. The Elder Yasa, having finished his search, returned to Vaisālī and struck the wooden gong. Hearing the sound of the gong 700 Arhats, all of them pupils of Ānanda, assembled. Then Yasa, addressing the Elders, began: "O venerable sirs, is the licence of shouting 'aha!' admissible?" Thus spoke he and further on as before, without mentioning names, that such and such monks were doing the prohibited actions. "Such a conduct is to be condemned by us." In this manner he discussed the 10 inadmissible points in detail, and the other Elders gave their approval. Then they went out and beat the wooden gong, causing the monks of Vaisālī to assemble. The Elders now called out the names of those who committed the transgressions, viz. the monks of Vaisālī, spoke of the 10 inadmissible points at full length and said: "These are to be excommunicated by all of us." And, for speaking thus, the 700 Arhats became known as "those who made the correct resolution."

Thus the second rehearsal was carried out by the 700 Arhats. The aim of it was the exclusion of the 10 inadmissible points. The time was 110 years after the Teacher had passed away. The place was the monastery of Kusmapura at Vaisālī, and the alms-giver of the monks was the pious king Asoka.

The First Schism.

After the second council the monks, who accepted the Ten Points as admissible, convened another council of their own and made a different rehearsal of the Dhamma and Vinaya. As their number was greater than that of the conservative Theras, they called their council Mahāsaṅghikā = the Great Council, and their community Mahāsaṅghikā = that which has a great number of followers. Here I quote a passage from Mr. Narainasha Datta's work, which explains the attitude of the Mahāsaṅghikas:

The Early Buddhist Councils

1. Huen Tsiang states in his travels that he saw the stūpa built at the spot where this second convocation was held, and gives a short account of that council. He gives the name Yasada instead of Yasa or Yasas of our records. Records of the Western World.

10. The Cullavagga, Samantapāsādikā, and Mahāvamsa agree in giving the name of the place as Vālukārāma: The N.R. states it as Kusmapura vihāra, while Dīpavamsa states that it took place in the Kiniṣṇu vihāra. Hall: "Kīrītārāma eva Vesāliyaṃ puruttame aṭṭhamasēhi niṭṭhasi dutiyo saṅgho ayaṁ." Dīp. V. p. 68.

11. The Cullavagga, Samantapāsādikā, and Mahāvamsa agree in giving the name of the place as Vālukārāma: The N.R. states it as Kusmapura vihāra, while Dīpavamsa states that it took place in the Kiniṣṇu vihāra. Hall: "Kīrītārāma eva Vesāliyaṃ puruttame aṭṭhamasēhi niṭṭhasi dutiyo saṅgho ayaṁ." Dīp. V. p. 68.

The principal objective of Mahāsāṅghikas in seceding from the main body of orthodox Buddhists becomes apparent to us by a glance at the subject matter of the rules regarding which they differed and the doctrines which they turned to profess. To put it in a nutshell, they wanted to have an amount of latitude and freedom regarding certain of their actions which the strictness and narrowness of orthodoxy was not ready to allow, and to carry into their organization and general governance a democratic spirit which at no time appeared to them an unreasoning servility to the monastic authorities, which could not be supported in a reasonable management of the monasteries. The exclusive power and privileges which by lapse of time the arahats came to claim upon by the Mahāsāṅghikas as a reappearance in a different garb of selfish exclusiveness of the brāhmaṇas against which the rise of Buddhism was, as it were, a revolt.

The S.R. gives only these ten points as the cause of dissension of the Mahāsāṅghikas; but some Northern Records state that some views of an Elder named Mahādeva originated this discord. In this connection Mr. Nalinaksha Datta states in the same book (p. 228), “This work attributes a few differences in tenets to the Mahāsāṅghika school. Bhavya, Vasumitra, Viṅādeva and Tārānātha trace the origin of this school in Mahādeva’s five articles of faith, which were:

1. An arahat may commit a sin under unconscious temptation. 2. An arahat may have doubts on matters of doctrine. 3. One may be an arahat and not know it. 4. One cannot attain arahatship without the aid of a teacher. 5. ‘The noble ways’ may begin with a shout, that is, one meditating seriously on religion may make an exclamation as ‘How sad!’ and by so doing attain progress towards perfection.”

Of this Mahādeva a statement is found in the Records of Hiuen Tsang (Part I, p. 150): “In the hundredth year after the Nirvāṇa of Tathāgata, Asoka, king of Magadhā, extended his power over the world... At this time there were 500 Arahats and 500 schismatical priests, whom the king honoured and patronised without any difference. Among the latter was a priest called Mahādeva, a man of deep learning and rare ability; in his retirement he sought for himself the expense of the bhikkhus of lower order were looked upon by the Mahāsāṅghikas as a reappearance in a different garb of the selfish exclusiveness of the brāhmaṇas against which the rise of Buddhism was, as it were, a revolt.”

Here the words “schismatical priests” indicate that there was some discord then existing among these parties. Therefore it is not wise to take these views of Mahādeva as a cause of dissension between the Theravādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas. Dr. R. Kimura states that these views of Mahādeva caused a division among Mahāsāṅghikas themselves; his statement is: “During two hundred years after Buddha’s Mahāparinirvāṇa, three schools sprang up from Mahāsāṅghika, namely:—(i) Ekavyavahārīka, (ii) Lokottaravāda, (iii) Kaukkuṭika. And the cause of this separation was at first, Mahādeva, the leader of the Mahāsāṅghikas who dwell in Ángottara country in the north of Rājagṛha. There he preached the doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, etc. At that time two parties seceded from the main Mahāsāṅghika school on account of Mahādeva’s preaching. Because some of them believed in that doctrine, they together formed one party; while others did not agree and they made up another party.” Dr. Kimura is quoting this from Paramārtha’s commentary on the Nikāyavālamabha-dīśa of Vasumitra, and he says as the original commentary has been lost he culled this statement from a quotation in San-ron-gen-gi, a Chinese treatise.

During the first century of the Buddhist Era there arose 5 different sects from the Mahāsāṅghikas, and eleven more from the Theravādins. The Mahāvanisa describes the origination of these sects as follows: The heretical bhikkhus, subdued by the Elders who had held the Second Council, in all ten thousand, founded the school which bears the name Mahāsāṅghika. From this arose Gokulika and Ekyavahārīka schools. From the Gokulika arose Pammāttvāda sect and the Bāhussutika or Bāhulika sect; from these the Cetiya sect. Thus there are six, with the Mahāsāṅghikas.

At first Mahīśāsakas and Vacchipputtakas parted from the Theravādins. From the Vacchipputtakas there arose Dhammattarīyas, Bhadrayānikas, and the people of the Vatsa country are called Vamsas.

13. i.e., Kathāvatthu of Abhidhamma-piṭaka.

14. Here we have a curious statement that Asokarāja summoned a council of monks, intending to drown them. No other record, Southern or Northern, confirms this statement. For Hiuen Tsang there was only one Asoka who has reigned after 100 years from the Buddha’s parinibbāna. He does not know about two Asokas, viz. Kālāskak and Dharmāsoka. This case is common to many other Northern Records.

15. Almost all of the Southern Records have the word as Vajjiputtakas; but this is confusing with the Vajjiputtakas of the Second Council who were the founders of the Mahāsāṅghika School. The Northern Records have the word Viḷāsuttipāta, meaning thereby the monks of the Vatsa country (of which Kosamī was the capital). In Pali the people of the Vatsa country are called Viḷāsas. No derivative is found from this word; therefore I like to derive ‘Vaccipputtīya’ as the counterpart of the Sanskrit Viḷāsputriya.’

In this connection Mrs. Rhys Davids states, in her Prelatory Notes on the “Points of Controversy,” as follows: “The case of the Vajjiputtakas, Vajjiputtīyas, Viḷāsuttipāta may possibly be somewhat analogous. The ‘Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus’, as we know from the
which means "existing in six towns" or "the Six-Towners," as Mrs. Rhys Davids renders it in her Introduction to the Six-Towners. As such, nothing whatever is recorded of them in other documents.

In theSanskrit accounts, as translated, the original move byVajjiputtakas has been lost sight of, and, as with the term Vibhajjavadin, Vatsiputryas figure as an offshoot of the original Theravādins these make their number 12. These 12 and the former six schools make it 18.

Table for the first and second centuries of Buddhist Era.

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The Third Council.

One and united was the community of the Buddhist monks in the first hundred years after the death of the Buddha. During the second century there arose 18 schools. When, in the third century B.C.E., Emperor Asoka supported the fraternity with every possible help, many heretics entered the Sangha. This word has many different readings: Geiger's Mahavamsa, both the text and the English version, gives it as Chandrāṅgika; the Nikayasangraha, both the text and the English version, has Chanaṅgika. The Northern Tradition has Chanaṅgika; the Southern tradition has Candragoña. For this reason that Arhats and ordinary monks, caused a great disturbance within the community. Asoka came to the throne in 218 B.C.E.

The account of this third rehearsal is not to be found in the Vinaya and therefore we meet here and there with disagreeing points. According to some, 137 years after the Teacher had passed away, at the time when the kings Nanda and Mahāpadma were reigning, and when the elders Mahākāyapa, Uttara and others were residing at Pātaliputra, Māra, the Evil One, having assumed the form of a monk named Bhadra, showed many miraculous apparitions, sowed disunion amongst the clergy and brought confusion into the teaching. At that time, when the elders Nāgasena and Manojñi were living, the clergy became split into various sects. In the 63rd year after this division had taken place, the Teaching was rehearsed by the elder Vatsiputra.

According to others, 160 years after the Teacher had passed away, at the time when king Asoka began to reign in the city called Kusumavistara, the Arhats were reading the word of the Buddha in 4 different languages, viz. Sanskrit, Prākrit, Apabhraṃsā, and Pāśācāka. Accordingly, the pupils of the different Arhats formed separate fractions, and this gave origin to the division into the 18 sects.

In the philosophical views of the different sects there were many conflicting points which brought confusion into the Church. It was for this reason that Arhats and ordinary...
the various monasteries, where taking up their abode they would introduce themselves into the assembly of monks who were performing the uposatha-rites. As a result, it came about that there was no performance of the uposatha-rites for a whole period of seven years.

The great King Dharmāsoka, having heard of this state of things, went to the great Elder Moggaliputta-Tissa, and staying in his monastery for seven days and learning all the differences of religious doctrine, caused all the monks of Jambudīpa to be summoned and to assemble at the monastery of Asokārāma, in Pātaliputra. And making those who entertained similar beliefs stand separately in groups, and ascertaining the differences of the beliefs, he purified the religion by expelling from it about sixty thousand crafty monks. He then set guards all round the monastery and caused the pious monks who had assembled there, to hold under the presidency of the Elder Moggaliputta-Tissa the third rehearsal of the Dhamma, which was concluded in nine months.

learned monks, having assembled in the monastery of Jalandhara, rehearsed the Scriptures for a third time. This took place 300 years after the Teacher had passed away.

The following prophecy is found in the Karuṇāpūpaṅka-sūtra:—"One hundred years after I have passed away, there will appear in Pātaliputra a king named Asoka of Maurya dynasty. This king will institute the worship of 84,000 monuments containing my relics in a single day." And in the Prabhāvatīśūtra it is said:—"Thereafter king Dharmāsoka died, and the Arhats, in order to put an end to the practice of reciting the Scriptures in Pārśkīt, Aparahānṣa and in a dialect of intermediate character, gradually rehearsed the canonical texts according to other methods. These new texts were like the sūtras which were compiled in Sanskrit. Thereafter the Teaching assumed 18 different forms. Others speak about the 3rd council as follows:—The aim of it was to clear the doubts of the 18 sects as regards the spurious texts of scripture. The time was 300 years after the Teacher had passed away. The place was the country of Kashmir and the monastery of Kūvana, and the alms-giver was Kanishka, the king of Jalandhara. The members of the council were 300 Arhats with Pūrṇika at their head, 500 Bodhisatvas, Vasmātra and others, and 250 or 10,000 ordinary Pandits. After a recitation of the texts which had been made, it was settled, that the texts acknowledged by the 18 sects were all of them the Word of the Buddha.
intervals of duty he frequently consulted the sacred books of the Buddha; daily he invited a priest to enter his palace and preach the Law; but he found the different views of the schools so contradictory that he was filled with doubt. At this time the venerable Pārśva said: "Since Tathāgata left the world many years and months have elapsed. The different schools hold to the treatises of their several masters." Having heard this, the king was deeply affected and after a while he said to Pārśva: "I will arrange the teaching of the three Pitakas of the Buddha according to the various schools. The king then summoned from far and near a holy assembly. For this they came from the four quarters. Being thus assembled, for seven days offerings of the four necessary things were made, after which, as the king desired that there should be an arrangement of the Law, and as he feared the clamour of such a mixed assembly, he said, with affection for the monks: "Let those who have obtained the holy fruit remain, but those who are still bound by worldly influences, let them go...." There remained 499 men. Then the king desired to go to his own country, as he suffered from the heat and moisture of this country.... The honourable Pārśva and others then counselled him, saying: "We cannot go there, because there are many heretical teachers there. The mind of the assembly is well affected towards this country; the land is guarded on every side by mountains, and is well provided with food."

The Elder Vasumitra was the most learned person among these hosts of monks, but as he was not an Arhat the holy men were not willing to admit him to the Council. Vasumitra informed the assembly that he did not care for Arhatship but for Buddhahood. After a long discussion, however, the Arhats allowed him to enter the Council. Vasumitra informed the assembly that he did not care for Arhatship but for Buddhahood. After a long discussion, however, the Arhats allowed him to enter the Council, and at last he was chosen as their president. These 500 sages first composed Upadesā Sūtra to explain the Sūtra Pitaka. Next they made the Vinaya Pitaka to explain the Vinaya Pitaka, and the Abhidhamma Pitaka on Abhidharma Pitaka. Altogether they composed thirty myriad of verses in six hundred and sixty myriad of words, which thoroughly explained the three Pitakas.

Kanishka forthwith ordered these discourses to be engraved on sheets of red copper. He enclosed them in a stone receptacle and having sealed this, he raised over it a Śāstra, with the Scriptures in the middle. He commanded the Yakṣas to defend the approaches to the kingdom, so as not to permit the other sects to get these śūstras and take them away.

Different tenets of the various schools, their location, etc., will be discussed in the next portion of this article.

A. P. BUDDHADATTA

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**The Abhidhamma Psychology of Perception and the Yogācāra Theory of Mind.**

The theory of perception laid down in the Abhidhamma of the early scholastic period, mainly the Visuddhi Magga, the Commentary to the Vibhanga, and the Atthasālini, emerges quite suddenly in a highly elaborated form, with a technical jargon of its own, in such a manner as to presuppose a fairly long period of development. It is a theory that has no parallel in any of the other Abhidharma literatures to which we have access through Sanskrit sources, and in the absence of any first-hand knowledge of the old Sinhalese commentaries, to which the Pali Abhidhamma books often refer, we cannot say to what extent the theories presented in the Pali books were a re-statement of the theories that had been independently developing in the Ceylon schools. Only in a very few instances do the scholiasts who came from India and wrote the Abhidhamma in Pali (as they claim to have done,) distinguish between the old Atthakathā doctrines and their own theories. One such instance is the theory of sampattatagocara and asampattatagocara which the author of the Atthasālini says is different from the view held by the Teachers of old (Porāṇas). He further explains in detail how the two theories differ from each other. In this particular case we are fortunate, for we know that this theory was held by other schools of Indian Buddhism under the designation of the doctrine of praṇāyākāri and aprāṇāyākāri, and we can therefore surmise that it was introduced into the Pali Abhidhamma by the commentators who came from India and were familiar with the Indian doctrines. Certain feats of hair-splitting are attributed to particular scholiasts who are referred to by name in the commentaries, and these, no doubt, were leaders of schools in Ceylon. Apart from this, the main body of Abhidhamma doctrines remains anonymous, and we unable to say to what extent Buddhaghosa and his line of commentators were original thinkers or mere translators, or to what extent

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1. We have considered these three works as belonging to an earlier period than for example, the Abhidhammatthasangaha together with its Sinhalese paraphrase and the Vibhavaṇī śāstra of Sumangala. Of these, too, the Atthasālini is probably later than the Visuddhi Magga and Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā (see introduction by Bapat and Vadekar in the Bhandarkar Oriental Series). This chronology suggests itself to us from an examination of the doctrinal matters presented in the three works, the details of which cannot be gone into here.


4. For example, Tipiṭaka Cūḷadvatī Thera, Moravāpyāḍā Mahādatta, Mahāśīva, Tipiṭaka Mahādhammarakkhita Thera and several others who are mentioned in the commentaries.
they introduced into the Pali Abhidhamma theories they were familiar with from other systems of Indian philosophy.

In the case of the peculiar and highly fascinating theory of perception of the Abhidhamma, which we have stated above, appears suddenly in front of us in full dress, there is strong reason to suspect that it is a deliberate modification of a doctrine expounded in a school of Buddhism whose ideology was strange to say, fundamentally opposed to that of Theravada Buddhism. The Yogacara theory of mind presents such close similarities to the theory of perception laid down in the Abhidhamma, that if we ignore for a moment its idealistic implications, we cannot resist the conclusion that it must have had some direct influence on the formulation of the Abhidhamma theory. And a closer examination would reveal to us how the Yogacara theory has been modified in order to suit the ideology of the Theravada Abhidhamma. In fact, much of what appears to be of a purely speculative and highly arbitrary nature in the Abhidhamma theory, is explained when viewed in the light of the Yogacara theory. So that the most likely conclusion would be that one of the scholiasts who came from India had a knowledge of the Yogacara theory, and framed the Abhidhamma theory in the form in which we have it now, on the lines of the Yogacara theory, modifying it in such a way as to do away with its idealistic implications. Perhaps we shall not be very wrong if we attribute its authorship to that nebulous personage known as Buddhaghosa.

The Yogacara philosophy distinguishes between mind in its pure state and mind when it is evolving. Mind evolves through sense-perception, and in the process of evolution it is said to become polluted. In this sense, the Alaya has been contaminated by external impurities (agantukaklesa) assailed by all kinds of philosophising (vitarakadasana) based on the discrimination of subject and object.—Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, p. 185, 186. See Lankavatara Sutra, Ed. Bunyiu Nanjio: mahamate ayaI!1 tathagatagarbhalaya-p.

As to whether it was individual memory or a sort of cosmic memory does not seem very clear, though it seems to have been looked upon in both ways. "When the Sutra says that in the Alaya is found all that has been going on since beginningless time systematically stored up as a kind of seed, this does not refer to individual experiences, but to something general, beyond the individual, making up in a way the background on which all individual psychic activities are reflected."—Suzuki, Studies, p. 184. Elsewhere Suzuki says: "According to the Yogacara school, the Alaya is not an universal, but an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the germs of all things exist in their ideality."—Outlines of Mahayana, p. 66.

The Sautrantika, too, distinguishes between prayritivijñana and alayavijñana, but since the evidence we have for their view is late, we cannot say whether they originated the theory or borrowed it.

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as the alaya was held to be, but certain similes brought to illustrate the nature of bhavanga contain, if not implications, certainly reminiscences of such a view. Nowhere in the Abhidhamma is bhavanga regarded, however, as a "repository of all kinds of karmaseeds, good as well as bad." The striking similarity between the two theories lies in the manner in which the alayavijnana is described as evolving into the modes of empirical consciousness, known as prayritivijñana, which word itself is reminiscent of the Abhidhamma word pavatti (e.g. visaya pavatti) often used in reference to a mental process. The evolution of the alaya is the result of ignorance, and itself is the cause of endless transmigrations, in the same way as the Abhidhamma regards the continuum of thoughts and bhavangs as the cause of the round of rebirths.

"When the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidyā), the waves of mentality (vijñāna) make their appearance." This vijñana or sense-activity has the function of grasping objects with the help of the sense-organs. It becomes attached to them in the belief that the external world is real. The external world is, for the Yogacara, a creation of the mind, and it springs from a false distinction between subject and object, a distinction that in the very nature of sense-perception is made.

This sense-perception, which leads to a falsification of reality, brings consciousness out of its natural state (prakṛtivasubhāva) and projects an external world of plurality: and it has been the misfortune of mortals, from time immemorial, to regard this illusion as real.13

8. Ibid., p. 179, 180. Alayavijñana is memory, which bhavanga definitely is not. As to whether it was individual memory or a sort of cosmic memory does not seem very clear, though it seems to have been looked upon in both ways. "When the Sutra says that in the Alaya is found all that has been going on since beginningless time systematically stored up as a kind of seed, this does not refer to individual experiences, but to something general, beyond the individual, making up in a way the background on which all individual psychic activities are reflected."—Suzuki, Studies, p. 184. Elsewhere Suzuki says: "According to the Yogacara school, the Alaya is not an universal, but an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the germs of all things exist in their ideality."—Outlines of Mahayana, p. 66.

9. The Sautrantika, too, distinguishes between prayritivijñana and alayavijñana, but since the evidence we have for their view is late, we cannot say whether they originated the theory or borrowed it.


12. Lankā, p. 68.
13. Ibid, p. 44.
The Abhidhamma, of course, has none of the idealistic implications of the Yogācāra theory, but regarding the actual mechanism of consciousness the two theories have very much in common with each other. The similes used by the two schools in illustration of their views bring out several points of contact between the two theories, and also help to show the points on which they differ. The alayavijñāna is often compared to an ocean from which waves arise when a wind stirs it. Similarly, conscious processes or processes of sense-perception arise in the alayavijñāna when it is disturbed by an object or by the external world (viṣaya).

Suzuki quotes the following verse from the Chinese version of Lankāvatāra Sūtra:

Like unto ocean waves Which by a raging storm maddened Against the rugged precipice strike Without interruption; Even so in the Alaya-sea Stirred by the objectivity-wind All kinds of mental waves Arise a-dancing, a-rolling.

The Yogācāra thus, distinguishes between a sort of subconscious mind and a mind in a state of active cognition, just as the Abhidhamma distinguishes between bhavanga or vīthimitta and vīdhicitta or process-consciousness caused by sense-perception. Just as the alaya is compared to an ocean, the flow of bhavangacittas is compared to a stream, and it is a disturbance that gives rise to sense-perception in both theories. The arising of mental activity in the Yogācāra view is due to the projection by the mind of a visible world, a world of form, which causes a disturbance in the uninterrupted continuity of the alaya. But the functioning consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñāna) is regarded as a manifestation of the alaya-sea and this is not accepted by the Theravādins. Further, the Yogācāra view seems to imply that the subconscious alaya remains all the while as a sub-plane even when perceptual processes function. Aśvaghosa says: “This (i.e. the process of evolution of consciousness) may be illustrated by (the simile of) the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be identical to sense-perception in both theories. The arising of mental activity in the Yogācāra view is due to the projection by the mind of a visible world, a world of form, which causes a disturbance in the uninterrupted continuity of the alaya.” But these do not necessarily imply that bhavanga was understood as existing as an under-current all the while. But the later Abhidhamma was quite definite on the matter. They contrasted the passive and the active aspects of mind rather sharply, and postulated a cutting off of bhavanga at a stage when conscious processes begin to arise.

The Yogācāra, in regarding the alayavijñāna as a sub-plane of activity, came very near to substituting by it the notion of a soul which Buddhism was fighting hard against. Radhakrishnan writes: “It is the need for a permanent consciousness, which is capable of impressions and preserving the viśānas, that makes the Yogācāras look upon alaya as a permanent entity, yet they are obliged by their Buddhist presuppositions to look upon it as ever changing.” Though they used the similes of ocean (alayavijñāna) and flood (alayaugha), and sometimes even that of a stream in very much the same language that the Pāli scholiasts use,18 they regarded the alaya all (in one sense) and not identical (in the other sense) with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases, the motion of the waves subsides; but the water remains the same.”

14. Outlines, p. 130, from the Chinese of Sīkṣānanda. The verses in the Sanskrit version of Lankā are as follows: Taranā hyadadher vadyav patanapravrttyeritaṃ nityamāṇāṃ pravartante vyucchedaṃ ca na viññate, alayaughas tattā nityāṃ viṣayapavaranitaṃ citraṃ tarana-vijñānaṅnair nityamāṇāṃ pravartante, p. 46.
15. Sāvyādā kārāṇaṃ treṣṭān citraṇāṃ sampravartikām antarā kīm avastāḥ ‘sau yadh vṛppam na jāyate. Samaṇantarapradhānām citraṃ anyat pravartate; vṛppam na tiṣṭhate kāle kim alambya pravartate?—Lankā, p. 238, 239.
16. Ibid. p. 258.
17. Awakening, p. 67.
19. E.g. bhavangavātthīnaṃ vicchinditvā (VbhA 153); bhavaṅgaṃ vicchinditvā (AtthaS, para. 222), and bhavanga-vicchinn. (Vis. Magga 460).
21. Ibid. p. 126, 676.
22. AtthaS para 558, VbhA, 156.
24. Suzuki quotes the following verse from the Chinese Sandhi-Nirvācana Sūtra:—

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The Adāna-vijñāna (i.e. alaya) is deep and subtle, Where all the seeds are evolved like a stream:—

Where they are apt to imagine it an ego-substance.—Studies, 258.

126, 676.
21. Ibid. p. 126, 676.
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The Adāna-vijñāna (i.e. alaya) is deep and subtle, Where all the seeds are evolved like a stream:—

Where they are apt to imagine it an ego-substance.—Studies, 258.
the while as a principle of consciousness over and above the Skandhas, 'pure
consciousness,' more or less. From the Theravada point of view this was
a heresy, for the early Pali literature stresses the fact that consciousness always
originated from causes (pāṭiccasamuppànama).25 Suzuki, too, draws attention
to the similarity of the Yogācāra view to the heresy of an ego-substance.

"The main idea is that there is a principle of consciousness from which the
whole viññāna system evolves and is set in operation, but which is not to be
regarded as something residing in the five skandhas. Ordinarily this principle,
unknown, invisible, and beyond the grasp of the sense-vijñānas is taken for
an ego, and unenlightened people try to locate it in the body . . . "26 In fact,
the Bodhisatva Mahāmati asks the same question from the Buddha. What
is the difference, he asks, between the tathāgatagarbha or ālayavijñāna, and
the soul theory of heretical philosophers, for it is said of the ālaya, too, that
it is by nature resplendent (prakṛtiprabhāsvara)27 and abiding in the bodies
of all creatures, that it is eternal, unchanging, firm, and all-blessed. Heretics,
too, speak of the soul as eternal, the doer, and as all-pervading and free from
qualities.28

The Abhidhamma commentators, in order to avoid this ambiguity, made
of bhavanga a relational mode of consciousness. It was not 'pure conscious-
ness,' without an object. It functioned out of a relationship that had for its
objective factor the dying thoughts of the individual in his previous birth.
Hence bhavangacitta, like any other kind of consciousness, sprang out of the
relationship of subject and object, both of which were, in the pluralistic
philosophy of the Abhidhamma, considered as a real. According to the Yogācāra,
this relationship of duality was the work of the functioning mind, of active
consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna). For the ālaya, in its true nature, was beyond
the sphere of duality, beyond the subject-object relationship. The Lankā-
vatāra Sūtra compares the active mind to a dancer. A dancer does not dance
alone. He needs a companion. Hence the mind creates an external world,
an illusion of plurality. When this illusion is removed, the ālaya is seen in
its intrinsic nature as pure consciousness. The functioning of the mind is
then seen to be a mere illusion. From the standpoint of ultimate truth, there
is no object or appearance of object.29

Bhavanga was therefore denied the character of being a storehouse, a
genuine subconscious mind where all the traces of past actions and thoughts,
and future possibilities and latent tendencies are deposited, as the ālaya-
vijñāna was. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra defines citta as that which stores up

27. Cf. the Pali expression 'pabbasāram idam bhikkhave cittam.'
28. Lankā p. 78.
30. Studies, p. 249.
31. p. 279.
32. VbhA, p. 156.
34. Ibid, p. 102.
matter, is called the vastupratikvipaññā (object-discriminating consciousness) in contrast to the khyattvipaññā (perceiving consciousness) which latter is, in its intrinsic nature the same as ālaya, since it makes no discrimination between subject and object. The two kinds of conscious are, however, identical in their ultimate nature, and causally dependent one on the other.35

The system of vipaññas includes the five sense-perceptions and manoviññā, which latter always functions in co-operation with manas. “The function of Manoviññā is by hypothesis to reflect on Manas, as the eye-vipañña reflects on the world of forms and the ear-vipañña on that of sounds.” The evolution therefore begins with ālayavipañña and proceeds by way of manas, manoviññā, and indriyaviññā in order.

The Abhidhamma realists put the series in a reverse order. According to the Yognāra, the world was a projection of the mind. Hence to them, the world of plurality evolved from the internal unity of the ālaya. The Abhidhamma, on the other hand, took the visible world (rupa, ruparammanā) as a reality, and thought as the product of the relation between the external world and the perceiving subject. It took for granted the premise that duality was inherent in every form of sense-perception, but it did not concede to the view that this duality was an illusion. Hence the series begins with indriyaviññā. When an object enters within the field of vision, for example, there arises that aspect of mind (manodhatu) which performs the function of attending to the object. This is analogous to the position of manas in the Yognāra doctrine, which performs the function of a discriminating intelligence.36 Following on this comes sensory awareness which is the equivalent of indriyaviññā of the Yognāra. Next there follows a manodhatu performing the function of ‘receiving’ the object. And the two final stages are two classes of manoviññānadhatu, equivalent to the manoviññā of the Yognāra. Hence in the Abhidhamma we have bhavangaviññā, indriyaviññā, mano and manoviññā, corresponding to ālayavipañña, manas, manoviññā and indriyaviññā of the Yognāra.

Mutual influence seems irrefutable when we consider other points of similarity in the two theories. The Yognāras regard all the evolutes of mind (citta) as being ethically good or bad, just as the Abhidhammikas do, although in the Yognāra philosophy there is rigid classification of every form of consciousness according to its moral quality. The Yognāras further regard the process as momentary (ksanika), and we see traces of this view in the Visuddhi Magga and the earlier commentaries, and a final development of the theory in the Abhidhammatthasangaha where a thought process is divided into seventeen moments. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra says: “The eight vipaññas, Mahāmati, are good or bad. What are they? The tathāgata-garbhā known as ālayavipañña, manas, manoviññā, and the fivefold body of vipaññas described by philosophers. Now the fivefold body of vipaññas, together with manoviññā, differentiated from one another in respect of good and bad, a succession of moments proceeding in a train of unbroken continuity, move on. Moving on, they cease to exist, and being unable to understand phenomena as being only mind, immediately on the destruction of one there arises another vipañña ; and manoviññā, which is able to grasp the difference in forms and figures, proceeds along with the body of five vipaññas. It does not remain still for a moment. I call it momentary.”37

The Abhidhamma theory, even in its vocabulary (see original quoted above) seems to be an elaboration of the theory set forth here.

E. R. DE S. SARATHCHANDRA.
Certainty in History

By E. BERNHEIM. Translated by E. J. THOMAS

(Note.—Ernst Bernheim was professor of history at the University of Greifswald in Prussia, and while there published his chief work, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode (Textbook of Historical Method, with reference to the most important sources and aids to the study of history, 4th ed., Leipzig, 1903). The following consists of extracts from the chapter on Methodology. He there deals with a problem which has so far been more prominent in the West than in the East, the inquiry whether we can rely on the trustworthiness of any historical records at all. This question became prominent in the 15th century at the Revival of Learning. At that time many ancient records had been discovered, and the very wealth of the new material showed that the records were not history in the sense that they could all be taken as faithful accounts of what had happened. There were too many contradictions. Hence some scholars of the time were inclined to reject the whole, and to say, “History is only a fiction that has been agreed upon.” It is against this universal scepticism that Bernheim wrote, for naturally, as in any science, there may be doubts on particular questions. He shows how the material ought to be treated so that we can extract the main certainties from what is merely probable or possible. An example of this is in the early history of Ceylon is the story of Vijaya and his ancestors. It may not be accepted as it stands, and yet no one doubts that the Aryan invasion really took place.

E. J. THOMAS.

There are two distinct difficulties in historical method, which may occasion doubts about the possibility of being able to arrive at sure results, and which have in fact repeatedly awakened scepticism about “the certainty of history.” These doubts cannot be left unexamined, for it depends on their solution whether History can rightly be called a science, since the most essential mark of a science is that it transmits assured knowledge. The difficulties in question lie partly in the matter of history, and so are objective, and partly in our cognitive faculties, and thus are subjective. Accordingly the question is on the one hand about the objective, and on the other hand, the subjective possibility of certain knowledge from history.

1. The subjective possibility of certain historical knowledge.

We need only deal in passing with the ancient scepticism directed against the certainty of any human knowledge whatever, for in that case it is the question of a general theory of knowledge, with which we have not to deal. Further, this general scepticism is directed specially against natural science, seldom specially against history. Why so, however, is of interest to know. That old familiar attack of scepticism against the faculty of knowledge is in fact valid: “It is not the things themselves, the phenomena of the outer world themselves, that we apprehend in our mind, but only the impressions which we receive through our senses; who can tell us that these impressions correspond with reality?” This attack can evidently be turned just as well against the knowledge of history as against the knowledge of nature, for the former has also to deal with phenomena of the outer world. If the former has nevertheless occurred more rarely, the reason lies in the immediate relation of our minds to the objects of historical knowledge. For these objects are the actions of men, which proceed from human feeling, thinking, and willing, and they are of the same kind as that which day by day we experience inwardly in our own mental life as actual. This is our own most intimate experience of our feeling, thinking, and willing, together with the actions springing therefrom as something real, convinces us immediately and irrefutably of the reality of analogous phenomena among our fellowmen, and hence also among the men of the past, for us to have any room for doubt about it. Only one who goes so far as to assert that his own life is a dream and that his world is the imaginary picture of such a dream can deny the reality of history.

But it is just on this inner basis of historical knowledge that a more particular sceptical doubt is connected. We must in fact be convinced not only of the reality of the historical world, but we must conceive and understand the events as actions, i.e. as rationally connected expressions of human feeling, thinking, and willing. Hence we must so reproduce in ourselves the feelings and ideas of other men as if we ourselves felt and imagined them. Is that possible? Are we then at all certain that our fellow-men in the present and the past did not feel and think in some way quite differently from ourselves, so that it is an illusion to think that I can realise the feelings and thoughts of another? As a matter of fact such a certainty can never be logically proved. Here too we can only appeal to the practical experience of daily existence. But this furnishes us all the more immediately, by means of continually recurring proofs, with the inner conviction and certainty that we rightly understand the actions of the people around us with their motives, according to the analogy of our own actions and motives. This certainty, which is deeply and firmly based on general experience, the certainty of the analogy of the ways of feeling, thinking, and willing among mankind, or, as we might say, the identity of human nature, is the fundamental axiom of any historical knowledge. In fact, if there were or ever had been a people or an individual that did its thinking in a different kind of logic from ours, to whom hate was not hate and love was not love, its history would be even more impenetrable to us than the events in a beehive.

But the recognition of this axiom does not remove all doubts that have been raised. Even if we grant that we can understand the actions of the people living round about us, because we feel and think analogously, yet with some appearance of justification it might be doubted whether long vanished
races and distant peoples thought in the same way. Is not blood-revenge, which was a sacred duty to the primitive Germans, extremely detestable to us? Do we comprehend the asceticism of a mediaeval hermit or an Indian fakir? Are not numberless customs and views of the past entirely strange to us? Such a doubt can only mislead us as long as we do not make it clear that in all such cases we have to deal with what are only different expressions of the same psychological processes. We see it most easily in the sphere of the spiritual and intellectual dispositions. This is expressed quite otherwise in different times and among different peoples, in other forms of speech and language. It has continually other content; in fact, the whole direction of thinking, the way of operating with the elements of thought, are continually changing. Nevertheless, we never think of doubting that we can understand, e.g., the works of Aristotle as well as his contemporaries. The reason is that in spite of all difference of expression and subject-matter the general processes of thought remain the same.

Quite correspondingly in the sphere of feeling the expressions and the content of the particular feelings differ according to peoples and times. But the general psychic processes at the basis remain unchangeable. For example, the modes of expressing feeling are very different when the Indian fakir mortifies himself, when the Greek in praying raises his hands to the gods, or the modern man kneels down humbly at the sound of the organ, and is absorbed in the thought of the All. But the feeling lying at the base, the devotion, is in its inner process one and the same. It is of course quite easy, owing to the external form in which feelings and ideas make their appearance, to be mistaken about their real nature. Hence one must methodically pay attention to the fact that they change and how they change, and be able, under the different modes of expression, to recognize the feelings and ideas lying at the basis.

There is still one doubt to be considered, which is closely connected with what has been said. Even though we have recognized that the emotional and ideational processes of all men are analogous, we do not wish to deny the difference of the individual human feelings and ideas, nor would it be possible to do so. This difference rests on the relative difference of the individualities not only of peoples and epochs, but also of individual persons. The constitution of our sense-organs results in no one of us perceiving an object of the outer world quite in the same way as another would. No one realises exactly the same factors of an external event as another contemporary observer. In the sphere of the natural sciences we can control and eliminate this defect of the human power of observation by repeatedly observing the same object or by bringing the same event repeatedly to our perception by experiment in order finally to have grasped all the factors equally. With the subject-matter of history that is mostly impossible. The actual events that it deals with, the events, are only once accessible to immediate observation, and they are usually

so complicated that even the immediate observer can observe only the smallest part with his sense-faculties, and only some of their results are lastingly to be observed as remains and existing states. When that is the case one may with seeming justice doubt whether, in view of the diversity and incompleteness of individual apprehension, we are in a position to recognize the particular historical events in conformity with truth. But this doubt too, when more closely examined, involves its own refutation, for it is precisely from the relative diversity of individual apprehension that the actuality of those factors of the events that have been observed simultaneously and in the same way by two or more independent personalities, comes out with all the greater certainty, and the different incomplete observations can thus be mutually supplemented. The correspondence and the completing of a number of observations are, in the sphere of natural science, our means of control and protection against the onedimensionalness and insufficiency of the individual's capacity of observation.

Besides this, the evidence of remains and of concurrent circumstances comes in, when they correspond with the other somewhat one-sided observation of the events and many another item furnished by higher criticism. In addition there are the original conclusions that we may draw from the remains independently of a psychological interpretation of the facts and circumstances that caused them. We thus acquire a great stock of ascertained facts, sufficient to protect us against the sceptical generalization of that doubt. As remarked, higher criticism has further to set out the criteria of actuality. It has also to show us in what cases we cannot attain certainty, but must be satisfied with different degrees of probability. The recognition that there are such cases cannot on the whole affect the knowability of the historical events. It is something quite different from the sceptical doubt from which we started. Thus it appears here also as usual that scepticism is indeed based on correct
actual observations, but that it goes too far in doubting the possibility of any certain knowledge, while a scientific method only finds occasion for the application of special rules.

2. The objective possibility of certain historical knowledge.

The observation just made about the character of scepticism can be made still more clear in connexion with the attacks upon the matter of history, for these have rested upon entirely pertinent observations about the nature of historical material.

Even since the revival of the scientific spirit in the time of the Humanists, it was soon observed, as soon as historical writers began to be more sharply criticised, that their accounts of the same events, either owing to lack of knowledge or party prejudice were often enough contradictory. Now instead of asking, cannot the truth nevertheless be reached? are there no ways and means of removing the sources of the mistakes? the critics went too far by holding that in view of the untrustworthiness of the tradition it is not possible to acquire any certain knowledge of the past. We meet this view already in Agrippa of Nettesheim (1530), in his work On the uncertainty and vanity of the sciences, and it passed into France, where it was linked on to Pierre Bayle's critical and often sceptical investigations in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1678); and chiefly among the versatile spirits of France it has repeatedly found approval, and has won its classical expression in the well known bon mot, "‘history is only a fiction agreed upon” (l’histoire n’est qu’une fable convenu), attributed to Fontenelle (b. 1657) the nephew of Corneille.

In a finer and lessened manner, but consequently more embracingly, this scepticism is again making itself felt, just because of the most keenly penetrating critical research, and it often steals upon us at our work with its doubts. These are the doubts that rest partly on the same basis as those discussed above, but which here are however directed at the state of the material. Not only in the case of historical writers but rather directly in the case of any of the various forms of historical tradition—the sources of history, as we generally call them—we come with keener critical penetration upon a limit, where owing to the character of the sources in question certainty itself ceases, and serious doubts arise. The reporters, orally or in writing, and the authors do not in fact record the events directly, but only so much as they have apprehended in their minds, and only in the way they have apprehended it, coloured and distorted by the manifold intentional and unintentional modifications of their subjective ways of apprehending and reflecting. Often enough we come upon a fact recorded only once by one untrustworthy reporter, or upon several statements that contradict one another, without being in the position to hold that one of them is absolutely correct.

The remains of occurrences of course present us with immediate testimonies, but by no means always with the unconditioned reality. In documents and official acts, for example, the events often enough owing to some tendency are recorded in a way that does not correspond with the truth—secret instructions, articles of peace, which wholly or partially revoke or cancel the published ones, have disappeared. In general the material is often so defectively preserved that from the documents that happen to come to our knowledge we get a quite onesided or erroneous picture of the actual events. Further, the documents are often dated erroneously or not at all, or their purposes are unintelligible because they presuppose what we lack, the immediate knowledge of the facts in question possessed by the interested parties who knew the inner motives. These are all valuable observations and quite to the point, but they are not calculated to lead us to a downhearted scepticism, as in the case of Sir Walter Raleigh, who according to the well-known anecdote is said to have thrown the second volume of his History of the World into the fire, because a street-affray before his window, which he had himself witnessed, was immediately reported by another eyewitness quite differently from the way in which he had himself observed it. These observations only suggest to us that we should treat the sources methodically, each according to their character, and apply methodical rules of control and precaution in order to recognize the actual events through all the obscurities. To be sure, in many particular cases we shall not be able to arrive at absolute certainty, yet even our methodical inferences and judgments about the reliability of the sources rest on general principles of experience, which in particular cases may be exceptionally crossed by individual divergences and incidental occurrences. In any case we shall not lose sight of the fact that we must exclude chance as far as possible.

But if we finally see that we cannot in all circumstances arrive at absolute certainty, we shall not give way to the sceptical generalisation that there is no certainty at all in history. Otherwise we must for that reason say the same of any other science. For can one name a single science in which, besides the certain knowledge, there are not also probable and hypothetical results? And that the latter are any the more frequent in the case of history can only be for a moment the view of the investigator of details, when the more he penetrates into the particular he all the less arrives at established facts, and forgets that the main features of the events are undoubtedly established and remain established. Although the course of a battle, for example, may in detail arouse disparate and insoluble doubts, the actuality of the battle itself, its place, time, and result, are not at all affected. And thus in spite of any doubtful events, there remains a great stock of indubitably certain facts throughout history.
which we only overlook and undervalue because we have accustomed ourselves to treat them as taken for granted. To realize this properly let anyone take an outline of history or set of historical tables compiled more or less according to the principles of modern criticism. How few dates will one there find of which the certainty could be disputed! In view of this certain stock we can calmly grant and recognize that, as in all sciences, so also in history we must not rarely be contented with probabilities, often also with possibilities.

For that reason it is no good to give way to sentimental laments about the inadequacy of human knowledge. It is rather the task of the investigator to give himself and his public a clearly recognized and strict account as to how far he comes short of the limit of certainty, and to what degree his results are only probable. By "probable" we mean the facts in historical inquiry whose occurrence are supported by reports on indirect reasons more weighty than the reports or other reasons that are in favour of their non-occurrence. "Possible" we call the facts against the occurrence of which there are no direct or indirect reasons, while there are no positive grounds for assuming their occurrence. It is clear that according to the number and weight of the reasons on both sides and according to their relation to one another there can be very different degrees of probability, rising to an approach to certainty and down to mere possibility. The balancing and determination of these eventualities and different degrees of probability is everywhere a matter of scientific method, and we shall not neglect it. Whether the science of history has on the whole fewer certainties or more probabilities to show than other sciences is a consideration as to which the certainty could be disputed! In view of this certain stock we can calmly grant and recognize that, as in all sciences, so also in history we must not rarely be contented with probabilities, often also with possibilities.

The keen interest in Indian wisdom shown by the Arabs of the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era is a significant feature of the Arabic literature of this period. The fame of the Abbasid Caliph's patronage of letters had spread far and wide which made Baghdad a sort of literary rendezvous, where just as "to a monarch's hall, as to a market, people bring only what is in demand," Greeks and "AL-BRAHIMA"—a term then applied to Hindus—Persians and Egyptians met each other. Of all the non-Arabian members of the Academy of Baghdad, the Persian IBNUL-MUQAFFA (+ Circa 760 A.D.) who made several translations from PEHLEVI or Middle-Persian into Arabic deserves our serious attention. The most famous of all his writings which are many is his "Book of Kalila wa Dimna." This work through a translation in Pehlevi goes back to the Sanskrit "FABLES of BIDDAI" and is undoubtedly one of the oldest Prose works in Arabic, and has always been recognized as a model of literary eloquence.

Al-jahiz (+ 869) a celebrated scholar of Basra, a man of encyclopaedic knowledge, and as described by C. Brockelmann, "a genius who stood far above his age," has paid glowing tributes to Hindu Thinkers. It is a pity that the names of those Indian scholars have become so completely metamorphosed in Semetic script—partly because of Arabs' difficulty to pronounce Sanskrit names and of "the serious defects of Arabic script," just as many Arabic
names in European languages have completely undergone phonetic changes. Thus Indian (AL-BRAHIMA) Pundits appear in Arabic pronunciation BAHILA, MANKA, BAZIKAR, FILBARFIL, SINDBAD and KANKA. The Hindu sciences which Arabs interpreted to the Eastern Caliphate (as opposed to the Western Caliphate of Spain) are Mathematics, Medicine, Ophidia (Sarpavidya), Toxicology, Astronomy and Astrology. Al-Beruni (+ 1048 A.D.) informs us that "a Hindu scholar learned in Astronomy and Mathematics came with a deputation from Sind, and brought a Sanskrit Siddhanta to Baghdad during the time of AL-MANSUR. By the Order of the Caliph he translated this work into Arabic with the help of IBRAHIM FAZARI. "This was the first time" says AL-QIFTI in his Dictionary of Philosophers, "that the Arabs recognized the intellectual attainments of India." In Arabic, Mathematical figures were written first in words and later in Alphabets. As a result of Indo-Arab cultural relations, Hindu numerals were cast in the Arabic mould, which were accepted by European students attending the University of Cordova, who called them "Arabic numerals," because they had learnt them from the Arabs, who still call them "Hindu numerals." AL-KHWARIZMI the Court-Mathematician and Astronomer of MAHMUN AR-RASHID (+ 833 A.D.)—the son of "Harun Alraschid,"—who researched into Indian Mathematics and published many important treatises, must be regarded as the pioneer in this branch of Indian Science. In Europe names of particular branches of Mathematics such as Logarithms, Algorithms and Algorism are all corrupted forms of AL-KHWARIZMI. The Arab writers of eighth and ninth centuries used the term "HISABUL-GHUBAR" (Arithmetic of the dust) to indicate the Indian origin of the numerals. The probable reason for this appellation is that these numerals were written with either chalk or lime-water on levelled ground in Indian village patshalas. The Indian origin of the Arabic numerals is best evidenced by the figures which are written from left to right, as in Sanskrit, and not from right to left as in the Arabic script.

IBN ABI USEYBA narrates in his "TARIKH-UL-ATIBBA" (Biographical dictionary of Physicians), how MANKA, the Indian cured a serious disease. He says:—"Once Harun Alrashid fell seriously ill. When the Physicians of Baghdad failed to cure him, somebody suggested the name of MANKA, the Indian Physician. He was invited to Baghdad and special arrangements were made for his long travel. Under his treatment the Caliph was restored to health. The Caliph rewarded him profusely. He was then commissioned to translate Sanskrit books in the "Translation Department." BAHILA was another Indian Physician who was presented to the Court of Harun. At that time Gabriel BAKHTISHU, a Greek, was the Court-Physician who failed to cure the Caliph's Cousin of his diseases, and it fell to the lot of BAHILA to treat him in which he completely succeeded. Another Indian (Al-Brahima) Pundit whose name is recorded by a tenth century scholar as RAI is reputed to be an authority on 'Snake-bite Cure.' His book was translated from Sanskrit into Arabic. Early Arab writers have mentioned casually the contributions made by Hindus to the science of Toxicology. IBN Nadim refers to a Sanskrit work on Poison, which had already been translated into Arabic long before his time. IBN DHAN was a well known figure in Baghdad. In Arabic "IBN" means "Son"—that is son of DHAN. Semites in general and Arabs in particular were always keen to know the name of the Father; hence this additional "IBN." This Physician was held in high esteem, and he was a medical officer of an important Public Hospital of Baghdad. Besides his hospital duties, he was attached to the Translation Department where he translated Sanskrit works into Arabic. The great German Orientalist Prof. E. Sachau thinks that this DJAN might have been 'DHANVANTA' or 'DHANAN.' This name was probably adopted to resemble the word DHANVANTA, which is the name of the physician of the gods in MANUSHAJTRA.

In the domain of Astronomy and Astrology the Arabs drank deep from the "Fountain" of India, particularly, in Astrology which was entirely a new subject to them. In Astronomy, however, they may have acquired considerable knowledge through the observations of the ancient Semites known in history as Chaldians, who inhabited the region lying between north Arabia and modern Mesopotamia. In this sphere of knowledge the ground was already prepared to grasp Indian calculations. The celebrated Al-Beruni writing in the early eleventh century A.D. while commenting upon the meteorological studies of famous ABU Mashar of Balkhi—which works have been studied by Nallino and Caetani—observes: "This is the testimony of ABO Mashar, showing that through this (Indian) method you obtain correct results. If, (besides,) you take to (help) the Mansions (the places of the Lunar Stations) of the Hindus and their single parts, you are pretty sure in your calculation to come near the truth." 13

6. cf. Al-Razi, and Ibn Rushd with European Rhazes and Averroes or Ibn Bajja recorded by medieval Romans as Avempace.
Historian Masudi (+ 947 A.D.) informs us that a voluminous medical book was written for RAJA KURASH (?), wherein the causes and treatment of diseases are discussed, and drugs and herbs illustrated, and “Female Diseases”—written originally in Sanskrit by a Hindu woman named “RAOOSA”¹⁶—are described.

To this list of Brahmin scholars another may be added. I have discovered recently an Arabic MS. in Colombo, which is dated 641 A.H. (circa 1241 A.D.) and copied as the scribe of the MS. says from a still older manuscript at Ghaza near Damascus.

The author of this manuscript is one “BA YYUN” stated in the manuscript as “Al-Brahamin.” It deals with the effect of minerals and jewels on the human system. This appears to be a unique manuscript as I have so far not succeeded in tracing any reference to this manuscript in the published printed catalogues of European or Asiatic libraries.

In consequence of the Indo-arabic cultural contacts many scientific Sanskrit words crept into Arabic but they have been Arabised to such an extent that not all of them can be easily identified. The question is where are these Arabic translations today? The answer to such a question is that probably all of them were destroyed by the order of Halaku Khan, the Mongol, who sacked Baghdad in 1258. According to the historians of the age the libraries of Baghdad were burnt to ashes while the Mongols took delight in this ‘bonfire.’ The treasured manuscripts which had been guarded jealously from century to century were completely destroyed. The same tragedy befell the Alhambra library which was triumphantly burnt to ashes by the Crusaders. Then followed a period of civil wars, in which there was little or no real cultural activity. Ceylon too has had in my opinion cultural contacts with Arabia. Al Beruni in his ‘India,’ incidentally mentions a certain SANHAL HIND, who wrote a book entitled “Great Book of Births.” In Arabic unvocalized script the author’s name is recorded as SNHL. Can we not take this for Sinhal or Sinhalese?

S. A. IMAM

Avoiding what is human, near,
Skirting the villages, the paddy fields
Where boys sit timelessly to scare the crows
On bamboo platforms raised above their lives.
A trackless wilderness divides
Joy from its cause, the motive from the act;
The killing arm uncurls, strokes the soft move;
The distant world is an obituary,
We do not hear the tapping of its dread,
The act sustains; there is no consequence.
Only aloneness, swinging slowly
Down the cold orbit of an older world
Than any they predicted in the schools,
Stirs the cold forest with a starry wind,
And sudden as the flashing of a sword
The dream exalts the bowed and golden head
And time is swept with a great turbulence,
The old temptation to remould the world.

Phrasally, rhythmically, and in its whole effect the communication is strong and severe. Lewis undoubtedly possessed the least of the poet's gifts—the memorable phrase. Every one of his contributions is marked by it, this from The Journey:

There was also the memory of Death
And the recurrent irritation of ourselves.

or this from The Mahratta Ghats:

Dark peasants drag the sun upon their backs.

What is distinctive in Alun Lewis's poems provides the best of the other work in Poems from India with its hallmark, the impression of a group of men not apathetic nor over self-conscious, but aware of a general catastrophe not specially India's or their own, but the evil of a world. If the volume, as its editors hope, does something to help understanding between British and Indian, it must be this feeling of a common greyness, which will strike sensitive Englishmen and English educated Indians as incidental to their world. In more than one poem, notably by Stuart Pigott in Bohemond's Tomb, by R. N. Currey in Burial Flags, Sind, and by George Taylor in Bengal: After a Storm, that mood is communicated, The last is in its own way a minor success:

Bengal: After a Storm

Sweetly the sky apologizes for
The epileptic interlude, the gibbering rain:
Water in pools shines out like compliments
The reconciling gestures are quite plain
Cool benediction of the moon
Healing touch of the night air
Cancel our exile and declare
Moment and place are both a boon.
The temporary truce must not deceive:
Already the snarling bull-frog in the slime
And the appalling jacks of measure
Betray the real intentions of the time.

All that remains to be said is that the book, illustrated by line drawings by Sapper Blackburn, is attractively got up.

E. F. C. L.
The Legend of the Topes (Thāpapavamsa).—Bibliotheca Indica: No. 268—
By BIMALA CHURN LAW; pp. i-x + 101.—Published by the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1945.

This is the first attempt made to translate the mediaeval Pali Chronicle Thāpapavicaya, the original of which was edited for the Pali Text Society by the same writer in 1935. The title chosen for the translation is rather misleading and, as will be seen below, is obviously the result of misunderstanding the Pali term. It is claimed that this translation will "help the reader to understand and appreciate a Pali traditional work of the late mediaeval period, to crack the hard nut of the stereotyped and highly conventionalized prose of scholastic writings (p. vii)." But, one regrets to say so, the translation is marred by so many inaccuracies on every page that the reader entertains a persistent doubt as to how this attempt will fulfil the intended purpose. It is, in fact, disturbing to anticipate its use even by students of the history of Buddhist art and institutions, not to speak of the effect on students of the Pali language for whom it is primarily intended.

A glance at the very first page of this translation will no doubt help to corroborate the above remarks. In the first verse itself, "For the welfare of the world I create an image of the Conqueror and bow down paying homage to that most wonderful tope wherein, on all sides, the Conqueror's noble relics ..." seems a puerile attempt to render the simple Pali of the original:

Vasamya sayyussa jina-dhātuvārā samantaṭha
chabhaṇna-ransathi rasari samuṣjitaṭhā
nimmaṭya loke-hitā hein jinassa rāpam,
Jam thāpamabhūbatamam sirasa nimāṭyā.

The reader can easily see for himself the trouble the two simple, though irregularly used, words 'nimmaṭya' and 'samantaṭṭha' have given the translator, from the italicized phrases in the citation. In spite of the dear singular 'thāpam' in this verse (cp. thāpasa, in verses 2 and 6; tattha thāpasa vannaṇ vakkhami, §1) it is impossible to understand why the author who uses the singular in the first verse has developed a prejudice for the plural sense ever afterwards and translated in every succeeding verse the word by "Topes!" In the fifth verse, "Legend of the Teacher's Topes" is simply inexcusable for "vamsam thūpassa satthano." In accordance with this prejudice the translator has throughout stuck to his "Legend of the Topes" as title, and this in spite of the palpable evidence of the original itself: "Idhā pana kaṇcananāmakkalihēpo ti adhippeto" (p. 1, last sentence). Moreover, this last sentence which clearly means "Here, of course, the great Suvannamali Thūpa is intended," for every student of Pali knows the interchangeability of the two synonyms 'kaṇcan' and 'suvanna,' has only deceived the translator into a glaring faux pas. "Here, however, a great tope having golden garlands is intended" (p. 2). As far as the translator's powers of English expression, the following specimen from the first page itself is characteristic: "Herein the expression 'I shall relate the Legend of the Topes,' a shrine which is built and erected after depositing the relics of the Buddha and the rest who are worthy of Thūpas, as follows from the dictum—a Tathāgata ... is worthy of a Thūpa; ... a sovereign king is worthy of a Thūpa, that on which a shrine has been built and erected, is called a Thūpa." One searches in vain for the precise of the subject "the expression" in view of the sheer impossibility of such a thing as "the expression ... is called a Thūpa." It is difficult even to suspect a printer's error in this case, for this first page should have stared in the face of any proof-reader! In the second verse "I shall relate the Legend of the Topes which brings welfare to the whole world, is a cause of joy to all beings, is always adored by the best of the gods, demons and lords of men and is a shining heap of jewels," the singular verb 'brings' would, of course, refer, in English syntax, to the 'Legend,' but then "is always adored ... etc." and "is a shining heap of jewels" would be sheer nonsense, as even the translator could have seen. Thus we are left with the English "... the Topes which brings ... and is a shining heap of jewels." It is, however, unfair by the author of the original to create an unwarranted metaphor out of his straightforward phrase "ratanajalathāpiṇkasa" which just commotes "having a shining heap with gems.

The task of the reviewer of this kind of work is indeed a difficult one; even the minimum number of remarks on prima facie inaccuracies is bound to exceed the space available. It will suffice to add that a cursory glance at the hundred odd pages of this translation shows at least as many errors of omission and commission, a few of which are given below:

(a) "a week" (p. 4) for "sattasattahā"; "boundless and suitable to the occasion" (p. 5) for "apārīmita-saṃsāya-saṃucitāya." (b) But there is nothing to be done for the translation of Nirvāṇa if I, in disguise, destroy my sins" (p. 5) for "Asūri dāve, sensa pama kilese jāpeva nibbidannaptiyā kicca nattthi"; " folly" (p. 8) for "okara"; "they did not scatter" (p. 9) for "were not scattered"; "taking advantage of the birth of an Enlightened One in their midst" (p. 13) for "rājapatīdham gahetvā," i.e., having collected the revenue of the country; a bad omission in para 23; p. 15; "golden bowls" (p. 16) for "suvaya-pañjakam"; "Enlightened One" (p. 19) for "buddho jano" meaning "a wise person"; "he reached the state of living at last" (p. 20) for "apposukatam āpajjamāno" which means "becoming reluctant; "jewels" (p. 24, para 8) for "rataṇa" which here implies "cubits; "sprous" (p. 25) for "mugga," i.e. "green pea;" But great privileges arose afterwards like these chieftains making an attack (p. 25) for "mahāpahīrā parante rājāno, paridhāraṃ karontā va pacchato jātā" which means "these chieftains have indeed made great preparations, (owing making preparations) they arrived there last." The para beginning with the words "he came there ... etc." (p. 33-34) is totally a mistranslation; "my father, a great Elder" (p. 38) for "pitāmahātthāno"—shows how uncounquainted the translator is with Pali idiom, for the meaning of the compound "the Elder, my teacher's teacher" seems to be unknown to him.

O. H. de A. W.


Amongst a vast crop of post-war Sinhalese Journals the Nava Maga distinguishes itself in two ways: it sets out with the purpose of raising the standard of literary taste and evaluation among the Sinhalese reading public by providing them with material of a definitely higher quality, and it aims at giving the new generation of writers who are seeking to express themselves through new concepts and new forms an opportunity of placing their work before the public.

Experimentation with new forms has been evidence in the past, of stagnation. The prose writers after the Saddharmalankārāya tried out new styles of writing for lack of anything new to say. Today's experimentation is rather the result of too many influences and too many new techniques as yet unincorporated into the tradition of the country. In order that new writers may discover what the genuine old tradition is, and in what way the new forms may be fused with it so that we find a path best suited to the expression of our national genius, it is necessary that there should be a rallying point. This is the unique service that this journal will be able to perform for the new literature that is attempting to express itself in the spirit of the new age.

There is a section devoted to critical articles on aspects of Sinhalese literature and culture, and a section in which special articles are contributed, of an informative nature, on modern subjects like psychology and sociology, who are still a closed book to the Sinhalese reader.

E. R. de S.
This translation of the Sutta Nipāta has appeared as the XVth. Volume of the Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series, and is, in fact, the third translation so far made of this most important Pali text. The earlier translations are those of Fausboll in the Sacred Books of the East Series and of Chalmers in the Harvard Oriental Series.

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that an understanding of early Buddhism is hardly possible without a correct interpretation of the Sutta Nipāta, which is the one single collection of verses that belong to the period of the first foundations of Buddhism. Apart from its linguistic importance, therefore, the point of view put forward in it ought to be of the greatest interest to those who wish to know what set of ideas originated this great movement in Indian thought, which in its final development included the most extreme forms of idealism and realism, the most devout forms of theism as well as the coldest forms of atheism, the subtlest kinds of logic as well as the most devastating systems of nihilism.

A comparison of the verses of the Sutta Nipāta with the gāthā portions of the Nikāyas would seem to point to the conclusion that what is instinctively sought after as being 'early Buddhism' is, for one thing, much earlier than it is often thought to be, and is, as a matter of fact, quite different from both what has been so far regarded as early Buddhism, as well as the Buddhism that goes as orthodox Theravāda. In fact, the entire ideological basis of the Sutta Nipāta, with its repeated emphasis on the evils of sense-perception, seems to be the first formulation in India of philosophy which takes for its major premise the relative unreality of the external world, and aims at the goal of individual happiness by the attainment of inward peace (ajjhattasanti) through Yogic contemplation. The difference between this philosophy and that of the Upanishads seems to lie mainly on the basis of the Sutta Nipata, with its repeated emphasis on the evils of sense-perception, which is the one single collection of verses that belong to the period of the first foundations of Buddhism.

The very difficult word sanhāra is translated as 'moulders' (incognotum per incognotum), but the rendering of rūpa as 'mind-at-work' is a happy flash, for it is certainly an improvement upon Chalmers' 'Consciousness'. Fausboll, by the way, leaves the word untranslated (where angels fear to tread.').

The fundamental defect in all previous translations, therefore, that they do not aim at any interpretation of the Sutta Nipāta, and that they do not reveal any consistent attitude on the part of their translators regarding the philosophical basis of this book, is shared by the translation of Mr. E. M. Hare as well. Apart from the difficulties of interpretation of the text, the translator is further limited by the demands of metre and poetic diction. Mr. Hare, however, overcomes this difficulty well, and it must be admitted that the translation reads smoothly as English unrhymed verse, in spite of the occasional use of such jargons as 'cankers' (compare 'the cankerless, ill-quit' for andassavo sabbadukkhappādino), 'ease' and 'ill' for suhā and dukkha, and a few such stock expressions which mean nothing to the reader who is unacquainted with Pali.

Another Pali word which the reader anxious to understand the philosophy underlying the obscure verses of the Sutta Nipāta would wish to know the real meaning of is ṣāṭṭha. Particularly in the Māgadhiya Sutta the Buddha is represented as rejecting ṣāṭṭha as a means of attaining purity (suddhi). Mr. Hare renders the word by 'knowledge' following Fausboll, while Chalmers uses 'lore', leaving the reader of today as confused about the meaning of the stanza as Māgadhiya himself (maṣānā'ḥaḥ manusam eva dhammasaṃ) have been.

Nor do the translations of other important words, with the exception of a few, throw any fresh light on the difficult portions of the Sutta Nipāta. Sandā is translated as 'vision', which is obviously incorrect. Sandā seems to be consistently employed in the Sutta Nipāta to mean 'sense perception'. Fausboll himself has stumbled over this word, as he translates it by 'marks'. Chalmers gets nearer what appears to be the correct meaning of this word when he renders it as 'sense-impressions' which, however, is closer to the meaning of phassa than of santhā. The very difficult word sanhāra is translated as 'moulders' (incognotum per incognotum), but the rendering of rūpa as 'mind-at-work' is a happy flash, for it is certainly an improvement upon Chalmers' 'Consciousness'. Fausboll, by the way, leaves the word untranslated (where angels fear to tread.').