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UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

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The Pāli Chronicles of Ceylon

An Examination of the Opinions expressed about them since 1879

THE three Pāli works, the *Dīpavaṃsa*, the chronicle of the island, the Introduction to the *Samantapāsādikā*, the commentary to the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, and the *Mahāvamsa*, the great chronicle, which enshrine the ancient historical tradition of Ceylon, are still available to the student of Ceylon history. All these three are closely related to one another, and it is not possible to study one independently of the other two. In addition to these there is the *Vamsatthappakāsinī*, the *ṭīkā* or commentary to the *Mahāvamsa*, which sheds considerable light on its main source, the *Sīhalaṭṭhakathā Mahāvamsa*.¹

Few Pāli works have attracted so much attention as the Dv, the Sp and the Mv. This was mainly due to the fact that they contain some traditions of the early history of Buddhism. Hermann Oldenberg edited the Dv, and published it with an English translation in 1879,² and in his Pāli edition of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* he included the historical introduction to the Sp.³ In 1905 Wilhelm Geiger made a critical examination of the Dv and the Mv and of other works which dealt with the early history of Ceylon.⁴ In 1907 still another German scholar, Otto Franke, criticized some of the conclusions arrived at by Geiger in this work,⁵ and Geiger replied to him in the same year.⁶ In 1908 Geiger brought out his edition of the Pāli text of the Mv,⁷ and his English translation of the same made with the assistance of Mabel H. Bode was

1. These five works will be referred to hereafter by the abbreviations Dv, Sp, Mv, Vap and SAKMv. Sp will refer to the Introduction alone and not to the whole *Samantapāsādikā*.

2. The *Dīpavaṃsa*. Ed. and Tr. by Hermann Oldenberg. London, 1879.

3. Oldenberg: *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. III, pp. 283-343. London, 1881.

4. *Dīpavaṃsa und Mahāvamsa und die geschichtliche Überlieferung in Ceylon*. Leipzig, 1905. The references in this work are to the English translation by Ethel M. Coomaraswamy. Colombo, 1908.

5. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. XXI, pp. 203 and 307.

6. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Vol. LXIII, p. 540.

7. The *Mahāvamsa*. Ed. by Wilhelm Geiger. Pali Text Society. London, 1908.

published in 1912.⁸ In the Introduction to the latter work Geiger once more summed up his views on the Mv, but a few of them were modified in his English translation of the *Cūlavamsa*, published in 1930.⁹

Since then two other contributions have added to our knowledge of the subject. In 1933 E. W. Adikaram submitted a thesis to the University of London on "State of Buddhism in Ceylon as revealed by the Pāli Commentaries of the Fifth Century."¹⁰ This was followed by the publication in 1935 of the *Vamsatthappakāsinī*, edited by G. P. Malalasekera.¹¹

The object of this article is to examine the views expressed by these writers with regard to these four works, the Dv, the Sp, the Mv and the Vap in the light of evidence now available. One of the chief points that will be considered is whether the view maintained or accepted by most of them that the Dv was based on the SAKMv of the Mahāvihāra is tenable.

Much of what is stated in the works referred to centred round the question of the sources of the Dv, the Sp and the Mv. Oldenberg in his Introduction to his edition of the Dv pointed out that according to the Vap¹² there was an *Atthakathā* (a commentary on Buddhist canonical writings) "handed down and probably also composed in the Mahāvihāra,¹³ written in Sinhalese, the introductory stanzas of which allude to a historical account of Buddha's visits to Ceylon, of the Councils, of Mahinda, etc., intended to be given in that very *Atthakathā*." This *Atthakathā* was the same as the *Porāṇatthakathā* and was also called the *Sīhaḷatthakathā Mahāvamsa*.¹⁴

Oldenberg did not consider the last two works identical but that the latter was only a part of the former. "It is not difficult" he continued, "to account for this expression where the two at first sight contradictory elements of a (theological) commentary (*Atthakathā*) and of an extensive historical narrative, (*Mahāvamsa*) are combined together. If we look at Buddhaghosa's *Atthakathā* on the Vinaya, we find that the author has there prefixed to his explanations of the sacred texts a detailed historical account of the origin of

8. The *Mahāvamsa*. Eng. Trs. by W. Geiger. P.T.S. London, 1912.

9. The *Cūlavamsa*. Eng. Trs. by W. Geiger and C. M. Rickmers. P.T.S., 1930.

10. *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* by E. W. Adikaram. Ceylon, 1946. This was preceded by a thesis entitled "An Historical Criticism of the *Mahāvamsa*" submitted to the University of London by the writer of this article. Much of what is stated here is based on that thesis.

11. P.T.S. London, 1935.

12. Oldenberg and Geiger usually refer to this work as the *Mahāvamsa Tikā*. Malalasekera has pointed out that its author never calls it by this name, but by the title *Vamsatthappakāsinī*. Vap. p. cvii.

13. This was the chief vihāra of the Theravādins in Anurādhapura.

14. The *Dīpavamsa*. p. 3.

the Tipiṭaka, its redaction in the three Councils, and its propagation to Ceylon by Mahinda and his companions. Buddhaghosa's commentary is based, as is well known, on that very Sinhalese *Atthakathā* of the Mahāvihāra, which we are discussing, and we may assume with almost certainty, that to this *Atthakathā* a similar introduction was prefixed which may have been of greater extent than that of Buddhaghosa."¹⁵

After drawing this inference about the relationship of the SAKMv to the *Porāṇatthakathā* from the analogy of the *Samantaṭṭhādikā*, and incidentally suggesting that the Sp too was based on the *Sīhaḷatthakathā* of the Mahāvihāra, Oldenberg concluded that the SAKMv was in prose intermixed with a considerable number of stanzas in Pāli,¹⁶ and was the source on which the Dv and the Mv were based. He drew the inference with regard to the Dv not from any actual statement to that effect as in the case of the Mv, but because the proem of the Dv as well as five passages in Pāli verse, ascribed to the *Porāṇā* in the Sp and the Vap, were common to the Dv,¹⁷ and both the Dv and the Mv finished their record at the same point. He expressed the view that the author of the Dv borrowed from the *Atthakathā* sometimes the mode of expression and even whole lines, word for word.¹⁸ He added further that the Dv and the Mv are "indeed in the main nothing but two versions of the same substance, both being based on the historical introduction to the Great Commentary of the Mahāvihāra. Each work represented, of course, their common subject in its own way, the *Dīpavamsa* followed step by step and almost word for word the traces of the original, the *Mahāvamsa* proceeding with much greater independence and perfect literary mastership."¹⁹

Finally Oldenberg suggested that the *Mahāvamsa* of the ancients referred to in the proem of the Mv may mean the Dv itself, as it contains the defects attributed to the old work.²⁰

Geiger in *The Dīpavamsa and Mahāvamsa* agreed with Oldenberg with regard to the relationship between the Sp and the Mv on the one hand and their connection with the SAKMv on the other.²¹ "Our M." he wrote, "as far as the contents are concerned, was a fairly correct translation of the AkM. It supplements the Sinhalese of the latter by Pāli verse and avoids certain deficiencies in the original, viz., its frequent repetitions and the uneven

15. *Ibid.* pp. 3-4.

16. *Ibid.* p. 4.

17. *Ibid.* p. 5.

18. *Ibid.* pp. 6-8.

19. *Ibid.* p. 7.

20. *Ibid.* p. 9.

21. Geiger: *The Dīpavamsa and Mahāvamsa*, p. 53.

character of its account, which is sometimes too short, sometimes too diffuse."²² He stated further: "The contents of the Smp. run very closely parallel with the M. We see so much verbal agreement between them that there can be no question of mere coincidence. This may be explained by the fact that the two works, the Smp. as well as the M., are both derived from the same source, the Aṭṭhakathā, and both reflect their source with fair exactness."²³

Geiger also agreed with Oldenberg that the Dv like the Mv was based on the SAKMv. "As there is no doubt that the M. is younger than the D.," he wrote, "two suppositions only are possible: either the M. has borrowed its material and arrangement from the D., or else both the M. and the D. have borrowed from the same sources, either directly or indirectly. The latter supposition is, as we shall see, the correct one."²⁴

But Geiger did not accept the suggestion of Oldenberg that the proem of the Mv referred to the Dv. "One might be inclined to think," he wrote, "that the proem of the M. refers directly to the D., in which, it is true, the fault complained of, that of irregular representation appears. The words 'free from faults' would look like a slight mockery of the self-conscious saying, 'without faults,' which is found in the proem of the D. 3. In reality our M. means, as we shall see, by the 'Mahāvamsa of the ancients,' the original work, upon which it, as well as the D., is founded. And therefore the reproach raised against it applies to the D. as well, because it (the D.) reproduces the original work with more slavish faithfulness, and its proem is also taken word for word from it."²⁵

Geiger also did not fall in fully with the view of Oldenberg that the SAKMv was a mere introduction to the *Porāṇaṭṭhakathā*. He admitted the possibility that it could have been so at first, but believed that it ceased to be so after some time.²⁶ "There are many reasons," he wrote, "to be put against this supposition. Everything seems to suggest that the old M. had very considerable proportions, and contained an enormous amount of detail. We certainly are not mistaken if we estimate it at least as extensive as our MT."²⁷ One has only to think of the repetitions so strongly condemned. This seems to be

somewhat large for an "historical introduction." No doubt it can be shown that the Ak. was extraordinarily comprehensive, and therefore that even the introduction may have been a long one. But another consideration seems to me of more importance. An introduction of the kind that Oldenberg imagines would hardly embrace the whole range of Sinhalese kings as far as Mahāsena. A transition from this prince to the Tipiṭaka does not seem to be very probable. It is much more likely that such an introduction would have finished with the coming of Buddhism into Ceylon, and with Mahinda, who brought the Tipiṭaka to the Island. According to my idea the "Mahāvamsa of the ancients" was an independent chronicle, which the monks of the Mahāvihāra carried on to Mahāsena, and certainly would have continued still further had they not been disturbed in their peaceable work in some violent manner.

"The analogy of the chronicles of our medieval monasteries lies extraordinarily near; but it may be correct that the base of that chronicle was such an introduction to the Tipiṭaka. The proem of the D. speaks at all events in favour of that. This proem was, as can be seen from the MT. QS. a, simply the proem of the old M. The subjects were mentioned in it which were to be represented. These are without exception those which belong to the period before Mahinda. There is no account of later times, not even of the great deeds of Duṭṭhagāmaṇi. The proem thus belongs to an epoch in which the extent of the work was smaller than at the time when Mahānāma developed the material into a poem, or when the D. was written. The old framework had burst, and out of the "historical introduction" of the Ak., the "Mahāvamsa of the ancients," the extensive monastery chronicle of the Mahāvihāra developed."²⁸

Rhys Davids, reviewing *Dīpavamsa und Mahāvamsa*, referred to "its great and permanent value as the most complete work which we have on the many important subjects it treats with scholarship so thorough (often indeed unique) and with judgment so sober and sound."²⁹ But Otto Franke did not consider Geiger's work in the same light. After a detailed examination of the Dv text he came to the conviction that the Dv was an original work and was not based on any other work as pointed out by Oldenberg and Geiger.³⁰

Franke pointed out that the main topics of the Dv were composed out of verses and pieces of verse of the canonical literature and was in language and ideas influenced above all by the *Buddhavamsa*, the *Cariyāpiṭaka*, and

22. *Ibid.* p. 63. D. = *Dīpavamsa*. M. = *Mahāvamsa*. Smp. = *Samanatapaṣādīkā* Introduction. AkM. = *Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvamsa*.

23. D. and M. (*The Dīpavamsa and Mahāvamsa*), p. 70.

24. *Ibid.* p. 14.

25. D. and M., p. 17.

26. Thus Geiger did not entirely disagree with the view of Oldenberg as Malalasekera states in Vap p. lviii. Malalasekera himself says: "It is quite probable this chronicle formed a sort of historical introduction to the Canonical Commentary and dealt only with the 13 subjects mentioned in the proem of the *Dīpavamsa*." It is, however, not clear whether he is expressing his own view or merely re-stating Geiger's view.

27. M.P. = *Mahāvamsa Tikā* = Vap.

28. D. and M., p. 64.

29. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. 1905. p. 391.

30. Franke first expressed his view in *Literarisches Centralblatt*, 1906, No. 37, Column 1,275. He made a closer examination of the Dv and its relations to the Sp and the Mv in 1907, in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XXI, pp. 203 and 307.

the *Jātaka*. Thus it was a clumsy bungling work, a mere botched compilation of Pāli quotations from these and other works of the Canon. From that he concluded that the Dv was not based on any source and must be considered as standing on its own tottering feet.³¹ He further compared the Dv with the Sp and the Mv and rushed to the conclusion that the authors of the Sp and the Mv merely rewrote the Dv.

Geiger accepted some of the minor conclusions of Franke.³² That the Dv was a clumsy bungling work had already been declared both by Oldenberg and himself.³³ He admitted that Franke had shed further light on the manner of composition of the author of the Dv, and that the evidence produced showed that the author of the Dv was strongly influenced by the ideas of the *Buddhavaṃsa*, the *Cariyāpīṭaka* and the *Jātaka*, the metrical diction of which was familiar to his feelings.³⁴ Earlier he had expressed the view that the author of the Dv had confined himself especially to the material that was already in Pāli in the Ak, viz. the verses interspersed throughout.³⁵ He now concluded that the SAKMv had probably far less Pāli verses than he originally imagined.

But the main contention of Franke that the Dv, the Sp, and the Mv were not based on another source Geiger refused to accept. The indebtedness of the Dv for its forms of expression to the Pāli Canon was not sufficient proof to conclude that the Dv was independent of the SAKMv. Such verses and pieces of verses which Franke quoted covered only a small part of the Dv. The authors of the Sp and the Mv could not have merely rewritten the Dv, as both the Sp and the Mv contained considerable fresh material, both new matter on old topics as well as entirely new episodes. The Sp made it clear that it was based on a Sinhalese work.³⁶ The Vap was definite that the Mv was based on the SAKMv compiled by the dwellers of the Mahāvihāra.³⁷ The Dv in arrangement and subject matter was closely related to these two works, while the Dv and the Mv covered the same period of Ceylon history.

In 1912 Geiger expressed once more the views he held with regard to the ancient historical tradition of Ceylon.³⁸ There was at the close of the fourth

31. Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1908, p. 1.

32. *Noch einmal Dīpavaṃsa und Mahāvaṃsa. Zeitschrift D. Morgenl. Gesellsch.* Vol. LXIII, p. 540.

33. D. and M., p. 66.

34. *Zweifellos lebte der Dīp-Verfasser sehr in den Ideenkreisen dieser Werke, und deren Melrische Diktion war seinem Empfinden etwas sehr Vertrautes.* *Wiener Zeitschrift* XXI, p. 233.

35. D. and M., p. 69. See also p. 64.

36. *Samantapāsādikā.* Ed. by J. Takakusu. London. P.T.S., 1924. p. 2.

37. Vap, p. 42.

38. The *Mahāvaṃsa.* Eng. Trs., p. x

century A.D. a sort of chronicle of the history of the island from its legendary beginnings onwards. It constituted a part of the *Aṭṭhakathā* or the old commentary literature on the Buddhist canonical writings, which formed the basis of the later Pāli commentaries. It was, like the *Aṭṭhakathā*, composed in old-Sinhalese prose probably mingled with verses in the Pāli language. Recensions of this *Aṭṭhakathā*, differing only in details, existed in the Mahāvihāra and in other monasteries.³⁹ It originally came down only to the arrival of Mahinda in Ceylon, and was continued most probably down to the time of Mahāsena, with whose reign both the Dv and the Mv came to an end. The Dv, composed at the close of the fourth century, presented the first clumsy redaction in Pāli verse. It is the *Mahāvaṃsa* of the ancients referred to at the beginning of the Mv. The Mv is a new treatment of the subject, but shows greater skill in the employment of the Pāli language. It is a more artistic composition and makes a more liberal use of the material contained in the original work.

It is clear that in this summary Geiger's views differ to some extent from the conclusions he gave in *The Dīpavaṃsa and Mahāvaṃsa*. Though he does not deny the indebtedness of the author of the Sp and the Mv to the SAKMv, he regards here the Mv "as a conscious and intentional rearrangement of the Dv, as a sort of commentary to this latter"; and thinks that "the quotation of the Mahāvaṃsa of the ancients in the proemium of our Mah. refers precisely to the Dīp." Further he expresses the view that the Sp is based on the Dv.⁴⁰

These are up to a point the views expressed by Franke. But Geiger seems to have come to these conclusions from an article written by Fleet in which he translated the passage in the *Cūlavāṃsa* xxxviii, 59, *datvā sahaṣṣam dīpetuṃ Dīpavaṃsam samādisi* as "he (King Dhātusena) bestowed a thousand (pieces of gold) and gave orders to write a dīpikā on the *Dīpavaṃsa*," and inferred that the *dīpikā* meant the *Mahāvaṃsa*.⁴¹ Geiger, however, found later that he had made a mistake in accepting this conclusion. "I was myself (Mhvs. trsl. p. xif) inclined to follow him," he wrote. "But I have since had scruples. Verses 58-59⁴² belong in construction most closely together. Consequently *dīpetuṃ Dīpavaṃsam* must refer to an action which took place within the framework of a festival. That, however, can only have been

39. E.g. The *Uttaravihāra Aṭṭhakathā*.

40. The *Mahāvaṃsa.* Eng. Trs., p. xi.

41. J. R. A. S., 1909, p. 5.

42. "After having made an image of the great Thera Mahinda he brought it to the spot where the Thera's body had been burnt, to organize there at great cost a sacrificial festival. He gave orders, with the outlay of thousand gold pieces, for the interpretation of the *Dīpavaṃsa* and commanded sugar to be distributed among the bhikkhus dwelling there."

a reading of the *Dīpavaṃsa*, perhaps with historical and legendary explanations, but not the composition of so voluminous a work as the *Mahāvāṃsa*.⁴³ Thus we have to go back once more to his original view expressed in *The Dīpavaṃsa and Mahāvāṃsa* that the Sp and the Mv were based not on the Dv but on the SAKMv.

Adikaram adds considerably to our knowledge of the Sinhalese commentaries of which the SAKMv formed a part. Though his subject is "State of Buddhism in Ceylon as revealed by the Pāli Commentaries of the Fifth Century A.D.", he supplies his readers with much information on the sources of these Pāli works, the Sinhalese commentaries, their nature and contents. His work clarifies certain obscure points and enables one to draw a few conclusions different from those that have been expressed so far with regard to the early historical tradition of Ceylon.⁴⁴

Dealing with the nature of the Sinhalese commentaries, Adikaram points out that Buddhaghosa mentions that a part of his work of translation consisted of the removal of errors and of repetitions.⁴⁵ He draws attention also to the fact that these commentaries though written in Sinhalese contained Pāli verses.⁴⁶ Thus the defect of repetition and the practice of the inclusion of Pāli verses were not features peculiar to the SAKMv.

Adikaram agrees with Oldenberg and Geiger that the term *Porāṇā* referred to the *Porāṇatthakathā*.⁴⁷ He examines in detail the numerous references to the *Porāṇā* in the Commentaries and comes to the conclusion that it is a definite commentary. This means he accepts the view of Oldenberg and Geiger that the SAKMv was at first really a part of the *Porāṇatthakathā* till probably, as Geiger suggests, it broke its bounds and developed into an independent work.⁴⁸

According to Adikaram the *Sīhala Mahāṭṭhakathā* contained expositions on the entire *Tiṭṭhaka*. There were in addition separate commentaries on the different sections such as the *Vinaya*.⁴⁹ From this one may conclude

43. The *Cūlavāṃsa*, I., p. 35, n. 2.

44. One may not always agree with Adikaram's conclusions on matters of Ceylon history, but one cannot help noticing the patient and thorough manner he had examined his material and the extent of the fresh light he has shed on the ancient commentaries.

45. Adikaram: *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* p. 11.

46. *Ibid.* p. 14.

47. *Ibid.* pp. 16, 22 and xvii.

48. D. and M., p. 64.

49. Adikaram, p. 13. This probably explains how the Pāli Commentaries were able to refer to one another. This could not have been possible had they not been based on earlier Sinhalese Commentaries.

that the Sp is a translation not of the SAKMv as Geiger imagined but of the introduction to the Sinhalese *Vinayattakathā*.⁵⁰

Other available evidence supports this view. The Vap mentions a few instances where the *Vinayattakathā* either differed from, or gave information not contained in, the SAKMv. The account of Asoka's benefactions is said to have been drawn not from the SAKMv but from the VAK. It is also given in the Sp.⁵¹ The VAK is said to have used the word *rohitamiga* for the word *gokanna* in the Mv. So does the Sp.⁵² The VAK says that in Suvannabhūmi after the preaching of the *Brahmajāla Suttanta* 1,500 daughters of noble families received the *pabbajjā* while the SAKMv gave the number as 1,350. The Sp also gives the number as 1,500.⁵³

Besides, as Adikaram points out,⁵⁴ the Sp appears at least in one part to be a literal translation of its original Sinhalese text. It gives a list of teachers who handed down the *Vinaya* from the time of Mahinda "up to the present day" (*yāva ajjatanā*).⁵⁵ None of these teachers belongs to the period after the first century A.D. It is the Sinhalese commentaries that were put into writing during the first century A.D., and not the Sp which Buddhaghosa wrote in the fifth century A.D. And if we are to draw any inference from the list of teachers who handed down the *Vinaya*, the original work on which the Sp was based appears to be no other than the *Vinayattakathā*.

Malalasekera helped the study of the Mv further by the publication of a critical edition with an introduction and notes of the Pāli text of the *Vamsatthapakāsinī*, which not only gives some idea of its main source, the SAKMv, but also refers to many other works which give us an insight into the growth of the early historical tradition of Ceylon.⁵⁶

50. Malalasekera who owes much to Adikaram's work also suggests this as a probability. Vap lxviii.

51. D. and M., p. 48. Sp I., p. 52. Vap, p. 207. Mv V, 83. VAK = *Vinayattakathā*.

52. D. and M., p. 49. Sp I., p. 73. Vap, p. 329. Mv xiv, 3.

53. Mv xii., 53. Sp I., p. 69. Vap, p. 319. D. and M., p. 48.

54. Adikaram, p. 3.

55. Sp I., p. 62.

56. Malalasekera sheds little fresh light on the sources and the contents of the Vap or on its authorship either in his Introduction or Notes to the Vap. He ignores the controversy between Geiger and Franke which brought out much new information on the manner of the construction of the Dv. He does not show how far the views of scholars like Geiger need revision in the light of the new material that has been collected in works like Przyluski's *Le Concile de Rājagṛha* and *La Légende de l'Empereur Asoka*. He does not go sufficiently into the implications of the detailed comparisons of the Mv accounts with those in the Sp and the Dv that were given in the Thesis on which this article is based. These drawbacks, however, do not take away the merits of his edition of the Pāli Text with its variant readings and comments on them which make a valuable contribution to the study of the Mv.

In his Introduction to the Vap Malalasekera deals with many of the problems discussed by Oldenberg, Geiger and Adikaram. He rejects their view that the *Porāṇā* were a definite commentary. He prefers to hold on to the view he expressed many years ago⁵⁷ that they are merely sayings of the ancients quoted by different writers. There is undoubtedly some ground for his view. The quotations from the *Porāṇā* clearly deal with a large variety of subjects. He could have added that in the *Saddhamma Saṅgaha*⁵⁸ even verses which occur in the *Cūlavamsa* dealing with events of the fifth century A.D. are called sayings of the ancients. But this and the arguments he puts forward do not express anything more than a contrary view. They do not prove that the commentary called the *Porāṇatthakathā* did not include the older sayings of the ancients.⁵⁹

Malalasekera disagrees with Geiger to some extent also in regard to the relationship between the SAKMv and the Mv. "Mahānāma," wrote Geiger who appears to have based his view on the evidence of the Vap, "could not yet rise quite above his material. He confined himself to his source to the best of his power. It is clear that certain sections in the M. are merely versifications of the corresponding passage in the original work. Often Mahānāma adopted the Pāli verses of the original unchanged into his work, especially if they bore an authoritative character. That is the case, for example, where the D. and M. agree word for word. Mahānāma is no genius, and his work is not a literary performance of the first rank; nevertheless the M. signifies in comparison with the D., a great aesthetic advance."⁶⁰ But says Malalasekera, "The Tikā would also have us believe that the translation (into Pāli) followed the original in its subject matter, if not word for word, at least very closely, and that only the style was changed. This, however, is not quite the case, as will appear in the sequel, and the Mv. should be considered rather as an adaptation, a work of an eclectic character, the author having obtained his material from diverse sources, sifted them with great care and attention to accuracy of detail, according to his own lights."⁶¹

57. *Pāli Literature of Ceylon*, p. 92. This work will be referred to hereafter by the abbreviation P.L.C.

58. *Journal of the Pāli Society* 1890, p. 57.

59. Malalasekera repeats exhaustively but briefly what Adikaram says on the subject, (Vap, p. lxi); but he does not meet adequately the arguments put forward by Geiger and Adikaram for their view. He sees a contradiction in Geiger who believed the SAKMv was an independent work and also identified it with the *Porāṇatthakathā* which contained matter other than historical. It has been shown already that this contradiction is only apparent and not real. Under these circumstances one cannot help preferring the view of Oldenberg, Geiger and Adikaram who appear to have made a more thorough study of the subject. See also Adikaram (p. 22) for his reasons for disagreement with Malalasekera.

60. D. and M., p. 69. See also p. 63.

61. Vap, p. lvii.

The last phrase 'according to his own lights' may cover much. The author of the Mv no doubt attempted to give a complete account lacking nothing. He avoided in his statements diffuseness, over-condensation, and repetitions and sometimes used other sources to correct and amplify his account.⁶² But a close examination of his work makes it clear that he did not sift his material with such great care and attention to accuracy of detail⁶³ and, as Geiger has shown, that he did not deviate much from his original.

One of the causes that led Malalasekera to come to his view appears to have been the assumption that the double versions given in the Dv were both derived from the SAKMv.⁶⁴ That he took this for granted is not surprising as both Oldenberg and Geiger did not think such an assumption unjustifiable. But they were guarded in their statements. "A great part of the *Dīpavamsa*," said Oldenberg, "has the appearance not of an independent continuous work, but of a composition of such single stanzas extracted from a work or works like that *Aṭṭhakathā*."⁶⁵ "We may assume," wrote Geiger, "that the original work may have already contained different recensions, which were indebted for their origin to oral tradition, and that they had been placed directly side by side in order to give the whole content of the tradition; but there remains the other possibility that the compiler of the Dv as well as the Ak M. of the Mahāvihāra from which Mahānāma's work was produced, also made use of a second source."⁶⁶

Thus according to Geiger it is possible that a considerable amount of the adaptation, which Malalasekera attributes to the author of the Mv, was the work of the authors of the SAKMv themselves. This seems to have been the case, as the Vap does not seem to refer to such double versions in the SAKMv. The repetitions there seem to have been of a different type. "We are able from the MT. to form an idea," wrote Geiger, "of the way in which such repetitions came occasionally to be made. Messages were given most probably in the same words at the sending of the order as at the delivery of the message. Thus, e.g. in M. 31, 15 Sonuttara was sent by the monastery to fetch from the Nāga king the relics of the Buddha that had been guarded by him. It is said that this corresponded with a prophecy of the Buddha, who at his death ordered that a *doṇa* should be deposited in Lankā in the Mahāthupa with his

62. Mv I, pp. 1-4. Vap, p. 319.

63. A close examination of the Mv shows that its author has put together accounts which do not always agree in matters of detail.

64. Vap, p. lx.

65. The *Dīpavamsa*, p. 6. The italics are not in the original.

66. D. and M., p. 68. Rhys Davids wrote of the Dv in J.R.A.S., 1905, p. 391: "It is the outcome of a fairly large number of previous works."

relics. When Soṇuttara came to the Nāga king, it says in M. 31, 48 merely *vatvādhikāram*, that he executed the order. But in the T. (413, 22)⁶⁷ the words were again repeated: *devinda, mama atthasu sarīradhātudomesu ekaṃ donaṃ Lankādīpē Mahāthūpē nidhānāya bhavissati.*

"The following is another example. As Duṭṭhagāmaṇi felt his end drawing near, he ordered that his bed should be carried out, so that he could once more see the masterpieces of his life, the Lohapāsāda and the Mahāthūpa. Many monks came there in order to get news of the condition of the sick man. Among them the king missed the Thera Puttābhaya. The MT. (424, 3 to M. 32, 11) relates the following story with reference to this. He had been one of the ten heroes of Duṭṭhagāmaṇi and after the defeat of the Damiḷa had become a monk, in order to fight against a still worse foe, against 'desire.' This is merely a repetition of the story already related in M. 26, 2, 4. Such a repetition may also have been found in the Ak.

"In a similar way, the history of Bhātiya and his visit to the relic chamber of the Mahāthūpa is anticipated (MT. 401, 11)⁶⁹ with reference to its description (according to M. 30, 97), and recurs in M. 34, 49 in the history of the reign of this king."⁷⁰

All this tends to show that there is no definite evidence for assuming that these double versions of the Dv were derived from the SAKMv, and it seems better to accept with Geiger the judgment of the Vap that the author of the Mv followed the original very closely in its subject matter and that only the style was changed.

What then can we conclude about the origins of the Dv, the Sp, the Mv, and the SAKMv? That the Mv was based on a Sinhalese chronicle is beyond doubt in spite of the assertion of Franke. The author of the Vap says that the Sinhalese chronicle, the SAKMv, also called the *Porāṇatthakathā*, belonged to the Mahāvihāra, and was a prose work in the Sinhalese dialect.⁷¹ He makes it clear that the *Mahāvamsa* of the ancients referred to in the Pāli Mv is this work and that it contained the faults of over-condensation, prolixity and repetition.⁷²

Similarly the Sp too was based on a Sinhalese work. Its author says that its chief source was the *Mahātthakathā*.⁷³ He wrote this Pāli work as the

67. Vap, p. 570.

68. Vap, p. 586.

69. Vap, p. 548.

70. D. and M., p. 67.

71. Vap, pp. 36, 42, 48.

72. *Ibid.* p. 46.

73. Sp, p. 2.

explanations in the language of the Sihalādīpa were of no avail to the bhikkhus outside the island. The section of the *Mahātthakathā* on which it was based, as already shown, appears to have been the *Vinayatthakathā*.

The sources of the Sp and the Mv, though different, handed down the same tradition as they both belonged to the Mahāvihāra.⁷⁴ In fact a close examination of these two Pāli works shows that the two accounts are very similar and rarely contradict each other. The Mv certainly gives more information about most matters dealt with in the Sp, but its accounts are as a rule only expanded versions of the material in the latter work. There is also sometimes verbal agreement between the Sp and the Mv, and in more than one case Pāli verses in the Sp, which form a definite part of the story and cannot be excluded, are incorporated in the Mv even without a verbal change.⁷⁵

Was the Dv similarly based on a Sinhalese work? The Dv itself says nothing about its source. But Oldenberg and Geiger, as we have seen, believed that it was based on the SAKMv of the Mahāvihāra, though both of them admitted the possibility that the Dv may owe some of its material to other sources. On the other hand Franke, though he did not question the view that the Dv belonged to the Mahāvihāra, believed it to be an independent work based on no other written source.

Does Franke in fact contradict Oldenberg and Geiger? Oldenberg was of opinion that the Dv was not a continuous work but a composition of single stanzas extracted from a work or works like the *Atthakathā*. He also attributed the repetitions and omissions to this peculiar method of compilation.⁷⁶ Geiger thought that the author of the Dv confined himself especially to the material that was already in Pāli in the *Atthakathā*, interspersed throughout. Thus in their opinion the Dv was not an independent work but a stringing together of fragments from the SAKMv. In other words the sections thus strung together could have been original compositions.⁷⁷

These, according to Geiger, seem to have formed the oldest part of the SAKMv and a part of the oral tradition. "The oldest part," says Geiger, "reaches back to monastic tradition, which originally was carried on from mouth to mouth. Oral tradition without doubt played an important part in the history of ancient Buddhism in Ceylon. Each tradition may have been composed of legends, following particular events and personalities: thus, for example, the visit of Buddha to the Island, the mission of Mahinda, the arrival of the sacred Bo-tree. A part of these legends were written in Pāli verse;

74. D. and M., pp. 49 and 70.

75. *Ibid.* pp. 70-73.

76. The *Dīpavamsa*, p. 6.

77. D. and M., p. 5.

they form the backbone of the whole story ; the reciter would thus with their help retain in his memory the whole course of the action. The verses were bound together by independent prose, in the ancient Sinhalese tongue."⁷⁸ Thus the disagreement between Franke on the one hand and Oldenberg and Geiger on the other on this point seems to be more apparent than real.

But were all these Pāli verses in the Dv, as Oldenberg and Geiger imagined, extracted from the SAKMv ? Geiger himself, as noticed earlier, admitted the possibility that the SAKMv had fewer Pāli verses than he originally imagined. But cannot one go further and ask whether the Dv was based on the SAKMv at all ? Is it not possible that it, or at least most of it, was based on oral tradition and not on the SAKMv ?

There is no doubt, as Oldenberg and Geiger have shown, that there is a great similarity between the Dv on the one hand and the Sp and the Mv on the other. The Mv in its material is similar to the Dv and generally follows the order of the Dv, though its accounts are much longer and fuller. The Sp, the earlier work, is even closer to the Dv in language and at times in the arrangement of matter. Further some of the verses found interspersed in the Sp and the Vap as well as some verses in the Mv are identical with, or almost the same as, some in the Dv, the differences of those in the Sp being due to improvements in language and metre. Besides the Dv covers the same period of time, and like the Mv ends with Mahāsena in whose reign the persecution of the bhikkhus of the Mahāvihāra and the destruction of some of its buildings probably led to the conclusion of the first part of the Mv.

But does it necessarily follow from all this that the Dv too was based on the SAKMv ? The *Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvamsa* of the Uttaravihāra,⁷⁹ as Geiger has shown from the evidence drawn from the Vap, does not seem to have been very different from the SAKMv except in matters of detail.⁸⁰ Hence could not the Dv have been a chronicle of some other *vihāra* like the Thūpārāma, which was closely associated with the Mahāvihāra and probably suffered equally from the persecution of Mahāsena ? In fact the Dv seems to attach greater importance to the Thūpārāma than the Mahāvihāra.⁸¹

The similarity of many verses in the Dv and the Mv is natural as both the Dv and the SAKMv seem to have followed a common oral tradition at least to the coming of Mahinda.⁸² But to judge from the *Uttaravihāra*

78. D. and M., p. 65.

79. The Abhayagiri Vihāra.

80. D. and M., p. 50.

81. Cf. Dv xv, 34; xvii, 1 (also Sp, p. 99) with Mv xv, 51. Malalasekera quotes an extract from Nevill who suggests that the Dv was a work of the nuns and not of the Mahāvihāra. P.L.C., p. 135. See also *Epigraphia Zeylanica* iv. p. 278.

82. D. and M., p. 64.

Aṭṭhakathā there is no reason why there should not be similarity in verses in later accounts too.⁸³ The only verses that need be considered are those which are identical or very similar.⁸⁴ The author of the Sp, or more probably the author of the *Vinayatṭhakathā*, knew the Dv as he quotes from it.⁸⁵ Hence it is not strange if he borrowed any verses from the Dv, even if it is assumed for the moment that he did not obtain the verses from oral tradition common to the many *vihāras*. All the verses common to the Dv and the Mv in the earlier chapters are also common to the Sp.⁸⁶ Since the author of the Mv knew the *Vinayatṭhakathā* and made use of it even to correct the SAKMv, he could have borrowed them from the VAK or the Sp, if it is again assumed that the SAKMv did not obtain the common verses from oral tradition. Two such verses, not common to the Sp, in a later chapter deal with the writing down of the Pāli Canon and the Commentaries. These, as Geiger points out, along with two other verses give "the impression that they were officially stamped by tradition, and therefore the words were fixed in the same way for the author of the Dv as for the author of the M."⁸⁷ The other verses common to the Dv and the Mv occur in one chapter of the Dv in a second version which appears to have been borrowed along with other second versions in the Dv from another source.⁸⁸ These second versions appear to be closer to the Mv than the rest, and may have been borrowed from the Mahāvihāra itself or from some other *vihāra* of the Theravādins.

In fact the Sp (or the Vak) seems to look upon the Dv as a work distinct from the *Porānatṭhakathā*. The Sp has three quotations from the *Porānā*. The first of these gives a list of the theras of Ceylon who handed down the *Vinaya*.⁸⁹ The second and the third deal with the coming of Mahinda⁹⁰ and these are also found in the Dv.⁹¹ There are some more quotations in the Sp, but they are said to be from the Dv.⁹² They deal with the relations between Asoka and Devānaṃpiya Tissa, a subject not included in the contents

83. *Ibid.* pp. 50, 51, 63.

84. Geiger believed the verses common to the Dv and the Mv were borrowed by each from the SAKMv.

85. Sp, p. 75.

86. Mv iv, 57, 58. xi, 28, 29. xi, 31b. xi, 34. xiv, 8.

Dv iv, 49. v, 22. xi, 33. xii, 1. xii, 4a. xii, 5. xii, 51.

Sp, pp. 33-35. p. 75. p. 76. p. 76. p. 74.

87. D. and M., p. 16.

88. Dv xxi, 21b, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33, 51, 56a, 66.

Mv xxxvi, 4a. xxxv, 115, 123. xxxvi, 1, 6, 18 and 19, 57, 105. xxxvii, 1.

89. Sp, p. 62. This list appears also in the *Parivāra* (p. 2), but not in the Dv though it seems to have formed a part of it once. See Dv, p. 204.

90. Sp, pp. 70, 71.

91. Dv xii, pp. 12-13 and 33-37.

92. Sp, pp. 75-76.

recorded in the first three lines of the Dv, which are common to the *Porāṇā*. If the Dv merely gave extracts from or reproduced in Pāli what was already in the *Porāṇāttḥakathā*, it is strange that the Sp should give the *Porāṇā* as the source for two passages contained also in the Dv and attribute the other quotations to the Dv.

The *Kathāvattuḥpakaraṇa* also quotes once from the Dv, but what it extracts is the passage about the heretical schools which finds no mention in the Sp or the Mv and thus probably formed no part of the SAKMv or the other works of the Mahāvihāra.⁹³

There is still another reason for thinking that the Dv originally was not based on the Sinhalese works on which the Sp and the Mv depended. It clearly belongs to an earlier stratum of tradition. Almost all the accounts in it are much shorter, and it does not refer at all to some of the episodes related in the Sp and the Mv. It mentions fewer places as visited by the Buddha. It makes no reference to Tissa, the brother of Asoka, and says that Asoka killed all his brothers. It knows of a western route from India to Ceylon, but not an eastern route like the Sp and the Mv. It refers to buildings not mentioned in the Mv, and sometimes credits a building to a king other than the one mentioned in the Mv.

The Dv has also traditions about the death of the Buddha and of the Third Buddhist Council which appear to show that it assumed dates for the death of the Buddha and Asoka's consecration different from those of the Sp and the Mv according to which Buddha died on the full-moon day of Vesākḥā and Asoka was consecrated 218 years after the Parinibbāṇa. The statement in the Dv that Mahinda arrived 236 years after the death of the Buddha⁹⁴ does not agree with another that the first consecration of Devānāmpīya Tissa took place also in the 237th year.⁹⁵ These two statements can be reconciled only if it is assumed that the Buddha died not on the full-moon day of Vesākḥā, but on some other date like the 8th day of the second half of Kattika (September-October), which the Sārvastivādins considered to be the date of the Parinibbāṇa.⁹⁶ The Dv traditions that the Third Buddhist Council took place 118 years after the death of the Buddha⁹⁷ seem to assume that Asoka was consecrated only a hundred years later. This again is a view held in the Sārvastivādin works, the *Dīvyāvadāna* and the *Avadāna Sataka*.⁹⁸ Do these dates too belong to an earlier stratum of tradition?

93. J.P.T.S., 1909, p. 3; Dv v, 30-33; *Kathāvattuḥ Aṭṭhakathā*, p. 123.

94. Dv xv, 71; xii, 44; xvii, 88.

95. *Ibid.* xxvii, 78.

96. J.R.A.S., 1909, p. 1. Mv Eng. Trs., p. xxxi.

97. Dv I, 24, 25; V, 55-59.

98. E. J. Thomas: *Theravādin and Sārvastivādin Dates of the Nirvāṇa*. B. C. Law Volume, pp. 18-20.

The Dv was probably not even a work of the Mahāvihāra. The author of the Vap takes great pains to note differences between the Mv and other works such as the *Aṭṭhakathā*. He points out, for instance, that the Uttara-vihāra *Aṭṭhakathā* leaves out King Cetiya from the genealogy of the Buddha.⁹⁹ The *Aṭṭhakathā* says that Paṇḍukābhaya sojourned on the Dolapabbata five years and on the Ariṭṭhapabbata six years whereas the Mv gives four and seven years.¹⁰⁰ He even refers to verbal differences. He says for the phrase *divam gato* the *Aṭṭhakathā* has *kālam akāsi devalokam gato*.¹⁰¹ The *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* uses *visajjesi* in place of *adāsi*.¹⁰² But the author of the Vap never refers to the differences between the Dv and the Mv. He mentions a *Dīpavamsa Aṭṭhakathā*,¹⁰³ but, like the author of the Mv,¹⁰⁴ never refers to the Dv itself. If the Dv was based on even an older tradition of the Mahāvihāra it is likely that the author of the Vap would have made some reference to it.

Thus the Dv seems to be an independent work with little or no direct connection with the SAKMv. But it does not follow, as Franke assumed, that it stands on its own tottering feet. Similarly all the accounts in the SAKMv need not necessarily be inventions of its authors. As Franke himself pointed out the language of the Dv clearly show the influence of the *Jātaka*, *Cariyāpīṭaka* and the *Buddhavamsa*. A close examination of the Dv, the Sp and the Mv show that some of the episodes and stories in them such as those of Vijaya, Paṇḍukābhaya and Nigrodha are based on Jātakas while certain other accounts show that they have been amplified or embellished with details from these tales.

The ancient historical tradition of Ceylon reveals also the influence of many other Pāli works. The chief of them are the *Mahāvagga* and the *Cullavagga* of the *Vinaya Pīṭaka*, the Mahāparinibbāṇa Suttanta of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the Pāli Commentaries.

Another work that contains some of the traditions common to the chronicles of Ceylon is the *Aśokāvadāna*. A considerable portion of the material in the Dv, the Sp and the Mv appears to have been borrowed from it or from other sources utilized by the authors of this work. The *Aśokāvadāna* is also a work which has grown with time. The original accounts in it have been amplified

99. Mv ii, 3; Vap, p. 125.

100. Mv x, 45; Vap, pp. 287 and 290.

101. Mv viii, 3; Vap, p. 268.

102. Mv v, 83; Vap, p. 207.

103. This is clearly not the Dv as the references are not to its contents.

104. Geiger believed that the author of the Mv was familiar with the Dv. "That the Dv was known to the author of the Mv is quite certain, and it is not at all unlikely that he, here and there, borrowed from it, considering the Indian's way of working in such cases." D. and M., p. 16. There is no conclusive evidence for such an assumption.

and new episodes have been added to it. The Sp and the Mv show that some of the legends included in the later forms of this work were known in Ceylon.

What conclusions may we draw from all this about the growth of the ancient historical tradition of Ceylon?

The Dv undoubtedly contains the oldest form of the tradition. But it is not the work of one author or of a single century. As Oldenberg and Geiger point out it is clearly a compilation. The different parts have been composed by different persons at different times. This is evident from the variety in style. Some passages, if the interpolations are omitted, are free from irregularities in metre and mistakes in grammar. Some accounts have one part in one metre and another in another metre. Some, like the accounts of Vijaya give only a summary of the story. Others, like the visits of the Buddha and the bringing of the Bo-tree, are narrated in greater detail. Some passages give only the speeches without any mention of the speakers, while others, which give the speakers, seem to represent a more developed form of such speeches. The double accounts seem to be derived from two different sources. The first accounts probably belonged to the vihāra that produced the Dv, while the second accounts belonged to another. The memory verses¹⁰⁵ show how some of the stories were remembered before the ballads themselves were composed. Some parts, such as the account of the life of the Buddha, seem to have been based on Pāli prose passages of the Canon. It is often quite clear that couplets have been introduced to connect independent ballads or parts of ballads. Most of the sentences expressed in a single line, many lines occurring in sentences which are expressed in three lines, many lines either metrically or grammatically wrong, and many lines which obviously consist of commentarial matter may have been added to the original verses at the time of compilation or even later.¹⁰⁶

The Dv appears to have existed before the *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* was written in the first century A.D. But at that time the narrative is not likely to have extended much beyond the introduction of Buddhism to the island. Such a work could have been either made up from oral tradition or extracted, as Oldenberg and Geiger imagined, from one or more written sources. Obviously the rest must have been added to this nucleus either from time to time or about the fourth century in which the last king referred to in it lived. Even if the additions were made still later the material itself is not likely to have belonged to a period later than the fourth century.¹⁰⁷

105. D. and M., p. 8.

106. See also D. and M., pp. 5-26, 66.

107. For the views of Oldenberg and Geiger, see D. and M., p. 43.

The different parts of the Dv may be further apportioned to different centuries. Some sections, like the visits of the Buddha may belong to the first century B.C.¹⁰⁸ The predictions about the buildings of the Mahāvihāra by Mahinda may belong to the second half of the first century A.D. or even later as the account is fuller than that in the Sp which was based on the *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* probably written not earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. Perhaps the most that can be concluded at present is that the contents of the Dv range from the first century B.C. to the fourth century A.D.

The work that seems to come next to the Dv is the SAKMv. As Geiger points out, "This 'Mahāvamsa of the ancients' is certainly not a work completed at one time; it took the form in which Mahānāma found it, quite gradually in the course of generations. New episodes were always being added on, so that in time it assumed more and more the character of a chronicle."¹⁰⁹

If the view of Oldenberg, Geiger and Adikāram is accepted that that the term *Porāṇā* referred to a definite *Atthakathā*, it is clear that the SAKMv existed when the *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* was written. This, in its original form, may have dealt only with the topics mentioned in the proem of the Dv: the visits of the Buddha, the bringing of the relics and of the Bo-tree, of Buddhism and the Pāli Canon and the *Atthakathā* and the coming of Vijaya.¹¹⁰ But as far as it can be judged from the evidence in the Vap, which shows that the SAKMv did not differ much from the Mv, its author does not seem to have merely reproduced in Sinhalese the oral tradition in the form found in the Dv, though he often keeps to the original language and quotes Pāli verses, but appears to have revised and added to it in accordance with the new information that was available to him.

This first part was probably written down about the time of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya in whose reign, according to the Dv and the Mv the Sinhalese Commentaries were written down.¹¹¹ According to the *Nikāya Saṅgraha*¹¹² the writing was done at Aluvihāre near Mātālē after the famine that followed the rebellion of the Brahmin Tissa. The rest of the Chronicle must have been written from time to time by different persons in the Mahāvihāra. The work of adding seems to have continued even after the Mv was composed.¹¹³

108. The fact that the language of some parts of the Dv has been influenced by the *Buddhāvamsa* and the *Cariyāpīṭaka* unfortunately is of no assistance to get at the earliest possible date of the earliest ballads as no serious attempt has yet been made to fix the dates of these works.

109. D. and M., p. 66; See also Vap, p. lix.

110. D. and M., p. 69. This can also be assumed from the fact that the Sp quotes from the Dv in dealing with a topic outside these contents. Buddhaghosa need not have done this. The author of the VAK was no doubt responsible for it.

111. Dv xx, 20-21; Mv xxxiii, 102b-104a.

112. Colombo, 1908, p. 10.

113. D. and M., p. 27.

The *Vinayaṭṭhakathā* comes next in order. Its author knew the *Porāṇā* as well as the *Dv.* He borrowed material either oral or written from other sources too.¹¹⁴ According to Adikaram this work appears to have been written in the latter half of the first century A.D. as the phrase *yāva ajjatanā* already referred to applies to about this period of time.¹¹⁵

The *Samanta-pāsādikā*,¹¹⁶ the Pāli Commentary, the introduction of which gives an account of the early history of Ceylon, seems to have been based on the *Vinayaṭṭhakathā*. It contains additional information not given in the *Mv.*¹¹⁷ According to Adikaram Buddhaghosa wrote it at the request of Buddhasiri having learnt the Sinhalese Commentaries from Buddhmitta while residing in the building erected to the east of the Mahāvihāra by the Minister Mahānigama.¹¹⁸ Buddhaghosa probably derived the additional information from the other commentaries he consulted. In addition to the *Mahāṭṭhakathā* he mentions two others by name, the *Mahāpaccarī* and the *Kurundi*. According to the *Sāratthadīpanī* and the *Vimativinodanī*, the others he consulted were the *Andhaka Aṭṭhakathā* and the *Sankhepa Aṭṭhakathā*, but according to the *Vajirabuddhi* they were the *Andhaka Aṭṭhakathā* and the *Culla-paccarī*.¹¹⁹

It is possible to fix more definitely the date of the *Samanta-pāsādikā*. According to Adikaram the writing of the Commentary was begun in the twentieth year and completed in the twenty-first year of King Sirinivāsa.¹²⁰ Sirinivāsa is an honorific applied at least to one other king.¹²¹ The king referred to here appears to be Mahānāma, who reigned from 409 to 431. Hence the date of the *Samanta-pāsādikā* may be said to be 430.

The *Mv* is undoubtedly a later work than the *Sp*, but there is no evidence in it to fix its date. In the *Vap*, though at times the names of other theras are given,¹²² the author of the *Mv* is always referred to as *ācariya*,¹²³ a term used for the writers of the Commentaries; but, in a colophon at the end of it, the author of the *Mv* is said to be Mahānāma of the *pariveṇa* built by the commander of the troops, Dīghasanda.¹²⁴ According to the *Mv* Dīghasanda

was the *senāpati* of Devānaṃpiya Tissa. He built a little *pāsāda* with eight great pillars for Mahinda, and this famous *pariveṇa*, the home of renowned men, was called the Dīghasandasenāpatipariveṇa.¹²⁵

. Who was this Mahānāma and when did he live? The only thera known to have lived in the Dīghasanda Pariveṇa is the uncle of King Dhātusena, but there is nothing to show that his name was Mahānāma.¹²⁶ A Mahānāma is mentioned in the *Cūlavamsa*,¹²⁷ but according to the readings given by Geiger he lived in the Dīghāṇa or Dīghāsana Vihāra. Therefore these two theras need not be the same person unless it can be proved that the Dīghāsana Vihāra and the Dīghasanda Pariveṇa are two different names for the same place.¹²⁸ Hence the evidence is insufficient to show that either of these was the author of the *Mv*.

Two questions arise from the foregoing. Was the statement in the colophon of the *Vap* based on a reliable tradition or was it a guess from the passages in the *Cūlavamsa* referred to in the previous paragraphs? If the latter is the case, the tradition is of no value. If the former is right, who was this Mahānāma? Is it valid to accept him, according to the Ceylon tradition, as the uncle of Dhātusena as well as the Mahānāma of the Dīghāsana Vihāra? This tradition seems to have no antiquity,¹²⁹ and only casts doubts on the authority of the statement in the colophon of the *Vap* itself.

Adikaram points out that a thera by the name of Mahānāma, while living in a vihāra built by the Minister Uttaramantī, wrote the *Saddhamma-ppakāsīnī*, the Pāli Commentary on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, in the third year after the death of Moggallāna I (*i.e.* about A.D. 516).¹³⁰ So far no one has connected this Mahānāma, who too lived in the sixth century A.D., with the authorship of the *Mv*.¹³¹

Geiger first placed the *Mv* in the last quarter of the fifth century on the ground that its author was the Mahānāma who lived in the reign of Moggallāna

114. *Ibid.* p. 48.

115. Adikaram, p. 87.

116. See D. and M., pp. 70-73, for a full analysis of this work. See also *Vap*, p. lxxvii.

117. *Vap*, pp. 146, 239 and lxxi.

118. Adikaram, p. 5.

119. J.R.A.S. Vol. V, p. 298. Adikaram p. 12.

120. Adikaram, p. 5. See also *Samanta-pāsādikā* (Sinhalese Edition) p. 427.

121. Adikaram, p. 9. The *Pāvakumbā Sīrita* of the fifteenth century refers to Mahānāma as Mahanam Sirinives (Mahānāma Sirinivāsa).

122. *Vap*, p. 47.

123. See D. and M., p. 32.

124. *Vap*, p. 687.

125. xv, 212-213.

126. *Cūlavamsa* xxxviii. 16.

127. *Ibid.* xxxix. 42.

128. For a discussion on this question, see D. and M., p. 41 and p. 140. In these it is assumed that Mahānāma lived in the Dīghasanda Pariveṇa and not in Dīghāṇa or Dīghāsana Vihāra. Geiger thinks that on grounds of age that these two cannot be the same but Malalasekera thinks otherwise. See also *Cūlavamsa*, Eng. Trs. I p. 48, n. 1. Geiger gives no reason for assuming that the Dīghasanda Pariveṇa and the Dīghāsana Vihāra are the same.

129. P.L.C., p. 140. *Vap*, p. civ.

130. Adikaram, p. 9.

131. Malalasekera in his P.L.C., p. 144, appears to identify this Mahānāma with the author of the *Vap*. It is not clear why he thinks that the two Mahānāmas mentioned in an inscription at Buddha Gayā are the authors of the *Mv* and *Vap* respectively.

in the Dighāsana Vihāra, which at that time was believed to be the Dighasanda Pariveṇa.¹³² Later he placed it in the sixth century depending on Fleet's translation of the passage in the *Cūlavamsa* referred to earlier.¹³³ Since he rejected later the view that this passage referred to the Mv, other evidence has to be sought to fix the date of the Mv.

The only piece of evidence available suggests that the Mv was composed some time after the visit of Fa Hsien to Ceylon at the beginning of the fifth century. There is no reference either in the Dv or the Sp to imply that the bowl of the Buddha was in Ceylon. According to Fa Hsien he learnt from an Indian in Ceylon that it was at first at Vaiśāli and then in Gandhāra. According to the Mv it was in Ceylon. Thus it is perhaps best to place the Mv in the sixth century, the date suggested by Geiger though on other grounds.¹³⁴

There is also no definite evidence to fix the date of the Vap. Geiger placed it between 1,000 and 1250. The author of the Vap lived after the reign of Dāṭhopa Tissa II (650-658), as he refers in his work to Dāṭhopa Tissa, the nephew.¹³⁵ The Vap was not later than the thirteenth century as its author does not seem to have known the later additions to the Mv while the author of the Pāli *Thūpavamsa*, which belongs to the thirteenth century, made use of the Vap. Geiger also took into account the possibility that the Vap was later than the *Mahābodhivamsa*. This made him place the Vap after 1000.¹³⁶

Malalasekera did not accept the view that the author of the Vap knew the *Mahābodhivamsa*.¹³⁷ This would place the Vap any time between 658 and 1250. But Malalasekera placed it at first in the seventh or eighth century on the belief that the Sinhalese sources on which the Vap was based disappeared not long after the Mv was written. He appears to have been influenced also by the Ceylon tradition which attributed the Vap too to Mahānāma, the author of the Mv. He did not agree that the same person was responsible for both these works, but he seems to have thought that the mistake was due to the fact that the Vap followed the Mv closely. But both these are assumptions which have yet to be established.

In the Vap Malalasekera places it in the eighth or ninth century,¹³⁸ since the author of the Mv is said to have lived in the sixth century and two centuries

132. D. and M., p. 42. The date is based on the reckoning that Buddha died in 544 B.C. and not 483 B.C.

133. xxxviii, 59. Mv Eng. Trs., p. xi.

134. D. and M., p. 32. *Indian Culture* I, p. 565, Louis Finot: Notes on the Sinhalese Tradition relating to Buddha's Relics.

135. Vap, p. 176.

136. D. and M., p. 32.

137. P.L.C., p. 143.

138. Vap, pp. civ-cix.

were sufficient for the development of the variant readings referred to in the Vap. He gives also additional arguments for placing it earlier than Geiger. He now thinks the fact that the author of the Mv was not the same as the author of the Vap does not preclude the possibility that the author of the Vap was also called Mahānāma. He then hints that the author of the Vap may be the second Mahānāma of the Buddha Gayā inscription, who is said to have been born in Ceylon.¹³⁹

Geiger pointed out that the name Sāmagalla mentioned in the Mv had changed into Moragalla when the Vap was written.¹⁴⁰ Earlier Malalasekera wrote: "It is clear that many years had elapsed between the original work and its *īkā*, sufficiently long to allow the name of a village to have undergone change."¹⁴¹ Now he says: "But this means nothing in point of time. We do not know the circumstances in which the change occurred; such a change may take place sometimes in one day, as happened, I believe, in the Great European War."¹⁴²

Malalasekera also points out that the *Mahābodhivamsa* attributed to the tenth century is in style more involved and more plentiful in ornamental epithets than the Vap, and therefore the Vap is likely to be older than the *Mahābodhivamsa*.¹⁴³

Malalasekera's attempt seems to be not so much to discover the date of the Vap as to maintain as far as possible the view taken earlier that it belonged to the seventh or eighth century. The fact that the author of the Mv was a person different from the author of the Vap certainly does not preclude the possibility of the author of the Vap being a Mahānāma. But what grounds are there to accept a tradition, first recorded by Turnour, that he was called Mahānāma? Can one connect the Mahānāmas of the Buddha Gayā inscription merely on the ground of the similarity of names and the fact that the second of them was born in Ceylon with the authorship of the Mv and the Vap? Could a name of a village have changed even in those times in a day? Can any other such instance be quoted? Does it necessarily follow that the Vap is older than the *Mahābodhivamsa* because the latter, a poem, is in style more involved and more plentiful in ornamental epithets?

Geiger, has shown that the first part of the *Cūlavamsa* was most probably composed not in the thirteenth century, as Malalasekera had suggested,¹⁴⁴ but at the end of the twelfth century or at the beginning of the

139. Vap, p. cv. *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum* III, p. 274.

140. Mv xxxiii, 53; Vap, p. 616; D. and M. p. 33.

141. P.L.C., p. 143.

142. Vap, p. cv.

143. *Ibid.* p. cvii.

144. P.L.C., p. 215.

The Institution of Property.

THE essence of the conception of property is that it is an institution like marriage or the legislature or the church. In this connection it is necessary to guard against the popular mistake of confusing the meaning of the two different concepts "institution" and "association." Institutions are not associations just as brushes are not paintings. They are the "instruments or devices by which modes of associations are formed and maintained and by which their special functions are fulfilled."¹ The association known as the "family," for instance, is formed and is being maintained by the social institution known by the name of "marriage."

The second popular mistake which must be avoided in a paper like this is that of treating the words "property" and "goods" as synonyms. This is entirely erroneous. Any conglomeration of things or goods (in a state of nature) is not property; the matter of that, goods (chattels and land) are not property at all. Those goods the use and enjoyment of which are sanctioned by the State are the objects of proprietary rights. This *right* of use, enjoyment and possession over things is property. It is not the things themselves but a particular legal relation of a man (or a body of men) to a thing (or things) that is property.

All goods however cannot be objects of proprietary rights and certainly goods in a state of nature are not. Even free-goods located within the State cannot be owned by a private individual, though they certainly can be treated as objects over which the state or a corporation can exert and exercise proprietary rights. They are the objects of public property. No doubt the political society gets the proprietary rights over such things without effort or labour but so does one with regard to the proprietary rights which he receives through inheritance. They can be the objects of a nation's proprietary rights because their use and transmission can be sanctioned by the State.

But though "property" is one of the social institutions it is an institution of special import and implication, because unlike any other institution which brings into being and maintains any one definite association within the social fabric the institution of property permeates through and interlinks all the associations in the society. In its scope and incidence it transgresses the boundaries of all the institutions except the institution of Law of which it is an important branch.

1. J. S. Mackenzie: *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, p. 63. The same view has been taken by Professor MacIver in his "Community." Bk. II, Chap. IV.

Professor Ely of Wisconsin has classified fundamental social institutions of the first rank under five heads:—*viz.*, property, inheritance, contract, vested rights and personal conditions. On a careful scrutiny it will be found that this classification is based on mere convenience. In their essence they are species of the same genus—property. Inheritance is a special “process of transmission of property from generation to generation.” The right to make contracts has been held to be a class of proprietary right by the Supreme Court of America.² Vested rights are a special variety of caste-property. Personal conditions like slavery and wifehood were originally and fundamentally and still are proprietary rights of the most objectionable type. It is a strange anomaly of our social history that though slavery has been thoroughly calumniated and practically abolished at least from civilised societies matrimony is not only tolerated but sanctified and worshipped. A beautiful wife of a rich husband bought off through social influence or with the help of superior purchasing power at one’s command is an exercise of a type of monopolistic proprietary right which is difficult to justify by any decent standard of social ethics. Be that as it may, it suffices here to say that the institution of property is extremely wide in its scope and affects the life of the individual in almost each one of his activities.

Property is essentially a jural concept. Proprietary right, like all other rights, is a product of Law. Like marriage (which we propose to treat as a special type of proprietary right) the right of ownership is unimaginable outside the State. In this connection I want to draw attention to the fact that even a purely religious marriage like the Hindu marriage is marriage only within the ambit of law as promulgated by the State. Its incidence, for example, the duty of the wife to observe chastity, the legitimation of the children of the union, the wife’s right to maintenance—has meaning only within the compass of Law and Law presupposes the existence of the State. Every member within a state enjoys things over every atom of which some one (either a private individual or a public body) exercises proprietary rights. The absolute anarchist in an absolute state of nature alone is or can be really “*property-less.*”

Obviously I am maintaining a thesis, *viz.*, that property is a bundle of rights, may be preponderantly over things, but the essence of it is not the things but the *rights*. This precludes any possibility of any one living without using property so long as he lives within a State. It simultaneously negatives the theory which conceives of the origin of property in occupation or possession.

2. Ely: Property and Contract in their relations to Distribution of Wealth. New York, 1914. Vol. I, p. 52.

3. Lee vs. Ry Co., 58 Ark. 407; Forier vs. People. 31 N.E. 395.

Occupation of land or possession of movables, I submit, for a million years will not give one proprietary rights over those things until and unless his adverse possession is ratified by the State and when that is done then that act of ratification will give rise to his exclusive right over those things and those rights will be his property. Consequently a person may own proprietary right over a thing without a single day’s possession and conversely he may not acquire any legal claim in it after years of possession. It is however, an entirely different matter that long term of possession of things by a person is usually recognised by the State as a good certificate for conferring proprietary rights over those things on the possessor. The origin of proprietary right therefore, is not occupation but Law or the recognition of the political society.

The institution of property further, is not merely a social institution like the church, but like the State, it is a social institution of peculiar incidence; its origin in a given society being coeval with State and Law. It is, I maintain, a political institution, that is, to say, it comes into being in a given society only when that society has been able to evolve a sovereign political authority from which positive law can emanate. In a society which has not yet developed into a State there can be no proprietary right. Men may have possession but no ownership, just as they may have love and friendship but no marriage or customs and conventions but no law.

What then is the chief characteristic of the right of ownership which confers upon men proprietary rights over things owned? It is the right of exclusive possession sanctioned and protected by the State. When I say this book is “mine” it is simultaneously declared that it is not thine, not his, not hers, not anybody else’s. This declaration receives legal sanction by the ratification of the State, at which point of time my proprietary right over the book is established against the whole world.

This exclusive right theory of ownership however, is not true in an absolute sense. Not only there are cases of ownership where the owner is obliged to concede an inferior type of right of use and enjoyment over things owned by him to non-owners but even in those objects of ownership from the enjoyment of which he can exclude the rest of the world his right of use is by *no means unlimited in extent*. That is, though he can exclude others from their use, he cannot use them in any way he likes (though it is admitted that the scope of his use is very large). It is not the narrowness of the sphere of restriction but the restriction itself that is important in this case and the restriction is really not so insignificant as it appears at first sight to be.

Within the limitations imposed upon by Law the right of exclusive control over things (which ownership confers upon the owner) can be exercised by a private individual as well as a public body. If this control is vested in a

political unit (as a city or a state) then it is *public property*, but if it is vested in a private individual or a group of such individuals then it is *private property*.

Apart from public property, which is expressly meant for the use and enjoyment of the public in general, even private property has a social aspect. This social complexion of private property is inherent in the very concept "property" and manifests itself clearly in the *limitations* imposed upon its use by the social will or the State. Just like any other right authorised by the State, the right of ownership is relative to the social needs and limited by the social necessities.

The social aspect of private property has been recognised by eminent jurists and constitutional authorities. In the words of the renowned German jurist, Professor von Jhering, "an absolute right of Property would result in the dissolution of the State." The Code of Frederick the Great lays down :—

"Niemand darf sein Eigentum zur Kränkung oder Beschädigung anderer missbrauchen."⁴

That is, none is permitted to (mis-) use his property to the discomfort or injury of others.

The Napoleonic Code says :

"La propriété est le droit de jouir et de disposer de choses de la manière la plus absolue, pourvu qu'on n'en fasse un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les réglemens."⁵

Lord Mackenzie Says :

"Property is a right to the absolute use, enjoyment and disposal of a thing, without any restraint, except what is imposed on the owner by law or pacton."⁶

Professor Huxley remarks :

"At present the state protects men in the possession and enjoyment of their property and defines what the property is. The justification for its so doing is that its action promotes the good of the people. If it can be clearly proved that the abolition of property would tend still more to promote the good of the people, the state will have the same justification for abolishing property that it now has for maintaining it."⁷

We conclude therefore that the main ethical justification of private property is its potential power of promoting public good. Indeed some learned autho-

4. Das Allgemeine Landrecht. Teil I., para. 27.

5. Art 544. Property is the right of using things and of controlling them in the most absolute manner, provided that one does not make a use of them prohibited by the laws or ordinances.

6. Roman Law, p. 171.

7. T. H. Huxley in Administrative Nihilism: an Address in the volume "Method and Results." New York, 1899.

rities are of opinion that in every law there is a silent clause to the effect that it is effective only so long as it does not destroy public weal or offend public conscience. Lasalle in his "System of Acquired Rights" observes :

"Jedem Verträge von Anfang an die stillschweigende Klausel hinzudenken ist, es solle das in demselben für sich oder Andere stipulirte Recht nur auf so lange Zeit Geltung haben, so lange die Gesetzgebung ein solches Recht überhaupt als zulässig betrachten wird."⁸

That is, in every contract there is a clause understood that it is valid so long as it does not offend the public conscience. Professor Jhering expresses the same opinion when he says,

"Die Idee des Eigentums kann nichts mit sich bringen was mit der Idee der Gesellschaft in Widerspruch steht."⁹

This obligation on the part of the owner not to offend the public conscience lends a social character to property, even to those types which we commonly term private property.

Admitting therefore that private property has a social aspect and that it is an important aspect we cannot however, interpret it, as Prof. Ely¹⁰ has endeavoured to do, as a *social trust*. All that we are prepared to say is that owing to a tendency towards wholesale socialisation of private property, private profit-makers have conceded of late, to so conduct their business affairs as to offer some benefit to the society at large but the guiding force and motive behind it is not social service but personal gain. The effort to interpret private property as a social trust appears to me to be an eleventh hour attempt to save the capitalist order of society and to check the onrush of socialism. The social aspect of private property as yet, appears to have received merely a negative recognition, that is, its exercise is to be so regulated as not to offend the public conscience and still it is not obligatory on the part of the owner of proprietary rights to so use them as to promote *positive public weal*.

The start towards the promotion of public utility by private property owners has however been made and there are unmistakable signs which give emphatic indication of the swing towards public utilisation. Laws relating to easement and servitude, disinfection and quarantine, laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals and children and marriage of minor girls, laws relating to the sterilization of the physically unfit and the consumption of opium and cocaine—all point to the same direction and tell the same story. The social aspect of private proprietary right is demonstrated nowhere so

8. Lasalle: System der Erworbenen Rechte, p. 164.

9. Von Jhering: Der Zweck im Recht. 3rd Edition, Vol. I., p. 523. The conception of property cannot carry with it any thing which is opposed to the conception of society.

10. Ely. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

emphatically and clearly as in the law relating to the prevention of suicides. Whether or not the state is justified in depriving a person from his moral right of refusing to live his own life when he so desires is entirely a different question with which we are not concerned here.

The ethical correctness of this tendency towards socialization of private property has come to be recognised among advanced peoples and progressive states. The Supreme Court of Carolina in a leading case held that "the right of the public to private property, to the extent that the use of it is needful and advantageous to the public must, we think, be universally acknowledged. Writers upon the laws of nature and of nations treat it as a right inherent in society."¹¹ This in other words means the recognition of the right of *expropriation* or the right of the State of compulsory seizing of private property in order to make it public property.

Thus far will be admitted by enlightened public opinion in all advanced countries at least in theory. A controversial point arises however, when we turn to the question whether this seizing of private property for public utilisation should be carried out *with or without compensation*. The arguments advanced in favour of paying compensation are (a) that an unfortunate mistake (of permitting a too wide range of proprietary rights to private individuals) has already been committed by the society at large (at a previous stage of our social evolution) and therefore the price for setting it right should be borne by the entire society and (b) that there will be political convulsion if no compensation is paid for expropriation.

The arguments however do not seem to be able to stand the test of criticism. Firstly if the society is asked to pay for a blunder said to have been committed by it centuries ago it may very well be said that the society has endured and paid enough for its original mistake by allowing the private owners the monopoly enjoyment of rights which should have been owned by the public.

Secondly the right of private ownership in land and other important factors of production was never willingly conceded by the society as a whole but by the governing group (which was for the time being in power) in the name of the society which being obliged to obey the political superior had no option but to acquiesce in this as in any other decision of the governing clique (assuming of course the absence of democratic form of government in those early days).

As to the fear of social convulsions it may be retorted, (i) that such a fear affords no ethical justification for paying compensation for expropriation though

it may have to be conceded in some cases on the grounds of administrative convenience and (ii) that social convulsions however undesirable a social phenomenon is certainly not worse than a state of affairs in which the accumulated groan of the propertyless is not even allowed to make itself audible and they are deprived of the courage to protest against injustice because that will bring them into conflict with the privileged class who holds the production units in their grip. Therefore on principles at least I would advocate expropriation *without compensation* on the largest possible scale. In the practical working out of the plan of expropriation however some compensation may be paid in special cases as a means of arresting social convulsions.

Though we accept the ideal of continuous expropriation at all time, the socio-economic history of mankind however shows that expropriation takes place in a given society more actively during a transition from one economic period to another. For instance when Europe passed from feudalism to industrialism great many rights, such as those connected with slavery and serfdom, were done away with. In India we are sure to witness instances of expropriation in great number as that country is now passing through a period of economic transition. Here in Ceylon the land-colonisation scheme sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture indicates the same tendency towards expropriation of private property for public benefit during a period of transition.

Property therefore we find is in a continuous state of flux and the tendency of the flux, in progressive societies, is to swing from private to public ownership. This is so because it is being progressively felt by the conscientious section of society that the contractual basis of acquiring property can have no ethical foundation in a capitalistic society where the poor (because of his poverty and dependence on the rich for his bare necessities without which he cannot live, far less act freely) is not free to enter into contracts which may truly be termed voluntary. The result has been a growing tendency towards the socialization of larger and larger spheres of private ownership.

Now that the process of socialisation has set in (at least in progressive societies) it must be decided once for all as to who is to take the initiative in this matter—the philanthropic rich or the State? I submit that the State ought to take the initiative in this matter and that for two important reasons: (a) in urgent cases we cannot depend upon the voluntary philanthropy of the generous rich even though it is possible to mention exceptional cases of voluntary socialisation of property like the Anand-Bhawan of Allahabad or the Tiergarten of Berlin where private proprietary rights were voluntarily transferred to the Nation by the Nehrus and the Hohenzollerns respectively on political and philanthropic grounds, and (b) secondly we should not depend upon the charity of others for a thing which ought to be ours by right.

11. Held in *R. R. Co. vs. Davis*. 19 N. Car. 451 and followed in *Dyckman vs. Mayor of New York*. 5, New York 434, and, *Scholl vs. German Coal Co.*, 18 Ill. 427.

The result that emerges out of our discussion so far is that the proprietary right of the individual should be controlled and limited as far as possible by the social will as expressed through the State and this launches us directly into a system of State Socialism. Consistently with our moral obligation to the vast majority of poor citizens in the State we have no option but to accept the above position, because we have only three alternative ideals of Proprietary Philosophy from which to choose :

- (i) the *ideal of private property under capitalism* (punctuated by occasional doses of philanthropy on the part of the propertied class) with which we have no sympathy for its obvious lack of an ethical justification,
- (ii) the *ideal of anarchism* (that is statelessness and propertylessness) which does not appear capable of ever being realised unless human nature changes from its very root,
- (iii) the *ideal of State Socialism* which appears to be the only practicable and plausible course to adopt at the present stage of our social evolution.

We want to emphasise here the fact that when we talk of socialisation of property we do not for a moment suggest that thereby we aim at or are capable of abolishing the institution of property so long as we are limiting our activities within the framework of a State. It is absurd to recognise the State and chuck off that institution. The abolition, the destruction of proprietary rights and claims, as distinguished from their transfer to some other ownership, "can only mean that the thing or the service claimed, if it is at all desirable, is flung out to be scrambled for."¹² That in other words means plain anarchy. That also means that within the State we can never abolish property altogether. Even in a hundred per cent communistic State there will be property—may be that every thing will be owned by the State and that there will be *no Private Property*.

It will be readily seen that though it is possible to imagine a state of perfect communism where private property is abolished in its entirety and individuals are reduced to mere users of public property in theory, some limits and restrictions have got to be put on the extent of socialisation of property when we come down to the realm of practical politics. Proprietary rights to the barest necessities of life and in the things which satisfy our emotional and aesthetic cravings have got to be admitted by any State but that which is out to be inhuman or intolerable. Nor does it appear just to deny proprietary rights over savings out of one's legitimate personal income acquired through thrift and self-denial so long as the extent of his right of ownership does not cover

12. H. G. Wells. *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*. 1932, p. 322.

such a wide field as to enable the owner to deprive others of their inherent right to evolve their own free personalities or to influence the life of the nation in a manner detrimental to the moral and physical well-being of its members.

All that we can do in this direction from the practical point of view therefore is to maximise socialisation, suppress our private greeds and progressively diminish the sphere of private ownership and bring it down to its absolute minimum level. In the words of Mr. Wells, "the extension of one's personality to things outside oneself is indeed as natural and instinctive a thing as eating. But because the liver is necessary and inevitable, there is no reason why it should be enlarged to uncomfortable proportions, because eating is an unconquerable instinct there is no excuse for repletion."¹³ But however we may reduce the sphere of private ownership the existence of the irreducible residue has got to be admitted.

The state-socialist does not like Proudhon, consider all private property as robbery. He preserves all that class of private property which is an "enlargement of personality" such as proprietary rights over one's person, clothes, personal tools, books and objects of aesthetic and emotional satisfaction. What he seeks to destroy is that class of proprietary rights which gives the individual power over the food and need of his fellow creatures, a power which can frustrate the realisation of the best selves of other individuals who do not have that power. He endeavours therefore to destroy the claim of the landlord, the usurer, the foreteller, the gambling speculator, monopolizer, etc. He socializes the means of large-scale production. He denies private ownership of great enterprises. Interested persons may be allowed to invest their surplus in those enterprises as shareholders but the control is to be vested in the State. The State is to be the sole banker, the sole landlord and the sole insurance office. This however is not the same thing as to abolish proprietary rights in big enterprise. By socialisation simply the centre of ownership is shifted from the individual to the State. Private property is replaced by public property; property is not abolished. Within the ambit of the State, it cannot be abolished.

KRISHNA PRASANNA MUKERJI.

13. H. G. Wells. *New Worlds for Old*. 1913, p. 137.

The Early Buddhist Councils and the Various Buddhist Sects

IT is impossible to explain the origin of the various sects of the Buddhist Saṅgha without first giving an account of the early councils of the community. Accounts of the first three councils as related in the Pali sources are well known to the Southern Buddhists; but the accounts that appear in the records of the Northern Buddhists are not so accessible to us. Therefore, here I intend to give both the accounts side by side that the reader may easily find out what differences there are. The Northern account I take from "The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet," compiled in the 14th century by a Tibetan Paṇḍit named Bu-ston, which was translated into English by Dr. E. Obermiller in 1931.¹ Dr. T. Stcherbatsky, the famous Russian scholar who writes an introduction to this work, says: "No one is better qualified for such a task than Budon,² for he was one of the redactors of the Kanjur and Tanjur³ collections in their final form." For the Southern Record I generally follow the Mahāvamsa. Here I use the abbreviations S.R. for the Southern Record and N.R. for the Northern.

The First Council.

S. R.

Seven hundred thousand bhikkhus were assembled at the funeral of the Buddha; the Elder Mahākassapa was the *saṅghatthera* of that congregation. When he had performed all rites due to the dead body of the Master and the bodily relics, the great Elder, thinking of the evil words of the aged Subhadda, selected 500 eminent bhikkhus to make a compilation of the holy Dhamma. But there was one less than 500 because of the therā Ānanda, and it was not possible without him.

N. R.

After the monuments harbouring the relics of the Buddha had thus been erected, the gods began to show their contempt towards the Doctrine, saying: "The word of the Teacher is dispersing like smoke. The monks who possessed authority and power have likewise passed away. Therefore the 3 Codes of Scripture will never come to be expounded." In order to put an end to this manifestation of contempt, Mahākāśyapa resolved to call a council of the clergy and bade Pūrṇa to assemble the

When these Elders had spent half a month—seven days in funeral ceremonies and seven in homage of the relics—they passed the following resolution: "Spending the rainy season in Rājagaha we will make a compilation of the Dhamma; no other monks must be permitted to dwell there."

In the bright half of the month of Āsāḥa the Elders went to Rājagaha and during the first of the rainy months they busied themselves with repairing all the vihāras there. When this was finished they said to the king: "Now we will hold the council." To the question "What should be done?" they answered: "A place should be prepared for the meetings." He with all speed had a splendid hall built by the side of the Vebhāra Rock by the entrance of the Sattapaṇṇi grotto.⁴

When the king informed the Elders that his work was finished they addressed Ānanda: "To-morrow the assembly comes together; it behoves thee not to take part in it since thou art still preparing for the highest stage." Thus spurred the therā put forth due effort and reached the state of an arahant without being confined to any one of the four postures. (He became an arahant at the moment when he was on the point of lying down).

monks. Pūrṇa beat the wooden gong, whereupon all the monks assembled. Then the Elder Mahākāśyapa said: "If the Doctrine is expounded here, many monks will come. Let us therefore go to Magadha."

Then they sent away the monks who were still under discipline and appointed Ānanda as their verger. Ānanda with the congregation passed through many a country district while travelling towards Magadha. But Mahākāśyapa went straight to Rājagṛha and was seen by Ajātaśatru. Kāśyapa told the king that they desired to discuss about the Doctrine in that godly place. The king saying "I shall provide all that is necessary," ordered the preparation of the seats, couches, and other requisites in the hollow of a Nyagrodha tree.⁴ The summer fast was then proclaimed. Now Mahākāśyapa said to Aniruddha: "Amidst this Congregation there are such who are still under discipline and are possessed of passion." Thereupon Aniruddha said to Kāśyapa: "If Ānanda is to be absent how is the word of the Buddha to be compiled?" "Although Ānanda is possessed of virtuous properties, he may not abide amongst us" replied Kāśyapa and then said to Ānanda: "Begone thou, Ānanda. When by thy zeal thou hast become an arhat then we can

1. Published by the "Institut für Buddhismus-Kunde" and printed in Heidelberg.

2. "Buston" is to be pronounced as "Budon."

3. "The translation of the Scriptures known as the Kanjur in 100 or 108 volumes was completed between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. There is also a collection of commentaries and secular works known as Tanjur." *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 249.

4. N.R. has understood *sattapaṇṇiguhā* as a hollow of a certain tree. Sattapaṇṇi is defined as *Echites scholaris* in the Abhidhanāppadīpikā. The Pali-English Dictionary of the P.T.S. only states that it is a name of a tree. In Sinhalese we call it රුක්ඛකන්ත. If it was a Nyagrodha (= banyan) tree as N.R. names it, a big banyan tree might hold such an assembly under its widespread branches. Such a vast banyan tree exists even now within the premises of the Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras.

On the second day of the second month of the rainy season the bhikkhus met together in that splendid hall. Leaving a fitting place vacant for Ānanda the Elders seated themselves on the seats, according to their rank. Ānanda at once appeared on the seat appropriated for him, rising out of the ground or passing through the air.⁵

Together the theras chose the Elder Upāli to speak on the Vinaya, for the rest of the Dhamma they chose Ānanda. Mahākassapa took upon himself the task of asking questions touching the Vinaya and the Elder Upāli was ready to explain them. Sitting in the Elder's chair, the former asked the latter the questions and Upāli, seated in the preacher's chair, expounded the matter. As this best master of the Vinaya expounded each clause in turn all the bhikkhus repeated the same after him.⁶

Then the Elder Mahākassapa taking the task upon himself questioned Ānanda concerning the Dhamma. Ānanda, taking the seat in the preacher's chair, expounded the whole Dhamma. And all the theras repeated the same in turn after the sage of the Videha country.

5. Hiuen Tsiang, in his "Records of the Western World," states: "He then went to the assembly, and knocking at the door, announced his arrival. Kāśyapa then asked him, saying, "Have you got rid of all ties? In that case exercise your spiritual power and enter without the door being opened." Ānanda, in compliance with the order, entered through the keyhole, and having paid reverence to the priesthood, retired and sat down." (Part II, p. 163).

6. S.R. gives precedence to the Vinaya while N.R. brings the Sūtras to prominence. S.R. relates in detail that Brahmajāla-sutta of Dīgha-nikāya was rehearsed first, and the rehearsal of the other Suttas of the same nikāya followed. N.R. begins with the first sermon, Dhammacakka, and follows the historical order of the other suttas.

discuss together." Ānanda, with eyes full of tears, departed from that place. He went to a village of the Vrijis and staying there practised profound meditation. At midnight, while sinking down on his couch, without lowering his head on the pillow, he attained the state of an Arhat. Thereafter he returned to the place of the Council.⁵

First of all there was a discussion about the rehearsal of the Sūtras. Kāśyapa asked Ānanda whether he had energy enough and bade him to compile the Sūtras on the basis of the resolution of the Congregation.⁶ Thereafter the 500 Arhats spread their religious garments on the seat supported by lions on which Ānanda seated himself. Thereupon Ānanda recollected all the teachings he was to compile and began: "This is what I have once heard: The Lord was abiding in Benares, in R̥shipatana, in the Grove of Antilopes. Then the Lord addressed the 5 monks as follows: O brethren, this is the doctrine that has not been heard before" . . . and so on.

Thereafter the Arhats asked Ānanda: "Is this the Word of the Buddha that is acknowledged by thee?" "It is the Word ac-

knowledged by all of us," replied Ānanda. This and the following Ānanda repeated, and 499 Arhats established that which he had said as the canonical text.

Thereupon Upāli was asked whether he had sufficient energy and was then ordered to rehearse the Vinaya. After Upāli had been seated on the preacher's seat Kāśyapa asked: "Where did the Lord lay the first foundation of Discipline?" "At Benares." "For whose sake?" "For the five monks. He has ordered them to wear the lower garment in a circular form."⁷

In such a way the Vinaya was rehearsed and after that Upāli descended from his seat. Then Mahākāśyapa, in order to rehearse the Abhidharma, followed the procedure of vote and resolution. He said: "Of the Abhidharma I shall speak myself."⁸

As the 500 Arhats thus rehearsed the 3 Codes of Scripture, the 500 monks received the name of the "Great Compilers."

7. S.R. here follows the order of the now existing texts of the Vinaya, *i.e.*, beginning with the first Pārājika offence. N.R. seems to follow the probable historical order of the Vinaya rules.

8. S.R. speaks only of Dhamma and Vinaya, and nothing is mentioned there about the Abhidhamma. N.R. speaks of 3 codes and the Elder Mahākassapa as the codifier of the Abhidharma. The commentaries on the Vinaya and Dīgha insert Abhidhamma in the Khuddaka-nikāya and ascribe its rehearsal to Ānanda himself: *Tattha vinayo āyasmatā Upālittherena vissajjito, sesa-Khuddakanikāyo cattāro ca nikāyā Anandattherena.*" Samp. p. 16.

And on p. 27 of the same it defines Khuddakanikāya as follows: "Katamo Khuddakanikāyo? Sakalaṃ Vinayapiṭakaṃ, Abhidhammapiṭakaṃ, Khuddakapāṭhādayo ca pubbe nidassitā pañcadasappabhedā, t̥hapetvā cattāro nikāye avasesaṃ Buddhavacanāṃ."

For further details on this subject see p. 28, and the Chapter XII of the "History of Buddhist Thought" by Dr. E. J. Thomas.

The Second Council.

S. R

At the end of the tenth year of Kālāsoka's reign a century had gone by since the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha. At that time in Vesālī many bhikkhus of the Vajji-clan accepted the following ten points as lawful: (1) The custom of putting salt in a horn vessel, in order to season unsalted food, when received; (2) The custom of taking the mid-day meal, even after the prescribed time, as long as the shadow had not passed the meridian by more than two-fingers' breadth; (3) The custom of going into a village after the meal, and there eating again, if invited; (4) Holding the uposatha feast separately by bhikkhus dwelling in the same district; (5) The carrying out of official acts by an incomplete chapter, on the supposition that the consent of absent bhikkhus was obtained afterwards; (6) That it was permissible to practise what was practised by one's tutor; (7) Milk which had begun to turn but had not become curd might be drunk by one who had had his meal; (8) Liquor which had not yet fermented might be drunk; (9) A rug not of the prescribed length might be used if it had no fringe; (10) Gold and silver (coins) might be accepted.⁹

9. These two lists of the ten points differ very much in their contents. Mr. Nalināka sha Datta, in his "Early History of the Spread of Buddhism," (p. 226), has defined these according to the S.R. but in a different way, which I reproduce here for more clear understanding of the points:

- (1) *Singūlakappa*—or the practice of carrying salt in a horn for use when needed, which contravened according to one view the rule against the storing of articles of food (Pācittiya 38).

N. R.

One hundred and ten years after the Teacher had passed away, the monks abiding in Vaiśālī were indulging in prohibited actions of which there were ten kinds:—(1) Exclamations of astonishment like "aho;" (2) Exclamations of rejoicing; (3) Using the sacred salt; (4) The monks having gone a yojana or a half of such, assemble and eat, with the pretext that they are travelling; (5) The food that has not been left from a previous meal they eat, taking it with two fingers; (6) The monks take wine in the manner of a leech that sucks blood and, having drunk, excuse it with illness; (7) The monks mix a *droṇa* measure of milk with as much sour milk and eat it at undue time, considering this to be admissible; (8) It is considered admissible to live by agriculture (by digging the ground); (9) The monks begin to use a new carpet without patching it with a piece taken from the old one; (10) The monks anoint an almsbowl with fragrant spices, put it on a table or a seat, and proclaim: "This is a sublime vessel. If you deposit your gifts into it you are to reap great merit." Accordingly, the people fill it with gold and silver which is enjoyed by the monks.⁹

When this came to the ears of the Elder Yasa, the son of Kākaṇḍa, who was wandering about in the Vajji country, he betook himself to the Mahāvana vihāra with the resolve to settle the matter. In the uposathahall those monks had placed a vessel made of metal and filled with water, and had said to the lay-folk: "Bestow on the brotherhood *kahāpaṇas* and so on." The Elder forbade them with the words "This is unlawful; give nothing." Then did they threaten the *thera* Yasa with the punishment called the Craving of pardon from lay-folk. He asked for one to bear him company and went with him into the city and proclaimed to the citizens that his own saying was according to the Dhamma.

When the bhikkhus heard what Yasa's companion had to tell, they came to excommunicate him and surrounded the *thera's* cell. He left it, rising up and passing through the

At that time an Arhat named Sarvakāmin was residing at Vaiśālī. And from the city called Dhanika there came an Arhat called Yaśas, with 500 adherents, who had made a turn through the country. Having arrived at Vaiśālī, they found that the monks had a large income, and they themselves obtained a great share. Having asked the reason for this, they came to know that 10 prohibited points were admitted. Accordingly, they went to Sarvakāmin and asked him whether these ten points are admissible. The Elder gave a negative answer and said to Yaśas: "Go thou and find such as would be of accord with thee, and I will be thy friend according to the Doctrine." Yaśas accordingly departed and spoke as he had before to Śāḍha from the city of Śoṇaka, to Dhanika from Saṅkaśya, to Kubjita of Pāṭaliputra, to Ajita of Śrughna, to

- (2) *Dvaṅgulakappa**—or the practice of taking food after midday, lit. when the shadow of the dial is two digits wide (Pāc. 37).
 (3) *Gāmantarakappa*—or the practice of going to a neighbouring village and taking a second meal there the same day, committing thereby the offence of over-eating. (Pāc. 35).
 (4) *Āvāsakappa*—or the observance of *uposathas* in different places within the same parish. (MV. ii, 8, 3).
 (5) *Anumalikappa*—or doing an act and obtaining sanction for it afterwards. (MV. ix, 3, 5).
 (6) *Acinṇakappa*—or the use of precedents as authority.
 (7) *Amahitakappa*—or the drinking of milk-whey after meal. (Pāc. 35).
 (8) *Jalogipātum*†—or the drinking of fermenting palm-juice which is not yet toddy. (Pāc. 51).
 (9) *Adasakaṃ nisīdanam*—or the use of a borderless sheet to sit on. (Pāc. 89).
 (10) *Jātaruparajatam*—or the acceptance of gold and silver. (Nissaggiya 18).

*The compound *dvaṅgula* in Pali may mean either "two inches" or up two fingers." The S. R. has taken the former meaning and the N. R. the latter.

†*Jalogi* is a very rare word. I have come across this word only in this context. The N. R. has perhaps mistaken this word for *jalūkā*, which, in both Pali and Sanskrit, means a 'leech'.

air, and halting at Kosambī, he forthwith sent messengers to the bhikkhus of Pāvā and Avanti; he himself went to the Ahogaṅga-mountain and related all to the Elder Sambhūta Sāṇavāsī. Sixty great theras from Pāvā and eighty from Avanti came together on the Ahogaṅga. The bhikkhus who met together here from this and that region were in all ninety thousand. When they had all conferred together they, knowing that the deeply learned thera Revata of Soreyya was the chief among them at that time, went thence to seek him out. They met him at Sahajāti; there the Elder Yasa questioned him on the Ten Points. The thera rejected them, and when he had heard the matter, he said: "Let us make an end of this dispute."

Here in Sahajāti 1,190,000 bhikkhus were come together under the Elder Revata, to bring the dispute to a peaceful end. But the Elder would not end the dispute save in the presence of those with whom it had begun; therefore all the bhikkhus went thence to Vesālī.

Thereafter the brotherhood came together to decide upon those points. Then the Elder Revata resolved to settle the matter by means of a Commission. He appointed four Elders from the East, and four from Pāvā. Sabbakāmi, Sālha, Khujjasobhita, and Vāsabhagāmika, these were the theras from the East. Revata, Sāṇasambhūta, Yasa, and Sumana were the four theras from Pāvā. Now to

Sambhūta of Mahiṣmati, and to Revata of Sahajā.

Thereafter the monks of Vaiśālī asked the pupils of Yaśas: Whither has your teacher gone? He is seeking for those who will aid him in executing the act of your excommunication. The monks of Vaiśālī became afraid and tried to bribe the pupils of Yaśas, by presenting to them robes, etc. The Elder Yaśas, having finished his search, returned to Vaiśālī and struck the wooden gong. Hearing the sound of the gong 700 Arhats, all of them pupils of Ānanda, assembled. Then Yaśas, addressing the Elders, began: "O venerable sirs, is the licence of shouting 'aho!' admissible?" Thus spoke he and further on as before, without mentioning names, that such and such monks were doing the prohibited actions. "Such a conduct is to be condemned by us." In this manner he discussed the 10 inadmissible points in detail, and the other Elders gave their approval. Then they went out and beat the wooden gong, causing the monks of Vaiśālī to assemble. The Elders now called out the names of those who committed the transgressions, *viz.* the monks of Vaiśālī, spoke of the 10 inadmissible points at full length and said: "These are to be excommunicated by all of us." And, for speaking thus, the 700 Arhats became known as "those who made the correct resolution."

Thus the second rehearsal was carried out by the 700 Arhats. The aim of it was the exclusion of the

decide on those points the eight theras betook themselves to the quiet and solitary Vālukārāma.¹⁰ There the Elder Revata questioned Sabbakāmin successively on each one of those points; and the great Elder gave the judgment, saying: "All these points are unlawful." They did all again, in like manner, in the presence of the brotherhood. And thus did the great theras refute the teaching of those ten thousand heretical bhikkhus who maintained the Ten Points.

At that time the Elder Revata, in order to hold a council, chose 700 out of all those monks. These seven hundred Elders met in the Vālukārāma protected by Kālāsoka, under the leadership of Revata, and compiled the Dhamma. They completed their work in eight months.

The First Schism.

After the second council the monks, who accepted the Ten Points as admissible, convened another council of their own and made a different rehearsal of the Dhamma and Vinaya. As their number was greater than that of the conservative Theras, they called their council *Mahāsaṅgīti* = the Great Council, and their community *Mahāsaṅghika* = that which has a great number of followers. Here I quote a passage from Mr. Nalinaksha Datta's work, which explains the attitude of the Mahāsaṅghikas.¹²

10. The Cullavagga, Samantapāsādikā, and Mahāvamsa agree in giving the name of the place as *Vālukārāma*: The N.R. states it as *Kusumapura vihāra*, while *Dīpavamsa* states that it took place in the *Kūṭāgāra*.

Hall: "Kūṭāgārasālāy 'eva Vesāliyaṃ puruttame aṭṭhamāsehi niṭṭhāsi dutiyo saṅgaho ayain." *Dīpv. V. v. 68.*

11. Hiuen Tsiang states in his travels that he saw the *stūpa* built at the spot where this second convocation was held, and gives a short account of that council. He gives the name *Yasada* instead of *Yasa* or *Yaśas* of our records. See *Part II, 74. Records of the Western World.*"

12. *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools* (p. 231). Published by Messrs. Luzac & Co., London.

“The principal objective of Mahāsaṅghikas in seceding from the main body of orthodox Buddhists becomes apparent to us by a glance at the subject matter of the rules regarding which they differed and the doctrines which they turned to profess. To put it in a nutshell, they wanted to have an amount of latitude and freedom regarding certain of their actions which the strictness and narrowness of orthodoxy was not ready to allow, and to carry into their organization and general governance a democratic spirit which set at nought what appeared to them an unreasoning servility to the monastic authorities, which could not be supported in a reasonable management of the monasteries. The exclusive power and privileges which by lapse of time the arahats came to claim for themselves at the expense of the bhikkhus of lower order were looked upon by the Mahāsaṅghikas as a reappearance in a different garb of the selfish exclusiveness of the brāhmaṇas against which the rise of Buddhism was, as it were, a revolt.”

The S.R. gives only these ten points as the cause of dissension of the Mahāsaṅghikas; but some Northern Records state that some views of an Elder named Mahādeva originated this discord. In this connection Mr. Nalinaksha Datta states in the same book (p. 228). “This work¹³ attributes a few differences in tenets to the Mahāsaṅghika school. Bhavya, Vasumitra, Vinītadeva and Tārānātha trace the origin of this school in Mahādeva’s five articles of faith, which were:

1. An arahat may commit a sin under unconscious temptation.
2. An arahat may have doubts on matters of doctrine.
3. One may be an arahat and not know it.
4. One cannot attain arahatship without the aid of a teacher.
5. ‘The noble ways’ may begin with a shout, that is, one meditating seriously on religion may make an exclamation as ‘How sad’ and by so doing attain progress towards perfection.”

Of this Mahādeva a statement is found in the Records of Hiuen Tsiang (Part I, p. 150): “In the hundredth year after the *Nirvāna* of Tathāgata, Aśoka, king of Magadha, extended his power over the world . . . At this time there were 500 Arahats and 500 schismatical priests, whom the king honoured and patronised without any difference. Among the latter was a priest called Mahādeva, a man of deep learning and rare ability; in his retirement he sought a true renown; far thinking, he wrote treatises the principles of which were opposed to the holy doctrine. All who heard of him resorted to his company and adopted his views. Asoka-rāja, not knowing either holy or common men, and because he was naturally given to patronise those who were seditious,

13. *i.e.*, Kathāvatthu of Abhidhamma-piṭaka.

was induced to call together an assembly of priests to the banks of the Ganges, intending to drown them all.”¹⁴

Here the words “schismatical priests” indicate that there was some discord then existing among these parties. Therefore it is not wise to take these views of Mahādeva as a cause of dissension between the Theravādins and the Mahāsaṅghikas. Dr. R. Kimura states that these views of Mahādeva caused a division among Mahāsaṅghikas themselves; his statement is: “During two hundred years after Buddha’s Mahāparinirvāna, three schools sprang up from the Mahāsaṅghika, namely:—(i) Ekavyavahārika, (ii) Lokotaravāda, (iii) Kaukkuṭika. And the cause of this separation was at first, Mahādeva, the leader of the Mahāsaṅghikas who dwelt in Aṅgottara country in the north of Rājagṛha. There he preached the doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, etc. At that time two parties seceded from the main Mahāsaṅghika school on account of Mahādeva’s preaching. Because some of them believed in that doctrine, they together formed one party; while others did not agree and they made up another party.” Dr. Kimura is quoting this from Paramārtha’s commentary on the *Nikāyāvalambana-sāstra* of Vasumitra, and he says as the original commentary has been lost he culled this statement from a quotation in San-ron-gen-gi, a Chinese treatise.

During the first century of the Buddhist Era there arose 5 different sects from the Mahāsaṅghikas, and eleven more from the Theravādins. The Mahāvamsa describes the origination of these sects as follows: The heretical bhikkhus, subdued by the Elders who had held the Second Council, in all ten thousand, founded the school which bears the name Mahāsaṅghika. From this arose Gokulika and Ekavyohārika schools. From the Gokulikas arose Paṇṇattivāda sect and the Bāhussutika or Bāhulika sect; from these the Cetiya sect. Thus there are six, with the Mahāsaṅghikas.

At first Mahimsāsakas and Vacchiputtakas¹⁵ parted from the Theravādins. From the Vacchiputtakas there arose Dhammuttariyas, Bhadrāyānikas,


14. Here we have a curious statement that Asokarāja summoned a council of monks, intending to drown them. No other record, Southern or Northern, confirms this statement. For Hiuen Tsiang there was only one Asoka who has reigned after 100 years from the Buddha’s *parinibbāna*. He does not know about two Asokas, *viz.* Kālāsoka and Dharmāsoka. This case is common to many other Northern Records.

15. Almost all of the Southern Records have the word as Vajjiputtakas; but this is confusing with the Vajjiputtakas of the Second Council who were the founders of the Mahāsaṅghika School. The Northern Records have the word *Vātsīputriya*, meaning thereby the monks of the Vatsa country (of which Kosambī was the capital). In Pālī the people of the Vatsa country are called *Vamsas*. No derivative is found from this word; therefore I like to derive ‘Vacchiputtiya’ as the counterpart of the Sanskrit *Vātsīputriya*.

In this connection Mrs. Rhys Davids states, in her Prefatory Notes on the “Points of Controversy,” as follows: “The case of the Vajjiputtakas, Vajjiputtiyas, Vatsīputriyas may possibly be somewhat analogous. The ‘Vajjiputtaka bhikkhus’, as we know from the

Channāgarikas,¹⁶ and Sammitīyas. Sabbatthivādins and Dhammaguttikas originated from the Mahimsāsakas. Kassapīyas and Saṅkantikas arose from the Sabbatthivādins; and lastly the Suttantikas from the Saṅkantika Sect. Together with the original Theravādins these make their number 12. These 12 and the former six schools make it 18.

Table for the first and second centuries of Buddhist Era.



The Third Council.

One and united was the community of the Buddhist monks in the first hundred years after the death of the Buddha. During the second century there arose 18 schools. When, in the third century B.E., Emperor Asoka supported the fraternity with every possible help, many heretics entered the

Vinaya of the Canon itself, are said to have been the arch disturbers of Saṅgha concord a century after the Founders' death . . . Yet, judging by the introduction to the second debate, they were still considered as a distinct group. . . . There is no difference of meaning in the affixes -aka, -iya. They are like our 'New-Zealander' and 'Etonian.' The Mahāvamsa account juxtaposes both forms with an ambiguous result that is noticeable in Professor Geiger's translation (p. 26). This ambiguity may have misled Asiatic chroniclers. In the Sanskrit accounts, as translated, the original move by Vajjiputtakas has been lost sight of, and, as with the term Vibhajjavādin, Vatsīputriyas figure as an offshoot only. As such, nothing whatever is recorded of them in other documents."

16. This word has many different readings: Geiger's Mahāvamsa, both the text and the English version, gives it as Chandāgarika; the *Nikāyasaṅgraha*, both the text and the English version, has *Channāgarika**. The Northern Tradition has *Shannāgarika*, which means "existing in six towns" or "the Six-Towners" as Mrs. Rhys Davids renders it in her Introduction to "Points of Controversy," p. XXXVIII.

*English translation by Mr. C. M. Fernando, p. 6.

priesthood, and dwelling together with the real monks, caused a great disturbance within the community. Asoka came to the throne in 278 B.E.

S. R.

(Following the *Nikāyasaṅgraha*).

The corrupt monks, about ten thousand in number, who were excommunicated by the great elders of the second convocation, went to a bordering country in search of supporters, and having there got the adherence of a petty prince, they held a conference in defiance of the Sthaviravāda, and, forming themselves into a fraternity called Mahāsaṅghika, reversed the true doctrine by interpolating new and strange texts, and inventing commentaries agreeable to their purposes.

Within 100 years from that time they gradually grew into 17 schisms. . . . After these, a great king arose by name Dharmāsoka. He was anointed in the 278th year after the Nirvāna of Buddha. This king caused to be built in the capital cities of Jambudīpa 84,000 grand monasteries befitting royal munificence, and, spending wealth to the extent of five lacs a day, he contributed to the advancement and glorification of the *faith*.

At this time the infidel ascetics had come to profess the faith for the sake of gain and honour; and they were going about making an imposture of their own creeds as the right law of discipline, and extolling it greatly. These ascetics, not being admitted to the priesthood, would themselves shave themselves, and, putting on the yellow robe, they would enter

N. R.

(Following Buxton).

The account of this third rehearsal is not to be found in the Vinaya and therefore we meet here and there with disagreeing points. According to some, 137 years after the Teacher had passed away, at the time when the kings Nanda and Mahāpadma were reigning, and when the elders Mahākāśyapa, Uttara and others were residing at Pāṭaliputra, Māra, the Evil One, having assumed the form of a monk named Bhadra, showed many miraculous apparitions, sowed disunion amongst the clergy and brought confusion into the teaching. At that time, when the elders Nāgasena and Manojña were living, the clergy became split into various sects. In the 63rd year after this division had taken place, the Teaching was rehearsed by the elder Vātsīputra.

According to others, 160 years after the Teacher had passed away, at the time when king Aśoka began to reign in the city called Kusumavistara, the Arhats were reading the word of the Buddha in 4 different languages, viz. Sanskrit, Prākṛit, Apabhraṁśa, and Paśācika. Accordingly, the pupils of the different Arhats formed separate fractions, and this gave origin to the division into the 18 sects. In the philosophical views of the different sects there were many conflicting points which brought confusion into the Church. It was for this reason that Arhats and ordinary

the various monasteries, where taking up their abode they would introduce themselves into the assembly of monks who were performing the *uposatha*-rites. As a result, it came about that there was no performance of the *uposatha*-rites for a whole period of seven years.

The great King Dharmāśoka, having heard of this state of things, went to the great Elder Moggaliputta-Tissa, and staying in his monastery for seven days and learning all the differences of religious doctrine, caused all the monks of Jambudīpa to be summoned and to assemble at the monastery of Asokārāma, in Pāṭaliputra. And making those who entertained similar beliefs stand separately in groups, and ascertaining the differences of the beliefs, he purified the religion by expelling from it about sixty thousand crafty monks. He then set guards all round the monastery and caused the pious monks who professed the pure doctrine to perform religious rites together; and he also caused one thousand Arhats, chosen out of sixty millions of sanctified monks who had assembled there, to hold under the presidency of the Elder Moggaliputta-Tissa the third rehearsal of the Dhamma, which was concluded in nine months.

learned monks, having assembled in the monastery of Jalandhara, rehearsed the Scriptures for a third time. This took place 360 years after the Teacher had passed away.

The following prophecy is found in the *Karuṇāpundarīka-sūtra*:—"One hundred years after I have passed away, there will appear in Pāṭaliputra a king named Aśoka of Mauryadynasty. This king will institute the worship of 84,000 monuments containing my relics in a single day." And in the *Prabhāvatīsūtra* it is said: "Thereafter king Dharmāśoka died, and the Arhats, in order to put an end to the practice of reciting the Scriptures in Prākṛit, Apabhraṃśa and in a dialect of intermediate character, gradually rehearsed the canonical texts according to other methods. These new texts were like the sūtras which were compiled in Sanskrit. Thereafter the Teaching assumed 18 different forms.

Others speak about the 3rd council as follows:—The aim of it was to clear the doubts of the 18 sects as regards the spurious texts of scripture. The time was 300 years after the Teacher had passed away. The place was the country of Kashmir and the monastery of Kuvana, and the alms-giver was Kanishka, the king of Jalandhara. The members of the council were 500 Arhats with Pūrṇika at their head, 500 Bodhisatvas, Vasumitra and others, and 250 or 10,000 ordinary Paṇḍits. After a recitation of the texts had been made, it was settled, that the texts acknowledged by the 18 sects were all of them the Word of the Buddha.

It is very strange that the Northern tradition has no definite knowledge about the 3rd council under the patronage of Dharmāśoka. They have got his name but they always place him after one century from the Founder's death, and not in the third century B.E., as the Southern tradition assigns to him. Hiuen Tsiang, who has given a very lengthy and valuable description about the life and the establishments of this illustrious Emperor, always agrees with the Northern tradition in the case of fixing his date. Likewise, the Southern tradition knows nothing about the council held, in Kashmir, under the patronage of Kanishka, the second Buddhist Emperor of India.

It will be useful here to know what Dr. E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University has to say on this subject. In his valuable work, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, he states: "The story of the third Council of Pāṭaliputta is given in the *Mahāvamsa* (Ch. 5) at the end of the legendary account of the reign of Asoka. Much of the material of this comes from Indian sources, as we find most of the legend in Sarvāstivādin works, but it is only in the Pāli that there is any mention of this council. We are told in the *Mahāvamsa* that owing to the prosperity of the Order under Asoka, who was ruling in Pāṭaliputta, heretics had come to live with the monks. These heretics are expressly spoken of as non-Buddhists, not as members of any Buddhist party. No reference to Buddhist sects appears. Asoka sent for Tissa Moggaliputta, assembled all the monks on the earth, and turned out all who wrongly answered his question, "What was the teaching of the Buddha?" . . . Thus all we are told of the Council is that it was held and that the *Kathāvatthu* was spoken. Later accounts tell us no more . . ."

"The Sarvāstivādin accounts have much in common with the Pāli. They agree essentially in the reports of the first two Councils, although they put Asoka not two centuries but one after Buddha's death. Both accounts tell much of Asoka and repeat some of the same legends . . . But the Sarvāstivādins have no word about the third Council. They speak of a Council under Asoka, but this is the second Council, and they may have confused this Asoka with Kālāsoka. Kern supposes that the third Council was but a party meeting, so much so that no other party ever heard of it; but the fact that it is ignored by all other sects makes it necessary to consider the other alternative, that there never was a third Council." (p. 34-35).

Before concluding this portion of the article I desire to give a short account of the Council convened by Kanishka, following the Records of Hiuen Tsiang: In the 400th year¹⁷ after the *Nirvāṇa* of Tathāgata, Kanishka, king of Gandhāra, having succeeded to the kingdom, his kingly renown reached far. During his

17. Kanishka is supposed to have reigned at about 75 A.D. See p. 174, *History of Buddhist Thought*.

intervals of duty he frequently consulted the sacred books of the Buddha ; daily he invited a priest to enter his palace and preach the Law ; but he found the different views of the schools so contradictory that he was filled with doubt. At this time the venerable Pārśva said : “ Since Tathāgata left the world many years and months have elapsed. The different schools hold to the treatises of their several masters.” Having heard this, the king was deeply affected and after a while he said to Pārśva : “ I will arrange the teaching of the three *piṭakas* of the Buddha according to the various schools. The king then summoned from far and near a holy assembly. For this they came from the four quarters. Being thus assembled, for seven days offerings of the four necessary things were made, after which, as the king desired that there should be an arrangement of the Law, and as he feared the clamour of such a mixed assembly, he said, with affection for the monks : “ Let those who have obtained the holy fruit remain, but those who are still bound by worldly influences, let them go. . . .” There remained 499 men. Then the king desired to go to his own country, as he suffered from the heat and moisture of this country. . . .¹⁸ The honourable Pārśva and others then counselled him, saying : “ We cannot go there, because there are many heretical teachers there. The mind of the assembly is well affected towards this country ; the land is guarded on every side by mountains, and is well provided with food.”

The Elder Vasumitra was the most learned person among these hosts of monks, but as he was not an Arhat the holy men were not willing to admit him to the Council. Vasumitra informed the assembly that he did not care for Arhatship but for Buddhahood. After a long discussion, however, the Arhats allowed him to enter the Council, and at last he was chosen as their president. These 500 sages first composed *Upadeśa Śāstra* to explain the Sūtra Piṭaka. Next they made the *Vinayavibhāṣā* to explain the Vinaya Piṭaka, and the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* on Abhidharma Piṭaka. Altogether they composed thirty myriads of verses in six hundred and sixty myriads of words, which thoroughly explained the three Piṭakas.

Kaṇishka forthwith ordered these discourses to be engraved on sheets of red copper. He enclosed them in a stone receptacle, and having sealed this, he raised over it a *Stūpa*, with the Scriptures in the middle. He commanded the *Yakṣas* to defend the approaches to the kingdom, so as not to permit the other sects to get these *śāstras* and take them away.

Different tenets of the various schools, their location, etc., will be discussed in the next portion of this article.

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18. That is : Kāśmir.

they introduced into the Pali Abhidhamma theories they were familiar with from other systems of Indian philosophy.

In the case of the peculiar and highly fascinating theory of perception of the Abhidhamma, which, we have stated above, appears suddenly in front of us in full dress, there is strong reason to suspect that it is a deliberate modification of a doctrine expounded in a school of Buddhism whose ideology was, strange to say, fundamentally opposed to that of Theravāda Buddhism. The Yogācāra theory of mind presents such close similarities to the theory of perception laid down in the Abhidhamma, that if we ignore for a moment its idealistic implications, we cannot resist the conclusion that it must have had some direct influence on the formulation of the Abhidhamma theory. And a closer examination would reveal to us how the Yogācāra theory has been modified in order to suit the ideology of the Theravāda Abhidhamma. In fact, much of what appears to be of a purely speculative and highly arbitrary nature in the Abhidhamma theory, is explained when viewed in the light of the Yogācāra theory. So that the most likely conclusion would be that one of the scholiasts who came from India had a knowledge of the Yogācāra theory, and framed the Abhidhamma theory in the form in which we have it now, on the lines of the Yogācāra theory, modifying it in such a way as to do away with its idealistic implications. Perhaps we shall not be very wrong if we attribute its authorship to that nebulous personage known as Buddhaghosa.

The Yogācāra philosophy distinguishes between mind in its pure state and mind when it is evolving. Mind evolves through sense-perception, and in the process of evolution it is said to become polluted. In this sense, the Yogācāra view of mind in its state of purity, called *tathāgatagarbha* or *ālayavijñāna*⁵ is comparable to the Abhidhamma view of *bhavangacitta* as mind in its natural state, unpolluted by impurities.⁶ *Bhavanga* was not regarded as a storehouse of "all the memory of one's thoughts, affections and deeds"⁷

5. "The Ālaya has been contaminated by external impurities (āgantukakleśa) amassed by all kinds of philosophising (vitarkadarśana) based on the discrimination of subject and object"—Suzuki, Studies in the Lankāvatara Sutra, p. 185, 186. See Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Ed. Bunyiu Nanjio: mahāmate ayam tathāgatagarbhālaya-vijñānagocaraḥ, sarvaśrāvaka-pratyekabuddhatīrthyavitarkadarśanānām prakṛtipariśuddho'pi san śuddha ivāgantukakleśopakliṣṭatayā teṣām ābhāti na tu tathāgatānām. p. 222. Note :—Suzuki gives 443 A.D. as the lower limit for the date of Lankā, as the Chinese translation is said to have been done then (Lankā. Trans. XLII). Aśvaghōṣa who appears to be the first propounder of the theory of ālaya is dated by Suzuki between 50 and 80 A.D. during the reign of Kanishka. (See Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna, p. 17).

6. In commenting on the passage: *pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam taṃ ca kko āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham*, the commentaries explain *cittam* as *pakatimano* and *bhavangacitta*.

7. Suzuki, Studies, p. 176.

as the *ālaya* was held to be, but certain similies brought to illustrate the nature of *bhavanga* contain, if not implications, certainly reminiscences of such a view. Nowhere in the Abhidhamma is *bhavanga* regarded, however, as a "repository of all kinds of karmaseeds, good as well as bad."⁸ The striking similarity between the two theories lies in the manner in which the *ālayavijñāna* is described as evolving into the modes of empirical consciousness, known as *pravṛttivijñāna*⁹, which word itself is reminiscent of the Abhidhamma word *pavatti* (e.g. *visayaḥpavatti*) often used in reference to a mental process. The evolution of the *ālaya* is the result of ignorance, and itself is the cause of endless transmigrations, in the same way as the Abhidhamma regards the continuum of thoughts and *bhavangas* as the cause of the round of rebirths.¹⁰ "When the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (*avidyā*), the waves of mentality (*vijñāna*) make their appearance"¹¹. This *vijñāna* or sense-activity has the function of grasping objects with the help of the sense-organs. It becomes attached to them in the belief that the external world is real. The external world is, for the Yogācāra, a creation of the mind, and it springs from a false distinction between subject and object, a distinction that is inherent in the very nature of sense-perception¹². This sense-perception, which leads to a falsification of reality, brings consciousness out of its natural state (*prakṛtisvabhāva*) and projects an external world of plurality: and it has been the misfortune of mortals, from time immemorial, to regard this illusion as real.¹³

8. *Ibid*, p. 179, 180. *Ālayavijñāna* is memory, which *bhavanga* definitely is not. As to whether it was individual memory or a sort of cosmic memory does not seem very clear, though it seems to have been looked upon in both ways. "When the Sūtra says that in the Ālaya is found all that has been going on since beginningless time systematically stored up as a kind of seed, this does not refer to individual experiences, but to something general, beyond the individual, making up in a way the background on which all individual psychic activities are reflected."—Suzuki, Studies, p. 184. Elsewhere Suzuki says: "According to the Yogācāra school, the Ālaya is not an universal, but an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the germs of all things exist in their ideality."—Outlines of Mahayana, p. 66.

9. The Sautrāntika, too, distinguishes between *pravṛttivijñāna* and *ālayavijñāna*, but since the evidence we have for their view is late, we cannot say whether they originated the theory or borrowed it.

10. *Cutito pana puna paṭisandhi, patisandhito puna bhavangan ti evaṃ bhavanga-ṭhitinivāsesu saṃsaramānānaṃ sātānaṃ, avicchinnaṃ cittasāntānaṃ pavattati yeva-Visuddhi Magga, p. 460. See also Abhidhammatthasangaha, p. 26: Iccevaṃ gahitapaṭisandhikānaṃ pana paṭisandhinirodhānantarato pabhuti tam ev'ālambanaṃ ārabha tad eva cittaṃ, yāva cuticcittuppādā, asati vithiccittuppāde, bhavassa anga-bhāvena bhavangasantatisankhātāṃ mānaṃ abhohocchinnaṃ nadisoto viya pavattati. Pariyosāne ca cavanavasena cuticcittam hutvā nirujjhati. Tato paraṃ ca paṭisandhādayo rathacakkam iva yathākkamaṃ eva parivattantā pavattanti.*

11. Awakening, p. 67.

12. Lankā, p. 68.

13. *Ibid*, p. 44.

The Abhidhamma, of course, has none of the idealistic implications of the Yogācāra theory, but regarding the actual mechanism of consciousness the two theories have very much in common with each other. The similes used by the two schools in illustration of their views bring out several points of contact between the two theories, and also help to show the points on which they differ. The *ālayavijñāna* is often compared to an ocean from which waves arise when a wind stirs it. Similarly, conscious processes or processes of sense-perception arises in the *ālayavijñāna* when it is disturbed by an object or by the external world (*viṣaya*).

Suzuki quotes the following verse from the Chinese version of Lankāvatāra Sūtra :—

Like unto ocean waves
Which by a raging storm maddened
Against the rugged precipice strike
Without interruption ;
Even so in the Ālaya-sea
Stirred by the objectivity-wind
All kinds of mentation waves
Arise a-dancing, a-rolling.¹⁴

The Yogācāra thus, distinguishes between a sort of subconscious mind and a mind in a state of active cognition, just as the Abhidhamma distinguishes between *bhavanga* or *vīthimutta* and *vīthicitta* or process-consciousness caused by sense-perception. Just as the *ālaya* is compared to an ocean, the flow of *bhavangacittas* is compared to a stream, and it is a disturbance that gives rise to sense-perception in both theories. The arising of mental activity in the Yogācāra view is due to the projection by the mind of a visible world, a world of form, which causes a disturbance in the uninterrupted continuity of the *ālaya*.¹⁵ But the functioning consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*) is regarded in the Yogācāra as a manifestation of the *ālaya* and this is not accepted by the Theravādins.¹⁶ Further, the Yogācāra view seems to imply that the subconscious *ālaya* remains all the while as a sub-plane even when perceptual processes function. Aśvaghoṣa says : “ This (*i.e.* the process of evolution of consciousness) may be illustrated by (the simile of) the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be identical

14. Outlines, p. 130, from the Chinese of Sikṣānanda. The verses in the Sanskrit version of Lankā. are as follows: Tarangā hyudadher yadvat pavanapratyayeritāḥ nṛtyamānāḥ pravartante vyucchedaś ca na vidyate, ālayaughas tathā nityam viṣayapavaneritāḥ citrais tarangavijñānair nṛtyamānāḥ pravartante, p. 46.

15. Sā'vidyā kāraṇam teṣāṃ cittānāṃ sampravartikam antarā kim avasthā 'sau yāvad rūpam na jāyate. Samanantarapradhvastam cittam anyat pravartate; rūpam na tiṣṭhate kāle kim ālambya pravartsyate?—Lankā. p. 238. 239.

16. Udadheḥ pavanāhatā iva mahāmate viṣayapavanacittodadhitarangā avyucchinna hetukriyālakṣaṇā anyonyavinirmuktāḥ, . . . pancavijñānakāyāḥ pravartante.—Lankā. p. 44.

(in one sense) and not identical (in the other sense) with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases, the motion of the waves subsides; but the water remains the same.”¹⁷ The early Theravada Abhidhamma was not quite clear as to the identity or otherwise of *bhavanga* and the perceptual process. The commoner phrase in the early Abhidhamma works was *bhavange āvaṭṭite*, meaning, ‘when *bhavanga* is turned or adverted.’ That *bhavanga* as such ceases to function when perceptual processes arise is made clear from such expressions as *bhavange niruddhe*, ‘when *bhavanga* ceases,’¹⁸ but these do not necessarily imply that *bhavanga* in its essential nature is different from active thought; which may, after all, be one of its manifest forms. Expressions which might quite definitely mean that *bhavanga* is cut off and something quite different from it arises, do actually occur in several early commentaries,¹⁹ but when we come across such expressions as *bhavangam vicchindamānā viya*, we cannot help inferring that the early Abhidhamma writers were not quite clear in their own minds about the identity or otherwise of *bhavanga* and mental processes.²⁰ On the other hand, phrases like *bhavangam otarati*²¹ and *bhavangotarana*²² quite clearly imply that *bhavanga* was understood as existing as an under-current all the while. But the later Abhidhamma was quite definite on the matter. They contrasted the passive and the active aspects of mind rather sharply, and postulated a cutting off of *bhavanga* at a stage when conscious processes begin to arise.

The Yogācāra, in regarding the *ālayavijñāna* as a sub-plane of activity, came very near to substituting by it the notion of a soul which Buddhism was fighting hard against. Radhakrishnan writes : “ It is the need for a permanent consciousness, which is capable of impressions and preserving the *vāsanās*, that makes the Yogācāras look upon *ālaya* as a permanent entity, yet they are obliged by their Buddhist presuppositions to look upon it as ever changing.”²³ Though they used the similes of ocean (*ālayavijñānodadhi*) and flood (*ālayaughā*), and sometimes even that of a stream in very much the same language that the Pali scholiasts use,²⁴ they regarded the *ālaya* all

17. Awakening, p. 67.

18. Vis. Magga, p. 458.

19. E.g. *bhavangavithim pacchinditvā* (VbhA 153); *vithim vicchinditvā* (AtthaS, para. 222), and *bhavange vicchinne* (Vis. Magga 460).

20. Vis. Magga, p. 458.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 126, 676.

22. AtthaS para 558, VbhA, 156.

23. Ind. Phil, I. p. 634, 635.

24. Suzuki quotes the following verse from the Chinese Sandhi-Nirmocana Sūtra :—

The Ādāna-vijñāna (*i.e.* *ālaya*) is deep and subtle,
Where all the seeds are evolved like a stream ;
I do not elucidate this for the ignorant,
For they are apt to imagine it an ego-substance.—Studies, 258.

the while as a principle of consciousness over and above the Skandhas, 'pure consciousness,' more or less. From the Theravāda point of view this was a heresy, for the early Pali literature stresses the fact that consciousness always originated from causes (*paṭiccasamuppanna*).²⁵ Suzuki, too, draws attention to the similarity of the Yogācāra view to the heresy of an ego-substance. "The main idea is that there is a principle of consciousness from which the whole vijñāna system evolves and is set in operation, but which is not to be regarded as something residing in the five skandhas. Ordinarily this principle, unknown, invisible, and beyond the grasp of the sense-vijñānas is taken for an ego, and unenlightened people try to locate it in the body . . ."²⁶ In fact, the Bodhisatva Mahāmati asks the same question from the Buddha. What is the difference, he asks, between the tathāgatagarbha or ālayavijñāna, and the soul theory of heretical philosophers, for it is said of the ālaya, too, that it is by nature resplendent (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*)²⁷ and abiding in the bodies of all creatures, that it is eternal, unchanging, firm, and all-blessed. Heretics, too, speak of the soul as eternal, the doer, and as all-pervading and free from qualities.²⁸

The Abhidhamma commentators, in order to avoid this ambiguity, made of bhavanga a relational mode of consciousness. It was not 'pure consciousness,' without an object. It functioned out of a relationship that had for its objective factor the dying thoughts of the individual in his previous birth. Hence bhavangacitta, like any other kind of consciousness, sprang out of the relationship of subject and object, both of which were, in the pluralistic philosophy of the Abhidhamma, considered as a real. According to the Yogācāra, this relationship of duality was the work of the functioning mind, of active consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*). For the ālaya, in its true nature, was beyond the sphere of duality, beyond the subject-object relationship. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra compares the active mind to a dancer. A dancer does not dance alone. He needs a companion. Hence the mind creates an external world, an illusion of plurality. When this illusion is removed, the ālaya is seen in its intrinsic nature as pure consciousness. The functioning of the mind is then seen to be a mere illusion. From the standpoint of ultimate truth, there is no object or appearance of object.²⁹

Bhavanga was therefore denied the character of being a storehouse, a genuine subconscious mind where all the traces of past actions and thoughts, and future potentialities and latent tendencies are deposited, as the ālayavijñāna was. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra defines citta as that which stores up

25. Majjhima, p. 258.

26. Studies, p. 257.

27. Cf. the Pali expression "pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam."

28. Lankā p. 78.

29. *Ibid*, p. 223, 224.

karma (*cittena ciyate karma*). "That karma is accumulated by citta means that the latter takes in all that goes on in the mind and also all that is done by the body. Technically stated, every deed (*karma*), mental and physical, leaves its seeds behind which are deposited in the citta, and the Citta has been hoarding them since time immemorial. It is the rich repository of all the thoughts, feelings, desires, instincts, etc., no matter how they have come to act, that is, whether merely stirred up in the inmost recesses of one's consciousness, or carried out by the body into deed, or checking the incipient stages of their activity."³⁰

We have pointed out how in the earlier commentaries and in the Visuddhi Magga *bhavanga* seems to have been conceived of somewhat in the manner of a main stream into which thoughts flowed back at the end of their course. Perhaps the early writers who framed the Abhidhamma theory were unable to dissociate themselves entirely from the Yogācāra doctrine which was influencing their ways of thinking. In fact there is a simile in the Atthasālinī, in which the perceptual process is likened to the constructing of an embankment in a river and directing the water along a channel to fill a field. The filling of the field is the apperceptive or final stage in the process, and at the end of it the water flows back into the river just as consciousness lapses back into bhavanga.³¹ Further, though there is no explicit mention in the Abhidhamma that *bhavanga* stores up karma, may we not regard the Abhidhamma statement that karma becomes an object of bhavangacitta as an echo of the Yogācāra doctrine? Else we have no plausible explanation for the curious view that a man's karma becomes, at the moment of his death, the object of his rebirth-consciousness (*patīsandhicitta*) which is the same as *bhavangacitta*.³²

The process of perception in its various stages, as laid down by the Abhidhamma, presents a close analogy to the evolution of mind in the Yogācāra. Out of the ālaya there evolves *manas* which Suzuki interprets as the individual empirical consciousness, the ālaya being regarded as the universal consciousness.³³ It is manas that makes the perception of the external world possible, for it creates the distinction between subject (*grāhaka*) and object (*grāhya*). "Together with the thought of 'me and mine,' taking hold of it and clinging to it, and reflecting upon it, Manas thereby takes shape and is evolved."³⁴ When manas begins to operate there is set up a whole system of vijñānas, a *cittakālāpa*, which, because it functions in relation to the external world, making a sharp (and unreal) distinction between mind and

30. Studies, p. 249.

31. p. 279.

32. VbhA, p. 156.

33. Studies, p. 195.

34. *Ibid*, p. 192.

matter, is called the vastuprativikalpavijñāna (object-discriminating consciousness) in contrast to the khyātivijñāna (perceiving consciousness) which latter is, in its intrinsic nature the same as ālaya, since it makes no discrimination between subject and object. The two kinds of conscious are, however, identical in their ultimate nature, and causally dependent one on the other.³⁵

The system of vijñānas includes the five sense-perceptions and manovijñāna, which latter always functions in co-operation with manas. "The function of Manovijñāna is by hypothesis to reflect on Manas, as the eye-vijñāna reflects on the world of forms and the ear-vijñāna on that of sounds." The evolution therefore begins with ālayavijñāna and proceeds by way of manas, manovijñāna, and indriyavijñāna in order.

The Abhidhamma realists put the series in a reverse order. According to the Yogācāra, the world was a projection of the mind. Hence to them, the world of plurality evolved from the internal unity of the ālaya. The Abhidhamma, on the other hand, took the visible world (rūpa, rūpārammaṇa) as a reality, and thought as the product of the relation between the external world and the perceiving subject. It took for granted the premise that duality was inherent in every form of sense-perception, but it did not concede to the view that this duality was an illusion. Hence the series begins with indriyavijñāna. When an object enters within the field of vision, for example, there arises that aspect of mind (manodhātu) which performs the function of attending to the object. This is analogous to the position of manas in the Yogācāra doctrine, which performs the function of a discriminating intelligence.³⁶ Following on this comes sensory awareness which is the equivalent of indriyavijñāna of the Yogācāra. Next there follows a manodhātu performing the function of 'receiving' the object. And the two final stages are two classes of manoviññādhātu, equivalent to the manovijñānā of the Yogācāra. Hence in the Abhidhamma we have bhavangaviññāṇa, indriyaviññāṇa, mano and manoviññāṇa, corresponding to ālayavijñāna, manas, manovijñāna and indriyavijñāna of the Yogācāra.

Mutual influence seems irrefutable when we consider other points of similarity in the two theories. The Yogācāras regard all the evolutes of mind (citta) as being ethically good or bad, just as the Abhidhammikas do, although in the Yogācāra philosophy there is rigid classification of every form of consciousness according to its moral quality. The Yogācāras further regard the process as momentary (kṣaṇika), and we see traces of this view in the Visuddhi Magga and the earlier commentaries, and a final development of the theory in the Abhidhammatthasangaha where a thought process is

35. Lankā. p. 37.

36. Studies, p. 190: "The function of Manas is essentially to reflect upon the Ālaya and to create and to discriminate subject and object from the pure oneness of the Ālaya."

divided into seventeen moments. The Lankāvatāra Sūtra says: "The eight vijñānas, Mahāmati, are good or bad. What are they? The tathāgatagarbha known as ālayavijñāna, manas, manovijñāna, and the fivefold body of vijñānas described by philosophers. Now the fivefold body of vijñānas, together with manovijñāna, differentiated from one another in respect of good and bad, a succession of moments proceeding in a train of unbroken continuity, move on. Moving on, they cease to exist, and being unable to understand phenomena as being only mind, immediately on the destruction of one there arises another vijñāna; and manovijñāna, which is able to grasp the difference in forms and figures, proceeds along with the body of five vijñānas. It does not remain still for a moment. I call it momentary."³⁷

The Abhidhamma theory, even in its vocabulary (see original quoted above) seems to be an elaboration of the theory set forth heré.

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37. Kuśalākuśalāḥ punar mahāmate yad utāṣṭau vijñānāni. Katamānyaṣṭau? Yad uta tathāgatagarbha ālayavijñānasamśabdito mano manovijñānam ca pañca ac vijñānakāyās tirthyānuvarṇitāḥ. Tatra mahāmate pañcavijñānakāyā manovijñānasahitāḥ kuśalākuśalākṣaṇaparāmarābheda bhinnāḥ santatiprabandhanāḥ hinnaśarīrāḥ pravartamānāḥ pravartante. Pravṛtya ca vinaśyanti svacittadṛśyānavatodhāt; samanantaranirodhe 'nyadvijñānam pravartate; samsthānākṛtviśeṣagrāhakaṃ manovijñānam pañcabhiḥ vijñānakāyāḥ saha samprayuktaṃ pravartate, kṣaṇakālanavasthāyī tat kṣaṇam iti vadāmi.—Lankā.

E. R. DE S. SARATHCHANDRA.

Certainty in History

By E. BERNHEIM. Translated by E. J. THOMAS

(*Note.*—Ernst Bernheim was professor of history at the University of Greifswald in Prussia, and while there published his chief work. *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode* (Textbook of Historical Method, with reference to the most important sources and aids to the study of history, 4th ed., Leipzig, 1903). The following consists of extracts from the chapter on Methodology. He there deals with a problem which has so far been more prominent in the West than in the East, the inquiry whether we can rely on the trustworthiness of any historical records at all. This question became prominent in the 15th century at the Revival of Learning. At that time many ancient records had been discovered, and the very wealth of the new material showed that the records were not history in the sense that they could all be taken as faithful accounts of what had happened. There were too many contradictions. Hence some scholars of the time were inclined to reject the whole, and to say, "History is only a fiction that has been agreed upon." It is against this universal scepticism that Bernheim wrote, for naturally, as in any science, there may be doubts on particular questions. He shows how the material ought to be treated so that we can extract the main certainties from what is merely probable or possible. An example of this in the early history of Ceylon is the story of Vijaya and his ancestors. It may not be accepted as it stands, and yet no one doubts that the Aryan invasion really took place.

E. J. THOMAS.

THERE are two distinct difficulties in historical method, which may occasion doubts about the possibility of being able to arrive at sure results, and which have in fact repeatedly awakened scepticism about "the certainty of history." These doubts cannot be left unexamined, for it depends on their solution whether History can rightly be called a science, since the most essential mark of a science is that it transmits assured knowledge. The difficulties in question lie partly in the matter of history, and so are objective, and partly in our cognitive faculties, and thus are subjective. Accordingly the question is on the one hand about the objective, and on the other hand, the subjective possibility of certain knowledge from history.

1. The subjective possibility of certain historical knowledge.

We need only deal in passing with the ancient scepticism directed against the certainty of any human knowledge whatever, for in that case it is the question of a general theory of knowledge, with which we have not to deal. Further, this general scepticism is directed specially against natural science, seldom specially against history. Why so, however, it is of interest to know. That old familiar attack of scepticism against the faculty of knowledge is in fact valid: "It is not the things themselves, the phenomena of the outer world themselves, that we apprehend in our mind, but only the impressions

which we receive through our senses; who can tell us that these impressions correspond with reality?" This attack can evidently be turned just as well against the knowledge of history as against the knowledge of nature, for the former has also to deal with phenomena of the outer world. If the former has nevertheless occurred more rarely, the reason lies in the immediate relation of our minds to the objects of historical knowledge. For these objects are the actions of men, which proceed from human feeling, thinking, and willing, and they are of the same kind as that which day by day we experience inwardly in our own mental life as actual. This which is our own most intimate experience of our feeling, thinking, and willing, together with the actions springing therefrom as something real, convinces us too immediately and irrefutably of the reality of analogous phenomena among our fellowmen, and hence also among the men of the past, for us to have any room for doubt about it. Only one who goes so far as to assert that his own life is a dream and that his world is the imaginary picture of such a dream can deny the reality of history.

But it is just on this inner basis of historical knowledge that a more particular sceptical doubt is connected. We must in fact be convinced not only of the reality of the historical world, but we must conceive and understand the events as actions, i.e. as rationally connected expressions of human feeling, thinking, and willing. Hence we must so reproduce in ourselves the feelings and ideas of other men as if we ourselves felt and imagined them. Is that possible? Are we then at all certain that our fellow-men in the present and the past did not feel and think in some way quite differently from ourselves, so that it is an illusion to think that I can realise the feelings and thoughts of another? As a matter of fact such a certainty can never be logically proved. Here too we can only appeal to the practical experience of daily existence. But this furnishes us all the more immediately, by means of continually recurring proofs, with the inner conviction and certainty that we rightly understand the actions of the people around us with their motives, according to the analogy of our own actions and motives. This certainty, which is deeply and firmly based on general experience, the certainty of the analogy of the ways of feeling, thinking, and willing among mankind, or, as we might say, the identity of human nature, is the fundamental axiom of any historical knowledge. In fact, if there were or ever had been a people or an individual that did its thinking in a different kind of logic from ours, to whom hate was not hate and love was not love, its history would be even more impenetrable to us than the events in a beehive.

But the recognition of this axiom does not remove all doubts that have been raised. Even if we grant that we can understand the actions of the people living round about us, because we feel and think analogously, yet with some appearance of justification it might be doubted whether long vanished

racés and distant peoples thought in the same way. Is not blood-revenge, which was a sacred duty to the primitive Germans, extremely detestable to us? Do we comprehend the asceticism of a mediaeval hermit or an Indian fakir? Are not numberless customs and views of the past entirely strange to us? Such a doubt can only mislead us as long as we do not make it clear that in all such cases we have to deal with what are only different expressions of the same spiritual and intellectual dispositions. We see it most easily in the sphere of thought. This is expressed quite otherwise in different times and among different peoples, in other forms of speech and language. It has continually other content; in fact, the whole direction of thinking, the way of operating with the elements of thought, are continually changing. Nevertheless, we never think of doubting that we can understand, e.g., the works of Aristotle as well as his contemporaries. The reason is that in spite of all difference of expression and subject-matter the general processes of thought remain the same.

Quite correspondingly in the sphere of feeling the expressions and the content of the particular feelings differ according to peoples and times. But the general psychic processes at the basis remain unchangeable. For example, the modes of expressing feeling are very different when the Indian fakir mortifies himself, when the Greek in praying raises his hands to the gods, or the modern man kneels down humbly at the sound of the organ, and is absorbed in the thought of the All. But the feeling lying at the base, the devotion, is in its inner process one and the same. It is of course quite easy, owing to the external form in which feelings and ideas make their appearance, to be mistaken about their real nature. Hence one must methodically pay attention to the fact that they change and how they change, and be able, under the different modes of expression, to recognize the feelings and ideas lying at the basis.

There is still one doubt to be considered, which is closely connected with what has been said. Even though we have recognized that the emotional and ideational processes of all men are analogous, we do not wish to deny the difference of the individual human feelings and ideas, nor would it be possible to do so. This difference rests on the relative difference of the individualities not only of peoples and epochs, but also of individual persons. The constitution of our sense-organs results in no one of us perceiving an object of the outer world quite in the same way as another would. No one realises exactly the same factors of an external event as another contemporary observer. In the sphere of the natural sciences we can control and eliminate this defect of the human power of observation by repeatedly observing the same object or by bringing the same event repeatedly to our perception by experiment in order finally to have grasped all the factors equally. With the subject-matter of history that is mostly impossible. The actual events that it deals with, the events, are only once accessible to immediate observation, and they are usually

so complicated that even the immediate observer can observe only the smallest part with his sense-faculties, and only some of their results are lastingly to be observed as remains¹ and existing states. When that is the case one may with seeming justice doubt whether, in view of the diversity and incompleteness of individual apprehension, we are in a position to recognize the particular historical events in conformity with truth. But this doubt too, when more closely examined, involves its own refutation, for it is precisely from the relative diversity of individual apprehension that the actuality of those factors of the events that have been observed simultaneously and in the same way by two or more independent personalities, comes out with all the greater certainty, and the different incomplete observations can thus be mutually supplemented. The correspondence and the completing of a number of observations are, in the sphere of natural science, our means of control and protection against the one-sidedness and insufficiency of the individual's capacity of observation.

Besides this, the evidence of remains and of concurrent circumstances comes in, when they correspond with the other somewhat onesided observation of the events and many another item furnished by "higher criticism."² In addition there are the original conclusions that we may draw from the remains independently of a psychological interpretation of the facts and circumstances that caused them. We thus acquire a great stock of ascertained facts, sufficient to protect us against the sceptical generalization of that doubt. As remarked, higher criticism has further to set out the criteria of actuality. It has also to show us in what cases we cannot attain certainty, but must be satisfied with different degrees of probability. The recognition that there are such cases cannot on the whole affect the knowability of the historical events. It is something quite different from the sceptical doubt from which we started. Thus it appears here also as usual that scepticism is indeed based on correct

1. Bernheim uses the terms *remains* and *tradition* in a technical sense to distinguish the two great groups of historical material. *Remains* are everything that survives of the period in question, such as the kitchen-middens of early Europe, the language that the people spoke, the customs, laws, and institutions, works of art, tools, weapons, coins, and buildings, and finally acts of councils, decrees, registers of landed property, and inscriptions other than historical.

Tradition aims at recording the actual events, and is historical material proper. It may be pictorial (statues, maps, plans), oral (legends, anecdotes, ballads), or written (historical inscriptions, chronicles, genealogies, biographies, etc.).—E.J.T.

2. Criticism is divided into lower or outer and higher or inner criticism. The former deals with the questions, (1) whether the source is what it professes to be. If it is not, it is a falsification. (2) Whether the source is really what we have supposed it to be. If not, there is an error. By these means we arrive at the real sources, but they do not tell us whether the sources are recording the truth. They merely remove errors that may mislead us in interpreting the sources. To determine the truth of the resources requires higher criticism, which aims at determining whether the witnesses are trustworthy, probable, possible, or to be rejected.—E.J.T.

actual observations, but that it goes too far in doubting the possibility of any certain knowledge, while a scientific method only finds occasion for the application of special rules.

2. The objective possibility of certain historical knowledge.

The observation just made about the character of scepticism can be made still more clear in connexion with the attacks upon the matter of history, for these have rested upon entirely pertinent observations about the nature of historical material.

Even since the revival of the scientific spirit in the time of the Humanists, it was soon observed, as soon as historical writers began to be more sharply criticised, that their accounts of the same events, either owing to lack of knowledge or party prejudice were often enough contradictory. Now instead of asking, cannot the truth nevertheless be reached? are there no ways and means of removing the sources of the mistakes? the critics went too far by holding that in view of the untrustworthiness of the tradition it is not possible to acquire any certain knowledge of the past. We meet this view already in Agrippa of Nettesheim (1530), in his work *On the uncertainty and vanity of the sciences*, and it passed into France, where it was linked on to Pierre Bayle's critical and often sceptical investigations in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1696); and chiefly among the versatile spirits of France it has repeatedly found approval, and has won its classical expression in the well known *bon mot*, "history is only a fiction agreed upon" (*l'histoire n'est qu'une fable convenue*), attributed to Fontenelle (b. 1657) the nephew of Corneille.

In a finer and lessened manner, but consequently more embracingly, this scepticism is again making itself felt, just because of the most keenly penetrating critical research, and it often steals upon us at our work with its doubts. These are the doubts that rest partly on the same basis as those discussed above, but which here are however directed at the state of the material. Not only in the case of historical writers but rather directly in the case of any of the various forms of historical tradition—the sources of history, as we generally call them—we come with keener critical penetration upon a limit, where owing to the character of the sources in question certainty itself ceases, and serious doubts arise. The reporters, orally or in writing, and the authors do not in fact record the events directly, but only so much as they have apprehended in their minds, and only in the way they have apprehended it, coloured and distorted by the manifold intentional and unintentional modifications of their subjective ways of apprehending and reflecting. Often enough we come upon a fact recorded only once by one untrustworthy reporter, or upon several

statements that contradict one another, without being in the position to hold that one of them is absolutely correct.

The remains of occurrences of course present us with immediate testimonies, but by no means always with the unconditioned reality. In documents and official acts, for example, the events often enough owing to some tendency are recorded in a way that does not correspond with the truth—secret instructions, articles of peace, which wholly or partially revoke or cancel the published ones, have disappeared. In general the material is often so defectively preserved that from the documents that happen to come to our knowledge we get a quite onesided or erroneous picture of the actual events. Further, the documents are often dated erroneously or not at all, or their purposes are unintelligible because they presuppose what we lack, the immediate knowledge of the points in question possessed by the interested parties who knew the inner motives. These are all valuable observations and quite to the point, but they are not calculated to lead us to a downhearted scepticism, as in the case of Sir Walter Raleigh, who according to the well-known anecdote is said to have thrown the second volume of his *History of the World* into the fire, because a street-affray before his window, which he had himself witnessed, was immediately reported by another eyewitness quite differently from the way in which he had himself observed it. These observations only suggest to us that we should treat the sources methodically, each according to their character, and apply methodical rules of control and precaution in order to recognize the actual events through all the obscurities. To be sure, in many particular cases we shall not be able to arrive at absolute certainty, yet even our methodical inferences and judgments about the reliability of the sources rest on general principles of experience, which in particular cases may be exceptionally crossed by individual divergences and incidental occurrences. In any case we shall not lose sight of the fact that we must exclude chance as far as possible.

But if we finally see that we cannot in all circumstances arrive at absolute certainty, we shall not give way to the sceptical generalisation that there is no certainty at all in history. Otherwise we must for that reason say the same of any other science. For can one name a single science in which, besides the certain knowledge, there are not also probable and hypothetical results? And that the latter are any the more frequent in the case of history can only be for a moment the view of the investigator of details, when the more he penetrates into the particular he all the less arrives at established facts, and forgets that the main features of the events are undoubtedly established and remain established. Although the course of a battle, for example, may in detail arouse disparate and insoluble doubts, the actuality of the battle itself, its place, time, and result, are not at all affected. And thus in spite of any doubtful events, there remains a great stock of indubitably certain facts throughout history,

which we only overlook and undervalue because we have accustomed ourselves to treat them as taken for granted. To realize this properly let anyone take an outline of history or set of historical tables compiled more or less according to the principles of modern criticism. How few dates will one there find of which the certainty could be disputed! In view of this certain stock we can calmly grant and recognize that, as in all sciences, so also in history we must not rarely be contented with probabilities, often also with possibilities.

For that reason it is no good to give way to sentimental laments about the inadequacy of human knowledge. It is rather the task of the investigator to give himself and his public a clearly recognized and strict account as to how far he comes short of the limit of certainty, and to what degree his results are only probable. By "probable" we mean the facts in historical inquiry whose occurrence are supported by reports on indirect reasons more weighty than the reports or other reasons that are in favour of their non-occurrence. "Possible" we call the facts against the occurrence of which there are no direct or indirect reasons, while there are no positive grounds for assuming their occurrence. It is clear that according to the number and weight of the reasons on both sides and according to their relation to one another there can be very different degrees of probability, rising to an approach to certainty and down to mere possibility. The balancing and determination of these eventualities and different degrees of probability is everywhere a matter of scientific method, and we shall not neglect it. Whether the science of history has on the whole fewer certainties and more mere probabilities to show than other sciences is a consideration as difficult to settle as it is idle, which E. A. Freeman (*The methods of historical study*, p. 152) settles with the pertinent words: "Whether such evidence is enough to make history a science or the pathway to a science, is really a question of words and nothing else."³

Some Indo-Arabic Cultural Contacts.

AL-MANSUR (+ 775) the second prince of the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258 A.D.), laid the first brick of his new Capital in 762 A.D. on the west bank of the Tigris—Baghdad which was destined to be the intellectual centre of the East. This scholar—Caliph founded "The Department of Translation" where Arabs and non-Arabs were employed to translate Greek and Sanskrit, including other Oriental languages, into Arabic. This institution became more and more prominent as the number of linguists increased. "The good Harun Alraschid" (786-809 A.D.) who plays an important role in "Thousand and One Nights" was the fifth Caliph of the dynasty, and he brought this to fruition with astonishing rapidity. His son Mamun established "The House of Wisdom," where he used to hold metaphysical discussion with brilliant scholars of the time, who published their standard works on various subjects.

The keen interest in Indian wisdom shown by the Arabs of the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era is a significant feature of the Arabic literature of this period. The fame of the Abbasid Caliph's patronage of letters had spread far and wide which made Baghdad a sort of literary Rendezvous, where just as "to a monarch's hall, as to a market, people bring only what is in demand."¹ Greeks and "AL-BRAHIMA"—a term then applied to Hindus—Persians and Egyptians met each other. Of all the non-Arabian members of the Academy of Baghdad, the Persian IBNUL-MUQAFFA (+ Circa 760 A.D.) who made several translations from PEHLEVI or Middle-Persian into Arabic deserves our serious attention. The most famous of all his writings which are many is his "Book of Kalila wa Dimna." This work through a translation in Pehlevi goes back to the Sanskrit "FABLES of BIDDAI"² and is undoubtedly one of the oldest Prose works in Arabic, and has always been recognized as a model of literary eloquence.

Al-jahiz (+ 869) a celebrated scholar of Basra, a man of encyclopaedic knowledge, and as described by C. Brockelmann³ "a genius who stood far above his age," has paid glowing tributes to Hindu Thinkers.⁴ It is a pity that the names of those Indian scholars have become so completely metamorphosed in Semetic script—partly because of Arabs' difficulty to pronounce Sanskrit names and of "the serious defects of Arabic script,"⁵ just as many Arabic

3. This work of Freeman's consists of his introductory lectures given in 1884, while he was professor of History at Oxford. It treats in a vivid manner of some of the problems here discussed by Bernheim.—E.J.T.

1. Tha'alibi (+ 1038 A.D.) *Yatima* (Damascus 1304 A.H.) Vol. I, P. 8.

2. Nicholson: *A Literary history of the Arabs*. (London 1907) P. 346.

3. *S. Geschichte d. Arabischen Literatur*. II.

4. *Al-Bayn I*. 294 (Cairo) 1935.

5. *Al-Beruni—Tahdid Nihayatul Amakin*. S. Islamic Culture Hyderabad. Oct. 1932. P. 531.

names in European languages have completely undergone phonetic changes.⁶ Thus Indian (AL-BRAHIMA) Pundits appear in Arabic pronunciation BAHLA, MANKA, BAZIKAR, FILBARFIL, ŠINDBAD and KANKA. The Hindu sciences which Arabs interpreted to the Eastern Caliphate (as opposed to the Western Caliphate of Spain) are Mathematics, Medicine, Ophidia (Sarpavidyā), Toxicology, Astronomy and Astrology. Al-Beruni⁷ (+ 1048 A.D.) informs us that "a Hindu scholar learned in Astronomy and Mathematics came with a deputation from Sind, and brought a Sanskrit Siddhānta to Baghdad during the time of AL-MANSUR. By the Order of the Caliph he translated this work into Arabic with the help of IBRAHIM FAZARI. "This was the first time" says AL-QIFTI⁸ in his Dictionary of Philosophers, "that the Arabs recognized the intellectual attainments of India." In Arabic, Mathematical figures were written first in words and later in Alphabets. As a result of Indo-Arab cultural relations, Hindu numerals were cast in the Arabic mould, which were accepted by European students attending the University of Cordova, who called them "Arabic numerals," because they had learnt them from the Arabs, who still call them "Hindu numerals." AL-KHWARIZMI the Court-Mathematician and Astronomer of MAMUN AR-RASHID (+ 833 A.D.)—the son of "Harun Alraschid,"—who researched into Indian Mathematics and published many important treatises, must be regarded as the pioneer in this branch of Indian Science. In Europe names of particular branches of Mathematics such as Logarithms, Alogrithms and Algorism are all corrupted forms of AL-KHWARIZMI.⁹ The Arab writers of eighth and ninth centuries used the term "HISABUL-GHUBAR" (Arithmetic of the dust) to indicate the Indian origin of the numerals. The probable reason for this appellation is that these numerals were written with either chalk or lime-water on levelled ground in Indian village patshalas. The Indian origin of the Arabic numerals is best evidenced by the figures which are written from left to right, as in Sanskrit, and not from right to left as in the Arabic script.

IBN ABI USEYBA narrates in his "TARIKH-UL-ATIBBA"¹⁰ (Biographical dictionary of Physicians), how MANKA, the Indian cured a serious disease. He says:—"Once Harun Alrashid fell seriously ill. When the Physicians of Baghdad failed to cure him, somebody suggested the name of MANKA, the Indian Physician. He was invited to Baghdad and special arrangements were made for his long travel. Under his treatment the Caliph

6. cf. Al-Razi, and Ibn Rushd with European Rhazes and Averroes or Ibn Bajja recorded by medieval Romans as Avempape.

7. Kitabul-Hind (London) P. 208.

8. Akhbarul Hukama: P. 177 (Cairo Edition)

9. Encyclopaedia Britannica XIX, 867.

10. II, 33 (Egyptian Edition).

was restored to health. The Caliph rewarded him profusely. He was then commissioned to translate Sanskrit books in the "Translation Department." BAHLA was another Indian Physician who was presented to the Court of Harun. At that time Gabriel BAKHTSHIU, a Greek, was the Court-Physician who failed to cure the Caliph's Cousin of his diseases, and it fell to the lot of BAHLA to treat him in which he completely succeeded.¹¹

Another Indian (Al-Brahima) Pundit whose name is recorded by a tenth century¹² scholar as RAI is reputed to be an authority on 'Snake-bite Cure.' His book was translated from Sanskrit into Arabic. Early Arab writers have mentioned casually the contributions made by Hindus to the science of Toxicology. IBN¹³ Nadim refers to a Sanskrit work on Poison, which had already been translated into Arabic long before his time. IBN DHAN was a well known figure in Baghdad. In Arabic "IBN" means "Son"—that is son of DHAN. Semites in general and Arabs in particular were always keen to know the name of the Father; hence this additional "IBN." This Physician was held in high esteem, and he was a medical officer of an important Public Hospital of Baghdad. Besides his hospital duties, he was attached to the Translation Department where he translated Sanskrit works into Arabic. The great German Orientalist Prof. E. Sachau¹⁴ thinks that this DHAN might have been 'DHANYA' or 'DHANAN.' This name was probably adopted to resemble the word DHANVANTARI, which is the name of the physician of the gods in MANUSHAstra.

In the domain of Astronomy and Astrology the Arabs drank deep from the "Fountain" of India, particularly, in Astrology which was entirely a new subject to them. In Astronomy, however, they may have acquired considerable knowledge through the observations of the ancient Semites known in history as Chaelians, who inhabited the region lying between north Arabia and modern Mesopotamia. In this sphere of knowledge the ground was already prepared to grasp Indian calculations. The celebrated Al-Beruni writing in the early eleventh century A.D. while commenting upon the meteorological studies of famous ABU Mashar of Balkh—whose works have been studied by Nallino and Caetani—observes: "This is the testimony of ABU Mashar, showing that through this (Indian) method you obtain correct results. If, (besides,) you take to (help) the Mansions (the places of the Lunar Stations) of the Hindus and their single parts, you are pretty sure in your calculation to come near the truth."¹⁵

11. Ibid. II, 34. (Egyptian Edition).

12. Ibn Nadim P. 303.

13. I, 317.

14. Al-Beruni's Kitabul-Hind—English Translation. See Introduction P. 33.

15. Al-Beruni's "Chronology of Ancient Nations" English translation by E. Sachau P. 342. (London 1879).

Historian Masudi (+ 947 A.D.)¹⁶ informs us that a voluminous medical book was written for RAJA KURASH (?), wherein the causes and treatment of diseases are discussed, and drugs and herbs illustrated, and "Female Diseases"—written originally in Sanskrit by a Hindu woman named "RAOOSA"¹⁷—are described.

To this list of Brahamin scholars another may be added. I have discovered recently an Arabic MS. in Colombo, which is dated 641 A.H. (circa 1221 A.D.) and copied as the scribe of the MS. says from a still older manuscript at Ghaza near Damascus.

The author of this manuscript is one "BAYYUN" stated in the manuscript as "Al-Brahamin." It deals with the effect of minerals and jewels on the human system. This appears to be a unique manuscript as I have so far not succeeded in tracing any reference to this manuscript in the published printed catalogues of European or Asiatic libraries.

In consequence of the Indo-arabic cultural contacts many scientific Sanskrit words crept into Arabic but they have been Arabicised to such an extent that not all of them can be easily identified.¹⁸ The question is where are these Arabic translations today? The answer to such a question is that probably all of them were destroyed by the order of Halaku Khan, the Mongol, who sacked Baghdad in 1258. According to the historians of the age the libraries of Baghdad were burnt to ashes while the Mongols took delight in this 'bonfire.' The treasured manuscripts which had been guarded jealously from century to century were completely destroyed. The same tragedy befell the Alhambra library which was triumphantly burnt to ashes by the Crusaders. Then followed a period of civil wars, in which there was little or no real cultural activity. Ceylon too has had in my opinion cultural contacts with Arabia. Al Beruni in his 'India,' incidentally mentions a certain SANHAL HINDI, who wrote a book entitled "Great Book of Births." In Arabic unvocalized script the author's name is recorded as SNHL. Can we not take this for Sinhal or Sinhalese?

S. A. IMAM

16. P. Muruj. Ed. by Barbier de Meynard with French translation I, 162 (Paris).

17. Ibn Nadim. P, 303.

18. S. Islamic Culture. Hyderabad. Oct. 1932. Moulana Sulaiman.

Reviews,

Poems from India by Members of the Forces.—Chosen by R. N. CURREY and R. P. GIBSON.—O.U.P. Rs. 3/-.

The editors of this selection of poems written by members of the forces in India are to be congratulated on the production of a highly interesting and illuminating little volume. Although the quality of the writing is, as natural in the circumstances, uneven, the general level would justify attention on its own account, apart from the valuable light thrown on the mood and temper of a generation of Britishers who lived and fought in India during the second world war.

Technically very few of the writers here have developed an utterance of their own, even the terse directness of colloquial speech which one might have expected in *vers libre*, the most popular form represented, seems to be wanting. There is something in the editors' remark that "original epigrammatic wit seems hard to come by." Might it not be that one meets here not with a deficiency of language but a kind of inarticulateness which is a deficiency of attitude. The weakness seemed to lie there, in the indefiniteness of attitude to what was seen and experienced. Or the moulds into which experiences flowed were old, banal ones—not those of Anglo-India mercifully—as the following might suggest :

Epitaph of a Sweeper

Monotonous, yes. Degrading, perhaps. But still
He has, for what it's worth, a cast iron defence,
Who passed his whole God-given existence,
Emptying the faeces of sahibs, until
Death eventually rewarded his diligence.

At least he can claim in Nirvana without pretence
That his life was dedicated to the Fundamental.

That leaves on me the impression of slackness, of the want of something which technique alone would not have imparted. The pun which ought to have given strength and firmness to the whole, is abortive, and it hovers perilously near the tasteless banality. Besides it is a trifle too long, technique might have saved it here.

The best things in the selection are in the first part entitled Indian Scene, and here the outstanding contribution is Alun Lewis's. The editors rightly comment on "the intensity of intuition" with which his work speaks for the wartime soldier. He expresses himself without any constraint and with a fine sensitiveness which gives his work individuality. What seems to me the most notable quality of his poetry is its complete expression of the type of mind portrayed—small in range, but deriving surety from the very limitation of range, sincere, clear, yet appalled at the incoherencies of his world. It does not seem correct to say that Alun Lewis had anything valid to say about India; wherever he would have been, in the world in which he grew up, he would have communicated the same integrity of a mind curiously defeated by the world of experience. India provided a focus which Sicily or the steppes or the Pacific might have given. In his last poem the impression is left of the unremitting exactitude with which the blankness of the time is portrayed. If a poem is judged by the success of its communication then this poem would rank very high. It is difficult to resist quotation :

Grey monkeys gibber, ignorant and wise.
We are the ghosts, and they the denizens;
We are like them anonymous, unknown,

Avoiding what is human, near,
 Skirting the villages, the paddy fields
 Where boys sit timelessly to scare the crows
 On bamboo platforms raised above their lives.
 A trackless wilderness divides
 Joy from its cause, the motive from the act ;
 The killing arm uncurls, strokes the soft moss ;
 The distant world is an obituary,
 We do not hear the tappings of its dread.
 The act sustains ; there is no consequence.
 Only aloneness, swinging slowly
 Down the cold orbit of an older world
 Than any they predicted in the schools,
 Stirs the cold forest with a starry wind,
 And sudden as the flashing of a sword
 The dream exalts the bowed and golden head
 And time is swept with a great turbulence,
 The old temptation to remould the world.

Phrasally, rhythmically, and in its whole effect the communication is strong and severe. Lewis undoubtedly possessed the least of the poet's gifts—the memorable phrase. Every one of his contributions is marked by it, this from *The Journey* :

There was also the memory of Death
 And the recurrent irritation of ourselves.

or this from *The Mahratta Ghats* :

Dark peasants drag the sun upon their backs.

What is distinctive in Alun Lewis's poems provides the best of the other work in *Poems from India* with its hallmark, the impression of a group of men not apathetic nor over self-conscious, but aware of a general catastrophe not specially India's or their own, but the evil of a world. If the volume, as its editors hope, does something to help understanding between British and Indian, it must be this feeling of a common greyness, which will strike sensitive Englishmen and English educated Indians as incidental to their world. In more than one poem, notably by Stuart Piggott in *Bohemond's Tomb*, by R. N. Currey in *Burial Flags, Sind*, and by George Taylor in *Bengal: After a Storm*, that mood is communicated. The last is in its own way a minor success :

Bengal: After a Storm

Sweetly the sky apologizes for
 The epileptic interlude, the gibbering rain :
 Water in pools shines out like compliments
 The reconciling gestures are quite plain
 Cool benediction of the moon
 Healing touch of the night air
 Cancel our exile and declare
 Moment and place are both a boon.
 The temporary truce must not deceive ;
 Already the sneering bull-frog in the slime
 And the appalling chorus of jackals
 Betray the real intentions of the time.

All that remains to be said is that the book, illustrated by line drawings by Sapper Blackburn, is attractively got up.

E. F. C. L.

Robert Bridges.—By EDWARD THOMPSON. O.U.P. 8/6.

The author of this memoir explains that Robert Bridges wished no biography of himself to be written ; the memoir has to be looked upon as a graceful circumvention of that wish. It is in no sense biographical, it gives the reader a picture of Bridges' personality and, within its slender compass of one hundred and twenty five pages, makes some comment on his poetry and criticism. Regarded as a friend's tribute Thompson's memoir would certainly please those who knew Bridges, and those who knew of him in Oxford. It is a pity its small scope offered an artist of Thompson's calibre little opportunity to make the portrait lively or even plausible. Too much seems to be taken for granted ; while there is no doubt that those who knew Bridges would be delighted, one wonders whether it will interest the majority who did not know him and did not care very much for his work.

Two things stand out for special mention, Thompson himself notes them, and to outweigh them points to qualities in the work which to him were undoubtedly excellent and are more than compensation. Both are such obvious criticism that it seems scarcely profitable to mention them here. Yet it is difficult to write anything about Bridges without referring to them. He himself was almost completely cut off from the life of his times, although he was no don, he was more donnish than most dons ; secondly, his interests in poetry were technical in a sense which made of technique an end in itself. Both these things had an inhibiting effect on the poetry, so that in the end little is left of value, when prosodic experiments and still lifes—"flower pieces" Thompson calls them—are put away.

The accident of birth gave Bridges the kind of life which "as he acknowledged repeatedly, was fortunate," not only his youth but the better part of his life was spent in days which were surely fortunate for the class to which he belonged. Thompson notes that this good fortune had its disadvantages.—"if Bridges had possessed more intellectual curiosity and had acknowledged a wider range of ideas, even heretical and subversive ideas, as being at least of interest, he would have been a still greater poet." Apart from the damaging innocence of that remark, the isolation of Bridges from the life of his time would surely have prevented him from being very much of a poet. On that score it is difficult to credit Thompson when he claims that Bridges' good fortune enabled him to devote all his time to being a poet.

Nor is it to be supposed that a man so "fortunate," even if he did possess a good ear and a feeling for racy and homely turns of speech, could bring anything to the technique of writing poetry but adroitness. For what could a manner of saying a thing do, if there was nothing to be said after all ? Thompson incidentally prefers to echo what Symons and Brett Young said of Bridges' early work, depending on Elton for opinions on *The Testament of Beauty* but what is culled is scarcely criticism at all. Thompson's own preferences are for the inept placing—of *The Growth of Love* for instance he writes "It ranks, of course, lower than Shakespeare's *Sonnets*, and in sincerity and passion is far inferior to the *Sonnets from the Portuguese*. How do remarks like this help to show that *The Testament of Beauty* for instance, offers any new insights or convinces of the reality of the writer's insights. Technique, prosody, in the way in which Bridges was interested in it was an arid study, it had more to do with languages very different in character from the English. Nothing that Thompson says of *Noel* does convince that it is "as astonishingly fresh and lovely poem, the first entirely successful unrhymed lyric in English or, if Collin's *Ode to Evening* is that, then the second ; it contains two rhymes only." Perhaps it would be better to say that the first part of the claim has not been maintained.

There is much to interest the critic of poetry in this memoir, even though the results may not support an argument with which its author would agree. To judge it from these points of view would be unfair, the book was intended as a labour of love, both the labour and the love are plentifully evident everywhere.

E. F. C. L.

The Legend of the Topes (Thūpavaṃsa).—Bibliotheca Indica: No. 268—
By BIMALA CHURN LAW; pp. i-x + 101—Published by the Royal Asiatic
Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1945.

This is the first attempt made to translate the mediaeval Pali Chronicle *Thūpavaṃsa*, the original of which was edited for the Pali Text Society by the same writer in 1935. The title chosen for the translation is rather misleading and, as will be seen below, is obviously the result of misunderstanding the Pali term. It is claimed that this translation will "help the reader to understand and appreciate a Pali traditional work of the late mediaeval period, to crack the hard nut of the stereotyped and highly conventionalized prose of scholastic writings" (p. vi). But, one regrets to say so, the translation is marred by so many inaccuracies on every page that the reader entertains a persistent doubt as to how this attempt will fulfil the intended purpose. It is, in fact, disturbing to anticipate its use even by students of the history of Buddhist art and institutions, not to speak of the effect on students of the Pali language for whom it is primarily intended.

A glance at the very first page of this translation will no doubt help to corroborate the above remarks. In the first verse itself, "For the welfare of the world I create an image of the Conqueror and bow down paying homage to that most wonderful tope wherein lay, on all sides, the Conqueror's noble relics . . ." seems a puerile attempt to render the simple Pali of the original :

*Yasmim sayimsu jina-dhātvarā samantā,
chabbanṇa-vaṃsi visarāhi samujjalantā :
nimmāya loka-hita-hetu jinassa rūpam,
tam thūpamabbhutatamam siraśā namitvā.*

The reader can easily see for himself the trouble the two simple, though irregularly used, words 'nimmāya' and 'samantā' have given the translator, from the italicized phrases in the citation. In spite of the clear singular 'thūpam' in this verse (cp. *thūpassa*, in verses 2 and 6; tattha *thūpassa* vaṃsam vakkhāmi, §1) it is impossible to understand why the author who uses the singular in the first verse has developed a prejudice for the plural sense ever afterwards and translated in every succeeding verse the word by "Topes"! In the fifth verse, "Legend of the Teacher's Topes" is simply inexcusable for "vaṃsam *thūpassa* satthuno." In accordance with this prejudice the translator has throughout stuck to his "Legend of the Topes" as title, and this in spite of the palpable evidence of the original itself: "Idha pana kañcana-mālikamahāthūpo ti adhippeto" (p. 1, last sentence). Moreover, this last sentence which clearly means "Here, of course, the great Suvannamālī Thūpa is intended," for every student of Pali knows the interchangeability of the two synonyms 'kañcana' and 'suvanna,' has only deceived the translator into a glaring *faux pas*: "Here, however, a great tope having golden garlands is intended" (p. 2). As for the translator's powers of English expression, the following specimen from the first page itself is characteristic: "Herein the expression 'I shall relate the Legend of the Topes,' a shrine which is built and erected after depositing the relics of the Buddha and the rest who are worthy of *Thūpas*, as follows from the dictum—a Tathāgata . . . is worthy of a Thūpa; . . . a sovereign king is worthy of a Thūpa, that on which a shrine has been built and erected, is called a Thūpa." One searches in vain for the predicate of the subject "the expression" in view of the sheer impossibility of such a thing as "the expression . . . is called a Thūpa"! It is difficult even to suspect a printer's error in this case, for this first page should have stared in the face of any proof-reader! In the second verse "I shall relate the Legend of the Topes which brings welfare to the whole world, is a cause of joy to all beings, is always adored by the best of the gods, demons and lords of men and is a shining heap of jewels," the singular verb 'brings' would, of course, refer, in English syntax, to the 'Legend,' but then "is always adored . . . etc." and "is a shining heap of jewels"

would be sheer nonsense, as even the translator could have seen. Thus we are left with the English ". . . the Topes which brings . . . and is a shining heap of jewels." It is, however, unfair by the author of the original to create an unwarranted metaphor out of his straight forward phrase "ratanajalathūpikassa" which just connotes "having a spire shining with gems."

The task of the reviewer of this kind of work is indeed a difficult one; even the minimum number of remarks on *prima facie* inaccuracies is bound to exceed the space available. It will suffice to add that a cursory glance at the *hundred* odd pages of this translation shows at least as many errors of omission and commission, a few of which are given below:

"a week" (p. 3) for "sattasattahā"; "boundless and suitable to the occasion" (p. 5) for "aparimita-samaya-samucitāya"; "But there is nothing to be done for the attainment of Nirvāṇa if I, in disguise, destroy my sins" (p. 5) for "Aññātakave-sena pana me kilēse jhāpetva nibbānappattiyā kiccaṃ natthi"; "folly" (p. 8) for "okāra"; "they did not scatter" (p. 9) for "were not scattered"; "taking advantage of the birth of an Enlightened One in their midst" (p. 13) for "raṭṭhupādam gahetvā," *i.e.*, having collected the revenue of the country; a bad omission in para 23, p. 15; "golden bowls" (p. 16) for "suvanna-paṭṭakam"; "Enlightened One" (p. 19) for "buddho jano" meaning "a wise person"; "he reached the state of living at ease" (p. 20) for "appossukatam āpajjamāno" which means "becoming reluctant"; "jewels" (p. 24, para 8) for "ratana" which here implies "cubits"; "sprouted" (p. 25) for "mugga," *i.e.* "green pea"; "But great privileges arose afterwards like these chieftains making an attack" (p. 28) for "mahāparihārā pa'ete rājāno, parihāraṃ karontā va pacchato jātā" which means "these chieftains have indeed made great preparations, (owing to their) making preparations they arrived there last." The para beginning with the words "he came there . . . etc." (p. 33-34) is totally a mistranslation; "my father, a great Elder" (p. 38) for "pitamahatthero" shows how unacquainted the translator is with Pali idiom, for the meaning of the compound "the Elder, my teacher's teacher" seems to be unknown to him.

O. H. de A. W.

Nava Maga.—(A Sinhalese Literary Quarterly). PERAMUNA PRESS, Colombo.
Rs. 1/25.

Amongst a vast crop of post-war Sinhalese Journals the *Nava Maga* distinguishes itself in two ways: it sets out with the purpose of raising the standard of literary taste and evaluation among the Sinhalese reading public by providing them with material of a definitely higher quality, and it aims at giving the new generation of writers who are seeking to express themselves through new concepts and new forms an opportunity of placing their work before the public.

Experimentation with new forms has been evidence in the past, of stagnation. The prose writers after the Saddharmālanākāraya tried out new styles of writing for lack of anything new to say. Today's experimentation is rather the result of too many influences and too many new techniques as yet unincorporated into the tradition of the country. In order that new writers may discover what the genuine old tradition is, and in what way the new forms may be fused with it so that we find a path best suited to the expression of our national genius, it is necessary that there should be a rallying point. This is the unique service that this journal will be able to perform for the new literature that is attempting to express itself in the spirit of the new age.

There is a section devoted to critical articles on aspects of Sinhalese literature and culture, and a section in which special articles are contributed, of an informative nature, on modern subjects like psychology and sociology, which are still a closed book to the Sinhalese reader.

E. R. de S.

Woven Cadences of Early Buddhists.—Translated by E. M. HARE, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (Printed in Ceylon), 1944.

This translation of the Sutta Nipāta has appeared as the XVth. Volume of the Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series, and is, in fact, the third translation so far made of this most important Pali text. The earlier translations are those of Fausböll in the Sacred Books of the East Series and of Chalmers in the Harvard Oriental Series.

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that an understanding of early Buddhism is hardly possible without a correct interpretation of the Sutta Nipāta which is the one single collection of verses that belong to the period of the first foundations of Buddhism. Apart from its linguistic importance, therefore, the point of view put forward in it ought to be of the greatest interest to those who wish to know with what set of ideas originated this great movement in Indian thought, which in its final developments included the most extreme forms of idealism and realism, the most devout forms of theism as well as the coldest forms of atheism, the subtlest kinds of logic as well as the most devastating systems of nihilism.

A comparison of the verses of the Sutta Nipāta with the gāthā portions of the Nikāyas would seem to point to the conclusion that what is instinctively sought after as being 'early Buddhism' is, for one thing, much earlier than it is often thought to be, and is, as a matter of fact, quite different from both what has been so far regarded as early Buddhism, as well as the Buddhism that goes as orthodox Theravāda. In fact, the entire ideological basis of the Sutta Nipāta, with its repeated emphasis on the evils of sense-perception, seems to be the first formulation in India of philosophy which takes for its major premise the relative unreality of the external world, and aims at the goal of individual happiness by the attainment of inward peace (ajjhattasanti) through Yogic contemplation. The difference between this philosophy and that of the Upanishads seems to lie mainly on the fact that early Buddhism does not define ultimate reality even in negative terms, or hold it out explicitly as the goal of salvation. It refers, however, to ultimate reality as being beyond the sphere of intellectual grasp as it is beyond the contradiction of opposites, beyond the sphere of relativity.

There seem to be certain key words in the Sutta Nipāta, therefore, on the interpretation of which will depend our entire understanding of its ideology. Such words are the oft-recurring *diṭṭha-sutamuta*, *phassa*, *saññā*, as well as the less frequent *papañca* and *nāma-rūpa*. Mr. Hare, unfortunately, does not give us, in his translation, any re-interpretation of these words. He translates the all-important word *phassa* in its literal meaning as 'touch', in the manner in which it has been translated by Fausböll (Chalmers uses the equally inadequate word 'Contact'). *Nāma-rūpa* is translated as 'name-and-form', which, though literal, does not in any way bring out the specific sense in which this pre-Buddhistic term is used in the Sutta Nipāta. Chalmers happily renders this expression as Mind and Matter, which could have been regarded as an attempt on his part to bring out the import of this stanza (872) had he not used the word 'Contact' in the same sentence.

Another Pali word which the reader anxious to understand the philosophy underlying the obscure verses of the Sutta Nipāta would wish to know the real meaning of is *ñāṇa*. Particularly in the Māgandiya Sutta the Buddha is represented as rejecting *ñāṇa* as a means of attaining purity (suddhi). Mr. Hare renders the word by 'knowledge' following Fausböll, while Chalmers uses 'lore', leaving the reader of today as confused about the meaning of the stanza as Māgandiya himself (*maññāma'ahaṃ momuham eva dhammaṃ*).

Nor do the translations of other important words, with the exception of a few, throw any fresh light on the difficult portions of the Sutta Nipāta. *Saññā* is translated as

'surmise', which is obviously incorrect. *Saññā* seems to be consistently employed in the Sutta Nipāta to mean 'sense perception'. Fausböll himself has stumbled over this word, as he translates it by 'marks'. Chalmers gets nearer what appears to be the correct meaning of this word when he renders it as 'sense-impressions' which, however, is closer to the meaning of *phassa* than of *saññā*. The very difficult word *sankhāra* is translated as 'moulders' (incognotum per incognotus), but the rendering of *viññāna* as 'mind-at-work' is a happy flash, for it is certainly an improvement upon Chalmers' 'Consciousness'. Fausböll, by the way, leaves the word untranslated (where angels fear to tread.).

The fundamental defect in all previous translations, therefore, that they do not aim at any interpretation of the Sutta Nipāta, and that they do not reveal any consistent attitude on the part of their translators regarding the philosophical basis of this book, is shared by the translation of Mr. E. M. Hare as well. Apart from the difficulties of interpretation of the text, the translator is further limited by the demands of metre and poetic diction. Mr. Hare, however, overcomes this difficulty well, and it must be admitted that the translation reads smoothly as English unrhymed verse, in spite of the occasional use of such jargon as 'cankers' (compare 'the cankerless, ill-quit' for *anāsavo sabbadukkhappahīno*), 'ease' and 'ill' for *sukha* and *dukkha*, and a few such stock expressions which mean nothing to the reader who is unacquainted with Pali.

E. R. de S. S.