UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

According to the Proclamation of 18th September, 1819 slaves were considered as movable property and the proprietors could sue for them at any time within six years from the period of desertion. But there seems to have been prescription under the old law: see Section 4 of this Chapter (Hayley, p. 140) and the notes above.

H. 143. 'Dahanayake Mudianse said that about sixty years ago a full grown woman and a child were worth 150 ridis (£5), the usual price'.

28th February, 1831.

Claim for six slaves valued 450 ridis or £15'.

In 1822, two women and six children were valued at 730 ridis or 333 rix-dollars. In 1838 a slave was valued at £4 (Gazetteer, p. 189). See also Nugawela Banda's case above, where two slaves were valued at £7/10s.

Section 8
THE ABOILITION OF SLAVERY

H. 144. For cases in which Price, A.D.J. held that failure to register slaves had emancipated them under Ordinance No. 3 of 1837, see D.C. Kandy South, Nos. 3680 (24th July, 1841) and 3705 (11th August, 1841). Both were affirmed on appeal, though in the former case the order was varied.

CHAPTER III
CASTE

H. 146. Lawrie has no separate Chapter on Caste. Caste came into the law by three routes:

(1) As a restriction on marriage;
(2) In relation to rajakariya or the obligations of service tenure;
(3) Through the Criminal Law; because—

(i) Defamation of caste was a criminal offence;
(ii) Punishments might vary according to caste; and
(iii) Deprivation of caste was a lawful punishment.

These are dealt with by Lawrie under the Law of Marriage, the Law of Property, and the Criminal Law respectively. He gives no general account of the Sinhalese castes though, as noted above, he draws attention to the distinction between Armour and the Niti Nighanduwa. He suggests that the list in Armour's Notes was drawn up by a low-country man.

W. IVOR JENNINGS

The Two Traditions in Indian Philosophy

I am deeply grateful to the University of Ceylon for asking me to be the first incumbent of the Chair of Philosophy. I deem it a great honour. I really consider it as a recognition of the importance attached to Indian Philosophy, especially to Buddhism. The special field of my own research has been with regard to the Schools of Buddhism.

The subject of my Inaugural Lecture is the Two Traditions in Indian Philosophy, and in my opinion it is of fundamental importance for the right understanding of Indian Philosophy as a whole.

I
The Two Traditions—Their General Nature

There are two main currents of Indian philosophy—one having its source in the ātma-doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the other in the anātma-doctrine of Buddha. They conceive reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The Upaniṣads and the systems following the Brāhmaṇical tradition conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul (ātman), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the Substance-view of reality (ātмavāda). In its radical form, as in the Advaita Vedānta, it denied the reality of the apparent, the impermanent and the many; and equated that with the false. The Saṅkhya did not go so far; still it inclined more towards the substantial, the permanent and the universal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, with its empirical and pluralist bias, accords equal status to both substance and modes. Not only did these systems accept the ātman, but what is more, they conceived all other things also on the substance-pattern. The ātman is the very pivot of their metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. In epistemology, substance makes for unity and integration of experience; it explains perception, memory and personal identity better than other theories. Bondage is ignorance of the self or the wrong identification of the non-self with the self (ātmava anātmādhyāsā). Freedom is the discrimination between the two.

1. Inaugural Lecture delivered on the 8th November, 1951 in the King George's Hall, University of Ceylon.

2. The term 'tradition' is used not in the sense of dogmatic authoritarianism, but to mean a fountain-source from which stems a continuous stream of thought and culture.
The two traditions represented by the Buddhist denial of substance (ātman), and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for the Buddhist is momentary (kṣaṇika), unique (sva-viśeṣa) and unitary (dharmamātrām). It is discontinuous, discrete and devoid of complexity. The substance (and this applies equally to the universal and the identical) was rejected as illusory; it was but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief (avidyā). This may be taken as the Modal view of reality. The Buddhists brought their epistemology and ethics in full accord with their metaphysics. Their peculiar conception of perception and inference and the complementary doctrine of mental construction (vīkāla) are necessary consequences of their denial of substance. Heroic attempts were made to fit this theory with the doctrine of Karma and rebirth. Avidyā (ignorance), which is the root-cause of suffering, is the wrong belief in the atman; and prajñā (wisdom) consists in the eradication of this belief and its attendant evils.

The terminology employed here is after the best Jaina epistemological treatises. Philosophical views, they say, are principally two—the dravyārthika naya (substance-view) and paryayārthika naya (modal view). Each view, carried to the extreme, denies the reality of the other. One emphasises the universal and the continuous to the exclusion of the changing and the different, and vice versa. The Vedānta is cited as the exponent of the extreme form of the Substance-view, and Buddhism (Tathāgatamatam) represents the exclusive Modal view.

The Jaina ostensibly reconciles these two opposed views by according equal reality to substance and its modes. There is no substance without modes nor modes without substance. Reality is manifold (anekāntatṛtavat) ; it is not of one nature; it is unity and difference, universal and particular, permanent and changing.
II
Upaniṣads and Buddhism

Since the opening of the Buddhist scriptures to the Western world, it has become almost a stereotyped opinion among orientalists to regard Buddhism as carrying on the work of the Upaniṣadic seers. Indian philosophy is interpreted as having evolved out of one single tradition—the Upaniṣadic. Buddhism and Jainism are treated as deviations rather than as radical departures from the Upaniṣadic tradition (ātmavādā). Such interpretation is not fully alive to the vital differences and exclusive attitudes inherent in the Brāhmanical and the Buddhist systems. It tends towards over-simplification.

Likewise, the differences obtaining in Buddhism itself are overlooked or minimised, and an attempt is made to treat it as one system. This mistake, however, is not made in the case of the systems (Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika) deriving their inspiration from the Vedas. Such an attempt engenders partisan spirit in writers; they begin taking sides with one or the other of the school of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, and consider that as the teaching of Buddha. There is again the fallacy of over-simplification. This prevents a correct understanding of the development of Buddhist philosophy. The dialogues of Buddha, as preserved in the Pali Canons, are suggestive; they are as little systematic as the Upaniṣadic texts. Buddhist systems grew out of them much in the way the Brāhmanical systems grew out of the Upaniṣads. Buddhism is a matrix of systems, and not one unitary system. It does not exclude legitimately different formulations. For a correct and fruitful understanding of the development of Indian philosophy, it is necessary to admit not only the difference between Buddhism and Brāhmanical systems of thought, but also internal differences within Buddhism itself. This would be evident if we consider the nature and development of the Upaniṣadic and Buddhist thought.

The entire Vedic teaching may be construed as knowledge of the deity (devatā vidyā). The Devatā (deity) is the super-natural personality or essence of all the objects perceived, but felt to be the guiding and controlling spirit within. Indra, Varuṇa, Agni and other Vedic gods are not mere natural forces personified, as interpreted by Western scholars. It would be truer to understand them as personalities. Each deity has a characteristic external manifestation, such as thunder and lightning in the case of Indra. Prayers for favour could be addressed to them as they are deities and had power over phenomena; and as personalities they could be gracious. The devatā has both a cosmic (ādiḥdiavika) and a microcosmic (ādiḥyātki) signification. In the Upaniṣads, deva and ātman are often used as interchangeable terms. Impelled by its own dynamism, there was a two-fold movement in the deepening of the devatā-knowledge. As the deity is understood as the soul or inner essence of things, the same logic led to the search for a deeper and innermost deity of deities. This is the movement towards monotheism which is an admitted feature of the Rg Vedic hymns. It may be truer to say that the insight into the innermost deity, variously called Viṣṇu, Prajāpati or Hīnayāna, was implicit from the beginning. The characterisation of each deity (Indra, Agni, Viṣṇu, etc.) as the highest God in turn, the other inner deities were minimised, and an attempt is made to treat it as one system. This mistake, engenders partisan spirit in writers; they begin taking sides with one or the other school of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, and consider that as the teaching of Buddha. There is again the fallacy of over-simplification. This prevents a correct understanding of the development of Buddhist philosophy. The dialogues of Buddha, as preserved in the Pali Canons, are suggestive; they are as little systematic as the Upaniṣadic texts. Buddhist systems grew out of them much in the way the Brāhmanical systems grew out of the Upaniṣads. Buddhism is a matrix of systems, and not one unitary system. It does not exclude legitimately different formulations. For a correct and fruitful understanding of the development of Indian philosophy, it is necessary to admit not only the difference between Buddhism and Brāhmanical systems of thought, but also internal differences within Buddhism itself. This would be evident if we consider the nature and development of the Upaniṣadic and Buddhist thought.

The entire Vedic teaching may be construed as knowledge of the deity (devatā vidyā). The Devatā (deity) is the super-natural personality or essence of all the objects perceived, but felt to be the guiding and controlling spirit within. Indra, Varuṇa, Agni and other Vedic gods are not mere natural forces personified, as interpreted by Western scholars. It would be truer to understand them as personalities. Each deity has a characteristic external manifestation, such as thunder and lightning in the case of Indra. Prayers for favour could be addressed to them as they are deities and had power over phenomena; and as personalities they could be gracious. The devatā has both a cosmic (ādiḥdiavika) and a microcosmic (ādiḥyātki) signification. In the Upaniṣads, deva and ātman are often used as interchangeable terms.

13. adhyātmyamādhūkṣham eva devam tvā dvīhāḥ harsāsokau jañāti (Katha, i, ii).
14. seyam devaśākṣata (Chād. Up. VI, iii, 2; devaśāmśākṣata (Śoud. Up. I, 3); cakṣub śrōtraṁ ka ṣva devo anakti (Kena Up. I, 1); yadaiṁ am apusāya ātmānaṁ devaṁ aṁśa (Br. Up. IV, iv, 15).
15. Compare the expressions: gudham anupraviṣṭam; gudhātman gahvareṣṭaṁ; nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ; eṣa gudhottam na prakṣātā; ya ātma sarvāntaram, etc.
16. In the Kena where the ātman is reached as the foundational principle behind all mental functions; or in the Taittiriya where the bodies (kośas) are shown to be the external trappings of the inner core (ātman); or in the Br. Up. where the self is established as the invariable light (svayamjyotih) which illumines the changing states, to mention only a few characteristic modes of approach.
unquestionable truth that even the immediate followers of the Master had no inkling of it? The Upanisads, on the other hand, blazen forth the Inner Essence= Sole Reality, Absolute (Brahman).

The mode of development in Vedic thought consists in accepting the \textit{atman} as an inner core in things, and then to deepen this insight till a logically stable position was reached. The true self is identical with the Absolute (Brahman).\textsuperscript{18} Later systems try to synthesise this original intuition in their own way; but they all take the \textit{atman} (Substance) as the basic reality. In the dialogues of Buddha, we breathe a different atmosphere. There is a distinct spirit of opposition, if not one of hostility as well, to the \textit{atmavāda} of the Upaniṣads. Buddha and Buddhism can be understood only as a revolt himself as initiating a new tradition, as opening up a path never trod before.\textsuperscript{17} Although his voice is reserved, referred to several times, Brahman (the Absolute) is never mentioned. Buddha always considers the \textit{atman} as an inner core in things, and then to deepen this insight till a logically stable position was reached. The true self is identical with the Absolute (Brahman).\textsuperscript{18} Later systems try to synthesise this original intuition in their own way; but they all take the \textit{atman} (Substance) as the basic reality.

If the \textit{atman} had been a cardinal doctrine with Buddhism, why was it so securely hidden under a bushel that even the immediate followers of the Master had no inkling of it? The Upaniṣads, on the other hand, blazen forth the reality of the \textit{atman} in every page, in every line almost. Buddha came to deny the soul, a permanent substantial entity, precisely because he took his stand on the reality of moral consciousness and the efficacy of Karma. An unchanging eternal soul, as impervious to change, would render spiritual life lose all meaning; we would, in that case, be neither the better nor the worse for our efforts. This might lead to inaction (akriyāvāda). Nay more; the \textit{atman} is the root-cause of all attachment, desire, aversion and pain. When we take anything as a self (substantial and permanent), we become attached to it and dislike other things that are opposed to it. Sakkāyadīpti (Substance-view) is avidyā (ignorance) \textit{par excellence}, and from it proceed all passions. Denial of Satkāya (\textit{atman} or Substance) is the very pivot of the Buddhist metaphysics and its doctrine of salvation.\textsuperscript{21}

The oft-recurring strain in the Pali Canons is that things are transitory:

\begin{itemize}
  \item How transient are all component things:
  \item Growth is their nature and decay.
  \item They are produced; they are dissolved again:
  \item To bring them all into subjection that is bliss.\textsuperscript{22}
  \item Decay is inherent in all component things:
  \item Work out your salvation with diligence.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{itemize}

This is the last speech of the Tathāgata, and must therefore be taken as summing up his life-teaching.

In his interesting monograph, \textit{The Basic Conception of Buddhism}, Professor V. Bhattacharya concludes, after a searching analysis, that the denial of the self is the basic tenet of Buddhism. He says: ‘Thus and in various other ways, too many to be mentioned, the existence of a permanent Self or \textit{atman}, as accepted in other systems, was utterly denied by the Buddha, thereby pulling down the very foundation of desire where it can rest.’ \textsuperscript{24} Another distinguished scholar, the late Professor Stcherbatsky, is equally emphatic about this.

When Buddha calls the doctrine of an eternal self ‘a doctrine of fools’ it is clear that he is fighting against an established doctrine. Whenever in his Sermons he comes to speak about Soullessness or Wrong Personalism (satkayadrsti) a sense of opposition or even animosity is clearly felt in his words. This doctrine along with its positive counterpart—the separate elements that are active in life and whose activity must gradually be suppressed till Eternal Repose is attained—is the central

\textsuperscript{17} cf. \textit{ātma}, \textit{ātman} sa bhava, atah \textit{yonyān devatām upāste} nyu sāvanyak’ham amūt na sa veda. \textit{Br. Up.} I, iv, 10, also, neha nāma kīma cīnaama.

\textsuperscript{18} The movement of thought can be expressed in the equation: \textit{Devatā=Ātman=Inner Essence=Reality, Absolute (Brahman)}.

\textsuperscript{19} samudayo samudayo ti kho me, bhikkhave, parikakṣave, paripānussaṇa sikkham na ca cakkhum udapādi, \textit{ātman} udapādi, \textit{ātman} udapādi. \textit{Saṃ. N.} II, p. 103. See also \textit{Maha Dvogga}, \textit{Vinaya Pitaka} I, 5. Na me \textit{ācariya} atthi sāsas na me na vijjati; sadevakasmi loka na ma atidājatī me. \textit{Majjh. N.} I, p. 171 (Sutta, 26).


\textsuperscript{21} The \textit{Upanisadic} verse: ‘\textit{ātmanan ca vijñāyād}, etc. can, with a slight change, be made to express the Buddhist formula: \textit{ātmanan ca vijñāyānās thāy anam iti pūr Ø saḥ}; kim iñcan kaya kīma tv anusamvartitum \textit{ātmanam}.

\textsuperscript{22} anicca vata saukhār appādavaya, dhammavaya; \textit{vijñānās thāy anam iti pūr Ø saḥ}; \textit{Cittavāsama sukho’ti}. \textit{Mahāsudassana Sutta}, ii, 17; \textit{Maha Pari Nib.,} VI, 10.

\textsuperscript{23} ‘vayādhammān saukhār, appamādena sampādethā’ti; ayam tathāgatassa pacchimā vacā. \textit{Maha Pari Nibbāna}, VI, 7.

\textsuperscript{24} Basic Conception, p. 70; see also p. 95.
point of the whole bulk of Buddhist teaching and Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids remarks, 'how carefully and conscientiously this anti-substantialist position had been cherished and upheld'. We may add that the whole of the history of Buddhist philosophy can be described as a series of attempts to penetrate more deeply into this original intuition of Buddha, what he himself believed to be his great discovery.25

We are now in a position correctly to indicate the relation between the Upaniṣads and Buddha. Both have the same problem, Pain (duḥkha), and they see it in all its intensity and universality. Phenomenal existence is imperfection and pain. Both again are one in placing before us the idea of a state beyond all possibility of pain and bondage. The Upaniṣads speak of it more positively as a state of consciousness and bliss (vijñāna anānanda brahma). Buddha emphasises the negative aspect of it: Nirvāṇa is the annihilation of sorrow. Both have to speak of the ultimate as devoid of empirical determinations, as incomparable to anything we know; silence is their most proper language. They also agree that no empirical means, organisational device, sacrifice or penance, can bring us to the goal. Only insight into the nature of the real can avail. For the Upaniṣads, the ātman is real; only its identification with the body (kośas), the states or any empirical object, is accidental. By negating the wrong identification, its unreal limitations, we can know its real nature. Ātman is Brahman; there is no other to it. No fear, aversion or attachment can afflict it.26 To realise the self (ātmakāma) is to have all desires satisfied (āptakāma) and thus to transcend all desires (akāma).27

Buddha reaches this very goal of desirelessness, not by the universalisation of the I (ātman), but by denying it altogether. For, only when we consider anything as permanent and pleasant, as a Self, do we get attached to it and are averse to other things that are opposed to it; there is then bondage (sānśāra). The atta is the root-cause of all passions, and this notion has to be rooted out completely to attain Nirvāṇa. For the Upaniṣads, the Self is a reality; for the Buddha it is a primordial wrong notion, not real. The highest experience, brahmānubhava, the Upaniṣads take not as the annihilation of the 'I', but of its particularity and finitude. In fact, we realise the plenitude of our being there as the whole (bhūmā). Buddha was impressed by the negative aspect of the highest trance-states as devoid (śānya) of intellect, consciousness, etc. Both reach the same goal of utter desirelessness, but through different means. The spiritual genius of Buddha carved out a new path, the negative path.

26. Compare the passages: tatra ko mohah ka śoka ekatvam anupāsati; yatra sarvam ātmāvābhūtah; abhayāna va, Janaka, prāptaśi, etc.
27. athākāmāyāmāno yo'kāmo nīkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo na ṭasya prāṇā ut-
krāmānti brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti (Br. U.P. IV, iv, 6).

THE TWO TRADITIONS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

There are observations in Professor Radhakrishnan's writings which indicate the difference between Buddha and the Upaniṣads: 'If there is a difference between the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the Buddha, it is not in their views of the world of experience (sārṣāra) but in regard to their conception of reality (nirvāṇa)'.28

The fundamental difference between Buddhism and the Upaniṣads seems to be about the metaphysical reality of an immutable substance, which is the true self of man as well... It is true that Buddha finds no centre of reality or principle of permanence in the flux of life and the whirl of the world, but it does not follow that there is nothing real in the world at all except the agitation of forces.29

Is not a fundamental metaphysical difference the source of all other differences? If Buddhism is 'only a restatement of the thought of the Upaniṣads' with a new emphasis,26 it is desirable to emphasise this 'emphasis', especially because it is of a fundamentally metaphysical nature. The Upaniṣads and Buddhism belong to the same spiritual genus; they differ as species; and the differentia are the acceptance or rejection of the ātman (permanent substance).

III

Was there a Primitive Buddhism affirming the Ātman?

Attempts have been made by not an inconsiderable section of orientalists to discover a primitive Buddhism—the actual teaching of the master as distinguished from later scholasticism and monkish elaboration. Some, like Poussin, Beck and others,31 aver that Yoga and practice of virtues formed the original teaching of Buddha which scholasticism later on transformed into a soul-denying creed.

Mrs. Rhys Davids32 holds, on the strength of a number of textual citations, that Buddha advocated the existence of soul and carried on the tradition of the Upaniṣads. She says:

You may find that genuine Sākyamuni more in what the Pāñcasikas betray and have suffered to survive than in what they affirm as chief and fundamental.

30. Ibid., 676.
31. See Stecheratsky—Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 6 and 23.
32. In her later works, Gotama the Man (1928), Sākyamuni Buddha (1931), A Manual of Buddhism (1932), Outlines of Buddhism (1934), To Become or not to Become (1937), What was the Original Buddhism (1938), and in many of her older works (e.g. Birth of Ind. Psy. and its Development in Buddhism (1936), Buddhism (1934), Milinda Questions, etc.), Mrs. Rhys Davids has re-edited and revised with the 'ātma-bias', and in reviews and articles in the periodicals (I.H.Q., Visuvaratna, Hibbert Journal, N.I.A., J.R.A.S., etc.), Mrs. Rhys Davids elaborates her pet theme with tiresome repetition. She has gone back completely on her previous interpretation of Buddhism.
This happened because the pitakas are the work of men removed from the Founder by centuries, not far short of five centuries when values were undergoing change.33

Buddha, according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, did not deny the soul or self outright, but only that the body, the sense-organs, etc. were the self.34 ‘Gotama was both teaching and expanding the Immanent cult of his day’.35 Accepting the Upaniṣadic ideal of the self as the ultimate value, Buddha taught how to realise it, how to become that. He insisted on conduct (śīla), works, concentration (samādhi) and insight (pañña), and dependence on oneself than on ritual or knowledge. The Sākyā religion was both teaching and expanding the Immanent cult of his day’.

The utter denial of the self as a reality and its replacement by the Group (Skandha) theory is a later but unwarranted accretion.36 Mrs. Rhys Davids calls it ‘monkish gibberish’. She seeks and finds a primitive Buddhism free from the soulless creed, but with a simple faith in the immanent ātman. Her favourite literary method is to declare Suttas as the Pujottāpāda and even portions of the same Sutta (e.g. the Śāmaññaphala) which speak of soullessness as later additions.38 She takes out passages out of their context, and reads them arbitrarily as subscribing to her view.

Yoga and practice of morality are neutral. It is no doubt true that Buddha and the Buddhist schools paid the utmost attention to śīla (virtues) and samādhi (concentration of attention); they brought to light deeper and subtler distinctions, and gave us a minute map of the entire terrain of our inner life. However, there is nothing peculiarly Buddhist about this. We have all the ingredients, if not the detailed prescriptions, of a moral code in the Śīkṣāvalli of the Taṭṭṭīrīya Upaniṣad and similar texts. Yoga practice was much older than Buddhism. Buddha himself was taught Yoga, all our accounts agree, by two Sāṅkhyā teachers, Ājāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. It is an accepted tenet of all Indian philosophical systems that an impure and distracted mind is incapable of perceiving the truth.39 All systems enjoin, as a preliminary to ultimate insight, the practice of virtues and the training of the mind in concentration. Excepting the materialist and the Mīmāṃsā, every system accepted Yoga as part of its spiritual discipline, though the orientation of it in each system differs. Buddhism differs in this respect from the other systems only to the extent that it made a systematic and intense study of these spiritual aids. But to reduce Buddhism to a technique of mind-concentration or to a code of morals is failure to appreciate the individuality of Buddha’s genius and his metaphysical insight. It is failure to discern that even a way of life implies a view of reality.40 The so-called ‘silence’ of Buddha and his aversion to speculative theories cannot be adduced as evidence of his not having a philosophy. The true significance of his silence is that the Real is Transcendent to Thought.

Passages must not be counted, but weighed. We must consider the entire body of texts together and evolve a synthesis, weighing all considerations. We require a synoptic interpretation of the Buddhist scriptures. It is necessary to make a doctrinal analysis of the contents and assess philosophically their value.

Such syntheses of doctrines and texts have been made from time to time by the Buddhist schools themselves.41 We need consider only three such important syntheses—one by the Vaibhāṣika and the Saṅgrahinī, the second by the Mādhyamika and the last by the Yogācāra. Each is an attempt to reconcile all the texts and doctrines from a definite point of view. In spite of the specific differences they exhibit, they have a generic affinity that is particularly Buddhistic. The Mādhyamika synthesis of the texts and doctrines is on the distinction of existence into paramārtha (Absolute) and saṁvrti (empirical) and texts into nītārtha (primary) and neyārtha (secondary). According to Nāgārjuna, Buddha has affirmed the existence of the ātman against the materialist, for there is the continuity of karma and its result, act and its responsibility; he has denied it as against the eternalist who takes it as an immutable identical essence; he has also said that there is neither the self...
Buddha, like a skilful physician, always graduated his teaching according to the need and the capacity of the taught.

Buddhist systems are the different ways in which the original vision of Buddha has been sought to be formulated in systematic form.

Nothing is gained by the theory of a soul-affirming primitive Buddhism followed by a soul-denying scholastic Buddhism. Even if, per impossible, it were proved that the historical person—Gautama the Buddha—did teach a soul-doctrine, fundamentally at variance with the doctrines we associate with classical Buddhism, we shall still have to explain Buddhism and to relate it with the Upanisadic tradition. Freeing Buddha from the charge of preaching the denial of the atman may save him from any guilt. The question is not a personal one. In attempting to bridge the difference between the Upanisads and Buddha, we would have immeasurably increased the distance between Buddha and Buddhism. We cannot find any sufficient and compelling motives for the falsification of the original teaching. Either the monks were too stupid to grasp the master's basic teaching or they were too clever and fabricated and foisted on him an opposite doctrine. Neither of the alternatives can be seriously entertained. Why and when precisely the falsification is supposed to have occurred is not specified.

Prima facie, those systems and schools of thought which owe allegiance to the founder of this religion have greater claim to represent and understand Buddhism than the moderns who are removed from him by centuries of time as well as distance of culture and outlook. The Buddhist schools have had an unbroken tradition of development, and most of the leaders of the schools had received their knowledge from some of the celebrated direct disciples of Buddha, like Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Kaśyapa, Ānanda and others. In the course of its progress, a great religion develops and emphasizes certain trends and tendencies implicit in the original inspiration of the founder. In the case of Buddhism too we must accept the law of evolution that the later phases are more thorough in carrying out the nairatmya doctrine. They deny not only substance (pudgala-nairatmya), but extend the denial to the Elements too (dharma-nairatmya) which the Hinayāna schools had uncritically accepted as real.

In that great compendium of early Buddhist philosophy—Abhidharma Kośa—Vasubandhu devotes one whole chapter to the discussion and refutation of the atma-doctrine (pudgala-viniścaya). It is principally a condemnation of the Pudgalatman-heresy in Buddhism, the special tenet of the Vātsiputriya school, which admitted a sort of quasi-permanent self, neither identical with nor different from the mental states (skandha). It also refutes the Śāntikhya and Vaiśeṣika conceptions of the atman. Vasubandhu observes that of all teachers Buddha is unique in denying the self.

Denial of substance (atman) is the foundation of Buddhism down the ages. Śāntarakṣita says that all heretical philosophers have made their position untenable by adhering to the atman. In later scholastic Buddhism the denial of the self is fully worked out with all its implications; its metaphysics, epistemology and spiritual discipline were brought in full accord with this basic tenet. There was elaboration and deepening of the original teaching of Buddha and not distortion or falsification.

The Buddhists are not the only ones in taking their philosophy as nairatmyavāda. Jaina and Brāhmanical systems invariably characterise Buddhism as denial of the atman, substance or soul. Mādhyāvārya considers the Buddhist only slightly less objectionable than the materialist (Cārvaka); in the gradation of systems he makes in his Sarvadarikanasangraha, Buddhistadorsana immediately follows the Cārvaka. For an atmavadin nothing could be more pernicious than the denial of the self. Udyanācārya very significantly calls his Refutation of Buddhist Doctrines (Buddha-diktākāra) Ātmatattvaviveka (Distinction of the Reality of self). The acceptance of the atman is what divides the orthodox from the Buddhist systems. The Jainas agree with

42. atmety api prajñāpāritam anātmyety api deśitaṃ; bhūddhāra nātmya na cānātmya kaścid ity api deśitaṃ. Mādhyāmyika Karikās, XVIII, 6. See the Mādhyāmyika Vyāsa (pp. 354 ff.) for the considered Mādhyāmyika standpoint on the subject.

43. This forms the first issue to be discussed in the Kathāvatthu.

44. cf. The stanza of a Stotikaśa referred to by Yasomitra:

sāhaṁkāre manasi na ātmaṁ yāti janamaprabandho,

nāhaṁkāro ca svātāt prakṛtiḥ ātmadeśa ca satyam,

manyāb ātmaḥ jagati ca yato vā tātī nairatmya-vadā

nāyaśa tasmād upaśāma-vikṛte tvan-mātād as āstāṁ mārgaḥ.

45. Tattra Saṅgharasa, p. 867 and p. 866.

328—C
this characterisation, and sharply distinguish theirs from the purely modal view of the Buddhist.

The modern exponent may not feel committed to the estimate of Buddhism by Buddhists and others. But he is required to pause and explain the unanimity with which Buddhism has been taken as anatma-vāda. He is also required to consider the teachings of Buddha in relation to Buddhist schools of thought which, prima facie, have the right to be considered as embodying the founder’s tenets.

There is another compelling reason for our nairātmya interpretation of Buddhism. If it had subscribed to the ātma-tradition like the Brahmanical systems, the emergence of the Madhyamika dialectic should prove an enigma. Dialectic is engendered by the total opposition between two points of view diametrically opposed to each other. And the required opposition could have been provided only by the ātma-view of the Brahmanical systems and the anātma-vāda of earlier Buddhism. The Ratna-Kāṭa-Sūtra (Kāyapa Parivarta)⁴⁶ makes this explicit:

“That everything is permanent ’ is one extreme; ‘ that everything is transitory ‘ is another ... that ātman is ’ (ātmeti) is one end (antah); ’ that the ātman is not ’ is another ; but the middle between the ātma and nairātmya views is the Inexpressible ... It is the reflective review of things (dharmaḥ bhūta-pratyaveka).” This is the Middle Path (madhyamā pratipad) of the Madhyamika.

IV

Some Objections against the Nairātmya Interpretation of Buddhism Answered

1. It is sometimes suggested that Buddha could not have propounded the nairātmya doctrine as the India of that period was not ripe for receiving it; the Zeitgeist was against any radical departure from the Upanishadic tradition. Further, the success that attended Buddha even during his life-time could not have been achieved only by the ātma-view of the Brahmanical systems and the anātma-vāda of earlier Buddhism. The Ratna-Kāṭa-Sūtra (Kāyapa Parivarta)⁴⁶ makes this explicit:

2. It is also suggested that Buddha was a practical man; he rigorously eschewed all theoretical considerations as vain; as not conducive to the spiritual life. Support is apparently lent to this by Buddha’s rebuke of Mālānkyaputta and Vaccha Gotta.⁴⁷ It is concluded that Buddha inculcated a way of life, but did not care to enunciate a view of reality. He addressed himself exclusively to ethics and left metaphysics severely alone. Votaries of this contention might further say that it was left to the scholastic phase of Buddhism to spin metaphysical theories and distort the teachings of the Master. The Master himself did not preach them, even by implication.

Can we have a way of life which does not imply a view of reality as well? Is it possible to follow an ideal of conduct which claims allegiance of the entire man without raising, by implication at least, questions about the ultimate value, the nature and destiny of the individual undertaking the discipline, and his relation to the ideal? The Mīmāṃsā which is ostensibly concerned with dharma—performance of the sacrifices and rites—finds that the investigation of dharma involves metaphysical and epistemological issues about the self, nature of karma, etc. It is committed to a form of Realism.⁴⁸ Stoicism and Epicureanism which began apparently as ethical schools have always implied a metaphysic.

3. By far the most serious objection to the view that Buddha taught the nairātmya doctrine (denial of soul or substance) is that it is contradictory to his other doctrines accepted as basic, namely, the efficacy of karma, of the adoption of spiritual life and the doctrine of rebirth. Karma without a permanent agent who wills and reaps the fruit of his action is inconceivable. What is the value of spiritual life if there is none at the end of it? Buddha’s doctrine would be the acceptance of pain without anyone who feels the pain, a spiritual

⁴⁶ Kāyapa parivarta, pp. 86-7.
⁴⁷ See Majjh. Nikāya; Suttas, 63 and 72.
⁴⁸ Śloka Vārttika, (Nirālambanavada, 3-4).
discipline without any person who undergoes discipline and a final result (nirvāṇa) without any individual to enjoy it. Such an absurdity, it might be said, could not have been meant seriously by Buddha.

Buddha himself was aware of these alleged absurdities. In the Canons it is especially stated: 'There is action, but the agent does not exist.'49 In the Sermon of the Bearer of the Burden, it is again stated that the Five Groups (pañcápādana skandhā) are the burden, attachment to them being carrying of the burden, and detachment from them is laying down of the burden.50

People entertain the fond belief that the rejection of the soul—the permanent substance—vitiates Buddhist metaphysics, and that the difficulties with which it is faced are insuperable. It is further believed that the ātma-metaphysics (substance-view) avoids these pitfalls and affords a more plausible explanation of things. All this, however, is evidence of confused thinking. The anātma doctrine is no more at variance with facts or logic than the ātma doctrine. How does the acceptance of the ātman—the unchanging permanent entity—explain karma, rebirth, memory, personal identity more plausibly? As the permanent is of one uniform immutable nature, it cannot have different volitions when different circumstances call for different actions. It is neither the worse nor the better for the actions performed. Precisely to avoid this insuperable difficulty did Buddha, for an appreciable stretch of time and then changes. This would mean two different ātmans. Nor can we admit that one part of the ātman changes while the other part is permanent. If the changing part does belong to the ātman as integrally as the other part, then we would be having a supposedly unitary entity which has two mutually opposed characteristics. This does violence to our conception of an entity.

Buddha replaced the soul by the theory of a mind-continuum, by a series of psychical states rigorously conditioned as to their nature by the causal law governing them (dharma-saṅketa). According to him this alone provides

52. The AKV (p. 710) has: Sunetra nama śāstrīyodaya Sūtra-yaśo eva bhagavān pūrṇa Sunetra nāma bhāhivetvā-ekaśānānām ānūyayati yasmat Sunetra Buddha-saṅkṛitena eva āśāt. See also MKV., p. 574: yat tarhiḥma pāñchate śāstra (prabha Dīgavatā, p. 228) 'ātmam eva sa tēna kālēna tēna sāmyena Māndhātya nāma Rājā cakravartī abhāvam iti', 'tāt kathām veditavam iti. anyatvapratipādakaraṇaṁ tām vacanam, naikatvapratipādaṁ iti viśeṣyam.
The opposite hypothesis of a permanent self does not fare much better either. How can an unchanging uniform being like the ātman remember anything at all? Memory is not merely the continuity of consciousness, but the knowing of an object as having been experienced in the past, and relating it with the present experience. An unchanging uniform ātman might have existed in the past; but as it does not lapse, it cannot know anything as past. The devices to which the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta resort for explaining this difficulty are well-known. They differentiate the function of the ātman as mere unchanging awareness (śvarūpa-jñāna) from the function of the changing mind (buddhi-vṛtti) which alone knows, remembers, etc. As ātman and buddhi would then fall asunder and would not make for any coherent experience, both Sāṅkhya and Vedānta further assume a false identification (adhyaśa) between the two, by virtue of which what is true of the one is mistakenly ascribed to the other. The Nyāya is oblivious to the difficulty. It postis a non-conscious substance (ātman) and conceives the states as produced in it through the cooperation of the inner sense (manas). How the states like knowledge, pain, pleasure, etc., which are transitory, can belong to the unchanging ātman is nowhere explained. The difficulty is not solved by simply asserting that the qualities are produced in the ātman from time to time. What prevents two states from being two different things altogether? In the Sāṅkhya and Nyāya, both the changing and the unchanging substances are considered equally real; there is no evaluation whether the changing is real or the unchanging. Vedānta (Advaita) accepts the unchanging alone as real and rejects the other as unreal. The Buddhists do the opposite.

The difficulty is not confined to memory and moral responsibility alone. Even in such rudimentary experiences as sensation or feeling and in higher forms of experience, such as judgement and inference, synthesis and interpretation are involved. The given data have to be classified, compared, related—appereceived—and synthesised into a unity; and yet the distinction has to be maintained.

The problem of knowledge is part of the larger problem, namely, the nature of existence. Our interpretation of experience will be of a piece with our interpretation of the real. In every aspect of things we find two opposite standpoints. In causation, we may emphasise the emergence of the effect as something new and different or we may emphasise its necessary connection and continuity. In any presented object, we may attend to the particular and the changing, or to the universal and the abiding feature. The latter may be termed the static or space-view of things, and the former the dynamic or the time-pattern. On the first, change and difference may be taken as appearance; on the second, the permanent and the universal. One emphasises unity, the other difference. What is real for one is appearance for the other, and vice versa. Whatever be the nature of our bias, we have to work out a systematic explanation of things—objects and our knowledge of them—in terms of our view. The Buddhist schools and the Brāhmaṇical systems in the course of their development did eventually come to formulate a coherent metaphysic and epistemology in consonance with their respective standpoints. It is not contended that Buddha himself formulated this doctrine of anātma in its systematic form with all its implications fully drawn. It is however suggested that he gave the inspiration and the impetus to the nairatmya view which came to be formulated in such sharp contrast to the ātma view. That there are insuperable difficulties on either conception of reality, on any conceptual pattern, no one realised perhaps more strongly than Buddha. He was thus led to discredit all attempts at conceiving reality, and in consequence, to reject all speculative metaphysics. This is the sole meaning of his silence.

Buddha sets himself above all dogmatism. 'The Tathāgata is free from all theories.' To Kaccāyana he says: 'That every thing exists is one extreme, that it does not exist is another. The Tathāgata teaches the Truth from the Middle Position (majjhena dhammaṃ deseti). This is the Mādhyamika Dialectic in essence, and Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika or the Central School of Buddhism, makes pointed reference to this passage. Dialectic is the consciousness of the antinomical conflict in Reason. It is engendered by at least two points of view (dṛṣṭis) diametrically opposed to each other as thesis and anti-thesis. The opposition is total, as affecting every aspect of things, and practically indeterminate, as the conflict cannot be settled by appeal to experience. The substance-view (ātma-vāda) of the Brāhmaṇical systems and the modal view (anātma-vāda) of the earlier Buddhism are the two 'moments' of the Mādhyamika Dialectic. The Mādhyamika resolves the conflict by rejecting the alternative views taken singly or in combination; he thereby rejects the competence of Thought or Reason to comprehend the Real. The Real is Transcendent—Śūnya. Though usually translated as Void or Negation, Śūnya or the Absolute is not void, but devoid of every kind of thought-determination. The Absolute is realised as Prajñā or Non-dual Intuition, free from the duality of 'is' and 'is not' (prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayam).

56. Mādhyamika Kārikā, XV, 7.
THE TWO TRADITIONS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

is conceived as replacement, the emergence and cessation of durationless entities.

At a subsequent stage, we find direct and sustained conflict between Buddhism (the Sautrântika especially) and the Realistic systems, Nyâya-Vaishšika, Mâdhyamika, and Jainism. We have ample evidence of this in the works of Kâśîapa (Nyâya Sûtras), Vâtsyâyana, Uddyotakara, Vâcaspati Miśra, Kumârila, Udayana, Jayanta, etc. on the Brahmanical side and Dignâga, Dharmakirti and Dharmottara on the other. The influence was felt practically on every important problem—perception, inference, nominalism (apoha), whole (avaya), universal (sâmyâ), etc. The Nyâya and the Mâdhyamika reformulated their realism with greater thoroughness and self-consciousness. The Buddhists stuck to their subjective and critical trends. Each system gained, owing to this impact, in clarity and depth. An interpretation of Indian philosophy in terms of this conflict should prove instructive.

The influence of the Vedânta on the development of the Mahâyâna and vice versa presents us with another problem, no less interesting. Earlier Buddhism was realistic and pluralistic. The absolutistic turn that it took in the Mâdhyamika and the Yogacara systems suggests the influence of the conception of Brahman as the unaffected reality underlying the appearances. Some scholars57 hold that there has been direct borrowing. This is rather doubtful.

Gaudapâda and Śaṅkara revolutionized Vedânta thought by establishing non-Dualism (advaita) dialectically; they characterise phenomena as false appearance (mâyâ), and formulate the doctrine of three truths and two texts (para and aparâ). The non-advaitic schools of Vedânta have roundly taken all these as concealed Buddhism, and some modern scholars have fallen in line with this view.58

It must however be recognised that the âtmavâda of the Upaniśads was, impelled by its inner dynamism, heading towards advaitism like the prior movement on the Buddhist side. The pre-Śaṅkara Vedânta establishes the reality of one substance by a criticism of the Śaṅkhya dualism; Śaṅkara himself arrives at his non-dualism and transcendence of Brahman by a criticism of the 'unity-in-difference' (bhedabheda) view of Bhattarapâṇa and others. There is no evidence of direct borrowing in Šaṅkara. Gaudapâda's Mâññhûya Kârikâs do however show in diction and doctrine the influence of the Mahâyâna.59 The different parts of the work however are loosely connected; they may be the work of different authors.60 Only in the III and especially in

57. See Stecherbatsky; Buddhists Nivârana, p. 51.
58. Ibid., pp. 51 and 62.
59. Professor V. Bhattacharya has established this with his characteristic thoroughness in his Agama Sûstra of Gaudapâda.
60. See Agama Sûstra, pp. cxlv, lv.
the IV Book of the Māṇḍākya Karikās are there unmistakable Buddhist influences. It is also difficult to conceive how the philosophers committed to the ātma-tradition could have borrowed doctrines from the nairātmya-tradition. It can therefore be suggested that there has been borrowing of technique rather than of tenets. The dialectic of Nāgārjuna and the Viññānavāda analysis of illusion and their doctrine of two truths might have suggested to Gaudapāda and Śāṅkara the most consistent way of interpreting the Upaniṣadic teaching.

Compelled by the urge to be consistent and rigorous, both the Ātma and the Anātma Traditions headed towards Absolutism—the Absolutism of Pure Being or Brahman and the Absolutism of Śānya or Prajñāpāramitā respectively. Though agreeing in their form, the two Absolutisms still differ in their modes of approach. The Mādhyamika approach is essentially logical, dialectical. Criticism itself is philosophy. The Vedānta approach may be taken as theological. The Ultimate Truth can initially be given to us only through revelation, by an extra logical communication, although it is confirmed by dialectic and realised by intuitive experience. The Vedānta and the Mādhyamika systems represent the fullness and maturity of the two traditions.

T. R. V. MURTI

Robert Knox and Robinson Crusoe

In his well documented analysis of the narrative methods of Daniel Defoe, Secord comes to the conclusion that, despite the great differences between Defoe’s moral treatises (like The Family Instructor and The Continuation of the Letters of the Turkish Spy) and his fiction, it is with his earlier work that stories like Robinson Crusoe must be linked. If Defoe’s particular mode of composition could be accounted for, then one could not do better than regard his wide and miscellaneous reading in the literature of travel and adventure as providing reality and diversion to material to which his aptitude as a writer of moral treatises already inclined him. Defoe wrote as he did because he had always been accustomed to giving a lively air of verisimilitude to his moral discourses: ‘Defoe’s narratives impress us as being authentic matter of fact records because they are to a large extent made up of actual occurrences, though these are transformed for the purposes of fiction. Defoe’s invention begins where history leaves off, embroidering fiction round the facts.’

Secord makes out a case for the dependence, in this way, of Robinson Crusoe on An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon written by Robert Knox and published in London in 1681. Defoe’s indebtedness to Knox had been cursorily stated by James Ryan in 1911. He added to his edition of Knox the recently discovered autograph MS in the Bodleian containing Knox’s reflections and some account of his later career. John Masefield in A Mainsail Haul took it for granted that Defoe and Knox were acquaintances. Secord concluded that not only do certain things occur in Robinson Crusoe and Captain Singleton because Defoe had read Knox’s book, but that Defoe is likely to have had access to Knox’s MS notes. He must have known the old sea captain therefore, who, in his turn, must have been glad to secure the services of such a popular writer as Defoe to give wider publicity to some of his experiences. In Secord’s own words ‘This relation of Knox’s with which we know Defoe was familiar has narrative devices and situations identical with those of Robinson Crusoe. So similar in tone are the two works that many such passages could be transferred bodily from one to the other without noticeable effect upon them.’

2. Ibid., p. 236.
5. Secord, op. cit., p. 34.